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Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
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Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Excuse validation: a study in rule-breaking.John Turri & Peter Blouw - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):615-634.details
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Being Rational and being Right.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.details
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Defending the principle of alternate possibilities: Blameworthiness and moral responsibility.David Copp - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):441-456.details
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Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
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The indispensability of internal justification.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):285-96.details
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Blame, not ability, impacts moral “ought” judgments for impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of “ought” implies “can”.Vladimir Chituc, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2016 - Cognition 150 (C):20-25.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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All things considered duties to believe.Anthony Robert Booth - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):509-517.details
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Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence Bonjour - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):53-73.details
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A plea for excuses.John Austin - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:1--30.details
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The normativity of content.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.details
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Objective Consequentialism and the Rationales of ‘ “Ought” Implies “Can” ’.Vuko Andrić - 2017 - Ratio 30 (1):72-87.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
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A plea for excuses.J. L. Austin - 1964 - In Vere Claiborne Chappell (ed.), Ordinary language: essays in philosophical method. New York: Dover Publications. pp. 1--30.details
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Deontic Logic and its Philosophical Morals.Jaakko Hintikka - 1969 - In Models for modalities. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 184--214.details
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Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Ethical Consistency.B. A. O. Williams & W. F. Atkinson - 1965 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 39 (1):103-138.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Values and the heart's command.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):5-19.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. [REVIEW]Barry Stroud - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):246-257.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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Stick to what you know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.details
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Imperfect epistemic duties and the justificational fecundity of evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4065-4075.details
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Epistemic versus all things considered requirements.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1861-1881.details
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Normativity without Cartesian privilege.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):273-299.details
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Using moral principles to guide decisions.Holly Smith - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):369-386.details
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How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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Deontic logic and the priority of moral theory.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 1986 - Noûs 20 (2):179-197.details
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In Defense of Moral Evidentialism.Sharon Ryan - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):405-427.details
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Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.details
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Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas.Jacob Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):411-447.details
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The Fragility of Goodness.Martha Nussbaum - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):376-383.details
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The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy.Paul B. Woodruff - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1):205-210.details
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Treating something as a reason for action.Ram Neta - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):684-699.details
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We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties.Mark T. Nelson - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):83-102.details
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Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.details
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Moral dilemmas and consistency.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):121-136.details
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The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection.Frank Jackson - 1991 - Ethics 101 (3):461-482.details
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