Results for ' IT '

987 found
Order:
See also
Bibliography: Philosophical Traditions
Bibliography: Social and Political Philosophy
Bibliography: Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Bibliography: Cognitive Sciences
Bibliography: Arts and Humanities
Bibliography: Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality
Bibliography: Philosophy of Probability
Bibliography: Philosophical Traditions, Miscellaneous
Bibliography: Political Science in Social Sciences
Bibliography: Cognitive Sciences, Misc in Cognitive Sciences
...
Other categories were found but are not shown. Use more specific keywords to find others, or browse the categories.
  1. Unjust organ markets and why it is irrelevant that selling a kidney is the best option.Andreas Albertsen - forthcoming - Journal of Medical Ethics.
    An important argument against prohibiting organ sales is that it removes the best option available to individuals in dire circumstances. However, this line of reasoning fails to recognise that selling a kidney on a regulated market is only the best option in a very narrow comparison, where a regulated organ market is compared with banning organ sales. Once we acknowledge this narrowness, selling a kidney is not the best option. This paves the way for a distributive justice-based critique of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Oops! I Did it Again: The Psychology of Everyday Action Slips.Myrto Mylopoulos - 2022 - Topics in Cognitive Science 14 (2):282-294.
    Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 2, Page 282-294, April 2022.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3. Save the Meat for Cats: Why It’s Wrong to Eat Roadkill.Cheryl Abbate & C. E. Abbate - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (1):165-182.
    Because factory-farmed meat production inflicts gratuitous suffering upon animals and wreaks havoc on the environment, there are morally compelling reasons to become vegetarian. Yet industrial plant agriculture causes the death of many field animals, and this leads some to question whether consumers ought to get some of their protein from certain kinds of non factory-farmed meat. Donald Bruckner, for instance, boldly argues that the harm principle implies an obligation to collect and consume roadkill and that strict vegetarianism is thus immoral. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  4. What is Conceptual Engineering and What Should it Be?David Chalmers - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63.
    Conceptual engineering is the design, implementation, and evaluation of concepts. Conceptual engineering includes or should include de novo conceptual engineering (designing a new concept) as well as conceptual re-engineering (fixing an old concept). It should also include heteronymous (different-word) as well as homonymous (same-word) conceptual engineering. I discuss the importance and the difficulty of these sorts of conceptual engineering in philosophy and elsewhere.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   86 citations  
  5. What Does It Mean for a Conspiracy Theory to Be a ‘Theory’?Julia Duetz - 2023 - Social Epistemology:1-16.
    The pejorative connotation often associated with the ordinary language meaning of “conspiracy theory” does not only stem from a conspiracy theory’s being about a conspiracy, but also from a conspiracy theory’s being regarded as a particular kind of theory. I propose to understand conspiracy theory-induced polarization in terms of disagreement about the correct epistemic evaluation of ‘theory’ in ‘conspiracy theory’. By framing the positions typical in conspiracy theory-induced polarization in this way, I aim to show that pejorative conceptions of ‘conspiracy (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  6. Do p values lose their meaning in exploratory analyses? It depends how you define the familywise error rate.Mark Rubin - 2017 - Review of General Psychology 21:269-275.
    Several researchers have recently argued that p values lose their meaning in exploratory analyses due to an unknown inflation of the alpha level (e.g., Nosek & Lakens, 2014; Wagenmakers, 2016). For this argument to be tenable, the familywise error rate must be defined in relation to the number of hypotheses that are tested in the same study or article. Under this conceptualization, the familywise error rate is usually unknowable in exploratory analyses because it is usually unclear how many hypotheses have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  7. XIV—Sexual Orientation: What Is It?Kathleen Stock - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (3):295-319.
    I defend an account of sexual orientation, understood as a reflexive disposition to be sexually attracted to people of a particular biological Sex or Sexes. An orientation is identified in terms of two aspects: the Sex of the subject who has the disposition, and whether that Sex is the same as, or different to, the Sex to which the subject is disposed to be attracted. I explore this account in some detail and defend it from several challenges. In doing so, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  8. What Does it Mean to Mimic Nature? A Typology for Biomimetic Design.Alessio Gerola, Zoë Robaey & Vincent Blok - 2023 - Philosophy and Technology 36 (4):1-20.
