My aim in this paper is to engage with C. Thi Nguyen’s characterization of the echo chamber and to propose two things. First, I argue that a proper reading of his concept of echo chamber should make use of the notion of ignorance in the form of a structural epistemic insensitivity. My main contention is that ignorance as a substantive structural practice accounts for the epistemically deleterious effects of echo chambers. Second, I propose that from the talk of ignorance we (...) should be able to see echo chambers in terms of their more harmful impacts in our daily lives. To do that, I argue that we should think of echo chambers as tools to promote hermeneutical domination. If my representation of Nguyen’s concept is accurate, I believe we can see some important theoretical consequences stemming from the way Nguyen understands it. (shrink)

Most interpretations of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics believe that the term ‘ameson’ is used to describe the principles or foundations of a given system of justification or explanation as epistemically prior to or more fundamental than the other propositions in the system. Epistemic readings (as I shall call them) arguably constitute a majority in the secondary literature. This predominant view has been challenged by Robin Smith (1986) and Michael Ferejohn (1994; 2013), who propose interpretations that should be classified as non-epistemic according (...) to the definition above. My aim in this article is purely negative. I intend to show that these non-epistemic interpretations are liable to serious objections and are in conflict with some important features of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration. (shrink)

This article offers a reconstruction of an argument against infinite regress formulated by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I 22. I argue against the traditional interpretation of the chapter, according to which singular terms and summa genera, in virtue of having restrict logical roles, provide limits for predicative chains, preventing them from proceeding ad infinitum. As I intend to show, this traditional reading is at odds with some important aspects of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration. More importantly, it fails to explain how (...) his proof is connected to a defence of the existence of ultimate explanations, a connection that must be the case if I 19-22 is advancing a foundationalist way-out to a sceptical challenge raised in I 3. (shrink)

No tratado intitulado Segundos Analíticos, Aristóteles desenvolve uma teoria da demonstração científica e da ciência demonstrativa. Ali, o conhecimento científico é descrito pelo filósofo como envolvendo uma certa "necessidade". Alguns intérpretes associam esta noção de necessidade à necessidade modal, pertinente à silogística modal de Aristóteles. Esta interpretação, todavia, tornaria o modelo de ciência proposto nos Analíticos incompatível com os explananda das ciências da natureza, cuja cientificidade o próprio Aristóteles reiteradamente defendeu. A fim de evitar este inconveniente, abordamos e reconstruímos a (...) mencionada interpretação, reconhecemos suas falhas e propomos, seguindo outra tendência da literatura secundária, uma leitura alternativa da noção de necessidade como adequação explanatória, a qual garantiria a cientificidade dos fenômenos naturais. (shrink)

according to aristotle's posterior analytics, scientific expertise is composed of two different cognitive dispositions. Some propositions in the domain can be scientifically explained, which means that they are known by "demonstration", a deductive argument in which the premises are explanatory of the conclusion. Thus, the kind of cognition that apprehends those propositions is called "demonstrative knowledge".1 However, not all propositions in a scientific domain are demonstrable. Demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles, whose knowledge is called "comprehension".2 If the knowledge (...) of all scientific propositions were... (shrink)

Neste verbete, ofereço uma apresentação breve e introdutória do conceito de injustiça epistêmica, de suas subpartes e da epistemologia das virtudes subjacente à proposta de Fricker, tanto em termos de caracterização quanto em termos de solução dos problemas que seu livro nos ajuda a diagnosticar. Ao final, indicarei algumas direções de crítica e aprofundamento dessa proposta nos trabalhos de outros autores e autoras que se ocuparam da compreensão desse profícuo debate.

In Metaphysics Γ, Aristotle argues against those who seem to accept contradictions. He distinguishes between the Sophists, who deny the principle of non-contradiction through arguments, and the Natural Philosophers, whose physical investigations lead to the acceptance of objective contradictions. Heraclitus’ name appears throughout the discussion. Usually, he is associated with the discussion against the Sophists. In this paper, I explore how the discussion with the Natural Philosophers may illuminate both the interpretation of Heraclitus by Aristotle and Heraclitus’ own worldview. To (...) refute the Natural Philosophers, Aristotle proposes a general reconstruction of their reasoning. Roughly, relying on sensory evidence (A1), they see that the same thing changes from one opposite to another (A2). Such a change appears to characterize a generation out of non-being, which a Natural Philosopher does not accept (A3). To solve the problem, despite their different worldviews, Natural Philosophers hint at a state in which opposites co-occur, characterizing an objective contradiction (C). Looking at the discussion in Metaphysics Γ and Heraclitus fragments, sections 1–3 show how assumptions A1, A2, and A3 easily apply to Heraclitus. The case of the conclusion is more challenging. In the case of the Pluralists, the co-existence of opposites characterizes a state in which there is no generation. Such a view does not fit Heraclitus’ mobilism. To argue that Aristotle’s argument is general enough to encompass dynamic views, I examine his problematization of accepting the change of change in Metaphysics K and Physics V. There, after re-stating several points that appear in Metaphysics Γ, Aristotle argues that accepting the becoming of another becoming leads to a state of contradiction in which the becoming is perishing. Heraclitus’ B8, cited in Nicomachean Ethics, gives evidence that, for Aristotle, Heraclitus puts a process at the origin of an opposite process. Moreover, after examining the expression ‘living the death/dying the life’ in B62, I argue that Heraclitus was aware that his worldview implied a dynamic objective contradiction. Finally, an analysis of elemental changes in B36 proves that accepting objective contradictions does not make Heraclitus’ worldview less attractive. (shrink)

