- The Lottery Paradox Generalized?Jake Chandler - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):667-679.details
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Subjective Probability and the Content/Attitude Distinction.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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Belief without credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.details
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Why is belief involuntary?O. Bennett - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87-107.details
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Why is belief involuntary?Jonathan Bennett & Alonso Church - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87-107.details
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Why Is Belief Involuntary?Jonathan Bennett - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87 - 107.details
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Inquiry.Jon Barwise - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (3):429.details
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Stake-invariant belief.Brad Armendt - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (1):29-43.details
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Reasonable religious disagreements.Richard Feldman - 2010 - In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oup Usa. pp. 194-214.details
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The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1827-1848.details
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Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.details
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Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
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The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2019 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 167-196.details
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Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.details
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Permission to believe : why permissivism is true and what it tells us about irrelevant influences on belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2019 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Voluntary belief and epistemic evaluation.Richard Feldman - 2019 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2019 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Reasons Without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Normative theories of rational choice: expected utility.Rachael Briggs - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Partial Belief and Flat-out Belief.Keith Frankish - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 75--93.details
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The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 49--74.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Evidence Cannot Be Permissive.Roger White - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312.details
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Evidence Can Be Permissive.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 298.details
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Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief.Richard Jeffrey - 1970 - In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, acceptance, and rational belief. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 157-185.details
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Change in view: Principles of reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 2008 - In . Cambridge University Press. pp. 35-46.details
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Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Rational Mind.Scott Sturgeon - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (4):515-519.details
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Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Synthese 79 (1):171-189.details
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Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (3):425-448.details
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Betting on Theories.Patrick Maher - 1993 - Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry.Isaac Levi - 1991 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The preface, the lottery, and the logic of belief.John Hawthorne & Luc Bovens - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):241-264.details
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Deciding to Believe.Carl Ginet - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth and Duty. Oxford University Press. pp. 63-76.details
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The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief.Richard Foley - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):111 - 124.details
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Revenge of Wolfman: A Probabilistic Explication of Full Belief.Jonathan Roorda - unknowndetails
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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief.R. Audi - 2001 - In M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.details
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Brainstorms.Daniel Dennett - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):326-327.details
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