    In an effort to produce new and more sustainable technologies, designers have turned to nature in search of inspiration and innovation. Biomimetic design (from the Greek bios, life, mimesis, imitation) is the conscious imitation of biological models to solve today's technical and ecological challenges. Nowadays numerous different approaches exist that take inspiration from nature as a model for design, such as biomimicry, biomimetics, bionics, permaculture, ecological engineering, etc. This variety of practices comes in turn with a wide range of different (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  9. On What it Takes to be an Expert.Michel Croce - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):1-21.
    This paper tackles the problem of defining what a cognitive expert is. Starting from a shared intuition that the definition of an expert depends upon the conceptual function of expertise, I shed light on two main approaches to the notion of an expert: according to novice-oriented accounts of expertise, experts need to provide laypeople with information they lack in some domain; whereas, according to research-oriented accounts, experts need to contribute to the epistemic progress of their discipline. In this paper, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  10. (1 other version)What is it Like to be a Group Agent?Christian List - 2015 - Noûs:295-319.
    The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness. In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much-discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  11. Meaning What I It.Jesús Gerardo Martínez del Castillo - 2015 - International Journal of Language and Linguistics 3 (6-1):66-76.
    Meaning as the original function of language is the arrangement of internal things on the part of the creative and historical individual subject who speaks a particular language. Meaning constitutes the series of contents making up the linguistic world human subjects can manage real things with. Real things are not described with meanings but merely represented and designated. Meanings represent the essence of things thus making them members of a category. In this sense, meaning is the base to create things (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. The Emerging Concept of Responsible Innovation. Three Reasons why it is Questionable and Calls for a Radical Transformation of the Concept of Innovation.V. Blok & P. Lemmens - 2015 - In Bert-Jaap Koops, Ilse Oosterlaken, Henny Romijn, Tsjalling Swierstra & Jeroen van den Hoven (eds.), Responsible Innovation 2: Concepts, Approaches, and Applications. Cham: Springer International Publishing. pp. 19-35.
    Abstract In this chapter, we challenge the presupposed concept of innovation in the responsible innovation literature. As a first step, we raise several questions with regard to the possibility of ‘responsible’ innovation and point at several difficulties which undermine the supposedly responsible character of innovation processes, based on an analysis of the input, throughput and output of innovation processes. It becomes clear that the practical applicability of the concept of responsible innovation is highly problematic and that a more thorough inquiry (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   78 citations  
  13. What matters and how it matters: A choice-theoretic representation of moral theories.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (4):421-479.
    We present a new “reason-based” approach to the formal representation of moral theories, drawing on recent decision-theoretic work. We show that any moral theory within a very large class can be represented in terms of two parameters: a specification of which properties of the objects of moral choice matter in any given context, and a specification of how these properties matter. Reason-based representations provide a very general taxonomy of moral theories, as differences among theories can be attributed to differences in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  14. What Is Wrong with the No-Report Paradigm and How to Fix It.Ned Block - 2019 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (12):1003-1013.
    Is consciousness based in prefrontal circuits involved in cognitive processes like thought, reasoning, and memory or, alternatively, is it based in sensory areas in the back of the neocortex? The no-report paradigm has been crucial to this debate because it aims to separate the neural basis of the cognitive processes underlying post-perceptual decision and report from the neural basis of conscious perception itself. However, the no-report paradigm is problematic because, even in the absence of report, subjects might engage in post-perceptual (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  15. If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.
    I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  16. The World Just Is the Way It Is.David Builes - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):1-27.
    What is the relationship between objects and properties? According to a standard view, there are primitive individuals that ‘instantiate’ or ‘have’ various properties. According to a rival view, objects are mere ‘bundles’ of properties. While there are a number of reasons to be skeptical of primitive individuals, there are also a number of challenges that the bundle theorist faces. The goal of this paper is to formulate a view about the relationship between objects and properties that avoids many of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  17. Free will as involving determination and inconceivable without it.R. E. Hobart - 1934 - Mind 43 (169):1-27.
    The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I mean free (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   141 citations  
  18. Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):178-196.
    Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  19. Should longtermists recommend hastening extinction rather than delaying it?Richard Pettigrew - 2024 - The Monist 107 (2):130-145.
