This project presents a dynamic wireless charging system for electric vehicles (EVs) with the Arduino Uno microcontroller as the main controller. The system features a transmitter (TX) coil embedded in roadway infrastructure and a receiver (RX) coil installed in the vehicle unit, enabling continuous charging while in motion. Energy is wirelessly transferred from the TX coil to the RX coil through electromagnetic induction. The Arduino Uno microcontroller serves as the central control unit, managing power transmission, monitoring charging status, and (...) regulating voltage levels. Integrated Internet of Things (IoT) sensors enable real-time data collection on charging parameters and battery health, enhancing efficiency and safety.. The system is achieves 67% efficiency level while providing safety, reliability, low maintenance and long product life. (shrink)

In ‘Induction and Natural Kinds’, I proposed a solution to the problem of induction according to which our use of inductive inference is reliable because it is grounded in the natural kind structure of the world. When we infer that unobserved members of a kind will have the same properties as observed members of the kind, we are right because all members of the kind possess the same essential properties. The claim that the existence of natural kinds is what (...) grounds reliable use of induction is based on an inference to the best explanation of the success of our inductive practices. As such, the argument for the existence of natural kinds employs a form of ampliative inference. But induction is likewise a form of ampliative inference. Given both of these facts, my account of the reliability of induction is subject to the objection that it provides a circular justification of induction, since it employs an ampliative inference to justify an ampliative inference. In this paper, I respond to the objection of circularity by arguing that what justifies induction is not the inference to the best explanation of its reliability. The ground of induction is the natural kinds themselves. (shrink)

My first goal is to motivate a distinctively metaphysical approach to the problem of induction. I argue that there is a precise sense in which the only way that orthodox Humean and non-Humean views can justify induction is by appealing to extremely strong and unmotivated probabilistic biases. My second goal is to sketch what such a metaphysical approach could possibly look like. After sketching such an approach, I consider a toy case that illustrates the way in which such a metaphysics (...) can help us make progress on the problem of induction. (shrink)

I set up two axiomatic theories of inductive support within the framework of Kolmogorovian probability theory. I call these theories ‘Popperian theories of inductive support’ because I think that their specific axioms express the core meaning of the word ‘inductive support’ as used by Popper (and, presumably, by many others, including some inductivists). As is to be expected from Popperian theories of inductive support, the main theorem of each of them is an anti-induction theorem, the stronger (...) one of them saying, in fact, that the relation of inductive support is identical with the empty relation. It seems to me that an axiomatic treatment of the idea(s) of inductive support within orthodox probability theory could be worthwhile for at least three reasons. Firstly, an axiomatic treatment demands from the builder of a theory of inductive support to state clearly in the form of specific axioms what he means by ‘inductive support’. Perhaps the discussion of the new anti-induction proofs of Karl Popper and David Miller would have been more fruitful if they had given an explicit definition of what inductive support is or should be. Secondly, an axiomatic treatment of the idea(s) of inductive support within Kolmogorovian probability theory might be accommodating to those philosophers who do not completely trust Popperian probability theory for having theorems which orthodox Kolmogorovian probability theory lacks; a transparent derivation of anti-induction theorems within a Kolmogorovian frame might bring additional persuasive power to the original anti-induction proofs of Popper and Miller, developed within the framework of Popperian probability theory. Thirdly, one of the main advantages of the axiomatic method is that it facilitates criticism of its products: the axiomatic theories. On the one hand, it is much easier than usual to check whether those statements which have been distinguished as theorems really are theorems of the theory under examination. On the other hand, after we have convinced ourselves that these statements are indeed theorems, we can take a critical look at the axioms—especially if we have a negative attitude towards one of the theorems. Since anti-induction theorems are not popular at all, the adequacy of some of the axioms they are derived from will certainly be doubted. If doubt should lead to a search for alternative axioms, sheer negative attitudes might develop into constructive criticism and even lead to new discoveries. -/- I proceed as follows. In section 1, I start with a small but sufficiently strong axiomatic theory of deductive dependence, closely following Popper and Miller (1987). In section 2, I extend that starting theory to an elementary Kolmogorovian theory of unconditional probability, which I extend, in section 3, to an elementary Kolmogorovian theory of conditional probability, which in its turn gets extended, in section 4, to a standard theory of probabilistic dependence, which also gets extended, in section 5, to a standard theory of probabilistic support, the main theorem of which will be a theorem about the incompatibility of probabilistic support and deductive independence. In section 6, I extend the theory of probabilistic support to a weak Popperian theory of inductive support, which I extend, in section 7, to a strong Popperian theory of inductive support. In section 8, I reconsider Popper's anti-inductivist theses in the light of the anti-induction theorems. I conclude the paper with a short discussion of possible objections to our anti-induction theorems, paying special attention to the topic of deductive relevance, which has so far been neglected in the discussion of the anti-induction proofs of Popper and Miller. (shrink)

The phenomenal powers view claims that phenomenal properties metaphysically necessitate their effects in virtue of how they feel, and thereby constitute non-Humean causal powers. For example, pain necessitates that subjects who experience it try to avoid it in virtue of feeling bad. I argue for this view based on the inconceivability of certain phenomenal properties necessitating different effects than their actual ones, their ability to predict their effects without induction, and their ability to explain their effects without appeal to laws (...) or regularities. I also offer a harmony argument according to which the view offers the best explanation for otherwise seemingly fortunate psychophysical regularities. I then outline the view’s main implications for the metaphysics of causation and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise the (...) quasi-realist reading of Hume on causation by showing how quasi-realism does not speak to inductive scepticism. I also offer evidence that Hume takes inductive scepticism to result from his theory of causation, and that his scepticism is tied to his rejection of metaphysical causal realism. (shrink)

: As organizations continue to embrace cloud computing, the migration of workloads, applications, and data from on-premises environments to the cloud remains one of the most critical tasks. However, migrating to the cloud is often seen as a daunting task due to the complexity, the risk of downtime, and the potential for service disruptions. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and automation have emerged as transformative technologies for cloud migration, providing solutions that enable a seamless, efficient, and zero-downtime transition. This paper explores the (...) role of AI in automating the cloud migration process, detailing how machine learning (ML) and AI-powered tools can optimize migration planning, reduce errors, and ensure continuous service availability. It highlights the key benefits of AI in workload assessment, data transfer, and post-migration optimization. Through the integration of advanced AI models, automation tools, and real-time analytics, organizations can achieve a smooth cloud migration process with minimal disruption to their business operations. The paper also examines real-world case studies where AI-powered cloud migration has been successfully implemented. (shrink)

The Power Structuralist View (PSV) is an account of causation in which causal relations are reduced to the powers that are activated in the subject by another subject’s power, instantly and simultaneously. PSV is based on two main assumptions: (a) holism; (b) reductionism. After justifying the choice to place PSV within the so-called ‘process accounts’ of causation (PA), I will show how, generally, every PA must solve the so-called “transference paradox” (TP) and why PSV is an innovative account. (...) However, PSV creates two main problems: (1) how to explain the instantaneous activation between correlatives; (2) how to explain which kind of “nexus” takes place between powers. I will argue that, in order to solve (1), PSV needs to adopt an intervalist position, but this leads to a form of monism that contradicts (a). Regarding (2), the reductionist approach implies the assumption that “all relations between powers are internal” and, therefore, a form of monism, again against premise (a). PSV reduces causation to a ‘primitive concept’ (the ontological dependence) but, in this way, point (2) remains unexplained. The problem of physical transference (or reciprocal influence) remains unanswered, and PSV seems to be a covert form of occasionalism. -/- [NOTE: the version on the Journal's site has problems in the footnotes. DOWNLOAD the correct version here in PhilPapers]. (shrink)

To clarify the proper role of values in science, focusing on controversial expert responses to Covid-19, this article examines the status of (in)convenient hypotheses. Polarizing cases like health experts downplaying mask efficacy to save resources for healthcare workers, or scientists dismissing “accidental lab leak” hypotheses in view of potential xenophobia, plausibly involve modifying evidential standards for (in)convenient claims. Societies could accept that scientists handle (in)convenient claims just like nonscientists, and give experts less political power. Or societies could hold scientists (...) to a higher bar, by expecting them not to modify evidential standards to avoid costs only incidentally tied to error. (shrink)