In Posterior Analytics II 16-17, Aristotle seems to claim that there cannot be more than one explanans of the same scientific explanandum. However, this seems to be true only for “primary-universal” demonstrations, in which the major term belongs to the minor “in itself” and the middle term is coextensive with the extremes. If so, several explananda we would like to admit as truly scientific would be out of the scope of an Aristotelian science. The secondary literature has identified a second (...) problem in II 16-17: the middle term of a demonstration is sometimes taken as the definition of the minor term (the subject), other times as the definition (or the causal part of the definition) of the major (the demonstrable attribute). I shall argue that Aristotle’s solution to the first problem involves showing that certain problematic attributes, which appear to admit more than one explanation, actually fall into the privileged scenario of primary-universal demonstrations. In addition, his solution suggests a conciliatory way-out to our second problem (or so I shall argue): the existence of an attribute as a definable unity depends on its subject having the essence it has, which suggests that both the essence of subjects and the essence of demonstrable attributes can play explanatory roles in demonstrations. (shrink)

At the beginning of the first book of Posterior Analytics, Aristotle‟s feature of demonstrative knowledge involves a certain concept of “necessity”. The traditional interpretation tends to associate this concept with modal necessity, which is found in the Prior Analytics and De interpretatione. The present article aims to show in which way the sixth chapter of book A of Posterior Analytics presupposes a set of essentialist theses that claims to base the necessity of scientific knowledge on predicative relations of essential character. (...) To acknowledge this essentialist background and simultaneously support a modal interpretation of scientific necessity urges us to attribute serious drawbacks to Aristotle‟s theory of demonstration, forcing us to reassess this interpretative tendency. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore two possible readings of Republic IV, 439c2-d8, and of Plato’s claim that the just soul is governed by its rational element. My aim is to argue against a “desiderative” interpretation of the passage, according to which the motivational strength of rational desires depends on a set of desires given in advance and produced independently of reason. As an alternative, I advance a “cognitivist” reading according to which the rational desires of the just soul have as (...) its ultimate source a knowledge about the nature of goodness and happiness, with its own motivational force. Finally, I argue for a reinterpretation of 439a4-b1, a passage that, at first sight, seems to contradict my analysis of 439c2-d8. (shrink)

A parcialidade epistêmica na amizade (PE) é a tese segundo a qual ser um bom amigo de alguém envolve tratar essa pessoa de forma diferente, em um sentido epistêmico. Sarah Stroud (2006) e Simon Keller (2004) defenderam essa tese e argumentaram que ela está em tensão direta com demandas de racionalidade epistêmica. A posição deles é que quando nossos amigos estão envolvidos em algum assunto ao qual temos que dar nossa avaliação (sobre os fatos, suas ações ou seu caráter), tendemos (...) a dar à questão um tratamento epistêmico diferencial, não reservado a não-amigos. Neste artigo, quero tratar de duas possíveis formas de responder à PE. Primeiro, quero discutir a rejeição de Sandy Goldberg (2018, 2020) a essa tese e à tensão que ela supostamente cria com as exigências da racionalidade epistêmica. Em sua proposta, Goldberg defende o comportamento epistêmico diferencial que a PE pressupõe, mas também argumenta que tal comportamento não configura um tipo de PE, e que tampouco está em tensão com as exigências da racionalidade epistêmica. Irei sugerir que a posição de Goldberg não capta uma distinção importante entre nossas atitudes epistêmicas diante do testemunho de um amigo e diante de relatos de terceiros sobre um amigo. Particularmente, o que eu argumentarei é que o caminho que leva da valorização da amizade às razões epistêmicas em apoio aos resultados doxásticos diferenciais quando nossos amigos estão envolvidos é, na melhor das hipóteses, frágil, já que envolve o que eu vejo como um movimento não autorizado de nosso desejo de preservar uma amizade para uma reação doxástica diferencial quando alguém testemunha negativamente sobre nossos amigos. Em segundo lugar, defenderei também que não devemos aceitar a prescrição da PE tão rapidamente. Argumentarei que, ao avaliar injustamente as credenciais epistêmicas de nossos amigos – algo que parece estar acontecendo em alguns casos de parcialidade epistêmica, podemos estar contribuindo para degradar as condições de trocas epistêmicas justas em uma comunidade. Se esse for o caso, teremos uma razão pragmática para rejeitar a PE. Na primeira seção do artigo, apresentarei a tese da parcialidade epistêmica na amizade, focalizando principalmente na forma como Stroud a articula. Depois disso, na seção II, tratarei da rejeição da PE por Goldberg e apresentarei uma crítica à sua posição. Na terceira e última seção, defenderei o que vejo como uma preocupação importante se aceitarmos a PE e oferecerei uma razão pragmática para questioná-la. (shrink)

For Aristotle, demonstrative knowledge is the result of what he calls ‘intellectual learning’, a process in which the knowledge of a conclusion depends on previous knowledge of the premises. Since demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles (the knowledge of which is called ‘νοῦς’), Aristotle is often described as advancing a foundationalist doctrine. Without disputing the nomenclature, I shall attempt to show that Aristotle’s ‘foundationalism’ should not be taken as a rationalist theory of epistemic justification, as if the first principles (...) of science could be known as such independently of their explanatory connections to demonstrable propositions. I shall argue that knowing first principles as such involves knowing them as explanatory of other scientific propositions. I shall then explain in which way noetic and demonstrative knowledge are in a sense interdependent cognitive states – even though νοῦς remains distinct from (and, in Aristotle’s words, more ‘accurate’ than) demonstrative knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I present two ways of conceiving a genealogical explanation of the concept of knowledge. The first one is through the epistemic state of nature hypothesis developed by Edward Craig, according to which knowledge is understood as a concept evolved from the concept of a good informant. After considering Craig’s project, I draw a parallel between this approach and Miranda Fricker’s value-laden account of the same concept. Then, I present and discuss Fricker’s social take on Craig’s genealogy, in (...) which she suggests that the notions of a good informant and of knowledge are necessarily dependent on the establishment of a credibility norm, and that this norm should be viewed as inherently political. Lastly, I defend an illustration, through Kristie Dotson’s work, of how both genealogical approaches could explain and offer solutions to failings in the normativity of our epistemic systems. (shrink)