    Longtermism is the view that the most urgent global priorities, and those to which we should devote the largest portion of our resources, are those that focus on (i) ensuring a long future for humanity, and perhaps sentient or intelligent life more generally, and (ii) improving the quality of the lives that inhabit that long future. While it is by no means the only one, the argument most commonly given for this conclusion is that these interventions have greater expected goodness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20. Parts generate the whole but they are not identical to it.Ross P. Cameron - 2014 - In Aaron J. Cotnoir & Donald L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press USA.
    The connection between whole and part is intimate: not only can we share the same space, but I’m incapable of leaving my parts behind; settle the nonmereological facts and you thereby settle what is a part of what; wholes don’t seem to be an additional ontological commitment over their parts. Composition as identity promises to explain this intimacy. But it threatens to make the connection too intimate, for surely the parts could have made a different whole and the whole have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  21. Moral Worth: You Can't Have it Both Ways.Nomy Arpaly - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    Some say that concern for morality de dicto grants right actions moral worth. That is, they say that if you do the right thing because of your concern to do the right thing, your action has moral worth (and you are worthy of esteem for that action). Some say that concern for morality de re grants moral worth - that is, they say that if you do the right action for the reasons that make it right (for example, because it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. (1 other version)If perception is probabilistic, why doesn't it seem probabilistic?Ned Block - 2018 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373 (1755).
    The success of the Bayesian approach to perception suggests probabilistic perceptual representations. But if perceptual representation is probabilistic, why doesn't normal conscious perception reflect the full probability distributions that the probabilistic point of view endorses? For example, neurons in MT/V5 that respond to the direction of motion are broadly tuned: a patch of cortex that is tuned to vertical motion also responds to horizontal motion, but when we see vertical motion, foveally, in good conditions, it does not look at all (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  23. A Structural Explanation of Injustice in Conversations: It's about Norms.Saray Ayala-López - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):726-748.
    In contrast to individualistic explanations of social injustice that appeal to implicit attitudes, structural explanations are unintuitive: they appeal to entities that lack clear ontological status, and the explanatory mechanism is similarly unclear. This makes structural explanations unappealing. The present work proposes a structural explanation of one type of injustice that happens in conversations, discursive injustice. This proposal meets two goals. First, it satisfactorily accounts for the specific features of this particular kind of injustice; and second, it articulates a structural (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  24. Solar radiation modification is risky, but so is rejecting it: a call for balanced research.Claudia Wieners, Benjamin P. Hofbauer, Iris de Vries, Matthias Honegger, Daniele Visioni, Hermann Russchenberg & Tyler Felgenhauer - 2023 - Oxford Open Climate Change 3 (1).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Anticipating the ultimate innovation, volitional evolution: can it not be promoted or attempted responsibly?Lantz Fleming Miller - 2015 - Journal of Responsible Innovation 2 (3):280-300.
    The aspiration for volitional evolution, or human evolution directed by humans themselves,has increased in philosophical, scientific, technical, and commercial literature. The prospect of shaping the very being who is the consumer of all other innovations offers great commercial potential, one to which all other innovations would in effect be subservient. Actually an amalgam of projected technical/commercial developments, this prospective innovation has practical and ethical ramifications. However, because it is often discussed in a scientific way (specifically that of evolutionary theory), it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. A Fact, As It Were: Obligation, Indifference, and the Question of Ethics.Bryan Lueck - 2016 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (1):219-234.
    According to Immanuel Kant, the objective validity of obligation is given as a fact of reason, which forces itself upon us and which requires no deduction of the kind that he had provided for the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. This fact grounds a moral philosophy that treats obligation as a good that trumps all others and that presents the moral subject as radically responsible, singled out by an imperatival address. Based on conceptions of indifference and facticity that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Kant’s Derivation of the Formula of the Categorical Imperative: How to Get it Right.Jacqueline Mariña - 1998 - Kant Studien 89 (2):167-178.
    This paper explores the charge by Bruce Aune and Allen Wood that a gap exists in Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative. I show that properly understood, no such gap exists, and that the deduction of the Categorical Imperative is successful as it stands.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  28. Future bias in action: does the past matter more when you can affect it?Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton & Christian Tarsney - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11327-11349.
