Realist theories of legislative intent can be divided between aggregative theories (on which legislative intent is what some proportion of legislators intend) and common intent theories (on which legislative intent is a unanimous intent among legislators). In this paper, we advance and defend an alternative realist conception of legislative intent: the Rational Unity Account. On this account, the legislature is an agent with a distinctive ‘rational point of view’—a concept we adopt from social ontology. The legislature’s rational point of view (...) is shaped by its procedures and structures, in ways not determined by either a common intention held by legislators or an aggregation of the intentions of legislators. We explain how our view improves on existing accounts. We then apply it to three cases to demonstrate its implications for legal interpretation. Importantly, on the proposed account, legislative intent can depart from what individual legislators think or know. (shrink)

● Un emplazamiento cualquiera (v. gr. sol en Tauro; Marte en Capricornio; Mercurio en la tercera casa) es necesariamente común a decenas de miles de personas. Saturno hospedado en la novena casa, por ejemplo, no se comportará de la misma manera o no producirá los mismos efectos en las veinte o cien cartas en que allí lo encontremos, sino en concordancia con el resto de la composición astrográfica (como hospedarnos en el mismo hotel en diferentes épocas o diferentes personas haber (...) contraído la misma enfermedad; nuestra estadía será diferente cada vez, según la época, y no todos los enfermos presentarán los mismos síntomas, según su metabolismo; por no mencionar que cada astrografía, como cada código o secuencia genética, es irrepetible). Ciertamente, “ningún planeta puede, por sí solo, producir lo que solamente la acción mancomunada o conjunta de todos puede” (BUSTAMANTE, 2023, revista SPICA, págs. 93-111). He aquí la naturaleza o condición sinérgica del ejercicio interpretativo (i.e., el todo es poco más que la suma de todas sus partes). ● El componente fundamental de la expresión matemática del ejercicio interpretativo lo constituye la triangulación astrológica, denominación funcional de lo que conocemos como síntesis (WEISS, 1946; LEO, 1983; HAND, 1981). ● Con el fin de demostrar su utilidad, así como la conveniencia de su expresión matemática, hemos escogido dos individuos (JEFFREY DAHMER, STEVEN SPIELBERG) cuyas astrografías no explican, según la comunidad, sus vidas. El resto de las astrografías corresponden a las de los asesinos en serie JOHN WAYNE GACY, DAVID CARPENTER y TED BUNDY. ● A través de notaciones algebraicas, explicamos la síntesis y los valores funcionales que la componen. ● Tomamos la luna y Neptuno como planetas relevantes a propósito del diagnóstico o el estudio de asuntos endocrinos o neurohormonales y a Marte, Plutón y Saturno como planetas relevantes a los fines de inferir violencia o comportamiento siniestro, según el caso, y las cuadraturas u oposiciones —y conjunciones— entre Venus y la luna, la luna y Neptuno o entre el sol o Venus y Neptuno o Urano como indicadores de desórdenes neurohormonales y/o de desviación sexual (definición APA) . ● Consideramos las cuadraturas u oposiciones —y conjunciones— entre: Mercurio o la luna y Saturno, o entre Marte o la luna y Saturno, Urano, Neptuno y/o Plutón como poderosos indicios de violencia o de desequilibrio, según el caso. ● También hemos considerado a Sagitario como un signo tan expansivo y abundante como su regente, Júpiter, según la mejor de sus caracterizaciones (o excepcionalmente raudo y salvaje, según otras), y a la quinta región de un mapa natal como una estrechamente relacionada con la fortuna en sentido amplio (material e inmaterial). ● Debido a que defendemos la idea según la cual los orbes deben predicarse del planeta (tamaño, velocidad), no del aspecto, a los gigantes gaseosos (Júpiter, Saturno, Urano y Neptuno) y al sol les hemos concedido hasta 10º de orbe (o 12º, en el caso de la influencia amplia ). ● Entendemos las relaciones aspectuales como relaciones angulares sostenidas entre dos o más cuerpos celestes emplazados en signos con al menos una propiedad en común (según nuestra teoría molecular de la eclíptica, compatible con la teoría óptica de los aspectos de la tradición helenística). (shrink)

