- Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
|
|
Putting logic in its place: formal constraints on rational belief.David Phiroze Christensen - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeffrey Dunn - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):541-551.details
|
|
Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Subjective and Objective Reasons.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
|
|
Three Ways in Which Logic Might Be Normative.Florian Steinberger - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (1):5-31.details
|
|
The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
|
|
The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability.Hannes Leitgeb - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Action, Knowledge, and Will.John Hyman - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-47.details
|
|
Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
|
|
Truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):599-618.details
|
|
Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
|
|
The "Prospective View" of Obligation.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):1-9.details
|
|
The preface paradox.Sharon Ryan - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (3):293-307.details
|
|
The epistemic virtues of consistency.Sharon Ryan - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):121-141.details
|
|
Subjective Rightness and Minimizing Expected Objective Wrongness.Kristian Olsen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):417-441.details
|
|
Act and value: Expectation and the representability of moral theories.Graham Oddie & Peter Milne - 1991 - Theoria 57 (1-2):42-76.details
|
|
The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
|
|
Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.details
|
|
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
|
|
Entitlement and rationality.C. S. Jenkins - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):25-45.details
|
|
Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
|
|
Utilitarianism and the virtues.Philippa Foot - 1985 - Mind 94 (374):196-209.details
|
|
Utilitarianism and the Virtues.Philippa Foot - 1983 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 57 (2):273-283.details
|
|
When is True Belief Knowledge?Richard Foley - 2012 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental.Roderick Firth - 1981 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 55 (1):5-23.details
|
|
Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
|
|
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.details
|
|
Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):816-853.details
|
|
Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification.Kevin McCain - 2014 - New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Justification and the Truth-Connection.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2008 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
|
|
In defense of objectivism about moral obligation.Peter A. Graham - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):88-115.details
|
|
Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.details
|
|
A defence of Epistemic Consequentialism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeffrey Dunn - unknowndetails
|
|
Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation.Gilbert Harman - 1968 - American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (3):164 - 173.details
|
|