- Intentions and the Reasons for Which We Act.Ulrike Heuer - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):291-315.details
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Fake Barns and false dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.details
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Competence to know.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.details
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Perception: Essays After Frege.Charles Travis - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis.Chris Ranalli - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.details
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(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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Epistemological disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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Acting for reasons, apt action, and knowledge.Susanne Mantel - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3865-3888.details
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Is Perception a Source of Reasons?Santiago Echeverri - 2012 - Theoria 79 (1):22-56.details
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Without Justification.Jonathan Sutton - 2007 - MIT Press.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge?Craig French - 2012 - Theoria 78 (2):115-127.details
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Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action.Maria Alvarez - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
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Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?John Turri - 2010 - Theoria 76 (3):197-206.details
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The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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(1 other version)Evidence.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.details
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Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.details
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Having reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.details
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Perception and its objects.Bill Brewer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):87-97.details
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(1 other version)Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge.John McDowell - 1988 - In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 455-79.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge Is Belief For Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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(1 other version)Having False Reasons.Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 59-80.details
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I—Non‐Inferential Knowledge.Marie McGinn - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):1-28.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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On Sensations of Position.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1962 - Analysis 22 (3):55-58.details
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(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John McDowell & I. G. McFetridge - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):13-42.details
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Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification.Kevin McCain - 2014 - New York: Routledge.details
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Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity.David Owens - 2000 - New York: Routledge.details
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What Is It to Be Happy That P?Jeremy Fantl - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge is belief for sufficient (objective and subjective) reason.Mark Schroeder - manuscriptdetails
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How knowledge works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.details
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Seeing And Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.details
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The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
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How visual perception yields reasons for belief.Alan Millar - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):332-351.details
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Counter-Closure.Federico Luzzi - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):673-683.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Philosophy 78 (305):414-425.details
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The Norm of Belief.John Gibbons - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism.Anthony Brueckner - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):384-391.details
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Justified judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.details
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(1 other version)Ignorance : a case for scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (3):371-372.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:221-238.details
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Gettier For Justification.Frank Hofmann - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):305-318.details
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Infallibilism, evidence and pragmatics.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):626-635.details
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Is evidence non-inferential?Alexander Bird - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):252–265.details
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