Estoy muy acostumbrado a libros extraños y gente especial, pero Hawkins se destaca debido a su uso de una técnica simple para probar la tensión muscular como una clave para la "verdad" de cualquier tipo de afirmación-es., no sólo para si la persona que está siendo probada lo cree, sino si es realmente cierto! Lo que es bien sabido es que las personas mostrarán respuestas fisiológicas y psicológicas automáticas e inconscientes a cualquier cosa a la que estén expuestos: imágenes, sonidos, (...) toques, olores, ideas, personas. así que, lectura muscular para descubrir sus verdaderos sentimientos no es radical en absoluto, a diferencia de usarlo como un palo doble (más lectura muscular) para hacer "ciencia Paranormal". Hawkins describe el uso de la tensión decreciente en los músculos de un brazo en respuesta a aumentos en la carga cognitiva causando así que el brazo caiga en respuesta a la presión constante de los dedos de alguien. No parece consciente de que existe un largo y vasto esfuerzo de investigación en psicología social que se hace referencia por frases como ' cognición implícita ', ' automaticidad ', etc., y que su uso de la ' Kinesiología ' es una sección diminuta. Además del tono muscular (utilizado con poca frecuencia) los psicólogos sociales miden el EEG, la respuesta galvánica de la piel y las respuestas verbales más frecuentes a las palabras, oraciones, imágenes o situaciones en momentos que varían de segundos a meses después del estímulo. Muchos, como Bargh y Wegner, toman los resultados para significar que somos autómatas que aprenden y actúan en gran medida sin conciencia a través de S1 (sistema automatizado 1) y muchos otros como Kihlstrom y Shanks dicen que estos estudios son defectuosos y somos criaturas de S2 (sistema deliberativo 2). Aunque Hawkins parece no tener idea, como en otras áreas de la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de mayor orden, la situación con respecto a "automaticidad" sigue siendo tan caótica como lo fue cuando Wittgenstein describió las razones de la esterilidad y la barrendez de la psicología en los años 30. Sin embargo, este libro es una lectura fácil y algunos terapeutas y maestros espirituales pueden encontrarlo de uso. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna Dos Sistemas Punto de Vista puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y lenguaje En Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2Nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2017' 3a Ed (2019) y otras. (shrink)

Öz David Hume İnsan Doğası Üzerine Bir İnceleme’de ben idesinin bilgikuramsal temellerini araştırırken, bir yandan hiç kuşku duyulmaksızın kabul edilen ben’e ilişkin bilgimizin güvenilir temellere dayanmadığını göstermeye çalışıyor, diğer yandan da bu tür bir araştırmanın ancak bir bilim aracılığıyla yapılması gereğine dikkat çekiyordu. Ben idesi için görgül kanıt arayışı, oluşturmaya çalıştığı insan biliminin deneysel temelleri olması gerektiği gibi insan doğasına ilişkin araştırmalar için yeni bir uslamlamayı da imliyordu. Hume’un önerdiği uslamlama yöntemi, geleneksel felsefenin insan zihnine dair yaklaşımının artık savunulamaz (...) olduğunun bir göstergesidir. Bu yazıda Hume’un ben idesi öğretisini oluştururken, zihinsel etkinlikleri doğal bir süreç içerisinde kalarak açıklama girişimi irdelenecek, ortaya koyduğu kavramsal ve ilkesel yeniliklerin günümüzde bilişsel bilimler olarak tanımlanan alanın doğuşunda etkili olduğu savunulacaktır. Bu amaçla, ben idesinin oluşumundaki bilgi kuramsal temeller, kişi-özdeşliği öğretisine ve bu tür bir özdeşliği düşünmemizi olanaklı kılan belleğin rolüne dikkat çekerek çözümlenecektir. -/- Abstract While Hume investigates the epistemological basis of the idea of self in his book 'A Treatise of Human Nature', on the one hand he tries to show that our knowledge about the self that is accepted without any doubt does not have reliable basis, on the other hand he draws our attention that any research in this field should be conducted through a science. The search for the emprical evidence for the idea of self is both required for the experimental basis of the newly formed human sciences, and implies a new reasoning for the researches concerning the human nature. Hume’s method of reasoning indicates that the approaches of the traditional philosophy concerning human mind are no longer tenable. In this paper it is examined that while Hume establishes the doctrine of the idea of self, he attempts to explain the mental activities remaining in a natural course, and it is argued that Hume’s epoch-making conceptual and principal contributions in this area have an undeniable impact upon the cognitive sciences of our age. Thus, the epistemological basis of the formation of the idea of self will be analysed by drawing our attention to the personal identity and to memory which makes possible to think such an identity. (shrink)