Heraclitus uses paradoxical language to present the relationship between opposites in his worldview. This mode of expression has generated much controversy. Some take the paradoxes as evidence of a contradictory identity of opposites (Barnes), while others propose a dynamic union through transformation without identity that avoids the contradiction (Graham). By examining B88 and B62, I seek to identify the stronger and weaker points of such readings. The contradictory identity reading thwarts the transformation between opposites. The dynamic reading offers a plausible (...) alternative. However, it skips a characterization of how Heraclitus conceives of the transformation between opposites in physical terms. To fill this gap, I consider Heraclitus’ use of what I call the anti-cognate internal object in B62. I argue that ‘living the death and dying the life’ is a case of change as mixture, a popular conception among the early Presocratics. Upon closer examination, the anti-cognate internal object suggests that real contradictions belong to Heraclitus conception of change. The details reveal a philosophically compelling view. (shrink)

This is an Editorial Note for the special volume of the journal Manuscrito (42: 4) devoted to Aristotle's theory of demonstration and its logical and metaphysical entanglements, which has been organized by me and Breno Zuppolini (as Guest Editors), with papers authored by Benjamin Morison, Owen Goldin, David Bronstein, Michail Peramatzis, Andrea Falcon, Laura Castelli, Paolo Fait, Joseph Karbowski, Adam Crager, Klaus Corcilius, Robert J. Hankinson, Raphael Zillig and Pieter Sjoerd Hasper.

This work has as its main goal to discuss two different epistemic proposals, both under the reliabilist handle. The first one, developed by Alvin Goldman, has as its central goal to offer an adequate characterization of the justificational element present in the standard account of knowledge. Goldman's proposal has the initial challenge of properly explaining Gettier's demand presented some years earlier, but also to correct some more central problems that affect his own causal theory of knowledge. However, the externalist proposal (...) within Goldman's reliabilism faced some serious attacks directed to its notion of justification. Three of these attacks became well known in the recent literature: the generality problem, the meta-incoherence problem and the new evil genius problem. Each one in its own way has established challenges to the his reliabilist account. The second reliabilist theory we will discuss consists in a reformulation of Goldman's account, defended mainly by Ernest Sosa in a series of very important works in contemporary epistemology. In these works, Sosa was able to insert the notion of intellectual virtues in the epistemological debate, bringing to the center of the externalist debate an idea of a responsible belief formation, and at the same time trying to give a proper answer to the more central challenges faced by original reliabilism. In the first part of the paper I present the first of these theories, and after that I offer a treatment of Sosa's reformulation of reliabilism and a defense of this proposal as a more adequate theory to deal with some basic demands of a proper theory of justification. (shrink)

Aristotle's theory of demonstration, developed in the Posterior Analytics, is not restricted to determining the formal requirements for formulating probative arguments that establish properly the results of scientific investigation. To the probative aspect of demonstration it shall be added its primarily explanatory character, orientated by theses of strong ontological and metaphysical content and involving notions like substance, essence and causation. We shall analyze the relation between those two ranges of Aristotle's philosophy of science and investigate how the formal features of (...) demonstration maintain an affinity with the metaphysical background to which scientific activity is conditioned. (shrink)

The chapter presents the prototyping of a thinking routine designed to foster good inference habits in children ages 6 to 11. The prototyping was developed at Ninho, an educational project for children from underprivileged households in Brazil. The thinking routines by Ritchhart and colleagues (2006) served as our starting point. Following a Virtue Education (VE) approach, we supposed that the repeated application would conduce to habituation. In addition, to increase peer-to-peer interactions, the teacher applying the routines worked as a facilitator (...) in a Community of Inquiry (CI). After six months of application, the results were partially successful. We identified that the repeated exposition to the magic question “What makes you say that?” made children more aware of the evidence supporting their assumptions. Furthermore, the interactions between peers made them recognize different perspectives. However, we also identified some shortcomings. Most of them seemed to arise from cognitive biases. At the individual level, belief perseverance kept children too attached to their first assumptions. They preferred self-serving rationalizations instead of accepting a counter-argument. At the group level, we identified problems of social contagion such as information cascades. The effects of a first opinion rhetorically voiced were hard to efface. Since none of the steps on the previous routines addressed these biases, we prototyped a routine to start filling this gap. Following Critical Thinking (CT) theorists, we added a step of structured instruction concerning one specific reasoning technique - the inference to the best explanation. Moreover, the recommendation of cognitive psychologists motivated the inclusion of some extra features to avoid groupthink biases. For instance, a visual table that juxtaposes contrasting arguments should facilitate comparative evaluations. Also, a star-based evaluation scale should help different individuals to discuss their assessments based on a common ground. As described in the end, the prototype with elements from VE, CI and CT presented promising results. (shrink)

[From SEP]: Contemporary virtue epistemology (hereafter ‘VE’) is a diverse collection of approaches to epistemology. At least two central tendencies are discernible among the approaches. First, they view epistemology as a normative discipline. Second, they view intellectual agents and communities as the primary focus of epistemic evaluation, with a focus on the intellectual virtues and vices embodied in and expressed by these agents and communities. This entry introduces many of the most important results of the contemporary VE research program. These (...) include novel attempts to resolve longstanding disputes, solve perennial problems, grapple with novel challenges, and expand epistemology’s horizons. In the process, it reveals the diversity within VE. Beyond sharing the two unifying commitments mentioned above, its practitioners diverge over the nature of intellectual virtues, which questions to ask, and which methods to use. It will be helpful to note some terminology before proceeding. First, we use ‘cognitive’, ‘epistemic’ and ‘intellectual’ synonymously. Second, we often use ‘normative’ broadly to include not only norms and rules, but also duties and values. Finally, ‘practitioners’ names contemporary virtue epistemologists. (shrink)

