Sentences about logic are often used to show that certain embedding expressions are hyperintensional. Yet it is not clear how to regiment “logic talk” in the object language so that it can be compositionally embedded under such expressions. In this paper, I develop a formal system called hyperlogic that is designed to do just that. I provide a hyperintensional semantics for hyperlogic that doesn’t appeal to logically impossible worlds, as traditionally understood, but instead uses a shiftable parameter that determines the (...) interpretation of the logical connectives. I argue this semantics compares favorably to the more common impossible worlds semantics, which faces difficulties interpreting propositionally quantified logic talk. (shrink)

A supplemental document for "Metalinguistic Gradability".

A counterpossible is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Counterpossibles present a puzzle for standard theories of counterfactuals, which predict that all counterpossibles are semantically vacuous. Moreover, counterpossibles play an important role in many debates within metaphysics and epistemology, including debates over grounding, causation, modality, mathematics, science, and even God. In this article, we will explore various positions on counterpossibles as well as their potential philosophical consequences.

Conventional wisdom has it that truth is always evaluated using our actual linguistic conventions, even when considering counterfactual scenarios in which different conventions are adopted. This principle has been invoked in a number of philosophical arguments, including Kripke’s defense of the necessity of identity and Lewy’s objection to modal conventionalism. But it is false. It fails in the presence of what Einheuser (2006) calls c-monsters, or convention-shifting expressions (on analogy with Kaplan’s monsters, or context-shifting expressions). We show that c-monsters naturally (...) arise in contexts, such as metalinguistic negotiations, where speakers entertain alternative conventions. We develop an expressivist theory—inspired by Barker (2002) and MacFarlane (2016) on vague predications and Einheuser (2006) on counterconventionals—to model these shifts in convention. Using this framework, we reassess the philosophical arguments that invoked the conventional wisdom. (shrink)

We develop and defend a new approach to counterlogicals. Non-vacuous counterlogicals, we argue, fall within a broader class of counterfactuals known as counterconventionals. Existing semantics for counterconventionals, 459–482 ) and, 1–27 ) allow counterfactuals to shift the interpretation of predicates and relations. We extend these theories to counterlogicals by allowing counterfactuals to shift the interpretation of logical vocabulary. This yields an elegant semantics for counterlogicals that avoids problems with the usual impossible worlds semantics. We conclude by showing how this approach (...) can be extended to counterpossibles more generally. (shrink)

A common objection to the very idea of conceptual engineering is the topic continuity problem: whenever one tries to “reengineer” a concept, one only shifts attention away from one concept to another. Put differently, there is no such thing as conceptual revision: there’s only conceptual replacement. Here, I show that topic continuity is compatible with conceptual replacement. Whether the topic is preserved in an act of conceptual replacement simply depends on what is being replaced (a conceptual tool or a conceptual (...) role) and what the topic under discussion is. Thus, the topic continuity problem only arises from a failure to specify these two things. (shrink)

It is widely held that counterfactuals, unlike attitude ascriptions, preserve the referential transparency of their constituents, i.e., that counterfactuals validate the substitution of identicals when their constituents do. The only putative counterexamples in the literature come from counterpossibles, i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. Advocates of counterpossibilism, i.e., the view that counterpossibles are not all vacuous, argue that counterpossibles can generate referential opacity. But in order to explain why most substitution inferences into counterfactuals seem valid, counterpossibilists also often maintain that counterfactuals (...) with possible antecedents are transparency‐preserving. I argue that if counterpossibles can generate opacity, then so can ordinary counterfactuals with possible antecedents. Utilizing an analogy between counterfactuals and attitude ascriptions, I provide a counterpossibilist‐friendly explanation for the apparent validity of substitution inferences into counterfactuals. I conclude by suggesting that the debate over counterpossibles is closely tied to questions concerning the extent to which counterfactuals are more like attitude ascriptions and epistemic operators than previously recognized. (shrink)

This is the second part of a two-part series on the logic of hyperlogic, a formal system for regimenting metalogical claims in the object language (even within embedded environments). Part A provided a minimal logic for hyperlogic that is sound and complete over the class of all models. In this part, we extend these completeness results to stronger logics that are sound and complete over restricted classes of models. We also investigate the logic of hyperlogic when the language is enriched (...) with hyperintensional operators such as counterfactual conditionals and belief operators. (shrink)

Counterfactual scepticism holds that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. The main argument for this view appeals to a ‘chance undermines would’ principle: if ψ would have some chance of not obtaining had ϕ obtained, then ϕ □→ ψ is false. This principle seems to follow from two fairly weak principles, namely, that ‘chance ensures could’ and that ϕ □→ ψ and ϕ ⋄→ ¬ ψ clash. Despite their initial plausibility, I show that these principles are independently problematic: given some modest (...) closure principles, they entail absurdities. Moreover, on the most promising strategy for saving these principles, they do not, in the relevant sense, entail the chance-undermines-would principle. Instead, they entail a principle that only supports counterfactual indeterminism, the view that most ordinary counterfactuals are chancy, that is, not settled true. I demonstrate this by developing an indeterminist semantics that vindicates the clash and chance-ensures-could principles but not the chance-undermines-would principle. This view, I argue, offers a better account of our credal and linguistic judgements than counterfactual scepticism. (shrink)

A counteridentical is a counterfactual with an identity statement in the antecedent. While counteridenticals generally seem non-trivial, most semantic theories for counterfactuals, when combined with the necessity of identity and distinctness, attribute vacuous truth conditions to such counterfactuals. In light of this, one could try to save the orthodox theories either by appealing to pragmatics or by denying that the antecedents of alleged counteridenticals really contain identity claims. Or one could reject the orthodox theory of counterfactuals in favor of a (...) hyperintensional semantics that accommodates non-trivial counterpossibles. In this paper, I argue that none of these approaches can account for all the peculiar features of counteridenticals. Instead, I propose a modified version of Lewis’s counterpart theory, which rejects the necessity of identity, and show that it can explain all the peculiar features of counteridenticals in a satisfactory way. I conclude by defending the plausibility of contingent identity from objections. (shrink)

While standard first-order modal logic is quite powerful, it cannot express even very simple sentences like “I could have been taller than I actually am” or “Everyone could have been smarter than they actually are”. These are examples of cross-world predication, whereby objects in one world are related to objects in another world. Extending first-order modal logic to allow for cross-world predication in a motivated way has proven to be notoriously difficult. In this paper, I argue that the standard accounts (...) of cross-world predication all leave something to be desired. I then propose an account of cross-world predication based on quantified hybrid logic and show how it overcomes the limitations of these previous accounts. I will conclude by discussing various philosophical consequences and applications of such an account. (shrink)

In the study of modal and nonclassical logics, translations have frequently been employed as a way of measuring the inferential capabilities of a logic. It is sometimes claimed that two logics are “notational variants” if they are translationally equivalent. However, we will show that this cannot be quite right, since first-order logic and propositional logic are translationally equivalent. Others have claimed that for two logics to be notational variants, they must at least be compositionally intertranslatable. The definition of compositionality these (...) accounts use, however, is too strong, as the standard translation from modal logic to first-order logic is not compositional in this sense. In light of this, we will explore a weaker version of this notion that we will call schematicity and show that there is no schematic translation either from first-order logic to propositional logic or from intuitionistic logic to classical logic. (shrink)

A supplemental document for "The Logic of Hyperlogic. Part A: Foundations".