Se diserta sobre “RESISTENCIA TRIBUTARIA” JUSTIFICADA EN EL ECUADOR. Ello, porque gobierno del presidente Daniel Noboa estableció todo un “paquete” de “impuestos de guerra”, como la Contribución Temporal de Seguridad (CTS); un incremento del IVA, a discreción del presidente de la República, el pechaje del sector construcción, transferencias al exterior y otros impuestos. Ley Orgánica para Enfrentar el Conflicto Armado Interno, la Crisis Social y Económica (en adelante, la Ley), publicada en el Registro Oficial, Suplemento No. 516 del 12 de (...) marzo de 2024, trayendo a discusión los aspectos jurídicos que vician de posible inconstitucionalidad dicha Ley, con fundamento en la normativa constitucional y tributaria de Ecuador. Con la Ley, dado el contexto de su aprobación, el gobierno creó un ´impuesto de guerra´, para financiar una guerra inexistente, partiendo del hecho que la Corte Constitucional del Ecuador estableció que en el país no existe un “Conflicto Armado Interno” (CAI). Así lo estableció en sus Dictámenes 5-24-EE/24 del 9 de mayo de 2024 y 6-24-EE/24 del 13 de junio de 2024, en los que declaró inconstitucionales los decretos ejecutivos No. 250 de 30 de abril de 2024 y 275 del 22 de mayo de 2024, relacionados con el Estado de Excepción que ha regido en Ecuador desde el 10 de enero de 2024, soportado éste en la presunta existencia de un CAI, “decertado” y reconocido sin fundamento jurídico, pese a que no cumple con los supuestos fácticos y normativos fijados, con fuerza ius cogens, por el Derecho Internacional Humanitario (DIH)7 para ser calificado como tal. El ´impuesto de guerra´, fijado en la Ley, por inconstitucional, es confiscatorio. Los Dictámenes, en el plano de la reflexión tributaria, reflejan la patética violación al principio de la constitucionalidad y de la legalidad fiscal, resultando viciada de nulidad absoluta la Ley y, con ella, la configuración del tributo, porque el hecho imponible (CAI) es inexistente, implicando que el presupuesto establecido por la Ley para configurar cada `impuesto de guerra´ jamás tendrá materialización práctica (por inexistente) y nunca tendrá validez jurídica (por inconstitucional), resultando en un tributo confiscatorio, surgido contra la Carta Fundamental y evidente fraude a la legalidad tributaria del país, en perjucio del patrimonio personal o corporativo de los contribuyentes, residentes fiscales o establecimientos permanentes en el país a los que somete a un pago indebido sancionado en el artículo 122 10 , concordado con los artículo 306 al 307 del Código Tributario del Ecuador. La nulidad absoluta e ineficacia del hecho imponible, por inconstitucional, deriva en la invalidez plena y la irrelevancia constitucional del inexistente hecho generador del tributo -proveniente de un acto de naturaleza jurídica - por la no realización fáctica, tangible y concreta del presupuesto generatriz establecido (CAI) en la Ley para su configuración. Como consecuencia, nunca jamás surge válidamente la obligación tributaria, cuya exigencia resulta ineficaz, por ilegal e ilusoria. La obligación tributaria, tiene que calificarse, en tal sentido, como no nacida lícitamente en el ámbito fiscal. Con ello, habría de resultar confiscatorio el pago de la alicuota del `impuesto de guerra´ fijado por el gobierno ecuatoriano de modo inconstitucional abusando del ejercicio del poder tributario relacionado con la urgencia en materia económica. Ante las hondas repercusiones económicas que genera en la población y el sector productivo del país, se describen las posibles vías institucionales disponibles en la regulación ecuatoriana para impugnar la Ley ante la Corte Constitucional del Ecuador -o en la jurisdicción constitucional- sin menoscabo de la eventual activación de la competencia derogatoria de la Asamblea Nacional frente a la misma. Se reafirma el principio de justicia tributaria y la vigencia del Estado social de derechos y de justicia consagrado en la República del Ecuador y la plena efectividad de los derechos y garantías fundamentales de los hermanos ecuatorianos ubicados en la posición de destinatarios de un "impuesto de guerra" tan arbitrario como inconstitucional, que riñe con el enunciado constitucional y convencional del respeto a la dignidad humana y la incolumidad de la propiedad privada frente a actuaciones del Estado que representan un claro abuso en el ejercicio del poder público en desmedro de la legalidad fiscal, generador de un supuesto de patética injusticia tributaria adoptada a contracorriente de toda regulación en materia de impositiva con la publicación de la Ley Orgánica para Enfrentar el Conflicto Armado Interno, la Crisis Social y Económica. En la lucha contra conductas gubernamentales transgresoras de la dignidad humana y frente a leyes inconstitucionales que afectan los derechos fundamentales, la libertad económica y la propiedad privada de los hermanos contribuyentes ecuatorianos y sus empresas afectadas. Este esfuerzo intelectual, realizado por nuestra familia de abogados, es una reverencia a la gesta de nuestros libertadores y un llamado al pueblo ecuatoriano económicamente afectado a resistir, por medios institucionales, frente al pago de impuestos arbitrarios e ilegales que atentan contra los principios fundamentales del orden público económico previsto en la Ley Fundamental. Lo anterior, como una singular expresión reglada, lícita y avanzada de dar al traste con una ley orgánica fiscal tan arbitraria como injusta, activando los mecanismos de protección de los derechos fundamentales constitucionalmente establecidos en el Ecuador. La pretensión judicial traduciría, mutatis mutandis, en la activación institucional de la añeja figura de la "resistencia tributaria" (objeción fiscal, desobediencia tributaria), que, en sus orígenes, nació como expresión de la desobediencia civil frente a leyes impositivas injustas, con el precedente del escritor estadounidense Henry David Thoreau, encarcelado por negarse a pagar un tributo electoral, reticente a contribuir con la continuidad de la esclavitud y la financiación de la Guerra entre México y EEUU, basado en la idea de que las personas deben priorizar su conciencia sobre la obediencia a leyes injustas. -/- . (shrink)