This work aims to present and discuss recent developments in epistemology that seek for satisfactory formulations and responses to the problem of radical skepticism. Its main goal is to understand how the skeptical problem can be properly characterized, how it can be viewed as inserted in the traditional dispute in epistemology between externalism and internalism, and to which extent antiskeptical theories are situated within this dispute. After identifying their place in the dispute, another antiskeptical proposal is discussed, one that suggests (...) a conciliatory take on the internalist/externalist debate. The way Duncan Pritchard presents this conciliatory view, known as epistemological disjunctivism, intends to show that we can know the things that radical skepticism wants to preclude us to know. In order to do that, we just have to consider our structure of reasons as one that allows us to have factive reasons, reasons of externalist and internalist nature, that could put us in a privileged position to know the things we ordinarily believe. After the presentation and discussion of Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivism, and his general rejection of skepticism, it is suggested that its antiskeptical tools are also available to more traditional epistemic theories - but to access them, some epistemological assumptions need to be adjusted. In order to do that, an alternative take on the internalism/externalism dispute is offered, so it can allow for a different way of conceiving the conciliatory antiskeptical strategy, one that has epistemic reliabilism as its framework. The final propposal consists in an attempt to democratize the disjunctivist tool against radical skepticism. (shrink)

Com esta obra, esperamos contribuir com uma pequena imagem do profícuo desenvolvimento recente da Epistemologia Social, em especial em terras brasileiras. A despeito de uma série de resistências, motivadas por fatores diversos, a uma concepção mais aplicada da Epistemologia, uma que extrapole os limites da mera análise conceitual, a Epistemologia Social tem ocupado um espaço cada vez mais significativo na Filosofia. Sua capacidade de dialogar com outras áreas da Filosofia e, principalmente, para além da Filosofia, tem se mostrado crucial para (...) sua consolidação. No Brasil, esta não é a primeira obra a reunir contribuições de relevo para a área, mas é com certeza a obra que reúne de modo mais nítido as investidas mais arrojadas de Epistemologia Social sobre problemas candentes do nosso tempo, que vão desde a importância e os limites da conversação para resolver impasses na nossa dinâmica de produção e transmissão de conhecimento até como o preconceito arraigado e a violência moldam nossos modos de vida epistêmico em comunidade, a ponto muitas vezes de anulá-los e destruí-los. Fazemos votos de que esta obra encontre leitores e leitoras animadas com os novos rumos da Filosofia, e que ela possibilite uma ampliação e uma renovação cada vez maior da Epistemologia enquanto teoria, mas também enquanto ferramenta de intervenção prática na nossa realidade. (shrink)

Este trabalho é uma breve análise do livro eletrônico ― tomado como meio de comunicação relevante para a educação e a cultura no futuro próximo ― centrada nos potenciais e desafios que ele apresenta em relação a acesso e autonomia. A análise visa apontar tendências gerais relativas às características das plataformas de leitura (dispositivos leitores e softwares), particularmente para leitores. Essas tendências são extrapoladas a partir de um pequeno número de exemplos ou casos já existentes. O trabalho avalia as restrições (...) à autonomia impostas pelo caráter proprietário das plataformas de leitura atuais, bem como seus efeitos sobre a mercantilização do livro, e esboça alternativas possíveis, ligadas a padrões abertos de arquivos, software livre e hardware livre. Conclui relacionando esse novo meio à chamada “era do acesso” (RIFKIN) ― evidenciada pela transição da propriedade à licença de uso dos livros ―, e avaliando as principais consequências possíveis (positivas e negativas) dessa transformação. (shrink)

In this paper, Charles Mills discusses what he calls “white ignorance”, developing one of the main themes of his 1997 book, The Racial Contract. His discussion is concerned with the idea of a cognitive disadvantage based on membership in a social group, which is not strange to the radical philosophical tradition, and that has been explored with more vigor in the recent Social Epistemology, in debates about epistemic injustices, silencing, willful ignorance, cognitive biases, epistemological standpoints, etc. Mills argues for an (...) “Epistemology of the white ignorance”, a racially and socially situated epistemology, which contraposes itself, in a great extent, to the individualistic tendencies of the traditional epistemological work, while conserving the interests in objectivity and truth of this work. (shrink)

Em seu artigo “Confiança epistêmica e testemunho feminino”, Patrícia Ketzer se propõe a duas tarefas centrais. Em primeiro lugar, ela pretende caracterizar as noções interpessoais de testemunho e de confiança epistêmica defendidas por Benjamin McMyler (2011). A partir disso, então, ela sugere que a proposta de McMyler pode ser útil para a compreensão de casos malsucedidos de testemunho, em particular casos de testemunho de violência sexual. Me interessa, aqui, em grande medida, avaliar se a aproximação sugerida é capaz de esclarecer (...) a natureza epistemológica dos problemas que parecem estar associados às práticas de rejeitar total ou parcialmente testemunho de violência sexual e de gênero. (shrink)

