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Rationality in the selection task: Epistemic utility versus uncertainty reduction.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (2):356-363.details
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Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End.Peter Brössel & Franz Huber - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):737-749.details
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Bayesian Measures of Confirmation from Scoring Rules.Steven J. van Enk - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):101-113.details
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Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.details
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Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):897-908.details
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Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations.Leonard Savage - 1971 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 66 (336):783-801.details
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Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):251-252.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.details
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Hempel's paradox and Wason's selection task: Logical and psychological puzzles of confirmation.Raymond S. Nickerson - 1996 - Thinking and Reasoning 2 (1):1 – 31.details
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Bayesian rationality for the Wason selection task? A test of optimal data selection theory.Klaus Oberauer, Oliver Wilhelm & Ricardo Rosas Diaz - 1999 - Thinking and Reasoning 5 (2):115 – 144.details
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The Wason task(s) and the paradox of confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.details
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Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.details
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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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What Accuracy Could Not Be.Graham Oddie - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):551-580.details
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Scoring in context.Igor Douven - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1565-1580.details
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Generalized Information Theory Meets Human Cognition: Introducing a Unified Framework to Model Uncertainty and Information Search.Vincenzo Crupi, Jonathan D. Nelson, Björn Meder, Gustavo Cevolani & Katya Tentori - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (5):1410-1456.details
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Information and Inaccuracy.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):577-604.details
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The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory.Jason Konek & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):69-107.details
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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Finding Useful Questions: On Bayesian Diagnosticity, Probability, Impact, and Information Gain.Jonathan D. Nelson - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (4):979-999.details
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On the analysis of irrational data selection: A critique of Oaksford and Chater (1994).Donald Laming - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (2):364-373.details
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Rational explanation of the selection task.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (2):381-391.details
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The Brier Rule Is not a Good Measure of Epistemic Utility.Don Fallis & Peter J. Lewis - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):576-590.details
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Inductive Logic.Vincenzo Crupi - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):641-650.details
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State of the field: Measuring information and confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47 (C):81-90.details
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Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.details
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Hempel meets Wason.I. L. Humberstone - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (3):391-402.details
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Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):511-534.details
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Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):233-248.details
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Strict propriety is weak.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):8-13.details
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Information and Inaccuracy.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw025.details
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Accuracy, Verisimilitude, and Scoring Rules.Jeffrey Dunn - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):151-166.details
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The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation.E. J. Lowe & Stephen P. Stich - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):98.details
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Without Good Reason.Edward Stein - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):234-237.details
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Judgment of blame in teenagers with Asperger's syndrome.Véronique Salvano-Pardieu, Romuald Blanc, Nicolas Combalbert, Aurélia Pierratte, Ken Manktelow, Christine Maintier, Sandra Lepeltier, Guillaume Gimenes, Catherine Barthelemy & Roger Fontaine - 2016 - Thinking and Reasoning 22 (3):251-273.details
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Truth-conduciveness as the primary epistemic justification of normative systems of reasoning.Gerhard Schurz - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):266-267.details
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