    Philosophers have long noted, and empirical psychology has lately confirmed, that most people are “biased toward the future”: we prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. At least two explanations have been offered for this bias: belief in temporal passage and the practical irrelevance of the past resulting from our inability to influence past events. We set out to test the latter explanation. In a large survey, we find that participants exhibit significantly less (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  29. When and why was Remarks on Colour written – and why is it important to know?Andrew Lugg - 2014 - In Frederik Gierlinger & Štefan Joško Riegelnik (eds.), Wittgenstein on Colour. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 1-20.
    A study of the origins of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Colour detailing when and why it was written.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. What is AI safety? What do we want it to be?Jacqueline Harding & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini - manuscript
    The field of AI safety seeks to prevent or reduce the harms caused by AI systems. A simple and appealing account of what is distinctive of AI safety as a field holds that this feature is constitutive: a research project falls within the purview of AI safety just in case it aims to prevent or reduce the harms caused by AI systems. Call this appealingly simple account The Safety Conception of AI safety. Despite its simplicity and appeal, we argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. On the Socratic Injunction to Follow the Argument Where it Leads.Jason Marsh - 2017 - In Paul Draper & J. L. Schellenberg (eds.), Renewing Philosophy of Religion: Exploratory Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-207.
    This chapter examines a common objection to the philosophy of religion, namely, that it has not sufficiently embraced the injunction of Socrates to follow the argument where it leads. Although a general version of this charge is unfair, one emerging view in the field, which I call religious Mooreanism, nonetheless risks running contrary to the Socratic injunction. According to this view, many people can quickly, easily, and reasonably deflect all known philosophical challenges to their core religious outlooks, including arguments from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. My brain made me do it: The exclusion argument against free will, and what’s wrong with it.Christian List & Peter Menzies - 2017 - In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Huw Price (eds.), Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    We offer a critical assessment of the “exclusion argument” against free will, which may be summarized by the slogan: “My brain made me do it, therefore I couldn't have been free”. While the exclusion argument has received much attention in debates about mental causation (“could my mental states ever cause my actions?”), it is seldom discussed in relation to free will. However, the argument informally underlies many neuroscientific discussions of free will, especially the claim that advances in neuroscience seriously challenge (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  33. ‘I didn't know it was you’: The impersonal grounds of relational normativity.Jed Lewinsohn - 2025 - Noûs 59 (1):191-218.
    A notable feature of our moral and legal practices is the recognition of privileges, powers, and entitlements belonging to a select group of individuals in virtue of their status as victims of wrongful conduct. A philosophical literature on relational normativity purports to account for this status in terms of such notions as interests, rights, and attitudes of disregard. This paper argues that such individualistic notions cannot account for prevailing and intuitive ways of demarcating the class of victims. The focus of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Conscientious Objection in Medicine: Making it Public.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2020 - HEC Forum 33 (3):269-289.
    The literature on conscientious objection in medicine presents two key problems that remain unresolved: Which conscientious objections in medicine are justified, if it is not feasible for individual medical practitioners to conclusively demonstrate the genuineness or reasonableness of their objections? How does one respect both medical practitioners’ claims of conscience and patients’ interests, without leaving practitioners complicit in perceived or actual wrongdoing? My aim in this paper is to offer a new framework for conscientious objections in medicine, which, by bringing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  35. (1 other version)Reactivity in Social Scientific experiments: What is it and how is it different (and worse) than a Placebo effect?María Jiménez-Buedo - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy of Science 11 (2): 1-22.
    Reactivity, or the phenomenon by which subjects tend to modify their behavior in virtue of their being studied upon, is often cited as one of the most important difficulties involved in social scientific experiments, and yet, there is to date a persistent conceptual muddle when dealing with the many dimensions of reactivity. This paper offers a conceptual framework for reactivity that draws on an interventionist approach to causality. The framework allows us to offer an unambiguous definition of reactivity and distinguishes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  36. Parts Ground the Whole and Are Identical to It.Roberto Loss - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):489-498.