I develop an expressivist account of verbal disagreements as practical disagreements over how to use words rather than factual disagreements over what words actually mean. This account enjoys several advantages over others in the literature: it can be implemented in a neo-Stalnakerian possible worlds framework; it accounts for cases where speakers are undecided on how exactly to interpret an expression; it avoids appeals to fraught notions like subject matter, charitable interpretation, and joint-carving; and it naturally extends to an analysis of (...) metalinguistic negotiations. (shrink)

Hyperlogic is a hyperintensional system designed to regiment metalogical claims (e.g., “Intuitionistic logic is correct” or “The law of excluded middle holds”) into the object language, including within embedded environments such as attitude reports and counterfactuals. This paper is the first of a two-part series exploring the logic of hyperlogic. This part presents a minimal logic of hyperlogic and proves its completeness. It consists of two interdefined axiomatic systems: one for classical consequence (truth preservation under a classical interpretation of the (...) connectives) and one for “universal” consequence (truth preservation under any interpretation). The sequel to this paper explores stronger logics that are sound and complete over various restricted classes of models as well as languages with hyperintensional operators. (shrink)

Many authors have noted that there are types of English modal sentences cannot be formalized in the language of basic first-order modal logic. Some widely discussed examples include “There could have been things other than there actually are” and “Everyone who is actually rich could have been poor.” In response to this lack of expressive power, many authors have discussed extensions of first-order modal logic with two-dimensional operators. But claims about the relative expressive power of these extensions are often justified (...) only by example rather than by rigorous proof. In this paper, we provide proofs of many of these claims and present a more complete picture of the expressive landscape for such languages. (shrink)

Sentences about logic are often used to show that certain embedding expressions, including attitude verbs, conditionals, and epistemic modals, are hyperintensional. Yet it not clear how to regiment “logic talk” in the object language so that it can be compositionally embedded under such expressions. This paper does two things. First, it argues against a standard account of logic talk, viz., the impossible worlds semantics. It is shown that this semantics does not easily extend to a language with propositional quantifiers, which (...) are necessary for regimenting some logic talk. Second, it develops an alternative framework based on logical expressivism, which explains logic talk using shifting conventions. When combined with the standard S5π+ semantics for propositional quantifiers, this framework results in a well-behaved system that does not face the problems of the impossible worlds semantics. It can also be naturally extended with hybrid operators to regiment a broader range of logic talk, e.g., claims about what laws hold according to other logics. The resulting system, called hyperlogic, is therefore a better framework for modeling logic talk than previous accounts. (shrink)

Arguments have always played a central role within logic and philosophy. But little attention has been paid to arguments as a distinctive kind of discourse, with its own semantics and pragmatics. The goal of this essay is to study the mechanisms by means of which we make arguments in discourse, starting from the semantics of argument connectives such as `therefore'. While some proposals have been made in the literature, they fail to account for the distinctive anaphoric behavior of `therefore', as (...) well as uses of argument connectives in complex arguments, suppositional arguments, arguments with non-declarative conclusions, as well as arguments with parenthetical remarks. A comprehensive account of arguments requires imposing a distinctive tree-like structure on contexts. We show how to extend our account to accommodate modal subordination and and di fferent flavors of `therefore'. (shrink)

We offer a novel account of metalinguistic comparatives, such as 'Al is more wise than clever'. On our view, metalinguistic comparatives express comparative commitments to conventions. Thus, 'Al is more wise than clever' expresses that the speaker has a stronger commitment to a convention on which Al is wise than to a convention on which she is clever. This view avoids problems facing previous approaches to metalinguistic comparatives. It also fits within a broader framework—independently motivated by metalinguistic negotiations and convention-shiftingexpressions— (...) that gives linguistic conventions a role in the semantics. (shrink)

Legal systems often rule that people own objects in their territory. We propose that an early-developing ability to make territory-based inferences of ownership helps children address informational demands presented by ownership. Across 6 experiments (N = 504), we show that these inferences develop between ages 3 and 5 and stem from two aspects of the psychology of ownership. First, we find that a basic ability to infer that people own objects in their territory is already present at age 3 (Experiment (...) 1). Children even make these inferences when the territory owner unintentionally acquired the objects and was unaware of them (Experiments 2 and 3). Second, we find that between ages 3 and 5, children come to consider past events in these judgments. They move from solely considering the current location of an object in territory-based inferences, to also considering and possibly inferring where it originated (Experiments 4 to 6). Together, these findings suggest that territory-based inferences of ownership are unlikely to be constructions of the law. Instead, they may reflect basic intuitions about ownership that operate from early in development. (shrink)

Much has been written on whether practical knowledge (knowledge-how) reduces to propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). Less attention has been paid to what we call deliberative knowledge (knowledge-to), i.e., knowledge ascriptions embedding other infinitival questions, like _where to meet_, _when to leave_, and _what to bring_. We offer an analysis of knowledge-to and argue on its basis that, regardless of whether knowledge-how reduces to knowledge-that, no such reduction of knowledge-to is forthcoming. Knowledge-to, unlike knowledge-that and knowledge-how, requires the agent to have formed (...) certain conditional intentions. We discuss the philosophical implications for knowledge-how, deliberative questions, and virtue. (shrink)

In light of the problem of logical omniscience, some scholars have argued that belief is question-sensitive: agents don't simply believe propositions but rather believe answers to questions. Hoek (2022) has recently developed a version of this approach on which a belief state is a "web" of questions and answers. Here, we present several challenges to Hoek's question-sensitive account of belief. First, Hoek's account is prone to very similar logical omniscience problems as those he claims to address. Second, the link between (...) belief and action he proposes is too rigid. We close by sketching a generalization of the account that can meet these challenges. (shrink)

Since ancient times, legal systems have held owners responsible for harm caused by their property. Across 4 experiments, we show that children aged 3–7 also hold owners responsible for such harm. Older children judge that owners should repair harm caused by property, and younger children may do this as well. Younger and older children judge that owners should apologize for harm, even when children do not believe the owners allowed the harm to occur. Children are also as likely to hold (...) owners responsible for harm caused by property as for harm caused by the owners themselves. The present findings contribute to psychological accounts of ownership by showing that ownership not only confers rights to control property, but also responsibility for harm caused by property. The findings also contribute to our understanding of the attribution of responsibility, and challenge accounts claiming that directly causing harm, or allowing it to happen, is a prerequisite for responsibility. The findings provide support for an account claiming that property is an extension of its owner, and likewise reveal that responsibility for harm caused by property is an early developing aspect of the psychology of ownership. 2018 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Achieving space situational awareness requires, at a minimum, the identification, characterization, and tracking of space objects. Leveraging the resultant space object data for purposes such as hostile threat assessment, object identification, and conjunction assessment presents major challenges. This is in part because in characterizing space objects we reference a variety of identifiers, components, subsystems, capabilities, vulnerabilities, origins, missions, orbital elements, patterns of life, operational processes, operational statuses, and so forth, which tend to be defined in highly heterogeneous and sometimes inconsistent (...) ways. The Space Domain Ontologies are designed to provide a consensus-based realist framework for formulating such characterizations in a way that is both consistent and computable. Space object data are aligned with classes and relations in a suite of ontologies built around the existing Space Object Ontology. They are stored in a dynamically updated Resource Description Framework triple store, which can be queried to support space situational awareness and the needs of spacecraft operators and analysts. This paper provides an overview of the Space Domain Ontologies and their development and use. It presents the motivation for and advantages of the Space Domain Ontologies, including the benefits they provide for enhancing and maintaining long-term space situational awareness. (shrink)

Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that a distinction ought to be drawn between two ways in which a given world might be logically impossible. First, a world w might be impossible because the laws that hold at w are different from those that hold at some other world (say the actual world). Second, a world w might be impossible because the laws of logic that hold in some world (say the actual world) are violated at w. We develop a novel (...) way of modelling logical possibility that makes room for both kinds of logical impossibility. Doing so has interesting implications for the relationship between logical possibility and other kinds of possibility (for example, metaphysical possibility) and implications for the necessity or contingency of the laws of logic. (shrink)

This is a protocol for a Cochrane Review (Intervention). The objectives are as follows: -/- The main aim of this review will be to assess the effects of changing practitioner empathy or patient expectations for all conditions. The main objective is to conduct a systematic review of randomised trials where the intervention involves manipulating either (a) practitioner empathy or (b) patient expectations, or (c) both.

What is W. V. O. Quine’s relationship to classical pragmatism? Although he resists the comparison to William James in particular, commentators have seen an affinity between his “web of belief” model of theory confirmation and James’s claim that our beliefs form a “stock” that faces new experience as a corporate body. I argue that the similarity is only superficial. James thinks our web of beliefs should be responsive not just to perceptual but also to emotional experiences in some cases; Quine (...) denies this. I motivate James’s controversial view by appealing to an episode in the history of medicine when a researcher self-experimented by swallowing a vial of bacteria that at the time had not been studied in much detail. The researcher’s commitment to his own as-yet untested hypothesis was based in part on emotional considerations. Finally, I argue that Quine’s insistence that emotions can never be relevant to adjusting our web of belief reflects a tacit holdover of one of logical positivism’s crucially anti-pragmatist commitments—that philosophy of science should focus exclusively on the context of justification, not the context of discovery. James’s emphasis on discovery as a (perhaps the) crucial locus for epistemological inquiry is characteristic of pragmatism in general. Since Quinean epistemology is always an epistemology of justification, he is not happily viewed as a member of the pragmatist tradition. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. May scientists rely on substantive, a priori presuppositions? Quinean naturalists say "no," but Michael Friedman and others claim that such a view cannot be squared with the actual history of science. To make his case, Friedman offers Newton's universal law of gravitation and Einstein's theory of relativity as examples of admired theories that both employ presuppositions (usually of a mathematical nature), presuppositions that do not face empirical evidence directly. In fact, Friedman claims that the use of (...) such presuppositions is a hallmark of "science as we know it." But what should we say about the special sciences, which typically do not rely on the abstruse formalisms one finds in the exact sciences? I identify a type of a priori presupposition that plays an especially striking role in the development of empirical psychology. These are ontological presuppositions about the type of object a given science purports to study. I show how such presuppositions can be both a priori and rational by investigating their role in an early flap over psychology's contested status as a natural science. The flap focused on one of the field's earliest textbooks, William James's Principles of Psychology. The work was attacked precisely for its reliance on a priori presuppositions about what James had called the "mental state," psychology's (alleged) proper object. I argue that the specific presuppositions James packed into his definition of the "mental state" were not directly responsible to empirical evidence, and so in that sense were a priori; but the presuppositions were rational in that they were crafted to help overcome philosophical objections (championed by neo-Hegelians) to the very idea that there can be a genuine science of mind. Thus, my case study gives an example of substantive, a priori presuppositions being put to use—to rational use—in the special sciences. In addition to evaluating James's use of presuppositions, my paper also offers historical reflections on two different strands of pragmatist philosophy of science. One strand, tracing back through Quine to C. S. Peirce, is more naturalistic, eschewing the use of a priori elements in science. The other strand, tracing back through Kuhn and C. I. Lewis to James, is more friendly to such presuppositions, and to that extent bears affinity with the positivist tradition Friedman occupies. (shrink)

We argue that C. Darwin and more recently W. Hennig worked at times under the simplifying assumption of an eternal biosphere. So motivated, we explicitly consider the consequences which follow mathematically from this assumption, and the infinite graphs it leads to. This assumption admits certain clusters of organisms which have some ideal theoretical properties of species, shining some light onto the species problem. We prove a dualization of a law of T.A. Knight and C. Darwin, and sketch a decomposition result (...) involving the internodons of D. Kornet, J. Metz and H. Schellinx. A further goal of this paper is to respond to B. Sturmfels’ question, “Can biology lead to new theorems?”. (shrink)

A reading is offered of Carl Hempel’s and Thomas Kuhn’s positions on, and disagreements about, rationality in science that relates these issues to the debate between W.V. Quine and Rudolf Carnap on the analytic/synthetic distinction.

It is shown that the infinite-valued first-order Gödel logic G° based on the set of truth values {1/k: k ε w {0}} U {0} is not r.e. The logic G° is the same as that obtained from the Kripke semantics for first-order intuitionistic logic with constant domains and where the order structure of the model is linear. From this, the unaxiomatizability of Kröger's temporal logic of programs (even of the fragment without the nexttime operator O) and of the authors' temporal (...) logic of linear discrete time with gaps follows. (shrink)

In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), Kant is typically held to make negative assertations about “things in themselves,” namely that they are not spatial or temporal. These negative assertions stand behind the “neglected alternative” problem for Kant’s transcendental idealism. According to this problem, Kant may be entitled to assert that spatio-temporality is a subjective element of our cognition, but he cannot rule out that it may also be a feature of the objective world. In this paper, I show in a new (...) way how Kant’s view (focusing on his conclusions about space) is not subject to this objection, by showing that he does not make the denial about mind-independent reality that he is typically held to make. The argument develops consequences of a new reading of Kant’s expression “an sich selbst” (‘in itself’; ‘in themselves’). I argue that “an sich selbst” or “per se” has a special, judgment-level role, so that this expression does not form new noun-terms adjectivally. It follows that the conceptual unit of Kant’s “Conclusions” in the TA is simply “things” (Dinge), since “things in themselves” is not a nominal expression; Kant adopts the Wolffian ontological use of “thing” as the basic kind-term for any existent. The arguments that things per se are not in space are arguments that space cannot be a necessary property or relations of things as a kind. I show that this does not involve the positive claim about mind-independent reality that inspires the neglected alternative objection. (shrink)