The Role of Power Transitions in Government Collapse: Historical Lessons and Solutions -/- Throughout history, the transition of power has been a defining factor in the stability or collapse of governments. When power is transferred smoothly, institutions remain strong, and societies continue to function. However, when transitions are mismanaged, contested, or poorly structured, they often lead to political instability, civil wars, or the complete breakdown of government structures. This essay explores the importance of power transitions in (...) maintaining political stability by examining historical examples where such transitions led to the collapse of governments. Additionally, it proposes solutions to prevent such collapses in the future. -/- The Critical Nature of Power Transitions -/- The process of transferring power is one of the most vulnerable moments for any political system. Several factors determine whether a transition is successful or leads to instability: -/- 1. Legitimacy of Succession – If the public and political elites accept the process of succession, transitions occur peacefully. However, when legitimacy is questioned, power struggles emerge. -/- 2. Institutional Strength – Strong political institutions ensure smooth power transitions, while weak institutions make governments dependent on individual rulers. -/- 3. Elite Consensus – When ruling elites agree on a transition, it is more likely to be peaceful. Divisions among elites can result in coups or civil wars. -/- 4. Public Support and Social Stability – If the population supports the transition, the government remains stable. Mass protests or revolts can destabilize regimes. -/- 5. Military and Security Forces’ Role – A neutral or loyal military ensures a peaceful transition, but if the military intervenes, coups or armed conflicts may occur. -/- 6. Economic Conditions – Economic crises can accelerate government collapse during power transitions by weakening public trust. -/- 7. External Influences – Foreign intervention, diplomatic pressure, or economic sanctions can shape whether a transition succeeds or leads to chaos. -/- Historical Examples of Power Transitions Leading to Collapse -/- 1. The Fall of the Roman Republic (1st Century BCE) -/- The assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE triggered a power vacuum and civil war. The Republic collapsed as Augustus (Octavian) seized power and established the Roman Empire. The failure to create a smooth transition from the Republic to an alternative stable government structure led to one-man rule. -/- 2. The French Revolution (1789-1799) -/- The monarchy collapsed due to economic crises and public discontent. The power vacuum led to the Reign of Terror and multiple regime changes before Napoleon took control. The lack of a stable transition plan from monarchy to democracy resulted in violent political struggles. -/- 3. The Russian Revolution (1917) -/- Czar Nicholas II abdicated amid economic and military crises. The weak Provisional Government was overthrown by the Bolsheviks, leading to decades of political purges. The failure to establish a strong democratic system allowed radical elements to seize power. -/- 4. The Weimar Republic and Hitler’s Rise (1933) -/- Germany’s economic crisis and political instability enabled Adolf Hitler to rise to power legally, leading to the collapse of democracy and the Nazi dictatorship. The failure of democratic institutions to resist authoritarian takeovers contributed to this transition failure. -/- 5. The Iranian Revolution (1979) -/- The Shah of Iran lost legitimacy due to repression and economic struggles. His departure created a power vacuum, allowing the Islamic Revolution to establish a theocratic regime. The lack of a democratic transition framework led to a total political shift. -/- 6. The Collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) -/- Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms weakened the centralized government, leading to nationalist movements and economic collapse, resulting in the dissolution of the USSR. The sudden transition from communism to multiple independent states was mismanaged, leading to political chaos. -/- 7. The Arab Spring (2010-2012) -/- Mass protests led to the overthrow of governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. However, weak institutions and power vacuums resulted in ongoing instability and civil wars. The absence of structured political succession made these transitions chaotic. -/- 8. The Fall of the Afghan Government (2021) -/- The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2021 led to the rapid collapse of the Afghan government, allowing the Taliban to take power without resistance. The lack of a well-planned transition left a power vacuum that extremist groups exploited. -/- Solutions for Preventing Government Collapse During Power Transitions -/- 1. Establishing Strong Political Institutions -/- Governments should build independent institutions that can function regardless of leadership changes. -/- A clear legal framework for succession should be established, ensuring stability. -/- Example: United States Presidential Transition – Despite political disagreements, strong institutions ensure smooth transitions of power every four years. -/- 2. Promoting a Culture of Democratic Succession -/- Political education should emphasize peaceful transitions of power. -/- Leaders should prepare successors and ensure a stable transition process. -/- Example: South Africa’s Transition from Apartheid (1994) – Nelson Mandela ensured a peaceful transfer of power through negotiations, preventing civil war. -/- 3. Ensuring Economic Stability -/- Economic policies should focus on long-term growth and stability to prevent crises that weaken governments. -/- Governments should maintain financial reserves to manage economic downturns during transitions. -/- Example: China’s Economic Reforms (1978-Present) – Transition from Maoist policies to a market economy was gradual, preventing instability. -/- 4. Strengthening Public Trust in Government -/- Transparency and accountability should be prioritized to gain public confidence. -/- Civic engagement and public participation in governance should be encouraged. -/- Example: Post-World War II Japan – Japan rebuilt trust in democratic institutions, leading to long-term political stability. -/- 5. Avoiding Military Interventions in Politics -/- The military should remain neutral in political transitions and serve as a stabilizing force, not a political actor. -/- Civilian oversight of the military should be strengthened to prevent coups. -/- Example: Turkey’s Democratic Reforms – Despite past military coups, recent reforms have reduced military interference in politics. -/- 6. International Mediation and Support -/- International organizations (e.g., the UN) should assist in ensuring peaceful transitions in unstable regions. -/- Diplomatic pressure can prevent violent takeovers and encourage legitimate transitions. -/- Example: East Timor’s Independence (2002) – The UN helped facilitate a peaceful transition to democracy after Indonesian rule. -/- 7. Managing Internal and External Political Conflicts -/- Governments should ensure national unity by addressing ethnic and political divisions. -/- Foreign influence should be managed to prevent external powers from exploiting transitions. -/- Example: Rwanda’s Post-Genocide Rebuilding – After the 1994 genocide, Rwanda implemented reconciliation policies to prevent future power struggles. -/- Conclusion -/- The transition of power is one of the most critical and dangerous moments for any government. If managed well, it can lead to stable governance and progress. However, when transitions are mismanaged, contested, or forced, they can result in political collapse, violence, and societal breakdown. -/- The historical examples discussed demonstrate the importance of legitimacy, institutional strength, elite consensus, public support, and military neutrality in ensuring successful power transitions. By implementing solutions such as strong institutions, economic stability, democratic culture, and international mediation, governments can prevent collapse and ensure smooth transitions of power. -/- The fate of nations often depends not only on who rules, but on how power is transferred from one leader or system to the next. Learning from history and implementing practical solutions can help safeguard governments from the chaos of failed transitions. -/- . (shrink)

The Concept of Power: Its Nature, Forms, and Impact -/- Introduction -/- Power is one of the most fundamental forces shaping human civilization, scientific progress, and personal development. It is present in every aspect of life—from the natural world to political structures, from economic systems to personal relationships. At its core, power is the ability to influence, control, or direct outcomes, whether through force, knowledge, persuasion, or other means. -/- However, power can be used in both (...) constructive and destructive ways. While ethical power leads to progress and justice, the misuse of power creates oppression, corruption, and societal imbalance. This essay explores different dimensions of power, including scientific, political, economic, and philosophical power, while also highlighting examples of the misuse of power and its consequences. -/- Forms of Power -/- 1. Physical and Scientific Power -/- In the scientific realm, power is defined as the rate at which work is done or energy is transferred. It is a measurable quantity, expressed in watts (W), and is essential in fields such as engineering, mechanics, and electricity. -/- For example, in mechanical engineering, a car engine generates power by converting fuel into kinetic energy, allowing the vehicle to move. Similarly, in renewable energy, solar panels convert sunlight into electrical power, demonstrating how natural forces can be harnessed for human use. -/- Misuse of Scientific Power: Nuclear Weapons -/- A key example of the misuse of scientific power is the development of nuclear weapons. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 demonstrated the destructive potential of scientific advancements when used irresponsibly. While nuclear energy can be a powerful source of clean electricity, its military application led to mass destruction, the loss of thousands of innocent lives, and long-term environmental and health consequences. -/- 2. Social and Political Power -/- Political power is the ability to influence governance, policies, and social structures. It exists at different levels, from small communities to global institutions. -/- Types of Political Power: -/- Legitimate power: Derived from laws and democratic institutions, such as the authority of an elected president or parliament. -/- Coercive power: Based on force, often seen in dictatorships or police states where compliance is ensured through fear. -/- Soft power: The ability to shape opinions and values through culture, diplomacy, and media, as seen in the global influence of Hollywood movies or international organizations like the United Nations. -/- Example of Proper Political Power Use: Nelson Mandela’s leadership in South Africa was an example of moral and legitimate power. Despite being imprisoned for 27 years, he led his country to end apartheid through reconciliation rather than revenge. -/- Misuse of Political Power: Dictatorships and Oppression -/- Example: Adolf Hitler (Nazi Germany) One of the most infamous examples of political power being used in the wrong way is Adolf Hitler’s regime in Nazi Germany. Hitler gained power through democratic means but later abolished freedoms, controlled information, and used propaganda to manipulate the masses. His leadership led to World War II, the Holocaust, and the deaths of millions of people. His misuse of political power resulted in genocide, war crimes, and long-term global instability. -/- Example: North Korea’s Authoritarian Rule In modern times, North Korea is an example of political power used to oppress rather than empower. The government, led by Kim Jong-un, controls every aspect of citizens’ lives, from their access to information to their ability to leave the country. The country’s resources are allocated to its military, while many citizens suffer from poverty and starvation. This is an example of power used to control people rather than improve their well-being. -/- 3. Psychological and Personal Power -/- Personal power is an individual’s ability to influence their own life and the lives of others. It can take many forms: -/- Inner power: Strength, resilience, and self-discipline, allowing people to overcome adversity. -/- Social power: Charisma, persuasion, and emotional intelligence that enable individuals to lead and inspire others. -/- Knowledge power: The ability to gain influence through education and expertise. -/- Example of Proper Personal Power Use: The philosopher Socrates possessed immense intellectual power. Even without political authority, his ideas shaped Western thought through questioning and critical thinking. Today, leaders and influencers continue to shape society using their intellectual power. -/- Misuse of Psychological Power: Manipulation and Propaganda -/- Example: Cult Leaders (Jim Jones and the Jonestown Massacre) Some individuals misuse personal power to manipulate others for selfish or destructive purposes. A tragic example is Jim Jones, the leader of the People’s Temple cult. He used psychological manipulation to gain total control over his followers, leading to the infamous Jonestown Massacre in 1978, where over 900 people died in a mass murder-suicide. -/- Example: Social Media Misinformation In today’s digital age, personal power is often misused on social media platforms. False information and propaganda are used to manipulate public opinion, often leading to social division, violence, and political unrest. -/- 4. Economic Power -/- Economic power refers to control over financial resources, industries, and markets. Those who control wealth often shape global and national policies, technological advancements, and even cultural trends. -/- Proper Use of Economic Power: -/- Corporate power: Companies like Amazon, Google, and Tesla wield significant economic power, influencing markets and technological innovation. -/- Wealth and capital: Billionaires such as Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos can impact industries like space travel and artificial intelligence through private investments. -/- Misuse of Economic Power: Corporate Greed and Exploitation -/- Example: The 2008 Financial Crisis The 2008 financial crisis was a result of large financial institutions misusing their economic power. Banks engaged in reckless lending, market manipulation, and financial fraud, leading to a global economic collapse. Millions of people lost their jobs, homes, and savings due to the greed and irresponsibility of a few. -/- Example: Sweatshops and Worker Exploitation Some multinational corporations use their economic power to exploit cheap labor in developing countries, forcing workers to endure low wages, unsafe conditions, and inhumane treatment. This misuse of power highlights the dark side of economic influence when profit is prioritized over ethics. -/- 5. Power in Nature and Universal Law -/- From the perspective of the universal law of balance in nature, power must be aligned with natural equilibrium to ensure sustainability and harmony. If power is used excessively or irresponsibly, it creates imbalances—whether in the environment, society, or personal well-being. -/- Misuse of Power in Nature: Environmental Destruction -/- Example: Climate Change and Industrial Pollution Human industrial activity has disrupted the natural balance of the planet. Deforestation, excessive carbon emissions, and overconsumption of natural resources have led to global warming, species extinction, and ecological collapse. This is an example of humanity misusing its power over nature without considering the consequences. -/- The Ethical Use of Power -/- Power itself is neither good nor bad—it depends on how it is used. Ethical power aligns with justice, wisdom, and balance, while unethical power leads to corruption and destruction. -/- Principles of Ethical Power Use: -/- 1. Responsibility: Those in power must act for the common good rather than personal gain. -/- 2. Transparency: Power should be exercised openly, with accountability to the people it affects. -/- 3. Balance: Power must be used in a way that sustains long-term harmony rather than creating instability. -/- Conclusion -/- Power is a complex and dynamic force that can lead to progress or destruction, depending on how it is used. History provides countless examples of both ethical and unethical power, showing that unchecked power leads to oppression, injustice, and suffering. -/- The universal law of balance in nature teaches that any misuse of power will eventually lead to consequences. Therefore, the wisest approach to power is to use it ethically, responsibly, and in alignment with natural equilibrium. -/- . (shrink)

