- Epistemic comparativism: a contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions.Jonathan Schaffer & Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):491-543.details
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The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.details
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(1 other version)The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.details
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Adapt or die: The death of invariantism&quest.Jessica Brown - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):263-285.details
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Contextualism, Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’‐Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):315-331.details
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(1 other version)The Will to Believe, and other Essays in Popular Philosophy.William James - 1897 - Philosophical Review 6 (3):331.details
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In defense of subject-sensitive invariantism.Brian Kim - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):233-251.details
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Fallibilism, closure, and pragmatic encroachment.Adam Zweber - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2745-2757.details
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Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.details
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Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Evidence against pragmatic encroachment.Daniel Eaton & Timothy Pickavance - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3135-3143.details
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Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Question‐directed attitudes.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.details
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Pragmatic Interests and Imprecise Belief.Brad Armendt - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):758-768.details
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Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation.Juan Comesaña - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):237-260.details
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Propositional faith: what it is and what it is not.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):357-372.details
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Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes.Wesley Buckwalter & Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):201–234.details
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Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism.Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):3-26.details
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Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI.Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.details
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The Ethics of Belief.Berislav Marušić - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):33-43.details
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Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):675-708.details
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(1 other version)The Ethics of Belief.W. K. Clifford - 1999 - In William Kingdon Clifford (ed.), The ethics of belief and other essays. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books. pp. 70-97.details
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On Intellectualism in Epistemology.Stephen R. Grimm - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):705-733.details
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The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
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The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James' 'Will To Believe'.Michael Pace - 2010 - Noûs 45 (2):239-268.details
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Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
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Stakes and beliefs.Brad Armendt - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):71 - 87.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study.Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull & Aaron Zimmerman - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):265–273.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Virtue epistemology.Heather Battaly - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):639-663.details
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The context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions.Patrick Rysiew - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):477–514.details
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How to think about fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):143-157.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.details
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Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.details
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Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
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A bayesian theory of rational acceptance.Mark Kaplan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):305-330.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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Contextualism and warranted assertibility manoeuvres.Jessica Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.details
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(1 other version)Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.details
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Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
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(1 other version)Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.details
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(2 other versions)Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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How to be a fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.details
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Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes.Charity Anderson & John Hawthorne - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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(1 other version)Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem.Jessica Brown - 2012 - Noûs 48 (1):179-192.details
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(6 other versions)A (Different) Virtue Epistemology.John Greco - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):1-26.details
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