In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views. I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis of the history of physics and geometry. In (...) the remainder of the paper, I explore connections between Putnam’s account of relativized a priori principles and contemporary views. In particular, I situate Putnam’s account in relation to analyses advanced by Michael Friedman, David Stump, and William Wimsatt. From this comparison, I address issues concerning whether a priori scientific principles are appropriately characterized as “constitutive” or “entrenched”. I argue that these two features need to be clearly distinguished, and that only the constitutive function is essential to apriority. By way of conclusion, I explore the relationship between the constitutive function of a priori principles and entrenchment. (shrink)

[First paragraphs: This essay takes its practical orientation from my experiences as a member of a philosophy reading group on death row at Riverbend Maximum Security Penitentiary in Nashville, Tennessee. Its theoretical orientation comes from W. E. B. Du Bois’ lecture-turned-essay, “Criteria of Negro Art,” which argues that the realm of aesthetics is vitally important in the war against racial discrimination in the United States. And since, according to Michele Alexander’s critically-acclaimed The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the (...) Age of Colorblindness, the prison system should be the primary front today in this war, my essay’s ultimate aim is t/o articulate a new criterion of the present-day “Negro” art being created by a prison population that is still overwhelmingly constituted by persons of color. In my first section, I will show how Du Bois’ insights in “Criteria of Negro Art” remain relevant today, especially in the prison context, and argue that it is thus appropriate for my new criterion to be shaped by his distinctive conception of “propaganda.” In my second section, through a close reading of two texts by Michel Foucault (the pivotal thinker of modern imprisonment), I will flesh out this new criterion, “self-torsion,” defined as the effect of prisoners’ attempts at self-care within a prison system that distorts those attempts into further exploitation of both prisoners and the outside world that imprisons them. And my final section, in an attempt to illustrate this new criterion’s efficacy as a form of propagandistic resistance to contemporary racism, will deploy self-torsion as a critique of two artworks created by imprisoned members of my reading group at Riverbend penitentiary. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I explore the work of Donald Davidson, reveal an inconsistency in it, and resolve that inconsistency in a way that complements a debate in philosophy of science. In Part One, I explicate Davidson's extensional account of meaning; though not defending Davidson from all objections, I nonetheless present his seemingly disparate views as a coherent whole. In Part Two, I explicate Davidson's views on the dualism between conceptual schemes and empirical content, isolating four seemingly different arguments that Davidson (...) makes against the dualism; I demonstrate that, though the arguments fail, each is ultimately meant to rely on his account of meaning. ;In Part Three, I show that Davidson's extensional account of meaning gives rise to the analytic-synthetic distinction, while simultaneously needing to reject it. I then propose a resolution to Davidson's dilemma. Rather than treating interpretation of meaning as continuous with the holistic enterprise of science, as Quine treats translation, one should treat it as conceptually prior to science, as Kant treats epistemology. Nonetheless I recognize four reasons why Davidson himself would reject doing so. I therefore propose a view called 'transcendental semantics', based on Davidson's, that accepts my resolution. Further, transcendental semantics, like Kant's own transcendental idealism, posits a single conceptual scheme; nonetheless Kant's is concerned with Newtonian physics, transcendental semantics' with interpretation. ;Finally, in Part Four, I show how positing such a scheme allows transcendental semantics to complement a promising neo-Carnapian account of theory confirmation in science proposed by Michael Friedman. Scientists are first and foremost interpreters, a fact that allows transcendental semantics to help Friedman establish the possibility of rational continuity through scientific revolutions. In fact, transcendental semantics, by complementing Friedman's project, reunites two of Carnap's own concerns, philosophy of language and philosophy of science. I conclude that philosophy of language without philosophy of science is empty , while philosophy of science without philosophy of language is blind. (shrink)

The paper discusses the sense in which the changes undergone by normative economics in the twentieth century can be said to be progressive. A simple criterion is proposed to decide whether a sequence of normative theories is progressive. This criterion is put to use on the historical transition from the new welfare economics to social choice theory. The paper reconstructs this classic case, and eventually concludes that the latter theory was progressive compared with the former. It also briefly comments on (...) the recent developments in normative economics and their connection with the previous two stages. (Published Online April 18 2006) Footnotes1 This paper suspersedes an earlier one entitled “Is There Progress in Normative Economics?” (Mongin 2002). I thank the organizers of the Fourth ESHET Conference (Graz 2000) for the opportunity they gave me to lecture on this topic. Thanks are also due to J. Alexander, K. Arrow, A. Bird, R. Bradley, M. Dascal, W. Gaertner, N. Gravel, D. Hausman, B. Hill, C. Howson, N. McClennen, A. Trannoy, J. Weymark, J. Worrall, two annonymous referees of this journal, and especially the editor M. Fleurbaey, for helpful comments. The editor's suggestions contributed to determine the final orientation of the paper. The author is grateful to the LSE and the Lachmann Foundation for their support at the time when he was writing the initial version. (shrink)

This paper tries to summarize the main lines of discussion at the conference "Compatibilist Libertarianism: Advantages and Challenges" (October 29, 2021). This conference, organised by Alexander Gebharter and Maria Sekatskaya, served the discussion of Christian List's account of compatibilist libertarianism. Speakers were Taylor W. Cyr, Nadine Elzein, Alexander Gebharter, Christian List, Alfred R. Mele, Leonhard Menges, Tuomas K. Pernu, and Maria Sekatskaya.