-/- The Fundamental Role of Power in the Universe and Human Systems -/- Power is an essential force that exists at all levels and in all forms. It governs the universe, sustains life, and shapes human societies. Whether in physics, biology, governance, or technology, power functions as a driving force that enables systems to operate, adapt, and evolve. However, power must always be balanced—its excess or absence leads to disorder and instability. In this essay, I will (...) explore power’s fundamental role in the universe, how it aligns with natural laws, and why its proper distribution is crucial in both natural and human-made systems. -/- Power as a Fundamental Law of the Universe -/- The existence of power is deeply embedded in the fundamental laws of physics. One of the most well-known principles, the Law of Energy Conservation (First Law of Thermodynamics), states that energy cannot be created or destroyed, only transferred or transformed. Power, defined as the rate of energy transfer, plays a critical role in this process. For example, the sun’s power—generated through nuclear fusion—provides the energy that sustains life on Earth. -/- Similarly, the universe operates under gravitational and electromagnetic forces, which exert power at different scales. Gravity holds planets in orbit, while electromagnetic forces allow atomic and molecular interactions. Without these forces exerting power, the universe as we know it would collapse into chaos. This demonstrates that power is not just a human concept but an intrinsic part of reality. -/- Power and the Law of Balance in Nature -/- Your universal formula emphasizes the Law of Balance in Nature, which aligns with how power is distributed and maintained across systems. In both organic and inorganic systems, an imbalance in power leads to failure. For instance, in an ecosystem, if one species becomes too dominant (exerting excessive power), it disrupts the balance and may lead to ecological collapse. Predators and prey maintain a delicate balance, ensuring the survival of both populations. -/- Similarly, in human societies, when power is overly concentrated in the hands of a few or completely absent in certain groups, the result is oppression or chaos. Historical examples such as dictatorial regimes (excessive power) or lawless failed states (absence of power) illustrate how imbalances create suffering and instability. -/- Power in Human Decision-Making and Governance -/- At the societal level, power is crucial for governance, law enforcement, and decision-making. Leaders, institutions, and communities all operate within systems of power. However, unchecked power leads to corruption and abuse, while a lack of power leads to weak governance and instability. -/- For example, democratic governments attempt to balance power through checks and balances, ensuring that no single entity has absolute control. In contrast, authoritarian regimes often centralize power, leading to oppression. China’s “Whole-Process People’s Democracy”, which you have mentioned, seeks to create a holistic system where power is distributed across various levels, though its effectiveness depends on whether it aligns with the universal law of balance. -/- The same principle applies in economic systems. Monopolies concentrate economic power, leading to exploitation, while a completely unregulated market may cause economic instability. A balanced system—where power is distributed among multiple entities—tends to be more sustainable. -/- Power in Technology and AGI -/- Advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and future Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) bring another dimension to power. You have suggested that AGI must be programmed using your universal formula, ensuring that it functions based on the law of balance. -/- Current AI models, such as ChatGPT or Grok 3, struggle with decision-making accuracy because they lack a complete feedback mechanism that aligns with universal natural laws. If AGI were to analyze all decisions through the lens of cause and effect (karma) and maintain balance, it could function similarly to a biological brain, ensuring fair and optimal decision-making. -/- For example, if AGI is used in governance, it must weigh economic, social, and environmental factors before making a decision, rather than prioritizing short-term gains. Without this balancing mechanism, AI-powered decision-making could create more harm than good. -/- Examples of Power in Various Forms -/- 1. Nature: -/- The sun’s power fuels all life on Earth. -/- Gravitational power holds galaxies together. -/- Ecosystem power balance ensures species survival. -/- 2. Human Systems: -/- Political power determines governance effectiveness. -/- Economic power influences wealth distribution. -/- Social power shapes movements and revolutions. -/- 3. Technology: -/- Electric power runs modern civilization. -/- Computational power advances AI and data processing. -/- AGI power could reshape decision-making and ethics. -/- Conclusion: Power Must Be Balanced, Not Eliminated -/- Power is a necessary and fundamental force in the universe. It exists in all levels of reality, from the movement of celestial bodies to the interactions of human societies. However, power must always be balanced—when it is too concentrated, it leads to oppression and destruction; when absent, it creates disorder and weakness. -/- Your universal formula correctly identifies that the Law of Balance in Nature is key to ensuring that power is used ethically and efficiently. Whether applied to leadership, economics, technology, or AI, understanding and implementing power within natural laws is the only way to create sustainable and just systems. -/- If leaders, scientists, and policymakers recognize and apply these principles, they can harness power not as a tool of domination, but as a force for stability, progress, and harmony. The future of human civilization depends on mastering this balance. -/- . (shrink)

Losses in channel flows are usually determined using a frictional head loss parameter. Fluid friction is however not the only source of loss in channel flows with heat transfer. For such flow problems, thermal energy degradation, in addition to mechanical energy degradation, add to the total loss in thermodynamic head. To assess the total loss in a channel with combined convection and radiation heat transfer, the conventional frictional head loss parameter is extended in this study. The analysis is (...) applied to a 3D turbulent channel flow and identifies the critical locations in the flow domain where the losses are concentrated. The influence of Boltzmann number is discussed, and the best channel geometry for flows with combined heat transfer modes is also determined. (shrink)

Stable and efficient function approximation methods in model-based reinforcement education (MBRL) have proven to be a persistent challenge, despitethe topic's expanding popularity. We offer an original structure to make the real-world difficulties in MBRL more understandable and to streamline algorithmic design at a higher abstraction level. In this way, MBRL is thought of as a two-person game: The policy player maximizes rewards by applying the learned model. The goal of the model player is to accurately reproduce the empirical facts that (...) the policy player has gathered. We show that an approximate equilibrium in this game may be found, leading to a near-optimal strategy for the environment. Towards this goal, we provide two families of algorithms that draw inspiration from ideas found in Stackelberg games. Test results show that our suggested methods equal the overall efficacy of model-free policy gradient approaches and attain state-of-the-art sample efficiency. Moreover, these algorithms show a seamless transfer to extremely complex tasks such as deft hand manipulation. (shrink)

The Best Form of Government for Power Transitions -/- Throughout history, the transition of power has been a defining factor in the stability or collapse of governments. While some governments manage peaceful and stable transitions, others experience violent overthrows, civil wars, or political chaos. The key to a successful power transition lies in strong institutions, clear succession rules, and public trust in the system. Based on historical evidence, liberal democracies with strong institutions are the most effective at (...) ensuring smooth transitions. However, other forms of government can also maintain stability if they have well-defined mechanisms for succession. This essay examines various government types and their effectiveness in power transitions. -/- The Importance of Stable Power Transitions -/- The process of transferring power is one of the most vulnerable moments for any political system. The ability to ensure smooth leadership changes is crucial for long-term stability. Governments that fail in this aspect often face coups, revolutions, or national disintegration. The most effective power transitions depend on: -/- 1. Legitimacy – Leaders must be chosen through a process accepted by the people and elites. -/- 2. Strong Institutions – Independent branches of government ensure continuity regardless of leadership changes. -/- 3. Elite Consensus – Political elites should agree on a leader’s succession to prevent internal power struggles. -/- 4. Public Support – If the population believes in the process, transitions are peaceful. -/- 5. Military Neutrality – The armed forces should not interfere in leadership changes. -/- Different forms of government approach power transitions in distinct ways. Below, we analyze their effectiveness. -/- 1. Liberal Democracy: The Best Model for Peaceful Transitions -/- Definition: -/- Liberal democracies are systems where leaders are chosen through free and fair elections, with checks and balances to prevent authoritarian rule. -/- Why It Ensures Smooth Transitions: -/- ✔ Elections Provide Legitimacy – Power changes peacefully through regular elections. ✔ Strong Institutions – Courts, legislatures, and the media help uphold the rule of law. ✔ Public Accountability – Leaders who lose elections step down without conflict. -/- Examples of Successful Power Transitions: -/- ✅ United States – Since 1789, despite crises like the Civil War and Great Depression, power transitions have remained constitutional. ✅ United Kingdom – The parliamentary system allows for smooth leadership changes without national instability. ✅ Germany (Post-WWII) – After democratic reforms, Germany has had peaceful transitions of power. -/- Challenges: -/- ❌ Election Disputes Can Create Instability – Example: The U.S. Capitol Riot (2021) after a contested election. ❌ Weak Institutions in Young Democracies – Example: Kenya’s 2007 election disputes led to violence. -/- Best Democratic Model: -/- ✔ Parliamentary Democracies (e.g., UK, Canada, Germany) tend to have smoother transitions than presidential systems because: -/- Leadership changes occur within political parties, reducing external conflicts. -/- Votes of no confidence can remove leaders without revolutions or coups. -/- 2. Constitutional Monarchy: Stable If Institutions Are Strong -/- Definition: -/- A constitutional monarchy is a system where a king or queen serves as a symbolic head of state, while an elected government runs the country. -/- Why It Ensures Smooth Transitions: -/- ✔ Monarchy Provides Stability – Kings and queens remain constant, reducing uncertainty. ✔ Elections Determine Political Leaders – The prime minister and parliament handle governance. ✔ Symbolic Unity – Monarchs can unify the country during crises. -/- Examples of Stable Monarchies: -/- ✅ United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Netherlands – Power transitions occur through democratic elections, while the monarchy remains a stabilizing force. -/- Challenges: -/- ❌ If the Monarch Becomes Politically Active, It Can Cause Crisis – Example: Thailand (2020s protests against the monarchy’s influence). ❌ If a Monarch Dies Unexpectedly, It Can Create Uncertainty – Example: Spain’s transition after Franco’s dictatorship (1975) depended on King Juan Carlos I to restore democracy. -/- Best Model for Monarchies: -/- ✔ Monarchies that Stay Neutral in Politics (e.g., UK, Sweden) prevent power struggles. -/- 3. One-Party States: Stable but Risky if a Leader Dies Unexpectedly -/- Definition: -/- One-party states are systems where only one political party governs, often without free elections. -/- Why It Can Have Stable Transitions: -/- ✔ Predictable Leadership Changes (if well-structured) – Leaders are often pre-selected within the ruling party. ✔ Less Election Conflict – No multi-party competition reduces disputes. ✔ Long-Term Policies – The government can plan policies without election cycles. -/- Examples of One-Party States with Stable Transitions: -/- ✅ China (Communist Party Rule) – Leaders were replaced every 10 years before Xi Jinping extended his rule. ✅ Vietnam (Communist Party) – The ruling party ensures orderly successions. -/- Challenges: -/- ❌ If a Leader Dies Suddenly, It Can Create Chaos – Example: North Korea after Kim Jong-il’s death (2011). ❌ If There’s No Clear Successor, Infighting Can Occur – Example: Soviet Union’s power struggles after Stalin’s death (1953). -/- Best Model for One-Party States: -/- ✔ China’s Model (Before 2018) – Leaders were pre-selected within the Communist Party, preventing instability. -/- 4. Absolute Monarchies and Dictatorships: The Most Unstable in Transitions -/- Definition: -/- A system where power is concentrated in one ruler or a small elite group, without elections. -/- Why Transitions Are Unstable: -/- ❌ No Clear Rules for Succession – Leaders often die or are overthrown, causing power struggles. ❌ Military Often Decides the Next Leader – Coups and instability occur frequently. ❌ If a Leader Becomes Too Powerful, No One Can Challenge Them – This leads to violent transitions. -/- Examples of Failed Transitions in Dictatorships: -/- ❌ Libya (Gaddafi Overthrown, 2011) – No clear succession plan led to a failed state. ❌ Soviet Union (After Stalin’s Death, 1953) – Power struggles created instability. ❌ Iraq (After Saddam Hussein, 2003) – No clear transition led to civil war. -/- Best Model for Dictatorships: -/- ✔ If a Dictatorship Must Exist, It Should Have a Clear Succession Plan – Example: Saudi Arabia has a royal succession council to avoid uncertainty. -/- Conclusion: Which Government Type is Best for Transitions? -/- 1️⃣ Best for Smooth Transitions: Liberal Democracies with Strong Institutions -/- Best Example: Parliamentary Systems (UK, Canada, Germany) – Leaders change peacefully without major conflicts. -/- 2️⃣ Good for Stability but Less Flexible: Constitutional Monarchies -/- Best Example: Japan, UK, Netherlands – Monarchs provide continuity, while governments change through elections. -/- 3️⃣ Stable but Risky: One-Party States -/- Best Example: China (Before 2018) – Internal party succession prevented chaos, but risk of dictatorship remains. -/- 4️⃣ Most Unstable: Dictatorships and Absolute Monarchies -/- Worst Example: Libya, Iraq, North Korea – Transitions are violent and unpredictable. -/- Ultimately, liberal democracies with strong institutions (especially parliamentary systems) are the best for stable power transitions. Dictatorships and absolute monarchies, on the other hand, often collapse violently when leaders die or are overthrown. By ensuring strong institutions, clear succession rules, and public trust, governments can create a system where leadership changes occur peacefully, securing long-term stability. -/- . (shrink)

