- Unprincipled virtue—synopsis.Nomy Arpaly - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):429-431.details
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Masked Abilities and Compatibilism.M. Fara - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):843-865.details
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Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.Timothy O'Connor - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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(1 other version)A Virtue Epistemology: Volume I: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Self-expression: a deep self theory of moral responsibility.Chandra Sripada - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1203-1232.details
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If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1101-1131.details
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(1 other version)Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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In Praise of Desire.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2013 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Timothy Schroeder.details
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Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter.Kadri Vihvelin - 2013 - New York, NY, USA: Oup Usa.details
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Belief control and intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.details
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Recent Work on Intentional Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):199 - 217.details
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Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.details
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Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.Kadri Vihvelin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):427-450.details
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The interventionist account of causation and the basing relation.Kevin McCain - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):357-382.details
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(3 other versions)What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.details
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Probability and Partial Belief.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1961 - In John Langshaw Austin (ed.), Philosophical Papers. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press. pp. 95-96.details
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(1 other version)Identification and Wholeheartedness.Harry Frankfurt - 1987 - In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)The logic of conditionals.Ernest Adams - 1965 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 8 (1-4):166 – 197.details
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Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.details
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Agency and answerability: selected essays.Gary Watson - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Practical reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 431--63.details
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Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.details
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(1 other version)Intentional action.Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):39-68.details
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(1 other version)What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.details
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Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (3):297-315.details
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Prevention, preemption, and the principle of sufficient reason.Christopher Hitchcock - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):495-532.details
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On conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
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Involuntary sins.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):3-31.details
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Freedom and necessity.A. J. Ayer - 2000 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 271-284.details
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Agentive Modals and Agentive Modality: A Cautionary Tale.Timothy Kearl & Robert H. Wallace - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2):139–155.details
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(1 other version)Deciding to believe.B. Williams - 1973 - In Bernard Williams (ed.), Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136–51.details
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Epistemic blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (8):e12762.details
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The Activity of Reasoning: How Reasoning Can Constitute Epistemic Agency.David Jenkins - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (3):413-428.details
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There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame.Cameron Boult - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):518-534.details
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(1 other version)Toward a credible agent–causal account of free will.Randolph Clarke - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):191-203.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism and Up-To-Me-Ness.Matthias Steup - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (4):611-618.details
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Can Beliefs Wrong?Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):1-17.details
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Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Hugh J. McCann & M. E. Bratman - 1991 - Noûs 25 (2):230.details
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Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Accountability.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.details
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Free Will, Agent Causation, and “Disappearing Agents”.Randolph Clarke - 2017 - Noûs:76-96.details
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Erratum: Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (4):561.details
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(1 other version)Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.details
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On Reflection.Hilary Kornblith - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Cans without Ifs.Keith Lehrer - 1968 - Analysis 29 (1):29 - 32.details
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General Propositions and Causality.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - In The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 237-255.details
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Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.details
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Justification, reasons, and reliability.Marshall Swain - 1985 - Synthese 64 (1):69 - 92.details
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