    What is the relation between parts taken together and the whole that they compose? The recent literature appears to be dominated by two different answers to this question, which are normally thought of as being incompatible. According to the first, parts taken together are identical to the whole that they compose. According to the second, the whole is grounded in its parts. The aim of this paper is to make some theoretical room for the view according to which parts ground (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  37. Positive psychology is value-laden—It's time to embrace it.Michael Prinzing - 2020 - Journal of Positive Psychology 16 (3):289-297.
    Evaluative claims and assumptions are ubiquitous in positive psychology. Some will deny this. But such disavowals are belied by the literature. Some will consider the presence of evaluative claims a problem and hope to root them out. But this is a mistake. If positive psychology is to live up to its raison d’être – to be the scientific study of the psychological components of human flourishing or well-being – it must make evaluative claims. Well-being consists in those things that are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  38. Death is common, so is understanding it: the concept of death in other species.Susana Monsó & Antonio J. Osuna-Mascaró - 2020 - Synthese (1-2):2251-2275.
    Comparative thanatologists study the responses to the dead and the dying in nonhuman animals. Despite the wide variety of thanatological behaviours that have been documented in several different species, comparative thanatologists assume that the concept of death is very difficult to acquire and will be a rare cognitive feat once we move past the human species. In this paper, we argue that this assumption is based on two forms of anthropocentrism: an intellectual anthropocentrism, which leads to an over-intellectualisation of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  39. Social Categories are Natural Kinds, not Objective Types (and Why it Matters Politically).Theodore Bach - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):177-201.
    There is growing support for the view that social categories like men and women refer to “objective types” (Haslanger 2000, 2006, 2012; Alcoff 2005). An objective type is a similarity class for which the axis of similarity is an objective rather than nominal or fictional property. Such types are independently real and causally relevant, yet their unity does not derive from an essential property. Given this tandem of features, it is not surprising why empirically-minded researchers interested in fighting oppression and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  40. I knew I Shouldn’t Do It; But I Did It: Davidson on Causal Strength and Weakness of Will.Rafael Martins - 2019 - Investigação Filosófica 10 (2):05-20.
    Reasons for action is a widely employed methodology in practical philosophy, and especially in moral philosophy. Reasons are facts that explain and justify actions. But, conceptually, if reasons were causes, incontinent actions would be impossible. When an agent ranks an evaluation about what to do as his best judgement, it entails that he has a reason for acting as that judgement prescribes. But when an agent acts incontinently, he acts in accordance to an intention that is not aligned with his (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. If There Is a Hole, It Is Not God Shaped.Guy Kahane - 2018 - In Klaas Kraay (ed.), Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Implications of Theism. pp. 95-131.
    Some people are deeply dissatisfied by the universe that modern science reveals to us. They long for the world described by traditional religion. They do not believe in God, but they wish He had existed. I argue that this is a mistake. The naturalist world we inhabit is admittedly rather bleak. It is very far from being the best of all possible worlds. But an alternative governed by God is also unwelcome, and the things that might make God’s existence attractive—cosmic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  42. Personal responsibility: why it matters.Alexander Brown - 2009 - New York: Continuum.
    Introduction -- What is personal responsibility? -- Ordinary language -- Common conceptions -- What do philosophers mean by responsibility? -- Personally responsible for what? -- What do philosophers think? part I -- Causes -- Capacity -- Control -- Choice versus brute luck -- Second-order attitudes -- Equality of opportunity -- Deservingness -- Reasonableness -- Reciprocity -- Equal shares -- Combining criteria -- What do philosophers think? part II -- Utility -- Self-respect -- Autonomy -- Human flourishing -- Natural duties and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  43. What Science Knows: And How It Knows It.James Franklin - 2009 - Encounter Books.
    In What Science Knows, the Australian philosopher and mathematician James Franklin explains in captivating and straightforward prose how science works its magic. It offers a semipopular introduction to an objective Bayesian/logical probabilist account of scientific reasoning, arguing that inductive reasoning is logically justified (though actually existing science sometimes falls short). Its account of mathematics is Aristotelian realist.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  44. Rawls’s Justification Model for Ethics: What Exactly Does It Justify?Necip Fikri Alican - 2017 - Humanitas 30 (1/2):112–147.