REPRODUÇÃO EM NOVILHAS LEITEIRAS -/- INTRODUÇÃO -/- O principal objetivo da criação de substitutos em gado leiteiro é produzir uma novilha que tenha seu parto aos dois anos de idade (23 a 25 meses) e com um peso de 550 a 580 kg. O manejo reprodutivo das novilhas começa quando estas atingem 14 ou 15 meses de idade e um peso de 350 a 370 kg. A produção de novilhas deve ser suficiente para substituir as vacas descartadas anualmente (25 a (...) 35%), e para contribuir com o crescimento do rebanho. Espera-se que em um gado leiteiro deva haver uma população de animais de reposição, desde um dia de vida até à fase de novilha ao parto, correspondendo pelo menos a 70 % do total das vacas (figura 1). -/- Figura 1: A meta do programa de produção de substitutos ou fêmeas de reposição consiste em uma novilha que chegue ao seu primeiro parto aos 24 ou 25 meses de idade, entre um peso de 550 a 580 kg. Elaborado pelo autor. -/- A produção de novilhas depende basicamente de três fatores: da fertilidade das vacas, ou seja, do número de bezerras nascidas anualmente; da mortalidade durante a criação e desenvolvimento; e da eficiência reprodutiva das novilhas. O manejo reprodutivo moderno das novilhas é orientado para a utilização da inseminação artificial, seja em um estro natural ou sincronizado. As novilhas representam a população animal geneticamente mais avançada no rebanho, portanto, o mérito genético de suas crias obtidas por inseminação é maior do que o das crias das vacas adultas. Além disso, as crias das novilhas obtidas mediante a inseminação aceleram o avanço genético, uma vez que contribuem com uma proporção maior de substituições do rebanho em comparação com as crias das vacas de outras faixas etárias. Além disso, as novilhas são as fêmeas mais férteis do rebanho (porcentagem de concepção: 60 a 70% vs 30 a 40% em vacas), pelo que o custo do sêmen por gestação é menor em comparação com as vacas adultas, o que permite investir em melhores touros e em sêmen sexado. -/- 1. PUBERDADE -/- A puberdade é definida como a fase de desenvolvimento em que a fêmea apresenta o seu primeiro estro fértil. Regularmente as novilhas leiteiras, sob condições ótimas de manejo, chegam à puberdade entre 11 e 12 meses de idade, ou seja, antes de alavancar o peso recomendado para receber o primeiro serviço. Vale salientar que as novilhas podem ficar gestantes após a puberdade; no entanto, isto não é conveniente porque ainda não completou-se o seu desenvolvimento. Se ficarem gestantes nos primeiros ciclos estrais, as novilhas poderiam chegar ao parto com pouco desenvolvimento físico, o que provocaria distocias e baixa produção de leite (figura 2). A ativação do sistema neuroendócrino para que a bezerra atinja a puberdade é regulada principalmente pelo estado nutricional (condição corporal). A transição do anestro pré-puberal à ciclicidade puberal coincide com um aumento da condição corporal e das concentrações de insulina, IGF-I e leptina. Estes hormônios agem como sinais metabólicos no hipotálamo e hipófise que modificam a frequência de secreção das gonadotropinas, resultando na maturação folicular e ovulação. O atraso em relação à puberdade está diretamente relacionado com deficiências na alimentação; esta condição verifica-se em criações pouco tecnificadas, principalmente de pequenos e médios produtores. As novilhas que já atingiram o peso para receber o primeiro serviço e não apresentaram estro, devem ser examinadas por via retal para excluir possíveis anormalidades do desenvolvimento, tais como freemartinismo ou hipoplasia genital. -/- Figura 2: O fator mais importante que determina a puberdade é a nutrição. Bezerras bem alimentadas apresentam ciclos estrais aos 11 meses de idade e devem ser inseminadas aos 14 ou 15 meses de idade, com um peso de 350 a 370 kg. Acervo pessoal do autor. -/- 2. DETECÇÃO DE ESTRO E INSEMINAÇÃO ARTIFICIAL -/- A baixa eficiência na detecção de estros é o problema que mais afeta a eficiência reprodutiva das novilhas. De acordo com a duração do estro (8 a 18 horas), a observação das novilhas em períodos de 30 minutos durante a manhã e à tarde, permite detectar em estro até 70% das fêmeas, enquanto a observação contínua (24 horas) aumenta a eficiência na detecção até 95% (figuras 3 e 4). No manejo tradicional dos rebanhos leiteiros, as novilhas recebem pouca atenção por parte dos trabalhadores, o que resulta em baixa eficiência na detecção de estros (50 a 60%). Em diferença das vacas adultas em lactação, as novilhas estão menos expostas a fatores que diminuem a expressão do estro, portanto, com uma rotina de observação, de pelo menos duas horas na manhã (6h a 8h da manhã) e duas horas pela tarde até a noite (17h da tarde a 19h da noite), pode-se detectar até 90% das fêmeas no estro (figura 5). -/- Figura 3: O fator que mais influencia a idade ao primeiro parto é a baixa eficiência na detecção de estros, pelo que é recomendável a observação de estros com pessoal qualificado, em períodos de pelo menos duas horas pela manhã e duas à tarde. Acervo pessoal do autor. -/- Figura 4: Com a observação contínua é possível alcançar de 90 a 95% de eficiência na detecção de estros. Acervo pessoal do autor. -/- Figura 5: A inseminação deve ser realizada durante o período de receptividade sexual. Com boa eficiência na detecção de estros, a inseminação pode ser praticada no programa AM-PM e PM-AM, ou em apenas um turno de inseminação pela manhã (10:00), com bons resultados. -/- 3. TAXA DE PRENHEZ -/- O melhor indicador de eficiência reprodutiva é a taxa de prenhez. Este indicador refere-se à proporção de animais gestantes do total elegível para inseminação, num período equivalente a um ciclo estral. Como já se descreveu no trabalho Fisiologia do Estro e do Serviço na Reprodução Bovina, este indicador considera a eficiência na detecção de estros e a porcentagem de concepção, e reflete com maior objetividade a eficácia do manejo reprodutivo. Este parâmetro pode ser melhorado através de um aumento da proporção de novilhas detectadas em estro, o que se obtém aumentando o tempo de observação e aplicando técnicas de sincronização do estro (figura 6). -/- 4. INSEMINAÇÃO DE NOVILHAS COM SÊMEN SEXADO -/- A utilização de sêmen sexado é uma boa opção para a produção de novilhas de reposição. Com a nova tecnologia disponível para a separação de espermatozoides com o cromossomo x, é possível alcançar até 90% de crias fêmeas; no entanto, o processo de separação de espermatozoides tem baixa eficiência, o que limita o número de espermatozoides por palheta. As palhetas de inseminação com sêmen sexado contém de dois a três milhões de espermatozoides (doses de sêmen não sexado têm de 20 a 30 milhões). De acordo com os dados de fertilidade de gados comerciais, as novilhas inseminadas com sêmen sexado mostram de 10 a 20% menor concepção que novilhas inseminadas com sêmen não sexado, o que desencoraja o seu uso. Causas de baixa fertilidade não são conhecidas, no entanto, estão associadas com a menor concentração espermática e com alguns danos nos espermatozoides provocados pelo processo de separação. No entanto, o uso de sêmen sexado é uma opção viável para aumentar a produção de novilhas no rebanho, e com o melhoramento dos processos de separação espermática em pouco tempo se converterá em uma prática de rotina nos estábulos (figura 7). -/- Figura 6: Uma técnica que aumenta a eficiência na detecção dos estros consiste em pintar a região da grupa. Quando esta pintura desaparece ou se nota que as novilhas estão "talhadas", devem ser apalpadas via retal para determinar se existem sinais genitais de estro. Acervo pessoal do autor. -/- Figura 7: As novilhas são as fêmeas mais férteis do rebanho, por isso o custo do sêmen por gestação é menor em comparação com as vacas adultas, o que permite investir em melhores touros e em sêmen sexado. Acervo pessoal do autor. 5. MONTA DIRIGIDA -/- A monta dirigida ou direta é uma opção prática e eficaz para emprenhar as novilhas. Neste sistema se introduz um touro com um grupo de novilhas, para que ele se encarregue de encontrar as fêmeas em estro e proceder a monta. Em rebanhos comerciais, o ideal é a utilização de um touro para 25 fêmeas. No entanto, com este manejo perde-se a oportunidade de utilizar a inseminação artificial e, com isso, a possibilidade de melhoria genética. -/- 6. PROGRAMAS DE SINCRONIZAÇÃO DE ESTROS -/- Os tratamentos para sincronizar o estro das novilhas possuem os mesmos fundamentos que os utilizados nas vacas. -/- 6.1 Prostaglandina F2a -/- A PGF2α é utilizada para a sincronização de estros em grupos de novilhas, e também é utilizada para a indução do estro individualmente, nas fêmeas que são examinadas por via retal e têm um corpo lúteo. A resposta dos animais tratados é variável; em novilhas pode-se alcançar até 95% de animais em estro. O tempo de manifestação do estro após a injeção é de 48 a 120 horas. -/- 6.1.1 Dupla injeção de PGF2a -/- Além da sincronização dos animais selecionados pela presença de um corpo lúteo diagnosticado por palpação retal, existem dois programas que não incluem a palpação retal. Por exemplo, na segunda-feira, ou no dia preferido, injeta-se PGF2α em todas as novilhas que se deseja inseminar. Cerca de 50% das novilhas manifestarão estro nas próximas 48 a 120 horas. As fêmeas que não mostrarem estro receberão uma segunda injeção na segunda-feira seguinte (intervalo de sete dias). As que apresentaram estro com a primeira injeção teriam um corpo lúteo nesse momento, enquanto as que não o manifestaram estavam em estro ou em metaestro; assim, ao repetir o tratamento sete dias depois, estas últimas novilhas teriam um corpo lúteo e responderiam à PGF2α (figura 8). No outro programa, é administrada duas doses de PGF2α com 11 dias de separação/intervalo. As novilhas podem ser inseminadas no estro observado, após qualquer uma das duas injeções. Este programa oferece uma boa sincroniza- ção após a segunda injeção e é o programa de escolha na sincronização das novilhas receptoras de embriões (figura 9). -/- Figura 8: Sincronização do estro com dupla injeção de PGF2a com 7 dias de diferença/intervalo. Elaborado pelo autor. -/- Figura 9: Sincronização do estro com dupla injeção de PGF2a com 11 dias de diferença/intervalo. Elaborado pelo autor. -/- 6.2 Progestágenos -/- Existe um tratamento que consiste na inserção, na parte externa da orelha, de um implante que contém norgestomet, que permanece na região auricular por nove dias. Além disso, o tratamento é complementado com a injeção intramuscular de valerato de estradiol e norgestomet, no momento da colocação do implante. O tempo de apresentação do estro a partir da remoção do implante é de 48 a 72 horas e a proporção de animais em estro muitas vezes se torna maior do que 80%. Outro tratamento é baseado na inserção intravaginal de dispositivos de liberação de progesterona. O dispositivo pode ser utilizado durante 12 dias ou o período de exposição pode ser encurtado, desde que seja acompanhado da injeção de uma dose luteolítica de PGF2α, um dia antes ou no momento da remoção do dispositivo. A fertilidade global conseguida após o serviço no estro sincronizado é similar à obtida no estro natural; porém, algumas novilhas são menos férteis, o que está associado com alterações no desenvolvimento folicular e alterações na relação temporal entre o estro e a ovulação. Observou-se que o tratamento com implantes de norgestomet combinados com a injeção de valerato de estradiol pode induzir comportamento estral em animais que não estão ciclando normalmente. Isso ocorre porque os níveis de estradiol, administrados no primeiro dia, persistem até o momento da remoção do implante. Assim, ao remover a fonte do progestágeno e ao haver concentrações altas de estradiol se desencadeia o estro, o qual em novilhas anéstricas não é acompanhado de ovulação, enquanto que em novilhas ciclando se altera a relação temporal entre o estro, pico pré-ovulatório de LH e ovulação. Bons resultados são alcançados quando o valerato de estradiol não é administrado e é substituído por uma injeção de PGF2α no momento da remoção do implante. Outro fator que tem sido associado com baixa fertilidade é o dia do ciclo em que o tratamento começa. Observou-se que quando coincide com a presença de um corpo lúteo (diestro), a porcentagem de concepção é maior do que quando não há um corpo lúteo (proestro). Isto ocorre porque a concentração sérica do progestágeno, por si só, não é capaz de suprimir a secreção pulsátil de LH, o que faz com que o folículo dominante presente no momento de iniciar o tratamento não sofra atresia e persista até o dia da retirada do progestágeno, convertendo-se no folículo ovulatório. Com isso, o folículo já envelheceu e o ovócito já sofreu alterações que reduzem o seu potencial para desenvolver um embrião viável. Quando o tratamento coincide com a presença de um corpo lúteo, a secreção de LH é efetivamente suprimida devido ao efeito aditivo da progesterona secretada pelo corpo lúteo e do progestágeno exógeno, inserido na vaca, o que provoca a reposição folicular. Em condições de campo, a seleção das vacas pela presença de um corpo lúteo antes de iniciar o tratamento com progestágenos é impraticável, uma vez que não é possível visualizá-lo, além disso essa prática/seleção não faria sentido, já que seria mais fácil tratar estes animais com dose ou doses de PGF2α. Atualmente existem tratamentos para eliminar folículos dominantes e promover uma nova onda folicular. -/- 6.3 Progestágenos orais -/- O acetato de melengestrol (MGA) é um progestágeno administrado por via oral. Em fêmeas bovinas é utilizado para melhorar a eficiência alimentar nos currais de engorda, o que se consegue através da inibição da apresentação do estro. Como todos os progestágenos, o MGA inibe a secreção de LH, eliminando assim a maturação do folículo e a ovulação. Após a remoção do MGA, o folículo dominante termina o seu desenvolvimento e as fêmeas apresentam estro em forma sincronizada. A dose de MGA por novilha é de 0,5 a 1 mg por dia, em tratamentos que variam de 9 a 14 dias. A apresentação comercial de MGA contém 0,22 mg do hormônio por 1 g do produto. O MGA pode ser facilmente misturado com qualquer concentrado ou grão moído. Após o último dia de tratamento, o estro se apresenta de dois a seis dias. O intervalo de remoção do MGA ao estro é mais longo quando comparado com outros progestágenos. Isto deve-se ao tempo de remoção do MGA, uma vez que enquanto um implante ou dispositivo intravaginal é removido abruptamente, o MGA pode continuar a ser absorvido enquanto é removido do trato gastrointestinal. Com tratamentos de 14 dias podem-se obter porcentagens de concepção menores em comparação com o estro natural, o que se deve em grande parte à ovulação de folículos persistentes. Um tratamento eficaz, que também melhora a fertilidade, consiste na administração de MGA durante 14 dias, seguido de uma injeção de PGF2α 15 ou 17 dias após a remoção do progestágeno. Com este programa, uma alta proporção de fêmeas teriam um corpo lúteo no momento da injeção da PGF2α e apresentariam estro com boa sincronização. Outro tratamento eficaz consiste na administração do MGA durante nove dias, mais uma dose de PGF2α ao nono dia; com este programa também se obtêm bons resultados em sincronização do estro e fertilidade. Este tratamento foi avaliado com novilhas holandesas e a porcentagem de fêmeas sincronizadas é elevada (95%). A porcentagem de concepção é semelhante à obtida no estro natural. Estes resultados são comparáveis aos obtidos com outros programas, como implantes de norgestomet ou dispositivos intravaginais de liberação de progesterona, mas com um custo significativamente menor (figura 10). -/- 6.4 Sincronização da ovulação e inseminação em tempo fixo -/- Em contraste com o observado em vacas em lactação, a resposta das novilhas aos programas de sincronização da ovulação e inseminação a tempo fixo é deficiente, o que se reflete em porcentagens de concepção de 20 a 35% menores que as novilhas inseminadas no estro natural. A causa desta resposta está relacionada com diferenças no desenvolvimento folicular; assim, nas novilhas o tempo de desenvolvimento do folículo dominante é mais rápido e o tempo de domínio é mais curto do que nas vacas em lactação. Desta forma, o folículo da onda folicular sincronizada com a injeção de GnRH sofre atresia antes da injeção de PGF2α, de tal forma que quando se induz a ovulação com a segunda injeção de GnRH, as novilhas têm folículos em diferentes estádios de desenvolvimento, o que provoca assincronia entre a ovulação e a inseminação artificial. -/- Figura 10: Programa de sincronização do estro com Acetato de Melengestrol (MGA). Elaborado pelo autor. -/- 7. MANEJO DO ANESTRO -/- Uma vez que as novilhas atingem a puberdade, apresentam ciclos estrais em intervalos de 21 dias que só são interrompidos pela gestação ou por alguma patologia. O anestro patológico é raro em novilhas; no entanto, surgem casos de piometra e cistos luteinizados, que são tratados com uma dose de PGF2α. Também se observam anormalidades de desenvolvimen- to, tais como freemartinismo e hipoplasia genital, patologias que não têm tratamento; somente 8% das novilhas freemartin são férteis. O anestro funcional (as novilhas manifestam estro, mas não são detectadas) é frequen- te e está diretamente relacionado com a eficiência na detecção de estros. As novilhas com idade e peso para se integrarem no programa reprodutivo e não apresentarem sinais de estro devem ser examinadas retalmente para diagnosticar a causa do anestro. Se, durante a palpação retal, as novilhas tiverem um corpo lúteo são tratadas nesse momento com PGF2α, os animais sem corpo lúteo podem receber uma injeção de PGF2α, sete dias depois. Este programa sincroniza o estro e aumenta a probabilidade de o detectar (figura 11). -/- Figura 11: As novilhas com idade e peso para se integrarem no programa reprodutivo e não mostrarem sinais de estro devem ser verificadas via retal para diagnosticar a causa do anestro. Arquivo pessoal do autor. -/- 8. MANEJO DA NOVILHA INFÉRTIL -/- A fertilidade das vacas leiteiras diminuiu nos últimos 30 anos, enquanto a fertilidade das novilhas não se alterou; após a primeira inseminação, entre 60 e 70% das novilhas emprenham. O objetivo do programa reprodutivo é conseguir que 90% das novilhas gestem nos primeiros três serviços. Desta forma, esta proporção de animais daria à luz antes dos 25 meses de idade. É comum que 10% das novilhas se transformem em animais repetidores, ou seja, novilhas com mais de três serviços inférteis. A causa da falha na concepção de novilhas deve-se principalmente à morte embrionária precoce. Uma causa importante da falha na concepção das novilhas repetidoras são as patologias adquiridas no aparelho reprodutivo; é comum encontrar aderências ovarianas e salpingite. Provavelmente, esses problemas são consequência de alguma infecção adquirida durante a criação. Diversos tratamentos hormonais têm sido testados para resolver o problema de infertilidade em novilhas repetidoras e os resultados obtidos ainda são deficientes. Como estes tratamentos não apresentam resultados consistentes, a melhor forma de mitigar o problema de infertilidade nas novilhas é melhorando as práticas de inseminação, ou seja, o momento da inseminação, o manejo do sêmen e a técnica de inseminação empregada. Além disso, a melhor técnica para aumentar a proporção de novilhas prenhes no rebanho é aumentar a eficiência da detecção de estros. -/- 9. RESUMO -/- As novilhas devem parir aos dois anos de idade (23 a 25 meses). O peso ao parto deve ser de 550 a 580 kg. O manejo reprodutivo começa aos 14 ou 15 meses de idade, com um peso de 350 a 370 kg. As palhetas de sêmen sexado contêm de 2 a 3 milhões de espermatozoides. As doses de sêmen não sexado contêm de 20 a 30 milhões de espermatozoides. A porcentagem de concepção das novilhas inseminadas com sêmen sexado é 10 a 20% menor do que com sêmen não sexado. Com sêmen sexado se obtém entre 90 e 95% de fêmeas. A porcentagem de concepção com programas de IATF é de 20 a 35% menor que nas novilhas inseminadas no estro natural. Cerca de 90% das novilhas devem ficar prenhes nos primeiros três serviços. Devem ser produzidas novilhas para substituir as vacas que são descartadas anualmen- te (25 a 35%). Espera-se que um gado leiteiro tenha ao dispor uma população de animais de reposição, desde um dia de vida até a etapa de novilha ao parto, correspondente a, pelo menos, 70 % do total das vacas. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- AUAD, Alexander Machado et al. Manual de bovinocultura de leite. Brasília: LK Editora, 2010. BRICKELL, J. S.; MCGOWAN, M. M.; WATHES, D. C. Effect of management factors and blood metabolites during the rearing period on growth in dairy heifers on UK farms. Domestic animal endocrinology, v. 36, n. 2, p. 67-81, 2009. DE VRIES, A. et al. Exploring the impact of sexed semen on the structure of the dairy industry. Journal of Dairy Science, v. 91, n. 2, p. 847-856, 2008. Fertilidade em Vacas Leiteiras: Fisiologia e Manejo. Fisiologia do Estro e do Serviço na Reprodução Bovina. FERREIRA, A. M. Manejo reprodutivo de bovinos leiteiros: práticas corretas e incorretas, casos reais, perguntas e respostas. Edição do autor, Juiz de Fora, 2012. FERREIRA, A. de M. Reprodução da fêmea bovina: fisiologia aplicada e problemas mais comuns (causas e tratamentos). Juiz de Fora: Minas Gerais–Brasil, p. 422, 2010. GALINA, Carlos; VALENCIA, Javier. Reproducción de los animales domésticos. 2006. GONÇALVES, J. N. Manual do produtor de leite. Viçosa, MG: Aprenda Fácil, 2012. HEINRICHS, A. J. Raising dairy replacements to meet the needs of the 21st century. Journal of dairy science, v. 76, n. 10, p. 3179-3187, 1993. HOFFMAN, P. C. Optimum body size of Holstein replacement heifers. Journal of Animal Science, v. 75, n. 3, p. 836-845, 1997. NEIVA, R. S. Criação eficiente de bezerros e novilhas. Lavras: Autor, 2013. NEIVA, Rogério Santoro. Produção de bovinos leiteiros. Lavras: UFLA, 1998. PEREIRA, E. S. et al. Novilhas leiteiras. Graphiti Gráfica e Editora LTDA, Fortaleza, Ceará, 2010. CARVALHO, B. C. Manejo reprodutivo de novilhas leiteiras. In. SENAR. Curso de reprodução e genética em bovinocultura de leite. Coronel Pacheco: Senar, 2021. YOUNGQUIST, Robert S.; THRELFALL, W. R. Large animal theriogenology. 2007. (shrink)

