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Impossible Worlds.Daniel Nolan - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (4):360-372.details
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Recent Debates about the A Priori.Hartry Field - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Moral Explanations.Nicholas Sturgeon - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the good life. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Debunking and Dispensability.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2016 - In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Biology and ethics.Philip Kitcher - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Causal Impotence and Evolutionary Influence: Epistemological Challenges for Non-Naturalism.Daniel Crow - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):379-395.details
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Darwinian skepticism about moral realism.David Copp - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):186-206.details
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God?: a debate between a Christian and an atheist.William Lane Craig - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.details
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Content preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.details
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Do the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs undermine moral knowledge?Kevin Brosnan - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):51-64.details
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Knowledge Under Threat.Tomas Bogardus - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):289-313.details
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Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709-727.details
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Epistemic circularity: Malignant and benign.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727.details
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Mathematical truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.details
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Our Reliability is in Principle Explainable.Dan Baras - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):197-211.details
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A reliability challenge to theistic Platonism.Dan Baras - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):479-487.details
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A platonist epistemology.Mark Balaguer - 1995 - Synthese 103 (3):303 - 325.details
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Epistemic circularity.William P. Alston - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):1-30.details
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In Defense of Epistemic Circularity.David Alexander - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):223-241.details
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Explanatory Challenges in Metaethics.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 443-459.details
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You just believe that because….Roger White - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.details
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Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.details
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Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.details
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Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Normativity Is Mind-Dependent?Selim Berker - 2014 - In Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson (ed.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Essays on the New Science of Ethics. pp. 215-252.details
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Knowledge without safety.Haicheng Zhao - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3261-3278.details
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Mathematics, Morality, and Self‐Effacement.Jack Woods - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):47-68.details
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On the evolutionary debunking of morality.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):441-464.details
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Ethics and Evolutionary Theory.Erik Joseph Wielenberg - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):502-515.details
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Epistemic Bootstrapping.Jonathan Vogel - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):518-539.details
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Debunking Evolutionary Debunking.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:76-101.details
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Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.details
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How could a “blind” evolutionary process have made human moral beliefs sensitive to strongly universal, objective moral standards?William J. Talbott - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (5):691-708.details
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Reply to Copp: Naturalism, normativity, and the varieties of realism worth worrying about.Sharon Street - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):207-228.details
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A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.details
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Darwin and moral realism: Survival of the iffiest.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243.details
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Evolution and Normative Scepticism.Karl Schafer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):471-488.details
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Review of Michael Ruse: Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy. [REVIEW]Michael Ruse - 1988 - Ethics 98 (2):400-402.details
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On explaining knowledge of necessity.Joel Pust - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):71–87.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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Debunking Morality: Lessons from the EAAN Literature.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):208-226.details
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Evolutionary debunking arguments and the proximate/ultimate distinction.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):196-203.details
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Circularity in Setiya’s Knowing Right from Wrong.Joshua D. McBee - 2018 - Social Theory and Practice 44 (3):349-375.details
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What Makes Evolution a Defeater?Matt Lutz - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1105-1126.details
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Must realists be skeptics? An Aristotelian reply to a Darwinian Dilemma.Micah Lott - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):71-96.details
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Evolutionary Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism.Jessica Isserow - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1025-1045.details
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A liberal realist answer to debunking skeptics: the empirical case for realism.Michael Huemer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1983-2010.details
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Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.details
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Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):81-88.details
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