- Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.details
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The Art of the Unseen: Three challenges for Racial Profiling.Frej Klem Thomsen - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (1-2):89 - 117.details
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(1 other version)Global Consequentialism.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 2000 - In Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason, Dale E. Miller, D. W. Haslett, Shelly Kagan, Sanford S. Levy, David Lyons, Phillip Montague, Tim Mulgan, Philip Pettit, Madison Powers, Jonathan Riley, William H. Shaw, Michael Smith & Alan Thomas (eds.), Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.details
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Trivial Truths and the Aim of Inquiry.NicK Treanor - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):552-559.details
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Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.details
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The Epistemology of Forgetting.Kourken Michaelian - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):399-424.details
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Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.details
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(1 other version)Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (11):615-640.details
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Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
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Inquiring Minds Want to Improve.Arianna Falbo - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2).details
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An instrumentalist unification of zetetic and epistemic reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry.Yasha Sapir & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5837-5859.details
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Inquiry and the epistemic.David Thorstad - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2913-2928.details
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An analysis of alpha-beta pruning.Donald E. Knuth & Ronald W. Moore - 1975 - Artificial Intelligence 6 (4):293-326.details
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Inquiry, knowledge and understanding.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1583-1593.details
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Some Epistemic Roles for Curiosity.Dennis Whitcomb - 2018 - In Ilhan Inan, Lani Watson, Dennis Whitcomb & Safiye Yigit (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Curiosity. Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 217-238.details
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Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.details
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An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.details
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On the Blameworthiness of Forgetting.Sven Bernecker - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 241-258.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2415-2431.details
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Equal treatment for belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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(1 other version)The Rationality of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Oxford University Press.details
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Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):342-370.details
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Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.details
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Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
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Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2014 - New York: Routledge.details
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Is Logic the Key to All Good Reasoning?Jaakko Hintikka - 2001 - Argumentation 15 (1):35-57.details
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7 Evaluative Focal Points.Shelly Kagan - 2000 - In Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason, Dale E. Miller, D. W. Haslett, Shelly Kagan, Sanford S. Levy, David Lyons, Phillip Montague, Tim Mulgan, Philip Pettit, Madison Powers, Jonathan Riley, William H. Shaw, Michael Smith & Alan Thomas (eds.), Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 134-155.details
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How Forgetting Aids Heuristic Inference.Lael J. Schooler & Ralph Hertwig - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (3):610-628.details
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The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes.Thomas Kelly - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-196.details
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Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):489-515.details
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Racial profiling: A reply to two critics.Mathias Risse - 2007 - Criminal Justice Ethics 26 (1):4-19.details
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(1 other version)Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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What is Epistemic Blame?Jessica Brown - 2018 - Noûs 54 (2):389-407.details
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Permissible Epistemic Trade-Offs.Daniel J. Singer - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):281-293.details
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Consequence and Normative Guidance.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):306-328.details
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Racial Profiling.Mathias Risse & Richard Zeckhauser - 2004 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (2):131-170.details
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The Epistemic Duty to Seek More Evidence.Richard J. Hall & Charles R. Johnson - 1998 - American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2):129 - 139.details
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(2 other versions)Uneasy Virtue.Julia Driver - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):238-240.details
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Minimal Rationality.Christopher Cherniak - 1988 - Behaviorism 16 (1):89-92.details
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Strategy selection as rational metareasoning.Falk Lieder & Thomas L. Griffiths - 2017 - Psychological Review 124 (6):762-794.details
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(3 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.details
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Subjective Ought.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.details
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