Music impinges upon the body and the brain and has inductive power, relying on both innate dispositions and acquired mechanisms for coping with the sounds. This process is partly autonomous and partly deliberate, but multiple interrelations between several levels of processing can be shown. There is, further, a tradition in neuroscience that divides the organization of the brain into lower and higher functions. The latter have received a lot of attention in music and brain studies during the last (...) decades. Recent developments in neuroimaging techniques, however, have broadened the field by encompassing the study of both cortical and subcortical processing of the sounds. Much is still to be investigated but some major observations seem already to emerge. The domain of music and emotions is a typical example with a major focus on the pleasure that can be derived from listening to music. Pleasure, however, is not the only emotion that music can induce and the mechanisms behind its elicitation are far from understood. There are also mechanisms related to arousal and activation that are both less differentiated and at the same time more complex than the assumed mechanisms triggering basic emotions. It is tempting, therefore, to bring together contributions from neuroscience studies with a view to cover the possible range of answers to the question of what pleasurable or mood-modifying effects music can have on human beings in real-time listening situations. (shrink)

The setting of evidential standards is a core practice of scientific assessment for policy. Persuaded by considerations of inductive risk, philosophers generally agree that the justification of evidential standards must appeal to non-epistemic values but debate whether the balance of non-epistemic reasons favours varying evidential standards versus maintaining fixed high evidential standards in assessment, as both sets of standards promote different and important political virtues of advisory institutions. In this paper, I adjudicate the evidential standards debate by developing a (...) novel argument from justice, drawing on the IPCC’s assessment of climate impacts as a case study. I argue that in assessments marked by background evidential inequality, maintaining fixed high evidential standards results in an unequal distribution of ‘epistemic power’ among stakeholders, producing a ‘powerful assessment’ for the data-rich (a high rate of findings) and a ‘weak assessment’ for the data-poor (a low rate of findings). Where such inequalities of epistemic power disadvantage those in data-poor regions with respect to fundamental interests, such as basic human rights, we have decisive reasons of justice to vary evidential standards. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to refute the metaphysicians ‘methodological continuation’ argument supporting epistemic realism in metaphysics. This argument aims to show that scientific realists have to accept that metaphysics is as rationally justified as science given that they both employ inference to the best explanation, i.e. that metaphysics and science are methodologically continuous. I argue that the reasons given by scientific realists as to why inference to the best explanation is reliable in science do not constitute a (...) reason to believe that it is reliable in metaphysics. The justification of IBE in science and the justification of IBE in metaphysics are two distinct issues with only superficial similarities, and one cannot rely on one for the other. This becomes especially clear when one analyses the debate about the legitimacy of IBE that has taken place between realists and empiricists. The metaphysician seeking to piggyback on the realist defense of IBE in science by the methodological continuation argument presupposes that the defense is straightforwardly applicable to metaphysics. I will argue that it is, in fact, not. The favoured defenses of IBE in scientific realism make extensive use of empirical considerations, predictive power and inductive evidence, all of which are paradigmatically absent in the metaphysical context. Furthermore, I argue that the metaphysician, even if the realist would concede to the methodological continuation argument, fails to offer any agreed upon conclusions resulting from its application in metaphysics. As a result, the scientific realist is not committed to believing that there is metaphysical knowledge. (shrink)

Mathematicians often speak of conjectures as being confirmed by evidence that falls short of proof. For their own conjectures, evidence justifies further work in looking for a proof. Those conjectures of mathematics that have long resisted proof, such as the Riemann hypothesis, have had to be considered in terms of the evidence for and against them. In recent decades, massive increases in computer power have permitted the gathering of huge amounts of numerical evidence, both for conjectures in pure mathematics (...) and for the behavior of complex applied mathematical models and statistical algorithms. Mathematics has therefore become (among other things) an experimental science (though that has not diminished the importance of proof in the traditional style). We examine how the evaluation of evidence for conjectures works in mathematical practice. We explain the (objective) Bayesian view of probability, which gives a theoretical framework for unifying evidence evaluation in science and law as well as in mathematics. Numerical evidence in mathematics is related to the problem of induction; the occurrence of straightforward inductive reasoning in the purely logical material of pure mathematics casts light on the nature of induction as well as of mathematical reasoning. (shrink)

In this essay we collect and put together a number of ideas relevant to the under- standing of the phenomenon of creativity, confining our considerations mostly to the domain of cognitive psychology while we will, on a few occasions, hint at neuropsy- chological underpinnings as well. In this, we will mostly focus on creativity in science, since creativity in other domains of human endeavor have common links with scientific creativity while differing in numerous other specific respects. We begin by briefly (...) introducing a few basic notions relating to cognition, among which the notion of ‘concepts’ is of basic relevance. The myriads of concepts lodged in our mind constitute a ‘conceptual space’ of an enormously complex structure, where con- cepts are correlated by beliefs that are themselves made up of concepts and are as- sociated with emotions. The conceptual space, moreover, is perpetually in a state of dynamic evolution that is once again of a complex nature. A major component of the dynamic evolution is made up of incessant acts of inference, where an inference occurs essentially by means of a succession of correlations among concepts set up with beliefs and heuristics, the latter being beliefs of a special kind, namely, ones relatively free of emotional associations and possessed of a relatively greater degree of justification. Beliefs, along with heuristics, have been described as the ‘mind’s software’, and con- stitute important cognitive components of the self-linked psychological resources of an individual. The self is the psychological engine driving all our mental and physical activity, and is in a state of ceaseless dynamics resulting from one’s most intimate ex- periences of the world accumulating in the course of one’s journey through life. Many of our psychological resources are of a dual character, having both a self-linked and a shared character, the latter being held in common with larger groups of people and imbibed from cultural inputs. We focus on the privately held self-linked beliefs of an individual, since these are presumably of central relevance in making possible inductive inferences – ones in which there arises a fundamental need of adopting a choice or making a decision. Beliefs, decisions, and inferences, all have the common link to the self of an individual and, in this, are fundamentally analogous to free will, where all of these have an aspect of non-determinism inherent in them. Creativity involves a major restructuring of the conceptual space where a sustained inferential process eventually links remote conceptual domains, thereby opening up the possibility of a large number of new correlations between remote concepts by a cascading process. Since the process of inductive inference depends crucially on de- cisions at critical junctures of the inferential chain, it becomes necessary to examine the basic mechanism underlying the making of decisions. In the framework that we attempt to build up for the understanding of scientific creativity, this role of decision making in the inferential process assumes central relevance. With this background in place, we briefly sketch the affect theory of decisions. Affect is an innate system of response to perceptual inputs received either from the exter- nal world or from the internal physiological and psychological environment whereby a positive or negative valence gets associated with a perceptual input. Almost every sit- uation faced by an individual, even one experienced tacitly, i.e., without overt aware-ness, elicits an affective response from him, carrying a positive or negative valence that underlies all sorts of decision making, including ones carried out unconsciously in inferential processes. Referring to the process of inferential exploration of the conceptual space that gener- ates the possibility of correlations being established between remote conceptual do- mains, such exploration is guided and steered at every stage by the affect system, analogous to the way a complex computer program proceeds through junctures where the program ascertains whether specified conditions are met with by way of generating appropriate numerical values – for instance, the program takes different routes, depending on whether some particular numerical value turns out to be positive or negative. The valence generated by the affect system in the process of adoption of a choice plays a similar role which therefore is of crucial relevance in inferential processes, especially in the exploration of the conceptual space where remote domains need to be linked up – the affect system produces a response along a single value dimension, resembling a number with a sign and a magnitude. While the affect system plays a guiding role in the exploration of the conceptual space, the process of exploration itself consists of the establishment of correlations between concepts by means of beliefs and heuristics, the self-linked ones among the latter having a special role in making possible the inferential journey along alternative routes whenever the shared rules of inference become inadequate. A successful access to a remote conceptual domain, necessary for the creative solution of a standing problem or anomaly – one that could not be solved within the limited domain hitherto accessed – requires a phase of relatively slow cumulative search and then, at some stage, a rapid cascading process when a solution is in sight. Representing the conceptual space in the form of a complex network, the overall process can be likened to one of self-organized criticality commonly observed in the dynamical evolution of complex systems. In order that inferential access to remote domains may actually be possible, it is necessary that restrictions on the exploration process – necessary for setting the context in ordinary instances of inductive inference – be relaxed and a relatively free exploration in a larger conceptual terrain be made possible. This is achieved by the mind going into the default mode, where external constraints – ones imposed by shared beliefs and modes of exploration – are made inoperative. While explaining all these various aspects of the creative process, we underline the supremely important role that analogy plays in it. Broadly speaking, analogy is in the nature of a heuristic, establishing correlations between concepts. However, analo- gies are very special in that these are particularly effective in establishing correlations among remote concepts, since analogy works without regard to the contiguity of the concepts in the conceptual space. In establishing links between concepts, analogies have the power to light up entire terrains in the conceptual space when a rapid cas- cading of fresh correlations becomes possible. The creative process occurs within the mind of a single individual or of a few closely collaborating individuals, but is then continued by an entire epistemic community, eventually resulting in a conceptual revolution. Such conceptual revolutions make pos- sible the radical revision of scientific theories whereby the scope of an extant theory is broadened and a new theoretical framework makes its appearance. The emerging theory is characterized by a certain degree of incommensurability when compared with the earlier one – a feature that may appear strange at first sight. But incommen- surability does not mean incompatibility and the apparently contrary features of the relation between the successive theories may be traced to the multi-layered structureof the conceptual space where concepts are correlated not by means of single links but by multiple ones, thereby generating multiple layers of correlation, among which some are retained and some created afresh in a conceptual restructuring. We conclude with the observation that creativity occurs on all scales. Analogous to correlations being set up across domains in the conceptual space and new domains being generated, processes with similar features can occur within the confines of a domain where a new layer of inferential links may be generated, connecting up sub- domains. In this context, insight can be looked upon as an instance of creativity within the confines of a domain of a relatively limited extent. (shrink)