Accounts of the nature of unpleasant pain have proliferated over the past decade, but there has been little systematic investigation of which of them can accommodate its badness. This paper is such a study. In its sights are two targets: those who deny the non-instrumental disvalue of pain's unpleasantness; and those who allow it but deny that it can be accommodated by the view—advanced by me and others—that unpleasant pains are interoceptive experiences with evaluative content. Against the former, I argue (...) that pain's unpleasantness does indeed have noninstrumental disvalue; against the latter I argue both that my critics’ own desire-theoretic accounts of pain's unpleasantness cannot accommodate such disvalue, and that my evaluativist view can—either by appealing to “anti-unpleasantness” desires or by exploiting pain's perceptuality. (shrink)

Pain asymbolia is a rare condition caused by brain damage, usually in adulthood. Asymbolics feel pain but appear indifferent to it, and indifferent also to visual and verbal threats. How should we make sense of this? Nikola Grahek thinks asymbolics’ pains are abnormal, lacking a component that make normal pains unpleasant and motivating. Colin Klein thinks that what is abnormal is not asymbolics’ pains, but asymbolics: they have a psychological deficit making them unresponsive to unpleasant pain. I argue that an (...) illuminating account requires elements of both views. Asymbolic pains are indeed abnormal, but they are abnormal because asymbolics are. I agree with Klein that asymbolics are incapable of caring about their bodily integrity; but I argue against him that, if this is to explain not only their indifference to visual and verbal threat, but also their indifference to pain, we must do the following: (i) take asymbolics’ lack of bodily care not as an alternative to, but as an explanation of their pains’ missing a component, and (ii) claim that the missing component consists in evaluative content. Asymbolia, I conclude, reveals not only that unpleasant pain is composite, but that its ‘hedomotive component’ is evaluative. (shrink)

Evaluativism is best thought of as a way of enriching a perceptual view of pain to account for pain’s unpleasantness or painfulness. Once it was common for philosophers to contrast pains with perceptual experiences (McGinn 1982; Rorty 1980). It was thought that perceptual experiences were intentional (or content-bearing, or about something), whereas pains were representationally blank. But today many of us reject this contrast. For us, your having a pain in your toe is a matter not of your sensing “pain-ly” (...) or encountering a sense-datum, but of your having an interoceptive experience representing (accurately or inaccurately) that your toe is in a particular experience-independent condition, such as undergoing a certain “disturbance” or being damaged or in danger (Armstrong 1962; Tye 1995). But even if such representational content makes an experience a pain, a further ingredient seems required to make the pain unpleasant. According to evaluativism, the further ingredient is the experience’s possession of evaluative content: its representing the bodily condition as bad for the subject. In this chapter, I elaborate evaluativism, locate it among alternatives, and explain its attractions and challenges. (shrink)

I argue for a transformative revival or actualization of the very core of an integrative, methodologically secured form of intellect‑mystical asceticism. This approach draws on traditional sources that are re‑examined from a systematic—synthetic and transcultural—philosophical perspective and in light of the multi‑civilizational global environment of the 21st century. The main traditional points of reference in this paper are provided by Nicolaus de Cusa and Ibn Sīnā, and I refer toa few others, such as Attar of Nishapur, in passing. I begin (...) by developing a basic concept of intellect‑mystical asceticism. It is distinguished from mystification, science, scientism, and modes of everyday communication and cognition. Then, I make the case for an updated, transcultural approach to intellect‑mysticism that can foster the internal (social) and external (environmental) reintegration of the human noosphere and technosphere in future planetary development. In this context, a modern intellect‑mystical philosophical notion of “knowing non‑knowing” (wissendes Nichtwissen, docta ignorantia) is developed. It is inspired by Nicolaus de Cusa and contextualized from a systematic transcultural angle at the same time. Finally, I discuss the problem of the practical, or rather ascetic, realization of the related possibilities of intellect‑mystical self‑enfolding. Here, the preceding steps of the reflection are mapped onto an outline regarding distinct developmental stages of such a transformative intellect‑mystical practice in Ibn Sīnā’s Remarks and Admonitions (al‑Ishārāt wat‑Tanbīhāt). (shrink)

