- Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
|
|
(1 other version)Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186.details
|
|
Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence.Miriam Schoenfield - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):690-715.details
|
|
(4 other versions)The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Popper - 1959 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
|
|
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling with Imprecise Probabilities.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (1):17-45.details
|
|
Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: from Accuracy to Akrasia.David Christensen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):397-422.details
|
|
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
|
|
A Dilemma for Calibrationism.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):425-455.details
|
|
Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy.J. Robert G. Williams - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.details
|
|
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
|
|
Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
|
|
Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.details
|
|
Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.details
|
|
Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility.Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):205-223.details
|
|
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.details
|
|
Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
|
|
Second Guessing: A Self-Help Manual.Sherrilyn Roush - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):251-268.details
|
|
(1 other version)Resiliency, propensities, and causal necessity.Brian Skyrms - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):704-713.details
|
|
New Rational Reflection and Internalism about Rationality.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
|
|
Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
|
|
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.details
|
|
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.details
|
|
(1 other version)On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):233--261.details
|
|
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
|
|
A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
|
|
A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
|
|
(1 other version)Decision Theory Without “Independence” or Without “Ordering”.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):267.details
|
|
Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.details
|
|
Resolving Peer Disagreements Through Imprecise Probabilities.Lee Elkin & Gregory Wheeler - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):260-278.details
|
|
Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.details
|
|
(1 other version)On indeterminate probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
|
|
(1 other version)On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.Roger White - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):233-250.details
|
|
Probabilism.Bruno De Finetti - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):169-223.details
|
|
(1 other version)Improbable knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.Roger White - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):233-250.details
|
|
A contrast between two decision rules for use with (convex) sets of probabilities: Γ-maximin versus e-admissibilty.T. Seidenfeld - 2004 - Synthese 140 (1-2):69 - 88.details
|
|
Why indeterminate probability is rational.Isaac Levi - 2009 - Journal of Applied Logic 7 (4):364-376.details
|
|
Probabilism: A Critical Essay on the Theory of Probability and on the Value of Science.Finetti Bruno De - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):169 - 223.details
|
|