- The Knowledge Argument and Two Interpretations of 'Knowing What it's Like'.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Consciousness. London, UK:details
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On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.details
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The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism.David Chalmers - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Kati Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal and perceptual concepts.David Papineau - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 111--144.details
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Grasping phenomenal properties.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.details
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What is a phenomenal concept?Janet Levin - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.details
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Does representationalism undermine the knowledge argument?Torin Alter - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 65--76.details
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Knowing What It is Like and Testimony.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):105-120.details
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Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.details
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Phenomenal Concepts and Higher‐Order Experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.details
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Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.details
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Revelation and Phenomenal Relations.Antonin Broi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):22-42.details
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Knowledge-the and propositional attitude ascriptions.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):147-190.details
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What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):439 - 467.details
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There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.details
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Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.details
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In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.details
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Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.details
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Consciousness and Conceptual Mastery.Derek Ball - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt075.details
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Social Externalism and the Knowledge Argument.Torin Alter - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt072.details
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Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
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The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.details
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Inexact knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):217-242.details
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A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:91-105.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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On Imagism about Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (3):43-95.details
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The Epistemic View of Subjectivity.Scott Sturgeon - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):221-235.details
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The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1161-1198.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.details
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Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in all Worlds?Robert Schroer - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.details
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Toward a Theory of Concept Mastery: The Recognition View.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):627-648.details
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Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument.Gabriel Rabin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.details
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A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.details
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Know-How and Gradability.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):345-383.details
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Something like ability.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.details
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Something Like Ability.P. Noordhof - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.details
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I *—The Presidential Address: Nothing Like Experience.D. H. Mellor - 1993 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1):1-16.details
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Phenomenal Concepts and the Defense of Materialism.Brian P. Mclaughlin - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):206-214.details
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The ontology of concepts: Abstract objects or mental representations?Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):561-593.details
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Knowing What an Experience Is Like and the Reductive Theory of Knowledge‐wh.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (3):252-275.details
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Phenomenal States (Revised Version).Brian Loar - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. MIT Press. pp. 219.details
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Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
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Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.details
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Phenomenal epistemology: What is consciousness that we may know it so well?Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.details
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Phenomenal Relations and Collective Essence.Yannic Kappes - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):800-808.details
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Knowledge-how: Interrogatives and Free Relatives.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):183-201.details
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There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454.details
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