This twelfth volume of Collected Papers includes 86 papers comprising 976 pages on Neutrosophics Theory and Applications, published between 2013-2021 in the international journal and book series “Neutrosophic Sets and Systems” by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 112 co-authors (alphabetically ordered) from 21 countries: Abdel Nasser H. Zaied, Muhammad Akram, Bobin Albert, S. A. Alblowi, S. Anitha, Guennoun Asmae, Assia Bakali, Ayman M. Manie, Abdul Sami Awan, Azeddine Elhassouny, Erick González-Caballero, D. Dafik, Mithun Datta, Arindam Dey, (...) Mamouni Dhar, Christopher Dyer, Nur Ain Ebas, Mohamed Eisa, Ahmed K. Essa, Faruk Karaaslan, João Alcione Sganderla Figueiredo, Jorge Fernando Goyes García, N. Ramila Gandhi, Sudipta Gayen, Gustavo Alvarez Gómez, Sharon Dinarza Álvarez Gómez, Haitham A. El-Ghareeb, Hamiden Abd El-Wahed Khalifa, Masooma Raza Hashmi, Ibrahim M. Hezam, German Acurio Hidalgo, Le Hoang Son, R. Jahir Hussain, S. Satham Hussain, Ali Hussein Mahmood Al-Obaidi, Hays Hatem Imran, Nabeela Ishfaq, Saeid Jafari, R. Jansi, V. Jeyanthi, M. Jeyaraman, Sripati Jha, Jun Ye, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Abdullah Kargın, J. Kavikumar, Kawther Fawzi Hamza Alhasan, Huda E. Khalid, Neha Andalleb Khalid, Mohsin Khalid, Madad Khan, D. Koley, Valeri Kroumov, Manoranjan Kumar Singh, Pavan Kumar, Prem Kumar Singh, Ranjan Kumar, Malayalan Lathamaheswari, A.N. Mangayarkkarasi, Carlos Rosero Martínez, Marvelio Alfaro Matos, Mai Mohamed, Nivetha Martin, Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Mohamed Talea, K. Mohana, Muhammad Irfan Ahamad, Rana Muhammad Zulqarnain, Muhammad Riaz, Muhammad Saeed, Muhammad Saqlain, Muhammad Shabir, Muhammad Zeeshan, Anjan Mukherjee, Mumtaz Ali, Deivanayagampillai Nagarajan, Iqra Nawaz, Munazza Naz, Roan Thi Ngan, Necati Olgun, Rodolfo González Ortega, P. Pandiammal, I. Pradeepa, R. Princy, Marcos David Oviedo Rodríguez, Jesús Estupiñán Ricardo, A. Rohini, Sabu Sebastian, Abhijit Saha, Mehmet Șahin, Said Broumi, Saima Anis, A.A. Salama, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Seyed Ahmad Edalatpanah, Sajana Shaik, Soufiane Idbrahim, S. Sowndrarajan, Mohamed Talea, Ruipu Tan, Chalapathi Tekuri, Selçuk Topal, S. P. Tiwari, Vakkas Uluçay, Maikel Leyva Vázquez, Chinnadurai Veerappan, M. Venkatachalam, Luige Vlădăreanu, Ştefan Vlăduţescu, Young Bae Jun, Wadei F. Al-Omeri, Xiao Long Xin.‬‬‬‬‬‬. (shrink)

Desarrollar el recuento de la producción filosófica contemporánea no es una tarea sencilla. Más en nuestro país, donde se hacen pocos esfuerzos para comprender la dimensión real del pensamiento mexicano. Ello se debe a varios factores, entre los que pueden señalarse la apatía por conocer las reflexiones alrededor de temas nacionales, el poco interés que despiertan pensadores locales, la casi nula difusión que tienen algunas propuestas filosóficas y los esfuerzos aislados por componer una historia de la “filosofía de provincia”. En (...) la mayoría de los estados de la república, no existe una tradición sólida para publicar y debatir sistemáticamente la filosofía; tan lamentable carencia deviene con regularidad en la alimentación de una filosofía ficticia o en aislamiento de meditaciones originales y novedosas que no tienen la difusión que merecen. Para comprender parte de las causas de este problema, se propone, como experimento historiográfico, hacer una revisión de cuatro tesis vinculadas con la filosofía presentadas en el estado de Chihuahua entre 1968 y 1993; se incluye también la de José Fuentes Mares, defendida en la unam en 1944. Se parte del supuesto que en trabajos de esta naturaleza puede verse con cierta claridad la vocación, talento y disposición filosófica de los autores. Dado que no participa un comité editorial o un corrector de estilo, más allá de la guía del director de tesis, es poco el mejoramiento metodológico y estilístico que reciben las tesis, con lo que se evidencian carencias y fortalezas de los sustentantes. Se revisará tan sólo una muestra; sin embargo, estos trabajos son clave porque dos de ellos son de filósofos con reconocimiento nacional (Fuentes Mares y Rico Bovio), una es la primera tesis de la extinta maestría en Filosofía de la Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez (David Mariscal). Dos más fueron escritas por profesores que no se han dedicado a la investigación filosófica (Gilberto Vargas y Rubén Lau), y otras dos fueron escritas por exrectores de universidades chihuahuenses (Rubén Lau y Fuentes Mares). Los temas tocados (filosofía del derecho, antropología filosófica, filosofía griega e historia de la filosofía mexicana) brindan una panorámica de intereses y líneas de investigación –si así pudiera llamárseles– a los que se asoman los tesistas chihuahuenses. De esta manera, se está en condiciones de esbozar un “mapa intelectual” superficial en el que también podrán visualizarse ciertas tendencias en la docencia dentro del estado. Palabras clave: historiografía de la filosofía, filosofía mexicana, filosofía contemporánea del norte de México. (shrink)