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle imposes some requirements on scientific propositions: (i) they must be susceptible of syllogistic articulation, (ii) they must have universal terms as subjects of predication and (iii) their subjects must be primary, i.e. they cannot “be said of a distinct underlying subject”. However, it is problematic to meet those three requirements together. If associated with the theory of predication in Categories, the requirement (iii) shall prescribe names or descriptions of individuals within the category of substance as (...) subjects of predication, which are primary insofar as they cannot play the logical role of predicate. Nevertheless, if the requirement (i) is satisfied, then the terms of scientific proposition would be able to perform the function of subject as well as of predicate since the rules of conversion and syllogistic moods presuppose the interchangeability among terms of predication. The requirement (ii), by its turn, withdraws all particular subjects from scientific propositions and a fortiori individual substances. We offer as a solution for the aforementioned dilemma the association of theses from the Posterior Analytics, not with the treatise Categories, but with the new ontology of predication emerged in the Metaphysics, which, by introducing the hylomorphic analysis of compound substances, admits primary and notwithstanding universal subjects of predication: the specific forms. (shrink)

Comments to: SOSA, Ernest. Representations, judgments, and the swamping problem for reliabilism: why the problem applies to process reliabilism, but not to virtue reliabilism. Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp journal of philosophy, vol. 44, Special issue in honor of Ernest Sosa, p. 19-24, 2021.

The aim is to examine the performative acts and gender constitution in the context of the Second British Invasion. Despite the pervasive character of patriarchy and the prevalence of sexual difference as an operative cultural distinction, gender was not passively scripted on the bodies of many British singers. The subversive performances did not exclude suffering and marginalization but simultaneously undermined compulsory coherence.

n the first part of the paper I will present Pritchard’s approach to Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge commitments, which is essential to his solution to the closure-based sceptical arguments. And, in the second par of the paper, I will raise some concerns that I have regarding Pritchard’s non-belief reading of the hinge commitments. In the third and final part, I make some concluding remarks regarding Pritchard’s overall strategy to solve the closure-based sceptical paradox.

Entende-se que os experimentos mentais são dispositivos da imaginação que podem nos fornecer crenças que constituem conhecimento. John D. Norton apresentou uma abordagem que se tornou influente para explicar como os experimentos mentais científicos podem produzir novos conhecimentos so- bre o mundo. Ele afirma que não há nada distintivo nos experimentos men- tais, uma vez que sustenta que eles funcionam exatamente como argumen- tos. Neste artigo, contestamos sua abordagem. Examinamos aspectos essen- ciais de sua abordagem, que envolvem as noções de (...) “argumento” e “inferên- cia” para mostrar que um sujeito que chega a saber algo através da execução ou condução de um experimento mental dificilmente será considerado como tendo efetivamente executado um argumento ou um processo de raciocínio inferencial. (shrink)

This paper seeks to point the epistemic aspects of obstetric violence. In order to do so, we will introduce the concept of epistemic injustice, as developed by Miranda Fricker, and how it has been used by the social epistemology literature to think about health issues. Subsequently, we will examine reports of cases of obstetric violence as well as a case of forced sterilization, by reviewing the Final Report of the CPMI on the incidence of mass sterilization of women in Brazil, (...) as well as papers that describe cases of obstetric violence. Thus, we aim to point out that there is an epistemic aspect to such violations and that a change in the distribution of credibility may be relevant to confront obstetric violence. (shrink)

Resumo Embora controversa, o contextualismo epistêmico alega oferecer a melhor explicação para alguns fenômenos analisados em epistemologia contemporânea, por exemplo: alega responder ou explicar o apelo de certos paradoxos e, ao mesmo tempo, manter a verdade de nossas alegações ordinárias de conhecimento. Conforme alegado por contextualistas, a vantagem de sua teoria ao explicar o apelo de certos paradoxos reside no fato de que nenhum princípio lógico precisa ser rejeitado. O paradoxo do prefácio – que consiste na aparente incoerência lógica que (...) ocorre quando o autor de um livro declara em seu prefácio que, apesar de acreditar que é altamente provável que tudo o que o livro afirma seja verdadeiro, também é altamente provável que o livro contenha, pelo menos, algum erro – parece não ter sido explorado o suficiente pelos contextualistas. Portanto, pretendemos sugerir uma versão do paradoxo do prefácio apresentando um argumento análogo ao argumento que os contextualistas costumam apresentar para explicar o paradoxo cético. Desta maneira, pretendemos oferecer, por meio de uma análise contextualista, uma explicação para o paradoxo do prefácio. Se a resposta contextualista é ou não adequada para esse paradoxo, isso será questão de disputa e não nos caberá discuti-la aqui. Meu objetivo é apenas sugerir que uma análise contextualista semelhante à aplicada ao paradoxo cético pode ser construída para explicar o paradoxo do prefácio. Palavras-chave: Contextualismo; Paradoxo do prefácio; Paradoxo cético. (shrink)

The article starts with two uses presented by Plato concerning the etymology of Hades' name. In the Phaedo, he follows the tradition and interprets the name as the 'in-visible'. In the Cratylus, on the other hand, he proposes a new reading of Hades as the 'all-knowing'. Despite this inconsistency, there is an anterior coherence in regard to the project of extinguishing the fear of death in the tradition. To understand these differences and similarities we recur to the Republic. In this (...) dialogue, there is a political motivation to extinguish the fear of death amongst citizens. Fearing death would be prejudicial for their brave behaviour in battles. We also found a concession to the manipulative use of the etymologies in order to correct illusory beliefs of the people. These are taken as evidence that the superficial variation on the use of the etymologies of Hades is consistent if read under the framework of a political project. Nevertheless, this is not exempt from moral questions. One may ask if this kind of manipulation remains to be seen as wrong, who would be allowed to do it and in which cases. It follows an attempt to find Plato's answer to these questions and a discussion with the contemporary literature on the subject. (shrink)

