- Belief is Contingently Involuntary.Anthony Robert Booth - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):107-121.details
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Believing intentionally.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2673-2694.details
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Attitudinal control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.details
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Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.details
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Why is belief involuntary?O. Bennett - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87-107.details
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Believing at Will.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (sup1):149-187.details
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Why Is Belief Involuntary?Jonathan Bennett - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87 - 107.details
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Intention.Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)Believing at Will.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):36-52.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.details
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The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
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(1 other version)Deciding to believe.B. Williams - 1973 - In Bernard Williams (ed.), Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136–51.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will.Blake Roeber - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):837-859.details
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Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3453-3476.details
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Pensées.Blaise Pascal - 2007 - In Aloysius Martinich, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Early Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 111-112.details
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(2 other versions)Pensées.B. Pascal - 1670/1995 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 60:111-112.details
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Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.details
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Rational Belief: Structure, Grounds, and Intellectual Virtue.Robert Audi - 2015 - New York, NY: Oup Usa.details
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What can we not do at will and why.Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1941-1961.details
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The Analogy Argument for Doxastic Voluntarism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):559-582.details
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Belief control and intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.details
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Deciding to Believe.Carl Ginet - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, truth, and duty: essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 63-76.details
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(1 other version)Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.details
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No Norm needed: On the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.details
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On belief and the captivity of the will.Dion Scott-Kakures - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1):77-103.details
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Equal treatment for belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.details
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(1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.details
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