In this article, I defend an account of linguistic comprehension on which meaning is not cognized, or on which we do not tacitly know our language's semantics. On this view, sentence comprehension is explained instead by our capacity to translate sentences into the language of thought. I explain how this view can explain our capacity to correctly interpret novel utterances, and then I defend it against several standing objections.

Eleanor Knox has argued that our concept of spacetime applies to whichever structure plays a certain functional role in the laws (the role of determining local inertial structure). I raise two complications for this approach. First, our spacetime concept seems to have the structure of a cluster concept, which means that Knox's inertial criteria for spacetime cannot succeed with complete generality. Second, the notion of metaphysical fundamentality may feature in the spacetime concept, in which case spacetime functionalism may be uninformative (...) in the absence of answers to fundamental metaphysical questions like the substantivalist/relationist debate. (shrink)

I insist that I was able to raise my hand, and I acknowledge that a law would have been broken had I done so, but I deny that I am therefore able to break a law. To uphold my instance of soft determinism, I need not claim any incredible powers. To uphold the compatibilism that I actually believe, I need not claim that such powers are even possible. My incompatibilist opponent is a creature of fiction, but he has his prototypes (...) in real life. He is modeled partly after Peter van Inwagen and partly on myself when I first worried about van Inwagen's argument against compatibilism. (shrink)

We present data and argument to show that in Tetris - a real-time interactive video game - certain cognitive and perceptual problems are more quickly, easily, and reliably solved by performing actions in the world rather than by performing computational actions in the head alone. We have found that some translations and rotations are best understood as using the world to improve cognition. These actions are not used to implement a plan, or to implement a reaction; they are used to (...) change the world in order to simplify the problem-solving task. Thus, we distinguish pragmatic actions ñ actions performed to bring one physically closer to a goal - from epistemic actions - actions performed to uncover information that is hidden or hard to compute mentally. To illustrate the need for epistemic actions, we first develop a standard information-processing model of Tetris-cognition, and show that it cannot explain performance data from human players of the game - even when we relax the assumption of fully sequential processing. Standard models disregard many actions taken by players because they appear unmotivated or superfluous. However, we describe many such actions that are actually taken by players that are far from superfluous, and that play valuable roles in improving human performance. We argue that traditional accounts are limited because they regard action as having a single function: to change the world. By recognizing a second function of action - an epistemic function - we can explain many of the actions that a traditional model cannot. Although, our argument is supported by numerous examples specifically from Tetris, we outline how the one category of epistemic action can be incorporated into theories of action more generally. (shrink)

This article defends the view that having a language just is knowing how to engage in communication with it. It also argues that, despite claims to the contrary, this view is compatible and complementary with the Chomskyan conception of language on which humans have languages in virtue of being in brain states realizing tacit knowledge of grammars for those languages.

Do psychological traits predict philosophical views? We administered the PhilPapers Survey, created by David Bourget and David Chalmers, which consists of 30 views on central philosophical topics (e.g., epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language) to a sample of professional philosophers (N = 314). We extended the PhilPapers survey to measure a number of psychological traits, such as personality, numeracy, well-being, lifestyle, and life experiences. We also included non-technical ‘translations’ of these views for eventual use (...) in other populations. We found limited to no support for the notion that personality or demographics predict philosophical views. We did, however, find that some psychological traits were predictive of philosophical views, even after strict correction for multiple comparisons. Findings include: higher interest in numeracy predicted physicalism, naturalism, and consequentialism; lower levels of well-being and higher levels of mental illness predicted hard determinism; using substances such as psychedelics and marijuana predicted non-realist and subjectivist views of morality and aesthetics; having had a transformative or self-transcendent experience predicted theism and idealism. We discuss whether or not these empirical results have philosophical implications, while noting that 68% of our sample of professional philosophers indicated that such findings would indeed have philosophical value. (shrink)

Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p, but I don't believe that p>. If there were nothing irrational about failing to know one's own beliefs, they claim, then there would be nothing irrational about Moore-paradoxical assertions or beliefs. This article considers a few ways the data surrounding Moore's paradox might be marshaled to support rational (...) requirements to know one's beliefs, and finds that none succeed. (shrink)

This paper develops and motivates a unification theory of metaphysical explanation, or as I will call it, Metaphysical Unificationism. The theory’s main inspiration is the unification account of scientific explanation, according to which explanatoriness is a holistic feature of theories that derive a large number of explananda from a meager set of explanantia, using a small number of argument patterns. In developing Metaphysical Unificationism, I will point out that it has a number of interesting consequences. The view offers a novel (...) conception of metaphysical explanation that doesn’t rely on the notion of a “determinative” or “explanatory” relation; it allows us to draw a principled distinction between metaphysical and scientific explanations; it implies that naturalness and fundamentality are distinct but intimately related notions; and perhaps most importantly, it re-establishes the unduly neglected link between explanation and understanding in the metaphysical realm. A number of objections can be raised against the view, but I will argue that none of these is conclusive. The upshot is that Metaphysical Unificationism provides a powerful and hitherto overlooked alternative to extant theories of metaphysical explanation. (shrink)

Do motivational limitations due to human nature constrain the demands of justice? Among those who say no, David Estlund offers perhaps the most compelling argument. Taking Estlund’s analysis of “ability” as a starting point, I show that motivational deficiencies can constrain the demands of justice under at least one common circumstance — that the motivationally-deficient agent makes a good faith effort to overcome her deficiency. In fact, my argument implies something stronger; namely, that the demands of justice are constrained (...) by what people are sufficiently likely to be motivated to do. Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, it is the business of ideal theory — not just nonideal theory — to work with the motivational capacities people are likely enough to have. (See also Estlund's reply in the same issue of EJPT and my rejoinder on Philpapers.). (shrink)

Which premisses should we use to start our inquiries? Which transitions during inquiry should we take next? When should we switch lines of inquiry? In this paper, I address these open questions about inquiry, formulating novel norms for such decisions during deductive reasoning. I use the first-order predicate calculus, in combination with Carnap’s state description framework, to state such norms. Using that framework, I first demonstrate some properties of sets of sentences used in deduction. I then state some norms for (...) decisions made during deductive reasoning, establishing initial benchmarks for efficient deduction by ideal reasoners. When deciding which transition to make next, reasoners should choose the most informative transition, the one that maximally reduces uncertainty in the sense of ruling out the largest number of state descriptions relevant to their inquiry. Finally, inspired by optimal foraging theory, I show that, under certain assumptions of ignorance, reasoners should change premiss sets when their information intake drops below the global average information intake across premiss sets. (shrink)

An internalist slogan says that justification depends on internal factors. But which factors are those? This paper examines some common motivations favoring internalism over externalism, and says they are compatible with including dispositional and even past mental states in the internal.

In recent years, metaphysics has undergone what some describe as a revolution: it has become standard to understand a vast array of questions as questions about grounding, a metaphysical notion of determination. Why should we believe in grounding, though? Supporters of the revolution often gesture at what I call the Argument from Explanatoriness: the notion of grounding is somehow indispensable to a metaphysical type of explanation. I challenge this argument and along the way develop a “reactionary” view, according to which (...) there is no interesting sense in which the notion of grounding is explanatorily indispensable. I begin with a distinction between two conceptions of grounding, a distinction which extant critiques of the revolution have usually failed to take into consideration: grounding qua that which underlies metaphysical explanation and grounding qua metaphysical explanation itself. Accordingly, I distinguish between two versions of the Argument from Explanatoriness: the Unexplained Explanations Version for the first conception of grounding, and the Expressive Power Version for the second. The paper’s conclusion is that no version of the Argument from Explanatoriness is successful. (shrink)

In the pure powers ontology (PPO), basic physical properties have wholly dispositional essences. PPO has clear advantages over categoricalist ontologies, which suffer from familiar epistemological and metaphysical problems. However, opponents argue that because it contains no qualitative properties, PPO lacks the resources to individuate powers, and generates a regress. The challenge for those who take such arguments seriously is to introduce qualitative properties without reintroducing the problems that PPO was meant to solve. In this paper, I distinguish the core claim (...) of PPO: (i) basic physical properties have dispositional essences, from a hitherto unnoticed assumption: (ii) the dispositional essences of basic physical properties exclusively involve type-causal relations to other basic physical properties. I reject (ii), making room for a structuralist ontology in which all basic physical properties are pure powers, individuated by their places in a causal structure that includes not only other powers, but also physically realized qualitative properties such as shapes, patterns and structures. Such qualities individuate pure powers in the way that non-mental input and output properties individuate realized mental properties in functionalist theories of mind, except that here it is basic physical powers that are individuated by relations to realized non-powers. I distinguish one Platonic and two Aristotelian version of this theory, and argue that the Aristotelian versions require that grounding is not always a relative fundamentality relation, because the powers ground the qualities that individuate them. By considering ontic structural realism, I argue that symmetric grounding is the best way to make sense of relational individuation in structuralist ontologies, and is therefore no additional commitment of the one proposed here. (shrink)