‘Injustiça epistêmica’ é o termo usado por Miranda Fricker para descrever um tipo de injustiça que ocorre quando excluímos a contribuição de uma ou mais pessoas à produção, disseminação e manutenção do conhecimento. Em seu livro de mesmo nome (2007), e em uma série de outros trabalhos, Fricker examina de que modo interações interpessoais e sistemas sociais estruturais podem ser responsáveis por influenciar nossa prática cotidiana, consciente ou não, de atribuir status epistêmico a membros de uma comunidade. Seu trabalho se (...) insere em um campo particular da epistemologia contemporânea, conhecido como Epistemologia Social. Um ramo do trabalho filosófico que tem como objetivo uma investigação sobre a dimensão social e sobre a moralidade das nossas práticas epistêmicas, do ponto de vista da sua influência na aquisição de conhecimento e justificação, e da formação racional de crenças. Fricker aporta neste campo com um tratamento do papel que a injustiça de tipo epistêmico desempenha nessas atividades. E ela o faz, particularmente, através do exame de duas formas primárias deste tipo de injustiça: a injustiça testemunhal e a injustiça hermenêutica. Sua proposta consiste, em larga medida, em mostrar que algumas das normas que governam as nossas práticas epistêmicas podem ser limitadas por estruturas de poder que se manifestam socialmente. De acordo com essa proposta, a concepção do sujeito conhecedor é essencialmente social, no sentido em que ela está sujeita a inúmeras considerações sociopolíticas. Uma dessas considerações está na possibilidade de pressões sociais advindas de relações de poder exercerem alguma influência nas normas epistêmicas de credibilidade que utilizamos para avaliar a autoridade racional de interlocutores em uma troca epistêmica cotidiana. Segundo Fricker, é possível que as normas que regulam a concessão de credibilidade a indivíduos ou grupos envolvidos nessas trocas reproduzam estruturas de poder constituídas socialmente. Ou seja, é possível que pessoas ou grupos que detêm algum tipo de vantagem ou poder social tendam a negar credibilidade a agentes epistêmicos que possuem autoridade racional de fato acerca de determinado assunto. Uma recusa em reconhecer tal autoridade por conta de preconceitos identitários é um dos modos de conceber o que Fricker chama de injustiça epistêmica. Neste artigo, pretendo apresentar alguns detalhes da proposta de Fricker, caracterizando mais cuidadosamente os dois tipos de injustiças que ela examina em seu trabalho principal e apresentando algumas das soluções que ela oferece como estratégias para dirimir as consequências supostamente perniciosas de práticas epistêmicas reguladas por preconceitos de identidade e pela exclusão de agentes de aspectos importantes de uma comunidade epistêmica. Em seguida, discutirei duas críticas mais pontuais às soluções que Fricker oferece, que surgem menos como objeções, no sentido mais forte do termo, e mais como contribuições adicionais a essas estratégias de remediação dos danos de uma prática epistêmica injusta. Particularmente, quero defender que as duas contribuições que apresentarei podem ser pensadas como frutos da mesma preocupação com o escopo estreito da proposta de Fricker, e podem ser pensadas também como oferecendo leituras complementares sobre que caminhos devemos seguir para buscar práticas e comunidades epistêmicas marcadas pela justiça e não pela injustiça. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss some of the recent developments in the political turn of Social Epistemology, focusing on the notions of epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression. In the first part of the work, I introduce Kristie Dotson’s characterization of the epistemic injustices presented by Miranda Fricker, through the understanding of systematic ways of violating epistemic agency in terms of oppressions. In the second part, I discuss Dotson’s critique of Fricker on the grounds that there is an important kind of (...) epistemic injustice that is not dealt with in Fricker’s proposal, and which could help us to perceive a particular, pervasive kind of violation of the epistemic agency. (shrink)

Debates em epistemologia recente têm se pautado, em grande medida, pelo problema de caracterizar a natureza da justificação. De modo geral, a tarefa tem sido explorar o status epistêmico que faz com que uma crença verdadeira seja uma instância de conhecimento. Este debate traz consigo uma discussão mais ampla acerca do conteúdo da definição de conhecimento, ou seja, uma discussão cujo propósito é identificar o que compõe de forma necessária e suficiente esta noção epistêmica central. No entanto, paralelamente a este (...) trabalho tem surgido um tipo de preocupação que, em alguma medida, parece ser anterior à tarefa de discutir a natureza ou os conteúdos do conceito em questão. Esta preocupação diz respeito ao problema da atribuição de conhecimento. Casos do tipo-Gettier não só colocam em xeque a definição tradicional, expondo uma insuficiência nos conteúdos comumente associados a esta noção, mas o fazem mostrando que atribuições triviais de conhecimento estão sob risco, quando pautadas pelos conteúdos da noção tradicional. Como veremos, a intuição contida na revisão feita por Edmund Gettier se torna ainda mais relevante ao notarmos que o problema persiste mesmo em versões reformuladas da noção tradicional do conhecimento, como presente na proposta confiabilista, com a qual lidaremos neste trabalho.Oproblema, em linhas gerais, é o seguinte: como devemos entender a atribuição de conhecimento para sujeitos que, supostamente, preenchem todas as demandas para tal, mas que não parecem ter conhecimento em sentido estrito? Os casos de Gettier são paradigmáticos neste sentido. Veremos mais adiante que casos como estes nos apresentam sujeitos que estão cumprindo todas as demandas da análise tradicional do conhecimento, mas que de fato não chegam a possuí-lo. Alternativamente, o problema pode ainda ser invertido: como devemos entender a atribuição de conhecimento para sujeitos que não cumprem todas estas demandas, mas para os quais, intuitivamente, atribuímos conhecimento? Este problema, veremos, é central para a proposta confiabilista, posto que coloca em dúvida uma das formulações recentes da teoria, defendida por John Greco, e pretende mostrar que tal formulação não salva a teoria do problema da atribuição. Neste trabalho, discutirei o alcance deste problema para a epistemologia e em que sentido sua versão invertida afeta o confiabilismo do agente1 de John Greco. Na primeira parte do trabalho meu foco estará no problema geral e na possível contribuição que a noção de saliência causal, proposta no confiabilismo do agente, tem a oferecer como solução.Emseguida, apresentarei dois contraexemplos à centralidade da saliência causal advogada por Greco. Então, na terceira e última parte do trabalho discutirei uma reformulação que Greco faz de sua própria proposta para dar conta das demandas apresentadas por estes contraexemplos. Ao final, defenderei, seguindo Greco, que sua reformulação da noção de saliência causal para casos de conhecimento, em termos qualitativos e não quantitativos, pode nos servir mais adequadamente para entender esta relação de atribuição. (shrink)