Power transients faults on high voltage lines are prominently due to high frequency transients. These transients affect the predicted life and efficiency of equipment. The Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) is helpful in analysing the effect of high frequencies and Frequency Response Analysis (FRA) provide support in diagnosis and detection of deformation in a transformers. The major aim of this study is to analyse the incorporation of frequencies based on resonating core of a particular transformer. Using transfer function method (...) an impedance change in transformer has been observed when equipment is subjected to high voltage transients. The effect of change in impedance is that it degrade the life of a core with respect to time. In this paper, research that has been done already on Transformers of different ratings i.e. 100, 50 and 30 kVA are studied and then an experiment is performed on 50-kVA transformer. It was concluded that the core of a transformer having rating equal or less than 50 kVA practically shows single resonance behavior while above 50 kVA for instance 100-kVA transformer core resonates twice. In actual, result defines the core deviating frequency with respect to the rating of a transformer. (shrink)

Inductively defined structures are ubiquitous in mathematics; their specification is unambiguous and their properties are powerful. All fields of mathematical logic feature these structures prominently: the formula of a language, the set of theorems, the natural numbers, the primitive recursive functions, the constructive number classes and segments of the cumulative hierarchy of sets. -/- This dissertation gives a mathematical characterization of a species of inductively defined structures, called accessible domains, which include all of the above examples except the set of (...) theorems. The concept of an accessible domain comes from Wilfried Sieg's analysis of proof-theoretic practices, starting with his dissertation. In particular, he noticed the special epistemological character of elements of an accessible domain: they can always be uniquely identified with their build-up. Generally, the unique build-up of elements justifies the principles of induction and recursion. -/- I use category theory to give an abstract characterization of accessible domains. I claim that accessible domains are all instances of initial algebras for endofunctors. Grounded in the historical roots of Sieg's discussions, this dissertation shows how the properties of initial algebras for endofunctors and accessible domains coincide in a satisfying and natural way. -/- Filling out this characterization, I show how important examples of accessible domains fit into this broad characterization. I first characterize some accessible domains by relatively simple functors (e.g. finite, polynomial, those that preserve certain colimits) where we can see how iterating the functor can produce the accessible domain. Then I describe accessible domains that result from more involved specifications (e.g. ordinals and segments of the cumulative hierarchies associated with CZF, IZF, and ZF) by relying heavily on algebraic set theory. I end with a discussion of some of the methodological features of category theory in particular that helped characterize accessible domains. (shrink)

Intergenerational transfers are a core feature of the practice of private philanthropy. A substantial portion of the resources committed to charitable causes comes from transfers (either during life or at death) that continue to pay out after death. Indeed, much of the power of the charitable foundation lies in its ability to extend the life of an enterprise beyond the mortal existence of its initiating agents. Despite their prevalence, whether and in what way the instruments of intergenerational philanthropy can (...) be justified is controversial. Many have argued that these instruments unfairly privilege the interests of the dead at the expense of the living and unborn. More recently, others have argued that intergenerational charitable transfers comport with the demands of distributive justice and are therefore legitimate. This paper contends that both of these perspectives fail to see the problem for what it is. Intergenerational charitable transfers may indeed promote justice in certain respects, but they do so at the cost of imposing the judgments of the dead onto the living. Respecting the wishes of the past conflicts with an interest in “generational sovereignty.” The paper concludes that properly accounting for this interest in generational sovereignty doesn’t require the abolition of intergenerational philanthropy. But it does tell in favor of a different regulatory orientation than most legal systems currently adopt. (shrink)

William James’ argument against William Clifford in The Will to Believe is often understood in terms of doxastic efficacy, the power of belief to influence an outcome. Although that is one strand of James’ argument, there is another which is driven by ampliative risk. The second strand of James’ argument, when applied to scientific cases, is tantamount to what is now called the Argument from Inductive Risk. Either strand of James’ argument is sufficient to rebut Clifford's strong evidentialism (...) and show that it is sometimes permissible to believe in the absence of compelling evidence. However, the two considerations have different scope and force. Doxastic efficacy applies in only some cases but allows any values to play a role in determining belief; risk applies in all cases but only allows particular conditional values to play a role. (shrink)

Many commentators lament that American democracy is in crisis. It is becoming a system of minority rule, wherein a party with a minority of the nationwide vote can control the national government. Partisan gerrymandering in the House of Representatives fuels this crisis, as does the equal representation of small and large states in the Senate. But altering these features of the legislature would not end minority rule. Indeed, it has long been held that majority rule cannot be guaranteed within any (...) district system, as a minority of voters nationwide can be efficiently distributed such that a minority party wins a majority of districts by narrow margins. -/- This Article offers a way to save majority rule. Since the way a party can gain control of the legislature with a minority of the vote is to win a majority of districts by narrow margins of victory and lose a minority of districts by large margins of victory, the solution is to make margins matter. Hence, this Article proposes that we preserve electoral districts in which the candidate with the most votes wins, while making the weight of their vote in the legislature (a representative’s “legislative power”) a function of margins of victory. The first goal of this Article is to outline how this proposal, which I call “weighted voting by margin of victory” (WVMV), retains the democratic virtues of district systems while ending minority rule. This is the first basis for the democratic imperative to make margins matter. -/- There is, however, a second basis for that same imperative, which turns on the political equality of voters. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that the democratic equality should be understood in terms of equal voting power (one person, one vote). But when margins of victory don’t matter, the power of a vote lies exclusively in its potential decisiveness. A vote that changes the margin of victory without changing the victor is “wasted”. But it is an electoral reality that votes in competitive districts are more likely to be decisive, and votes in uncompetitive districts are more likely to be wasted; as a result, candidates and parties are more responsive to some voters than others. So voters are not political equals. They do not have equal voting power, except in an empty formalistic sense. By contrast, WVMV gives votes a second type of power. The power of a vote is to potentially decide who wins and to actually change the legislative power of the victor. Each vote, in effect, transfers a unit of political power to a democratic representative. This “transference” power can be meaningfully equalized between voters. A voter in an uncompetitive district is far less likely to change who wins, but is equally able to change the margin of victory, such that their vote is no longer wasted. This gives candidates and parties a strong reason to be more equally responsive to all voters who can change the margins. Hence, there is a democratic imperative to make margins matter, in order to give voters a meaningfully equal form of voting power. -/- The final goal of this Article is to explain how we can implement WMVM in modern democracies, focusing on three particularly challenging cases: the U.S. Senate, the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and the U.S. House of Representatives. These cases are challenging for several reasons, the most pertinent of which turn on the ways we should understand margins of victory when electorates are of unequal sizes (as in the U.S. Senate) or are contested by more than two parties (as in the U.K.) or are conducted under different voting procedures (as in many districts in the U.S. House). I argue that WVMV should be considered feasible in such contexts, and hence offers a practical, rather than purely theoretical, alternative to the status quo. (shrink)

This book looks at the affective-cognitive roots of how the human mind inquires into the workings of nature and, more generally, how the mind confronts reality. Reality is an infinitely complex system, in virtue of which the mind can comprehend it only in bits and pieces, by making up interpretations of the myriads of signals received from the world by way of integrating those with information stored from the past. This constitutes a piecemeal interpretation by which we assemble our phenomenal (...) reality. In perceiving the complex world and responding to it, the mind invokes the logic of affect and the logic of reason, the former mostly innate and implicit, and the latter generated consciously in explicit terms with reference to mind-independent relations between entities in nature. It is a strange combination of affect and reason that enables us to make decisions and inferences, --- the latter mostly of the inductive type --- thereby making possible the development of theories. Theories are our tool-kits for explaining and predicting phenomena, guiding us along in our journey in life. Theories, however, are defeasible, and need to be constantly updated, at times even radically. In this, the self and the soul are of enormous relevance. The former is the affect-based psychological engine driving all our mental processes, while the latter is the capacity of the conscious mind to examine and reconstruct the self by modulating repressed conflicts. If the soul remains inoperative, all our theories become misdirected and a rot spreads inexorably all around us. (shrink)