    John Rawls is famous for two things: his attempt to ground morality in rationality and his conception of justice as fairness. He has developed and polished both in conjunction over the course of half a century. Yet the moral principles he advocates have always been more doctrinaire than the corresponding justification model should have ever allowed with design details explicitly promising objectivity. This article goes to the beginning, or to a reasonable proxy for it, in the “Outline of a Decision (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. How to Define 'Prioritarianism' and Distinguish It from (Moderate) Egalitarianism.Christoph Lumer - 2021 - In Michael Schefczyk & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Utility, Progress, and Technology: Proceedings of the 15th Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies. Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing. pp. 153-166.
    In this paper, first the term 'prioritarianism' is defined, with some mathematical precision, on the basis of intuitive conceptions of prioritarianism, especially the idea that "benefiting people matters more the worse off these people are". (The prioritarian weighting function is monotonously ascending and concave, while its first derivation is smoothly descending and convex but positive throughout.) Furthermore, (moderate welfare) egalitarianism is characterized. In particular a new symmetry condition is defended, i.e. that egalitarianism evaluates upper and lower deviations from the social (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Eco-anxiety: What it is and why it matters.Charlie Kurth & Panu Pihkala - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13:981814.
    Researchers are increasingly trying to understand both the emotions that we experience in response to ecological crises like climate change and the ways in which these emotions might be valuable for our (psychical, psychological, and moral) wellbeing. However, much of the existing work on these issues has been hampered by conceptual and methodological difficulties. As a first step toward addressing these challenges, this review focuses on eco-anxiety. Analyzing a broad range of studies through the use of methods from philosophy, emotion (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. Philosophy of Economics for Those Who Don’t Expect It (Yet Still Have to Take It).N. Emrah Aydinonat & Jack Vromen - forthcoming - In Giancarlo Ianulardo, John Davis & Ricardo Crespo (eds.), Edward Elgar Handbook for Teaching Philosophy to Economists. Edward Elgar.
    Teaching a compulsory, large-scale Philosophy of Economics (PoE) course to economics students presents distinct challenges. Instructors face a heterogeneous student body with varying levels of interest in the topics, diverse occupational goals and a limited philosophical background. Unlike elective courses, for which students self-select based on interest, a compulsory course entails motivating disengaged students and managing their expectations. We put forward the case for a student-oriented approach to teaching PoE, emphasising four key strategies: recognising students’ limited philosophical knowledge, demonstrating the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. What is Proof of Concept Research and how does it Generate Epistemic and Ethical Categories for Future Scientific Practice?Catherine Elizabeth Kendig - 2016 - Science and Engineering Ethics 22 (3):735-753.
    “Proof of concept” is a phrase frequently used in descriptions of research sought in program announcements, in experimental studies, and in the marketing of new technologies. It is often coupled with either a short definition or none at all, its meaning assumed to be fully understood. This is problematic. As a phrase with potential implications for research and technology, its assumed meaning requires some analysis to avoid it becoming a descriptive category that refers to all things scientifically exciting. I provide (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  49. What Does It Mean to Have a Meaning Problem? Meaning, Skill, and the Mechanisms of Change in Psychotherapy.Garson Leder - 2019 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 26 (3):35-50.
    Psychotherapy is effective. Since the 1970’s, meta-analyses, and meta-analyses of meta-analyses, have consistently shown a significant effect size for psychotherapeutic interventions when compared to no treatment or placebo treatments. This effectiveness is normally taken as a sign of the scientific legitimization of clinical psychotherapy. A significant problem, however, is that most psychotherapies appear to be equally effective. This poses a problem for specific psychotherapies: they may work, but likely not for the reasons that ground their theoretical explanations for their effectiveness. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  50. There Is an ‘Unconscious,’ but It May Well Be Conscious.Bernardo Kastrup - 2017 - Europe's Journal of Psychology 13 (3):559-572.
    Depth psychology finds empirical validation today in a variety of observations that suggest the presence of causally effective mental processes outside conscious experience. I submit that this is due to misinterpretation of the observations: the subset of consciousness called “meta-consciousness” in the literature is often mistaken for consciousness proper, thereby artificially creating space for an “unconscious.” The implied hypothesis is that all mental processes may in fact be conscious, the appearance of unconsciousness arising from our dependence on self-reflective introspection for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
1 — 50 / 987