This seventh volume of Collected Papers includes 70 papers comprising 974 pages on (theoretic and applied) neutrosophics, written between 2013-2021 by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 122 co-authors from 22 countries: Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Abdel-Nasser Hussian, C. Alexander, Mumtaz Ali, Yaman Akbulut, Amir Abdullah, Amira S. Ashour, Assia Bakali, Kousik Bhattacharya, Kainat Bibi, R. N. Boyd, Ümit Budak, Lulu Cai, Cenap Özel, Chang Su Kim, Victor Christianto, Chunlai Du, Chunxin Bo, Rituparna Chutia, Cu Nguyen Giap, Dao (...) The Son, Vinayak Devvrat, Arindam Dey, Partha Pratim Dey, Fahad Alsharari, Feng Yongfei, S. Ganesan, Shivam Ghildiyal, Bibhas C. Giri, Masooma Raza Hashmi, Ahmed Refaat Hawas, Hoang Viet Long, Le Hoang Son, Hongbo Wang, Hongnian Yu, Mihaiela Iliescu, Saeid Jafari, Temitope Gbolahan Jaiyeola, Naeem Jan, R. Jeevitha, Jun Ye, Anup Khan, Madad Khan, Salma Khan, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Darjan Karabašević, Kifayat Ullah, Kishore Kumar P.K., Sujit Kumar De, Prasun Kumar Nayak, Malayalan Lathamaheswari, Luong Thi Hong Lan, Anam Luqman, Luu Quoc Dat, Tahir Mahmood, Hafsa M. Malik, Nivetha Martin, Mai Mohamed, Parimala Mani, Mingcong Deng, Mohammed A. Al Shumrani, Mohammad Hamidi, Mohamed Talea, Kalyan Mondal, Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Gulistan, Farshid Mofidnakhaei, Muhammad Shoaib, Muhammad Riaz, Karthika Muthusamy, Nabeela Ishfaq, Deivanayagampillai Nagarajan, Sumera Naz, Nguyen Dinh Hoa, Nguyen Tho Thong, Nguyen Xuan Thao, Noor ul Amin, Dragan Pamučar, Gabrijela Popović, S. Krishna Prabha, Surapati Pramanik, Priya R, Qiaoyan Li, Yaser Saber, Said Broumi, Saima Anis, Saleem Abdullah, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Abdulkadir Sengür, Seyed Ahmad Edalatpanah, Shahbaz Ali, Shahzaib Ashraf, Shouzhen Zeng, Shio Gai Quek, Shuangwu Zhu, Shumaiza, Sidra Sayed, Sohail Iqbal, Songtao Shao, Sundas Shahzadi, Dragiša Stanujkić, Željko Stević, Udhayakumar Ramalingam, Zunaira Rashid, Hossein Rashmanlou, Rajkumar Verma, Luige Vlădăreanu, Victor Vlădăreanu, Desmond Jun Yi Tey, Selçuk Topal, Naveed Yaqoob, Yanhui Guo, Yee Fei Gan, Yingcang Ma, Young Bae Jun, Yuping Lai, Hafiz Abdul Wahab, Wei Yang, Xiaohong Zhang, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas, Lemnaouar Zedam. (shrink)