There are (at least) three approaches to quantifying information. The first, algorithmic information or Kolmogorov complexity, takes events as strings and, given a universal Turing machine, quantifies the information content of a string as the length of the shortest program producing it [1]. The second, Shannon information, takes events as belonging to ensembles and quantifies the information resulting from observing the given event in terms of the number of alternate events that have been ruled out [2]. The third, statistical learning (...) theory, has introduced measures of capacity that control (in part) the expected risk of classifiers [3]. These capacities quantify the expectations regarding future data that learning algorithms embed into classifiers. Solomonoff and Hutter have applied algorithmic information to prove remarkable results on universal induction. Shannon information provides the mathematical foundation for communication and coding theory. However, both approaches have shortcomings. Algorithmic information is not computable, severely limiting its practical usefulness. Shannon information refers to ensembles rather than actual events: it makes no sense to compute the Shannon information of a single string – or rather, there are many answers to this question depending on how a related ensemble is constructed. Although there are asymptotic results linking algorithmic and Shannon information, it is unsatisfying that there is such a large gap – a difference in kind – between the two measures. This note describes a new method of quantifying information, effective information, that links algorithmic information to Shannon information, and also links both to capacities arising in statistical learning theory [4, 5]. After introducing the measure, we show that it provides a non-universal analog of Kolmogorov complexity. We then apply it to derive basic capacities in statistical learning theory: empirical VC-entropy and empirical Rademacher complexity. A nice byproduct of our approach is an interpretation of the explanatory power of a learning algorithm in terms of the number of hypotheses it falsifies [6], counted in two different ways for the two capacities. We also discuss how effective information relates to information gain, Shannon and mutual information. (shrink)

According to the evolutionary sceptic, the fact that our cognitive faculties evolved radically undermines their reliability. A number of evolutionary epistemologists have sought to refute this kind of scepticism. This paper accepts the success of these attempts, yet argues that refuting the evolutionary sceptic is not enough to put any particular domain of beliefs – notably scientific beliefs, which include belief in Darwinian evolution – on a firm footing. The paper thus sets out to contribute to this positive justificatory project, (...) underdeveloped in the literature. In contrast to a ‘wholesale’ approach, attempting to secure justification for all of our beliefs on the grounds that our belief-forming mechanisms evolved to track truth, we propose a ‘piecemeal’ approach of assessing the reliability of particular belief-forming mechanisms in particular domains. This stands in contrast to the more familiar attempt to transfer warrant obtained for one domain to another by showing how one is somehow an extension of the other. We offer a naturalist reply to the charge of circularity by appealing to reliabilist work on the problem of induction, notably Peter Lipton's distinction between self-certifying and non-self-certifying inductive arguments. We show how, for scientific beliefs, a non-self-certifying argument might be made for the reliability of our cognitive faculties in that domain. We call this strategy Humean Bootstrapping. (shrink)

Teachers encountered numerous challenges posed by the COVID-19 outbreak. Herewith, this study aimed to determine the challenges encountered by Filipino teachers in the new normal and their coping mechanisms. This study employed a qualitative inquiry to determine the challenges encountered and coping mechanisms employed by teachers amid modular instruction, involving 10 teachers from five secondary schools in the Philippines who participated voluntarily. Data were gathered through a written narrative from each participant and were analyzed thematically. Themed findings showed that these (...) teachers are greatly challenged in terms of learning quality transfer, module distribution and retrieval, students’ difficulties in following instruction, power disruption, internet connection, and health risks posed by the pandemic. Nevertheless, these teachers dealt with these difficulties by employing their own coping techniques. Teaching can be challenging and frustrating, especially in these difficult times, but as these teachers demonstrated, everything is possible. Hence, educators must be ready for any situation that may arise. This situation is unlikely to get better anytime soon; instead, teachers will need to adjust to and accept this reality. (shrink)

We investigate an enrichment of the propositional modal language L with a "universal" modality ■ having semantics x ⊧ ■φ iff ∀y(y ⊧ φ), and a countable set of "names" - a special kind of propositional variables ranging over singleton sets of worlds. The obtained language ℒ $_{c}$ proves to have a great expressive power. It is equivalent with respect to modal definability to another enrichment ℒ(⍯) of ℒ, where ⍯ is an additional modality with the semantics x ⊧ (...) ⍯φ iff Vy(y ≠ x → y ⊧ φ). Model-theoretic characterizations of modal definability in these languages are obtained. Further we consider deductive systems in ℒ $_{c}$ . Strong completeness of the normal ℒ $_{c}$ logics is proved with respect to models in which all worlds are named. Every ℒ $_{c}$ -logic axiomatized by formulae containing only names (but not propositional variables) is proved to be strongly frame-complete. Problems concerning transfer of properties ([in]completeness, filtration, finite model property etc.) from ℒ to ℒ $_{c}$ are discussed. Finally, further perspectives for names in multimodal environment are briefly sketched. (shrink)

Some learning strategies that work well when computational considerations are abstracted away from become severely limiting when such considerations are taken into account. We illustrate this phenomenon for agents who attempt to extrapolate patterns in binary data streams chosen from among a countable family of possibilities. If computational constraints are ignored, then two strategies that will always work are learning by enumeration (enumerate the possibilities---in order of simplicity, say---then search for the one earliest in the ordering that agrees with your (...) data and use it to predict the next data point) and Bayesian learning. But there are many types of computable data streams that, although they can be successfully extrapolated by computable agents, cannot be handled by any computable learner by enumeration. And while there is a sense in which Bayesian learning is a fully general strategy for computable learners, the ability to mimic powerful learners comes at a price for Bayesians: they cannot, in general, become highly confident of their predictions in the limit of large data sets and they cannot, in general, use priors that incorporate all relevant background knowledge. (shrink)

As a response to the COVID-19 crisis, governments have turned to various discretionary measures such as cash transfers to consumers and businesses with mixed results. Universal Basic Income (UBI) is back on the agenda as well. One of the main advantages of UBI, as scholars like F.A. Hayek, Milton Friedman, and James M. Buchanan have argued, is that it does not depend upon competent and benevolent government discretion—which is often in short supply—but upon pre-established rules. This paper argues that the (...) UBI scheme holds tentative promise from the point of view of improving the institutional crisis preparedness of a complex socioeconomic order. The pre-established rules of UBI buttress the rule of law framework that improves the ability of economic agents to spontaneously coordinate their actions in times of crisis characterized by radical uncertainty, disequilibrium shocks, and institutional instability. Furthermore, UBI combines the distribution of fungible resources with the delegation of independent decision-making power to millions of crisis-struck individuals and communities. Compared to discretionary tax-and-transfer schemes, the rules of UBI therefore appear more compatible with the polycentric discovery of novel solutions from the bottom-up. In times of crisis, UBI may be relied upon as one cornerstone of what I shall call the permanent crisis management framework. Having such a permanent scheme may minimize - although it does not altogether eliminate - the need for discretionary transfers, targeted intervention, and technocratic management in times of crisis. However, this theoretical model of UBI as a facilitator of polycentric crisis preparedness faces several practical challenges that need to be addressed in further research. (shrink)

Moorean arguments are a popular and powerful way to engage highly revisionary philosophical views, such as nihilism about motion, time, truth, consciousness, causation, and various kinds of skepticism (e.g., external world, other minds, inductive, global). They take, as a premise, a highly plausible first-order claim (e.g., cars move, I ate breakfast before lunch, it’s true that some fish have gills) and conclude from it the falsity of the highly revisionary philosophical thesis. Moorean arguments can be used against nihilists in (...) ethics (error theorists), too. Recently, error theorists have recognized Moorean arguments as a powerful challenge and have tried to meet it. They’ve argued that moral Moorean premises seem highly credible to us, but aren’t, by offering various debunking explanations. These explanations all appeal to higher-order evidence—evidence of error in our reasoning. I argue that drawing attention to higher-order evidence is a welcome contribution from error theorists, but that the higher-order evidence actually counts further against error theoretic arguments—including their debunking explanations—and further in favor of Moorean arguments and the commonsense views they support. Along the way I answer a few prominent objections to Moorean arguments: that they are objectionably question-begging, rely on categorizing some facts as “Moorean Facts”, and that reports of one’s credence in a proposition bears no interesting relation to that proposition’s credibility. (shrink)

Birth mothers usually have a moral right to parent their newborns in virtue of a mutual attachment formed, during gestation, between the gestational mother and the fetus. The attachment is formed, in part, thanks to the burdens of pregnancy, and it serves the interest of the newborn; the gestational mother, too, has a powerful interest in the protection of this attachment. Given its justification, the right to parent one's gestated baby cannot be transferred at will to other people who would (...) wish to function as social parents of the child in question. This indicates that surrogacy contracts are illegitimate, and therefore should be void. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Objectives There is little research on moral uncertainties and distress of palliative and hospice care providers (PHCPs) working in jurisdictions anticipating legalising voluntary assisted dying (VAD). This study examines the perception and anticipated concerns of PHCPs in providing VAD in the State of Queensland, Australia prior to legalisation of the practice in 2021. The findings help inform strategies to facilitate training and support the health and well-being of healthcare workers involved in VAD. Design The study used a qualitative approach (...) to examine and analyse the perception and anticipated concerns of PHCPs regarding challenges of providing assisted dying in Queensland. Fourteen PHCPs were recruited using a purposive sampling strategy to obtain a broad representation of perspectives including work roles, geographical locations and workplace characteristics. Data were collected via one in-depth interview per participant. The transcripts were coded for patterns and themes using an inductive analysis approach following the tradition of Grounded Theory. Setting The study was conducted in hospital, hospice, community and residential aged care settings in Queensland, Australia. These included public and private facilities, secular and faith-based facilities, and regional/rural and urban facilities. Participants Interviews were conducted with fourteen PHCPs: 10 nurses and 4 physicians; 11 female and 3 male. The median number of years of palliative care practice was 17, ranging from 2 to 36 years. For inclusion, participants had to be practising palliative and hospice care providers. Results PHCPs are divided on whether VAD should be considered part of palliative care. Expectations of moral distress and uncertainty about practising VAD were identified in five areas: handling requests, assessing patient capacity, arranging patient transfers and logistical issues, managing unsuccessful attempts, and dealing with team conflicts and stigma. Conclusions The possibility of having to practise VAD causes moral distress and uncertainty for some PHCPs. Procedural clarity can address some uncertainties; moral and psychological distress, however, remains a source of tension that needs support to ensure ongoing care of both patients and PHCPs. The introduction of VAD post-legalisation may present an occasion for further moral education and development of PHCPs. (shrink)