This work has as its main purpose to discuss the use of the concept of virtue in contemporary theories of justification. From a general approximation that recent epistemology has established with traditional moral theories, we intend to evaluate the normative potential that the notion of intellectual virtue can offer to handle key epistemic demands, as the demand for an adequate characterization of the justificational element within the traditional definition of knowledge. Hence, we need to explore some of the theories that, (...) in contemporary philosophy, intended to characterize more properly the element that converts true beliefs into knowledge, based on the idea that it can be derived from the cognitive nature of the subject that forms beliefs. One of the main approaches in this regard was Ernest Sosa's virtue perspectivism. Sosa was responsible for inserting the concept of intellectual virtues in the most recent epistemological debate. His theory is also responsible for the popularization of an epistemic evaluation focused on the character of the doxastic agent. Two other prominent theories in this framework, and which were directly influenced by Sosa's seminal work, are Linda Zagzebski's pure virtue theory and John Greco's agent reliabilism. Both authors followed intuitions present in Sosa's proposal to construct, each in its own way, theories of epistemic justification that takes as evaluative measure the contribution of the subject to convert their beliefs into instances of knowledge. We'll discuss here each of these theories and assess to what degree they can characterize the justification so as to meet some epistemic needs, that we frequently judge important. (shrink)

The aim is to examine the performative acts and gender constitution in the context of the Second British Invasion. Despite the pervasive character of patriarchy and the prevalence of sexual difference as an operative cultural distinction, gender was not passively scripted on the bodies of many British singers. The subversive performances did not exclude suffering and marginalization but simultaneously undermined compulsory coherence.

ABSTRACT This is a review of David Bronstein's book "Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

Our object of study in this dissertation is the paralogism due to the concomitant ( which we’ll call abreviated “PDC”). This paralogism is analysed by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations as a false argument. Our study about this paralogismo is divided into four chapters. Trough the first chapter we pretend to answer an important question about the PDC’s appearance. Although this paralogism is a false argument, it possess certain similarity with arguments recognized as good by the one refuted. This similarity (...) would be the reason why debaters are refuted by the PDC. Identifying the nature of this similarity is relevant to comprehend how this paralogism’s appearance can be deceitful. The content of the second chapter can be better undestood as a deepening of our interest for the subjective or psychological dimension present in the studies about the paralogisms in the Sophistical Refutations. This deepening results in the description of a mental phenomenon which we call “parallel computation”. The parallel computation consists in a rational effort (although it is a misguided one) by the one who is refuted when he tries to make sense of the logical and semantical traits of an argument. This interpretation is motivated by a set of false presumptions held by the refuted one. In the third chapter we present a case study, turning our attention to an instance of the PDC, the triangle paralogism. By studying the relevant passages for the interpretation of this paralogism we put forward what we understand to be exegetical constraints. Afterward, making use of these constraints as evaluative parameters, we analyse some reconstitution proposals of the triangle paralogism. In the final part of our dissertation we analyse the content of the chapter 24 of SE. In this chapter Aristotle presents us with a inferential principle which isn’t satisfied by any of the PDC’s instance. The interpretation of this principle is a cause of huge controversy in the secondary literature. In order to make a contribution to the specialized debate of this point we test two interpretative hyphotesis of this principle’s content, the referential and the intensional interpretation. (shrink)

Resumo: Neste artigo, apresentamos uma versão de uma teoria que eu chamarei de Contextualismo Epistêmico ‒ a visão de que o contexto e os padrões determinados por ele desempenham um papel central na avaliação de se um agente epistêmico tem, ou não, justificação e, portanto, conhecimento ‒ para tentar resolver um dos problemas mais influentes em epistemologia, a saber, o Problema do Regresso epistêmico. O primeiro passo será o de caracterizar o problema do regresso epistêmico. Em seguida, apresentaremos uma importante (...) distinção que é útil para um melhor entendimento da nossa tese, isto é, a distinção entre justificação proposicional e doxástica. Então, abordaremos as visões tradicionais que supostamente alegam resolver este problema, mostrando que todas são problemáticas. Por fim, apresentaremos a visão que pretendemos defender, mostrando como ela pode oferecer uma resposta ao problema do regresso epistêmico, de uma maneira que as outras visões não podem. Palavras-chave: Regresso Epistêmico, Justificação, Conhecimento, Contextualismo Epistêmico. Abstract: In this paper we present a version of a theory that we will call Epistemic Contextualism - the view that the context and the standards that it determines, play a central role in evaluating whether, or not, a subject has justification, and therefore knowledge - to try to solve one of the most influential problems in epistemology, namely, the Epistemic Regress Problem. The first step will be to characterize the epistemic regress problem. Next, we present an important distinction that is useful to a better understanding of our view, that is, the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Then, we present traditional views that allegedly claim to solve this problem showing that all are problematic. The final step concerns the exposition of the view we want to defend, showing how it can solve the epistemic regress problem in a way that the other views cannot. Keywords: Epistemic Regress, Justification, Knowledge, Epistemic Contextualism. (shrink)

