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From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability.Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (2):111-123.details
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Time, rationality and self-governance.Michael E. Bratman - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):73-88.details
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Should subjective probabilities be sharp?Seamus Bradley & Katie Siobhan Steele - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):277-289.details
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Revising incomplete attitudes.Richard Bradley - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):235 - 256.details
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Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1205-1230.details
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Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.details
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A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 263-293.details
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Figures in a Probability Landscape.Bas van Fraassen - 1990 - In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap. Boston, MA, USA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 345-356.details
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Confidence and coarse-grained attitudes.Scott Sturgeon - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--126.details
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Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities.Peter Walley - 1991 - Chapman & Hall.details
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Against Radical Credal Imprecision.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.details
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Decision making with imprecise probabilities.Brian Weatherson - 1998details
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Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
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Decision Theory with a Human Face.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Ambiguity Attitudes, Framing and Consistency.Alex Voorhoeve, Ken G. Binmore, Arnaldur Stefansson & Lisa Stewart - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (3):313-337.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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Unsharp Sharpness.Nils-Eric Sahlin & Paul Weirich - 2013 - Theoria 80 (1):100-103.details
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A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):19-35.details
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Demystifying Dilation.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1305-1342.details
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Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.details
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Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.details
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Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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On indeterminate probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.details
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A Treatise on Probability. [REVIEW]Harry T. Costello - 1923 - Journal of Philosophy 20 (11):301-306.details
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A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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The Logic of Decision.Brian Skyrms - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (1):247-248.details
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Reasoning About Uncertainty.Joseph Y. Halpern - 2003 - MIT Press.details
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Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.details
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Unreliable probabilities, risk taking, and decision making.Peter Gärdenfors & Nils-Eric Sahlin - 1982 - Synthese 53 (3):361-386.details
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Morals by Agreement.Richmond Campbell - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (152):343-364.details
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Roger white’s argument against imprecise credences.Dylan Dodd - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):69-77.details
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Epistemology and Inference.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1983 - Univ of Minnesota Press.details
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Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy.J. Robert G. Williams - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.details
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Bayesianism With A Human Face.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1983 - In John Earman (ed.), Testing Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 133--156.details
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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.details
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A Decision Theory for Imprecise Probabilities.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.details
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A Generalisation of Bayesian Inference.Arthur Dempster - 1968 - Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 30:205-247.details
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Forecasting with Imprecise Probabilities.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane - unknowndetails
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Upper and Lower Probabilities induced by a Multi- valued Mapping.Arthur Dempster - 1967 - Annals of Mathematical Statistics 38:325-339.details
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