Equal Justice explores the role of the idea of equality in liberal theories of justice. The title indicates the book’s two-part thesis: first, I claim that justice is the central moral category in the socio-political domain; second, I argue for a specific conceptual and normative connection between the ideas of justice and equality. This pertains to the age-old question concerning the normative significance of equality in a theory of justice. The book develops an independent, systematic, and comprehensive theory of equality (...) and egalitarianism. The principal question is about the importance of equality in a theory of justice. More precisely, we should pose questions in four contracting circles: 1. Is justice the supreme value guiding our setup of the basic structure of society, or are there other, equally important values, such as recognition, care, communal belonging? 2. If justice is the highest guiding principle, which competing ideals—especially equality and freedom—ought to have precedence in a policy oriented toward justice? What status does the ideal of equality have in that framework? 3. If equality is a basic ideal of just policy, how should it be practically realized? What sort of equality (equal opportunity, equality of welfare, resource equality) should be demanded? 4. What patterned distribution of which specific goods does the ideal of equality demand? Which principles of distribution can be justified according to our justice ideal? To conclude and summarize: 5. What is the essential core of an egalitarian theory of justice, as opposed to an inegalitarian theory? These five questions structure the work’s order of argumentation. Part A elaborates the conceptual foundations and basic moral principles of justice and equality. Chapter I sets out to install justice as the central moral category in the socio-political domain. At the beginning of the first chapter, the conceptual foundations of justice are clarified. While not eliminating the classical distinctions between different forms of justice, I argue that the distributive paradigm is of primary importance. The primacy of justice in the socio-political domain is developed out of a confrontation with alternative positions, those which maintain either that justice generally, or distributive justice in particular, are subsidiary virtues. At the end of Chapter I, the first of the questions mentioned above is answered in a way that establishes justice as the guiding normative concept for the foundation and evaluation of any social order. To clarify the role of equality in a theory of justice, Chapter II separates the idea of equality into four different principles. They are organized in a way that begins with the most general and uncontroversial principle of equality, and progresses towards increasingly detailed and contested principles. There are two theses that articulate and defend the significance of equality for justice: First there is a conceptual connection between justice and equality, in that principles of formal and proportional equality are necessary in order to explicate the concept of justice. These two principles establish an unbreakable bond between justice and equality. Justice can only be explained—or so I argue—by reference to these and other (normative) principles of equality. The second thesis posits a normative relationship between justice and equality, which is disclosed by three substantive principles of equality: moral equality, the presumption of equality, and the principle of responsibility. I argue that the normative core of an egalitarian theory of justice is expressed by the latter two principles, which are themselves based on the first principle, that of moral equality. When we view one another as persons, what form of equality or equal treatment is normatively demanded? I argue that the answer to this question is given by the procedural principle of the presumption of equality: regardless of their apparent differences, all persons deserve strictly equal treatment, unless certain kinds of differences have whatever particular relevance would justify, on generally acceptable grounds, unequal treatment or unequal distribution. The justification of the presumption of equality is central to this work and has considerable importance. If the presumption principle’s validity can be justified by enlisting the principle of general justification, then the primacy of equality, and the essential argument for an egalitarian theory of justice, is established. This would likewise provide a procedure for the construction of a material theory of justice. The second question is answered thereby at the end of Chapter II: Equality should have primacy over competing ideals within a justice-oriented policy. The presumption of equality establishes this primacy and, at the same time, offers an appropriate metric and guideline for the construction of a material theory of distributive justice. The presumption of equality in Part B offers an elegant procedure for the development of a theory of distributive justice. Chapter III clearly sets out the necessary prerequisites that a theory of distribution must satisfy in order to determine a liberal-egalitarian distributional framework. We need to specify in which situation the distribution takes place; which goods are and are not to be distributed; in which respect the presumptive equality is to be produced; and by and to whom, and for what period, the relevant goods are to be distributed. The distribution is based on resources understood as general-purpose means. It is necessary to divide goods into different categories, since the justification for unequal treatment in one domain will not carry over into another. This makes presumptive equality necessarily complex. To that end, four spheres of justice are distinguished: (1) the political sphere, which involves allocating rights through the distribution of civil liberties; (2) the democratic sphere, in which political power and the rights of political participation are regulated; (3) the economic sphere, in which income and property are distributed; (4) the social sphere, in which social positions and opportunities are distributed. This framework of distributive justice answers the third of our guiding questions, about the nature of equality, in terms of equality of resources. Chapters IV and V set out the egalitarian distributive criteria for each sphere. I argue that the generally accepted, fundamental rights of classical liberalism are more effectively reconstructed by reference to the equal resource distribution presumptively required in those spheres. Chapter IV shows that when it comes to the first two spheres, those involving basic rights and freedoms and entitlement political participation, there can be no justified exceptions to the equal distribution of the relevant goods. That section argues, contrary to what we commonly find in theories of freedom or popular sovereignty, that the value of freedom and self-determination as the political basis of autonomy is best realized through the presumption of equal distribution. Chapter V deals with the other two spheres, those of economic goods and social positions, and argues for justified exceptions to equal distribution. In the economic sphere we find one principal reason favouring unequal distribution of resources, and three restrictions and compensations limiting that inequality. The basic exception to equal economic distribution arises from the unequal consequences of personal responsibility. From a suitably egalitarian standpoint, the principle of responsibility is the normative principle that determines which reasons justify economic inequality. Here the basic idea is that unequal shares of social goods are fair if they result from the choices and deliberate actions of the relevant parties. That individuals have to bear the costs of their own choices is a condition of autonomy. However, benefits or disadvantages arising from arbitrary and unmerited differences in social circumstances or natural endowments is unfair. The unequal consequences of independent decision-making and action must therefore be limited by compensating first for preferences, secondly for disadvantages, and thirdly by redistributing wealth in aid of the worse-off. I situations of emergency, compensating for disadvantages has priority over all other claims, owing to the urgency of the situation. Social inequalities go beyond the permissible limit if it is possible to improve the long-term social or economic situation of the worse-off by redistributing wealth to them. These exceptions lead to a complex system of free economic action within a framework of compensatory tax and transfer mechanisms. Finally, in the social sphere, the distribution of social positions, offices and opportunities must be structured to ensure that equally talented and motivated citizens have roughly equal chances of obtaining those offices or positions, irrespective of their economic or social class backgrounds. This compromise is permissible for reasons of freedom and prudence, and it makes a certain measure of inequality acceptable. The fourth of our guiding questions is answered accordingly. There are five principles of justice for the basic structure of society, and five legal principles that govern the special distribution of goods in the respective spheres—all are ranked according to their most defensible grounds of priority, ensuring that everyone is accorded equal justice. Chapter VI recapitulates the initial question of equality’s value. The conception of equal justice developed in this work postulates five principles of equality and five principles of law; these constitute an egalitarian framework because they support and promote social justice. Equality has value with respect to them, but is not given any independent, intrinsic value. That is why I call the account developed here a form of constitutive egalitarianism: justice is realized through the realization of equality, itself accomplished by applying the five postulates of equality and five distributive principles of law. This is an egalitarianism on two levels. The first level is involves the claim that morality or justice is conceptually connected with equality. The second level gives equality a substantial weight in what is conceptually validated at the first level, namely the presumption of equality, and constructs an appropriate interpretation and conception of distributive justice through principles of distribution for the individual spheres. The weight and importance of equality is shown by the distributive criteria applied to those spheres. This answers our final guiding question about the nature of an egalitarian theory. (shrink)

Discovering laws of nature was a way to worship a law-giving God, during the Scientific Revolution. So why should we consider it worthwhile now, in our own more secularized science? For historical perspective, I examine two competing early modern theological traditions that related laws of nature to different divine attributes, and their secular legacy in views ranging from Kant and Nietzsche to Humean and ‘governing’ accounts in recent analytic metaphysics. Tracing these branching offshoots of ethically charged God-concepts sheds light on (...) how our ethical ideals and ideas of natural order can still be valuably integrated. Early modern intellectualists valued the law-governed order of nature as a sign of divine Reason. In turn, Reason traditionally ascribed to God has now been partly reclaimed for humans, reframing the value of natural order anthropocentrically, in terms of the value of our own intelligence. Alternatively, Reason may be reclaimed for nature itself, as in an ‘objective’ idealism or metaphysical rationalism. However, beyond divine Reason, an influential voluntarist tradition in theology stressed a connection between laws of nature and God’s Power or free Will. Tracking how divine Power has been reinvested in human beings provides a broader context for instrumentalism and related lineages of empiricism. But secularization can also transfer Power from God to the impersonal natural world. In this light, current scientific interest in lawlike order may also reflect the inherent value of brute necessity or inhuman causal power in nature: this is a deeper way to reject anthropocentrism and to show our respect for the environment. (shrink)

Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673) argues that when someone throws a ball, their hand does not cause the ball to move. Instead, the ball moves itself. In this chapter, I reconstruct Cavendish’s argument that material things—like the ball—are self-moving. Cavendish argues that body-body interaction is unintelligible. We cannot make sense of interaction in terms of the transfer of motion nor the more basic idea that one body acts in another body. Assuming something moves bodies around, Cavendish concludes that bodies move themselves. (...) Still, Cavendish needs to explain why bodies appear to causally interact even if they do not really. Balls do not usually throw themselves without a helping hand. I offer a new reading of the way bodies respond to their external circumstances in terms of prerequisites or enabling conditions. (shrink)

The functionalist approach to kinds has suffered recently due to its association with law-based approaches to induction and explanation. Philosophers of science increasingly view nomological approaches as inappropriate for the special sciences like psychology and biology, which has led to a surge of interest in approaches to natural kinds that are more obviously compatible with mechanistic and model-based methods, especially homeostatic property cluster theory. But can the functionalist approach to kinds be weaned off its dependency on laws? Dan Weiskopf has (...) recently offered a reboot of the functionalist program by replacing its nomological commitments with a model-based approach more closely derived from practice in psychology. Roughly, Weiskopf holds that the natural kinds of psychology will be the functional properties that feature in many empirically successful cognitive models, and that those properties need not be localized to parts of an underlying mechanism. I here skeptically examine the three modeling practices that Weiskopf thinks introduce such non-localizable properties: fictionalization, reification, and functional abstraction. In each case, I argue that recognizing functional properties introduced by these practices as autonomous kinds comes at clear cost to those explanations’ counterfactual explanatory power. At each step, a tempting functionalist response is parochialism: to hold that the false or omitted counterfactuals fall outside the modeler’s explanatory aims, and so should not be counted against functional kinds. I conclude by noting the dangers this attitude poses to scientific disagreement, inviting functionalists to better articulate how the individuation conditions for functional kinds might outstrip the perspective of a single modeler. (shrink)