Resumo: No livro When is Knowledge True Belief? (2012), Richard Foley apresenta uma teoria do conhecimento bastante simples e original, que pretende desbancar as rivais e reorientar a teoria do conhecimento: um sujeito S sabe alguma proposição p se e somente se S verdadeiramente crê que p e não lhe falta nenhuma informação importante. Michael Hannon, em seu artigo “Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information?” (2013), faz uma objeção à visão de Foley, acusando-o de oferecer um argumento circular que, (...) ao não diferenciar informação importante de informação não importante, acaba, em última instância, por fazer referência à própria noção de conhecimento. Acredito que a teoria apresentada por Foley está no caminho certo; porém, apresenta- se de forma incompleta. Neste artigo, apresento uma interpretação subjetivista de relevância epistêmica, proposta originalmente por Floridi, que complementa a visão proposta por Foley e rechaça as objeções levantadas por Hannon. Palavras-chave: Conhecimento. Informação. Relevância. -/- Abstract: In When is Knowledge True Belief? (2012), Richard Foley offers an original and extraordinarily simple theory of knowledge which intends to overcome its rivals and reorient the theory of knowledge: a subject S knows some proposition p if and only if S truly believes that p and does not lack any important information. Michael Hannon, in his article “Is True Belief Knowledge Plus Adequate Information?” (2013), puts forward an objection to Foley’s view which charges him of offering a circular argument that fails to distinguish important information from unimportant information without ultimately making reference to knowledge. I believe the theory presented by Foley is on the right . (shrink)

A Ouranographia de van Roomen é constituída por três livros: no liber primus, descreve genericamente a máquina celeste, sua matéria e forma, seus movimentos e orbes; no liber secundus, descreve o primeiro céu e as linhas e círculos celestes que usamos para nos referenciar estando aqui da Terra; no liber tertius, explica o primeiro móvel, seus círculos e movimentos. Percebemos que van Roomen faz uma compilação de boa parte do conhecimento existente sobre o tema desde a Antiguidade até seu tempo (...) e, através de suas citações, percebemos ainda que ele teve contato com obras de inúmeros autores, se mostrando um grande intelectual. (shrink)

Resumo O Contextualismo Epistêmico é conhecido por alegar oferecer a melhor resposta para alguns dos principais problemas epistemológicos, dentre eles o problema gerado pelos paradoxos céticos e, por conseguinte, por deter o conhecimento sobre muitas coisas que ordinariamente julgávamos já conhecidas. Da mesma forma, seria uma via capaz de manter a validade do princípio de fechamento dedutivo. O presente texto pretende analisar a teoria contextualista, conforme apresentada por Stewart Cohen, mostrando como o contextualismo resolve essas questões. Na primeira parte do (...) texto apresentaremos alguns problemas (e algumas características históricas) que culminaram no surgimento do contextualismo. Na segunda parte explanaremos a teoria contextualista de Cohen. Em seguida levantamos algumas objeções comumente endereçadas ao contextualismo. Por fim, concluímos que, embora não seja completamente refutada, a teoria contextualista deve dirimir dúvidas e explicar algumas dificuldades para manter a sua plausibilidade. Palavras-Chave: Contextualismo; Ceticismo; Conhecimento; Stewart Cohen. -/- Abstract Epistemic Contextualism is known by his allegation to possess the best answer to some of the major epistemological problems, among them, the problem created by the skeptical paradoxes and therefore the claim that we can know many things we ordinarily claim to know, and also maintains the validity of the closure principle. This paper seeks to examine Contextualism, as presented by Stewart Cohen, showing how Contextualism solves these problems. In the first section of the text I will present some problems (and some historic features) that originated Contextualism. In the second section I will present the Cohen`s Contextualism. Then, we consider some objections raised against the contextualista theory. Finally, we conclude that although these objections are not able to completely refute contextualism its proponents have to give better explanations in order to maintain its plausibility. Keywords: Contextualism; Skepticism; Knowledge; Stewart Cohen. (shrink)

Epistemological disjunctivism is a philosophical theory that has received special attention in the recent years. Particularly because it has been seen by many as a way of renewing discussions that range from the nature of justification of our daily beliefs to the possibility of unveiling the structure of the problem of radical skepticism and of responding to it. Duncan Pritchard is one of the authors who have offered a particular view of disjunctivism and ways of conceiving of disjunctivist treatments to (...) such questions. His work has as its main source of inspiration the seminal work of John McDowell. In this paper, I present a way of understanding the problem ofradicalskepticism and the mannerin which epistemological disjunctivism aimsto offer solutionsto it. In orderto do that, I present McDowell’s general proposal and discuss in which way his account differs from Pritchard’s own disjunctivism. At the end, I try to show how Pritchard’s approach tries to respond to radical skepticism not only by appealing to a disjunctivist reading of our epistemic position, but also by offering a revision of our structure of reasons. (shrink)

The aim is to examine the multiple meanings of creativity in creative economy. The meanings which reinforce the individual aspect stress that personal characteristics may unlock the wealth that lies within people. The definitions that reinforce the organizational and social aspects understand creativity as a process, which requires knowledge, networks, and technologies that interconnect novel ideas and contexts. The perspectives which reinforce the political aspect see that creativity took the status of a doctrine to secure collaboration between government and industry. (...) However, these notions of creativity stress its instrumental utility and undermine fantasy, play, or uselessness. (shrink)

In this paper we present a introduction to the volume on philosophy of memory.