There have been attempts to subsume Charles Darwin's theory of evolution under either one of two distinct intellectual traditions: early Victorian natural science and its descendants in political economy (as exemplified by Herschel, Lyell, or Malthus) and the romantic approach to art and science emanating from Germany (as exemplified by Humboldt and Goethe). In this paper, it will be shown how these traditions may have jointly contributed to the design of Darwin's theory. The hypothesis is that their encounter created a (...) particular tension in the conception of his theory which first opened up its characteristic field and mode of explanation. On the one hand, the domain of the explanandum was conceived of under a holistic and aesthetic view of nature that, in its combination with refined techniques of observation, was deeply indebted to Humboldt in particular. On the other hand, Darwin fashioned explanations for natural phenomena, so conceived, in order to identify their proper causes in a Herschelian spirit. The particular interaction between these two traditions in Darwin, it is concluded, paved the way for a transfer of the idea of causal laws to animate nature while salvaging the romantic idea of a complex, teleological and harmonious order of nature. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend Rudolf Carnap's Principle of Tolerance from an accusation, due to Michael Friedman, that it is self-defeating by prejudicing any debate towards the logically stronger theory. In particular, Friedman attempts to show that Carnap's reconstruction of the debate between classicists and intuitionists over the foundations of mathematics in his book The Logical Syntax of Language, is biased towards the classical standpoint since the metalanguage he constructs to adjudicate between the rival positions is fully classical. (...) I argue that this criticism is mistaken on two counts: (1) it fails to fully appreciate the freedom with regard to the construction of linguistic frameworks that Carnap intended his Principle to embody, and (2) Friedman's objection underestimates the extent to which the evaluation of a framework is task-relative. I conclude that Tolerance is not self-undermining in the way that Friedman claims it is. While this is a restricted conclusion -- and is not a vindication of Carnap's views on logic and mathematics tout court -- it nonetheless suggests that his tolerant perspective has been dismissed too quickly, even by his supporters. (shrink)

