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Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred I. Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Putting logic in its place: formal constraints on rational belief.David Phiroze Christensen - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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In defense of proper functions.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.details
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When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof.Georgi Gardiner - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (3):288-318.details
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Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge.David Enoch, Levi Spectre & Talia Fisher - 2012 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (3):197-224.details
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Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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Dispositions without Conditionals.Barbara Vetter - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):129-156.details
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On linking dispositions and conditionals.David Manley & Ryan Wasserman - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):59-84.details
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Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.details
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(2 other versions)Normativity.J. J. Thomson - 2008 - Analysis 70 (4):713-715.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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(1 other version)Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.details
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Review Essay: Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric EpistemologyWorking Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Marian David & Richard Foley - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):943.details
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Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - London, UK: Routledge.details
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Justified Belief and Just Conviction.Clayton Littlejohn - 2021 - In Jon Robson & Zachary Hoskins (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge.details
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More on Normic Support and the Criminal Standard of Proof.Martin Smith - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):943-960.details
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Functional analysis and the species design.Karen Neander - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4).details
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Disposition Ascriptions.Simona Aimar - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1667-1692.details
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Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).details
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Warrant, Functions, History.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 15-35.details
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A gradable approach to dispositions.David Manley & Ryan Wasserman - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):68–75.details
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Statistical Evidence, Normalcy, and the Gatecrasher Paradox.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):563-578.details
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Why is Warrant Normative?Peter J. Graham - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):110-128.details
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An Explanationist Defense of Proper Functionalism.Kenneth Boyce & Andrew Moon - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Why Should Warrant Persist in Demon Worlds?Peter J. Graham - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 179-202.details
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In Defense of Proper Functionalism: Cognitive Science Takes on Swampman.Kenny Boyce & Andrew Moon - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2987–3001.details
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Is it a crime to belong to a reference class.Mark Colyvan, Helen M. Regan & Scott Ferson - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (2):168–181.details
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Swampman meets swampcow.Karen Neander - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):118-29.details
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On Knowing the Meaning; With a Coda on Swampman.Ruth G. Millikan - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):43-81.details
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The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 49--74.details
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On swampkinds.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):103-17.details
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The status of teleosemantics, or how to stop worrying about swampman.David Papineau - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):279-89.details
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Dispositions, Conditionals, and Counterexamples.D. Manley & R. Wasserman - 2011 - Mind 120 (480):1191-1227.details
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Swampman, teleosemantics and kind essences.David Papineau - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-19.details
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On Believing and Being Convinced.Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming - Cambridge University Press.details
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Civil liability and the 50%+ standard of proof.Martin Smith - 2021 - International Journal of Evidence and Proof 25 (3):183-199.details
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On the relation between categorical and probabilistic belief.Daniel Hunter - 1996 - Noûs 30 (1):75-98.details
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Three Puzzles about Lotteries.Julia Staffel - 2020 - In Igor Douven (ed.), Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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