- Believing what we do not believe: Acquiescence to superstitious beliefs and other powerful intuitions.Jane L. Risen - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (2):182-207.details
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Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.details
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Debating the a Priori.Paul Boghossian & Timothy Williamson - 2020 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Edited by Timothy Williamson.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Epistemic Self-Doubt.Sherrilyn Roush - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(2 other versions)Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy.Michael Polanyi - 1958 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Mary Jo Nye.details
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(1 other version)Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.details
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Experts and Peer Disagreement.Jennifer Lackey - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 228-245.details
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Philosophy Within its Proper Bounds.Edouard Machery - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Wittgenstein on Gödelian 'Incompleteness', Proofs and Mathematical Practice: Reading Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Part I, Appendix III, Carefully.Wolfgang Kienzler & Sebastian Sunday Grève - 2016 - In Sebastian Sunday Grève & Jakub Mácha (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Creativity of Language. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 76-116.details
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Philosophical temperament.Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma, Adam Feltz, Richard Scheines & Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):313-330.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition Advancing the Debate.Jonathan Evans & Keith E. Stanovich - 2013 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 8 (3):223-241.details
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(1 other version)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.details
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Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 141 (C):127-137.details
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The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.details
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Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.details
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The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.details
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Intuitive knowledge of linguistic co-reference.Peter C. Gordon & Randall Hendrick - 1997 - Cognition 62 (3):325-370.details
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(1 other version)Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?Hilary Kornblith - 2012 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and skepticism. New York: Routledge. pp. 260.details
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Expertise and intuition: A tale of three theories. [REVIEW]Fernand Gobet & Philippe Chassy - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):151-180.details
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(1 other version)Beyond dual-process models: A categorisation of processes underlying intuitive judgement and decision making.Andreas Glöckner & Cilia Witteman - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (1):1 – 25.details
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Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making.Shane Frederick - 2005 - Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (4):25-42.details
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The Reflective Epistemic Renegade.Bryan Frances - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419 - 463.details
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(1 other version)A Note on Wittgenstein’s “Notorious Paragraph” About the Gödel Theorem.Juliet Floyd & Hilary Putnam - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):624-632.details
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(1 other version)A Note on Wittgenstein’s “Notorious Paragraph” About the Gödel Theorem.Juliet Floyd & Hilary Putnam - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):624-632.details
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The role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert performance.K. Anders Ericsson, Ralf T. Krampe & Clemens Tesch-Römer - 1993 - Psychological Review 100 (3):363-406.details
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Moral intuitions and the expertise defence.J. Ryberg - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):3-9.details
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(1 other version)On bullshit.Harry Frankfurt - 1986 - Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
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Linguistic Intuitions Revisited.Michael Devitt - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):833-865.details
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Intuitions in linguistics.Michael Devitt - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):481-513.details
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(1 other version)Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1998 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & William M. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 201-240.details
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Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium.Robert C. Cummins - 1998 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & William M. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 113-128.details
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Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience.Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi - 1990 - Harper & Row.details
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Implicit learning and tacit knowledge: An essay on the cognitive unconscious.Arthur S. Reber - 1993 - Oxford University Press.details
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Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.details
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The Smart System 1: evidence for the intuitive nature of correct responding on the bat-and-ball problem.Bence Bago & Wim De Neys - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (3):257-299.details
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Intuition and Its Place in Ethics.Robert Audi - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):57--77.details
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Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion.Sanford Goldberg - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 167.details
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Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment.Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman (eds.) - 2002 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
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Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2002 - In Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick (eds.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 49-81.details
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(1 other version)Intuitive and reflective inferences.Hugo Mercier & Dan Sperber - 2009 - In Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press. pp. 149--170.details
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Intuition.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Ignorance of Language.Michael Devitt - 2006 - Oxford, GB: Oxford: Clarendon Press.details
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A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.Daniel Kahneman - 2003 - American Psychologist 58 (9):697.details
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Ignorance of Language.Michael Devitt - 2007 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (1):186-186.details
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Working minds : a practitioner's guide to cognitive task analysis.B. Crandall, G. A. Klein & R. R. Hoffman - forthcoming - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine.details
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Philosphical 'intuitions' and scepticism about judgement.Timothy Williamson - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):109–153.details
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(1 other version)Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):331-340.details
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