This is a work in Kantian conceptual geography. It explores issues in analytic epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics by appealing to theses drawn from Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.

The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.

In this paper, I take it for granted both that there are two types of blameworthiness—accountability blameworthiness and attributability blameworthiness—and that avoidability is necessary only for the former. My task, then, is to explain why avoidability is necessary for accountability blameworthiness but not for attributability blameworthiness. I argue that what explains this is both the fact that these two types of blameworthiness make different sorts of reactive attitudes fitting and that only one of these two types of attitudes requires having (...) been able to refrain from φ-ing in order for them to be fitting. (shrink)

On what I take to be the standard account of supererogation, an act is supererogatory if and only if it is morally optional and there is more moral reason to perform it than to perform some permissible alternative. And, on this account, an agent has more moral reason to perform one act than to perform another if and only if she morally ought to prefer how things would be if she were to perform the one to how things would be (...) if she were to perform the other. I argue that this account has two serious problems. The first, which I call the latitude problem, is that it has counterintuitive implications in cases where the duty to be exceeded is one that allows for significant latitude in how to comply with it. The second, which I call the transitivity problem, is that it runs afoul of the plausible idea that the one-reason-morally-justifies-acting-against-another relation is transitive. What’s more, I argue that both problems can be overcome by an alternative account, which I call the maximalist account. (shrink)

There is a current debate about the grammar of intention: do I intend to φ, or that I φ? The equivalent question in Aristotle relates especially to choice. I argue that, in the context of practical reasoning, choice, as also wish, has as its object an act. I then explore the role that this plays within his account of the relation of thought to action. In particular, I discuss the relation of deliberation to the practical syllogism, and the thesis that (...) the conclusion of the second is an action. (shrink)

It is widely thought that, to be morally responsible for some action or omission, an agent must have had, at the very least, the general ability to do otherwise. As we argue, however, there are counterexamples to the claim that moral responsibility requires the general ability to do otherwise. We present several cases in which agents lack the general ability to do otherwise and yet are intuitively morally responsible for what they do, and we argue that such cases raise problems (...) for various kinds of accounts of moral responsibility. We suggest two alternative approaches to thinking about the connection between moral responsibility and abilities to do otherwise, one of which denies that there is any ability-to-do-otherwise requirement on moral responsibility and the other of which requires only an opportunity to do otherwise. We also argue that a general-ability-to-do-otherwise requirement not only faces counterexamples but also lacks positive motivation. (shrink)