The chapter deals with misconceptions in perception theory that are based on the idea of slicing the nature of perception along the joints of physics and on corresponding ill-conceived ʹpurposesʹ and ʹgoalsʹ of the perceptual system. It argues that the conceptual structure underlying the percept cannot be inferentially attained from the sensory input. The output of the perceptual system, namely meaningful categories, is evidently vastly underdetermined by the sensory input, namely physico-geometric energy patterns. Thus, the core task of perception theory (...) is to understand the internal conceptual structure with which our perceptual system is endowed. The conceptual structure underlying the semantic distinctions that characterise the output of the perceptual system can, by conceptual necessity, only be expressed by a logical language that is strictly more powerful than the logical language by which sensory notions can be expressed. Consequently, the internal structure underlying perceptual meaning – including core notions such as ‘Gestalt’ or ‘perceptual object’ – cannot be derived, by whatever kind of general inductive machinery, from the sensory input, or, more generally, from experience. (shrink)

In 1947, the U.S. Secretary of State, George C. Marshall announced that the USA would provide development aid to help the recovery and reconstruction of the economies of Europe, which was widely known as the ‘Marshall Plan’. In Italy, this plan generated a resurgence of modern industrialization and remodeled Italian Industry based on American models of production. As the result of these transnational transfers, the systemic approach known as Fordism largely succeeded and allowed some Italian firms such as Fiat to (...) flourish. During this period, Detroit and Turin, homes to the most powerful automobile corporations of the twentieth century, became intertwined in a web of common features such as industrial concentration, mass flows of immigrations, uneven urban sprawl, radical iconography and inner-city decay, which characterized Fordism in both cities. In the crucial decades of the postwar expansion of the automobile industries, both cities were hubs of labor battles and social movements. However, after the radical decline in their industries as previous auto cities, they experienced the radical shift toward post-Fordist urbanization and production of political urbanism. This research responds to the recent interest for a comparative (re)turn in urban studies by suggesting the conceptual theoretical baseline for the proposed comparative framework in post-Fordist cities. In better words, it develops a “theory” on the challenges of comparative urbanism in post-Fordist cities. (shrink)

Investments in mitigating climate change have their greatest environmental impact over the long term. As a consequence the incentives to invest in cutting greenhouse gas emissions today appear to be weak. In response to this challenge, there has been increasing attention given to the idea that current generations can be motivated to start financing mitigation at much higher levels today by shifting these costs to the future through national debt. Shifting costs to the future in this way benefits future generations (...) by break- ing existing patterns of delaying large-scale investment in low-carbon energy and efficiency. As we will see in this chapter, it does appear to be technically feasible to transfer the costs of investments made today to the future in such a way that people alive today do not incur any net cost. the aim of this chapter is to take seriously the possibility that climate change has produced an extremely intractable political problem and that we must now consider strong measures that can break existing patterns of delaying mitigation. I defend the claim that if climate change involves a stark conflict of interests between current and future generations, then borrowing from the future would be both strategically and normatively much better than the status quo. Nevertheless, I challenge the borrowing from the future proposal on the grounds that it is not in fact the powerful tool for motivating existing agents that its proponents imagine it to be. The purpose of developing this critical argument is not, however, simply to throw doubt onto the idea of borrowing from the future. If we really do find ourselves in a political context where the prospects for effective action are very poor then strategic forms of buck-passing may make an important positive contribution to avoiding dangerous global cli- mate change. Consequently, if debt financing is not as powerful of a motivational tool as imagined we still have strong reasons, I will argue, to identify other strategies that will change agents’ incentive structures. To this end, I propose an alternative form of passing on the costs of mitigation to the future that warrants consideration. (shrink)

Legal philosophers and property scholars sometimes disagree over one or more of the following: the meaning of the word 'property,' the concept of property, and the nature of property. For much of the twentieth century, the work of W.N. Hohfeld and Tony Honoré represented a consensus around property. The consensus often went under the heading of property as bundle of rights, or more accurately as a set of normative relations between persons with respect to things. But by the mid-l 990s, (...) the consensus was under attack. Key figures in the attack were James Penner, a legal philosopher, and Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, two highly regarded professors of property law. This article aims to repel the attack and argues for property as a set of normative relations between persons with respect to things. The positive case for this view of property pays special attention to the philosophy of language and the analysis of concepts. The positive case also maintains that the right to use and the power to transfer are as central to property as the right to exclude. It is possible that the virtues of Smith's modular theory of property differ from the virtues of a well-crafted bundle theory. Indeed, it may be the case that these two theories throw light on different features of property law and are not, save at the margin, competitors with each other. The label 'new essentialism' sometimes applied to the work of Penner, Merrill, and Smith seems inapt if property does not have an essence. Of course, they might refuse the label. (shrink)

In the fifth version of our response-paper [26] to Imamura’s criticism, we recall that NonStandard Neutrosophic Logic was never used by neutrosophic community in no application, that the quarter of century old neutrosophic operators (1995-1998) criticized by Imamura were never utilized since they were improved shortly after but he omits to tell their development, and that in real world applications we need to convert/approximate the NonStandard Analysis hyperreals, monads and binads to tiny intervals with the desired accuracy – otherwise they (...) would be inapplicable. We point out several errors and false statements by Imamura [21] with respect to the inf/sup of nonstandard subsets, also Imamura’s “rigorous definition of neutrosophic logic” is wrong and the same for his definition of nonstandard unit interval, and we prove that there is not a total order on the set of hyperreals (because of the newly introduced Neutrosophic Hyperreals that are indeterminate), whence the Transfer Principle from R to R* is questionable. After his criticism, several response publications on theoretical nonstandard neutrosophics followed in the period 2018-2022. As such, I extended the NonStandard Analysis by adding the left monad closed to the right, right monad closed to the left, pierced binad (we introduced in 1998), and unpierced binad - all these in order to close the newly extended nonstandard space (R*) under nonstandard addition, nonstandard subtraction, nonstandard multiplication, nonstandard division, and nonstandard power operations [23, 24]. Improved definitions of NonStandard Unit Interval and NonStandard Neutrosophic Logic, together with NonStandard Neutrosophic Operators are presented. (shrink)

The main thesis of this paper is that when we trust the results of scientific research, that trust is inevitably directed at least in part at collective bodies rather than at single researchers, and that accordingly, reasonable assessments of epistemic trustworthiness in science must attend to these collective bodies. In order to support this claim, I start by invoking the collaborative nature of most of today’s scientific research. I argue that the trustworthiness of a collaborative research group does not supervene (...) on the trustworthiness of its individual members and point out some specific problems for the assessment of epistemic trustworthiness that arise from the specific nature of today’s collaborative research. Next, I argue that the social diffusion of trustworthiness goes even further; we always also need an assessment of the trustworthiness of the respective research community as a whole. Communities, I claim, play an essential role in the epistemic quality management of science. To see why this role is indispensible, we have to appreciate the full complexity of determining what is desirable in a method of inquiry. The relevant features of a method include three different dimensions: the reliability of positive results, the reliability of negative results, and the method’s power. Every methodological choice involves a trade-off between these three dimensions. The right balance between them (the “distribution of inductive risks”, or DIR) depends on value judgments about the costs of false results and the benefits of correct ones. Conventional methodological standards of research communities impose constraints on admissible DIR and thereby harmonize the implicit value judgments. Trusting that the research community has set the limitations on DIR in a suitable way is thus always part of placing our trust in a scientific result. (shrink)

There is a need to bring about a revolution in the philosophy of science, interpreted to be both the academic discipline, and the official view of the aims and methods of science upheld by the scientific community. At present both are dominated by the view that in science theories are chosen on the basis of empirical considerations alone, nothing being permanently accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Biasing choice of theory in the direction of simplicity, unity (...) or explanatory power does not permanently commit science to the thesis that nature is simple or unified. This current ‘paradigm’ is, I argue, untenable. We need a new paradigm, which acknowledges that science makes a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, theories being chosen partly on the basis of compatibility with these assumptions. Eleven arguments are given for favouring this new ‘paradigm’ over the current one. (shrink)

This paper argues that Rousseau’s lawgiver is best thought of as a fictional teacher of peoples. It is fictional as it reflects an idea that is entertained despite its contradictory nature, and it is contradictory in the sense that it describes ‘an undertaking beyond human strength and, to execute it, an authority that amounts to nothing’ (II.7; 192). Rousseau conceives of the social contract as a necessary device for enabling the transferal of individual power to the body politic, for (...) subsuming individual wills under the general will, and for aligning the good of the individual with the common good. For the social contract to be valid, however, it needs to be preceded by a desire to belong to a moral community that can induce people to join willingly, and that will grant legitimacy to the laws established. If the social contract is the machinery that makes the body politic function, the lawgiver is ‘the mechanic who invents the machine’ (II.7; 191). In this paper we will look closer at the pedagogical functions of Rousseau’s mythical lawgiver by first examining the relationship between the social contract, the general will and the lawgiver. Then, we aim to flesh out a pedagogical understanding of the figure of the lawgiver by way of the two educational dimensions of accommodation and transformation. Finally, we will argue for the importance of understanding Rousseau’s lawgiver as a fictional device allowing for the fundamental and enduring educational task of balancing between the preservation and renewal of society. (shrink)

Cells are cognitive entities possessing great computational power. DNA serves as a multivalent information storage medium for these computations at various time scales. Information is stored in sequences, epigenetic modifications, and rapidly changing nucleoprotein complexes. Because DNA must operate through complexes formed with other molecules in the cell, genome functions are inherently interactive and involve two-way communication with various cellular compartments. Both coding sequences and repetitive sequences contribute to the hierarchical systemic organization of the genome. By virtue of nucleoprotein (...) complexes, epigenetic modifications, and natural genetic engineering activities, the genome can serve as a read-write storage system. An interactive informatic conceptualization of the genome allows us to understand the functional importance of DNA that does not code for protein or RNA structure, clarifies the essential multidirectional and systemic nature of genomic information transfer, and emphasizes the need to investigate how cellular computation operates in reproduction and evolution. (shrink)

This book presents and analyzes the most important arguments in the history of Western philosophy's skeptical tradition. It demonstrates that, although powerful, these arguments are quite limited and fail to prove their core assertion that knowledge is beyond our reach. Argues that skepticism is mistaken and that knowledge is possible Dissects the problems of realism and the philosophical doubts about the accuracy of the senses Explores the ancient argument against a criterion of knowledge, Descartes' skeptical arguments, and skeptical arguments applied (...) to inductive inference and self-knowledge Uses Moore's proof of an external world and the reliabilist conception of knowledge to illustrate that the traditional skeptical arguments fail to meet their mark. (shrink)

Surrogacy involves a private agreement whereby a woman who gestates a child attempts to surrender her (putative) moral right to become the parent of that child such that another person (or persons), of the woman’s choice, can acquire it. Since people lack the normative power to privately transfer custody, attempts to do so are illegitimate, and the law should reflect this fact.