The advent of AI calls for an existential self-redefinition of humanity. It necessitates the establishment of a pluralistic global humanist culture that enables us to coexist in the new world of active media and autopoietic technology. In this paper, related philosophical questions give rise to the proposal of a novel metaculture that elevates human heritages and cultural memories to the plane of a digital AI- based infrastructure. I argue for a balanced and holistic approach to human-to-human and human–AI interactions and (...) metaculture that can be developed in the form of combinatorial “metagames” that reflect the potential of human consciousness, transcend the boundaries between technology, human embodiment and biology, the arts, sciences and humanities, and philosophy, and, finally, include the element of meaningful coincidence and spontaneity “in the second potency.” Hermann Hesse’s final novel, The Glass Bead Game, offers a key to understanding this basic idea. His vision is extremely relevant today. Based on this, the concept of cultivating global cultural memories through innovative aesthetic-epistemic “Glass Bead Games 2.0” is discussed further from a systematic angle. To complement this, reference is also made to Hesse’s own source of inspiration: Novalis’s “encyclopedist” approach interlinks aesthetic and epistemic productivity in a way that could become a major starting point to create a new holistic metaculture in the Age of AI. (shrink)

This paper develops the Diachronic Self-Making View, the view that we are the non-accidentally best candidate referents of our ‘I’-beliefs. A formulation and defence of DSV is followed by an overview of its treatment of familiar puzzle cases about personal identity. The rest of the paper focuses on a challenge to DSV, the Puzzle of Inconstant ‘I’-beliefs: the view appears to force on us inconsistent verdicts about personal identity in cases that we would naturally describe as changes in one’s de (...) se beliefs. To solve this problem, the paper defends the possibility of overlapping people, and addresses a number of objections to this idea. (shrink)

Perceptualists say that having a pain in a body part consists in perceiving the part as instantiating some property. I argue that perceptualism makes better sense of the connections between pain location and the experiences undergone by people in pain than three alternative accounts that dispense with perception. Turning to fellow perceptualists, I also reject ways in which David Armstrong and Michael Tye understand and motivate perceptualism, and I propose an alternative interpretation, one that vitiates a pair of objections—due (...) to John Hyman—concerning the meaning of ‘Amy has a pain in her foot’ and the idea of bodily sensitivity. Perceptualism, I conclude, remains our best account of the location of pains. (shrink)

Several different quantum gravity research programmes suggest, for various reasons, that spacetime is not part of the fundamental ontology of physics. This gives rise to the problem of empirical coherence: if fundamental physical entities do not occupy spacetime or instantiate spatiotemporal properties, how can fundamental theories concerning those entities be justified by observation of spatiotemporally located things like meters, pointers and dials? I frame the problem of empirical coherence in terms of entailment: how could a non-spatiotemporal fundamental theory entail spatiotemporal (...) evidence propositions? Solutions to this puzzle can be classified as realist or antirealist, depending on whether or not they posit a non-fundamental spacetime structure grounded in or caused by the fundamental structure. These approaches place different constraints on our everyday concepts of space and time. Applying lessons from the philosophy of mind, I argue that only realism is both conceptually plausible and suitable for addressing the problem at hand. I suggest a role functionalist version of realism, which is consistent with both grounding and causation, and according to which our everyday concepts reveal something of the true nature of emergent spacetime. (shrink)

The Question of Iterated Grounding (QIG) asks what grounds the grounding facts. Although the question received a lot of attention in the past few years, it is usually discussed independently of another important issue: the connection between metaphysical explanation and the relation or relations that supposedly “back” it. I will show that once we get clear on the distinction between metaphysical explanation and the relation(s) backing it, we can distinguish no fewer than four questions lumped under QIG. I will also (...) argue that given some plausible assumptions about what it would take for a relation to back metaphysical explanation, many salient views about grounding allow us to give “easy” answers to these questions—easy in the sense that we can straightforwardly derive them from the respective conception of grounding without getting into the sorts of complexities that typically inform answers to QIG. The paper's main upshot is that we cannot expect to make much progress on QIG without first addressing the difficult issue of how exactly grounding is related to metaphysical explanation. (shrink)

To the extent that dualism is even taken to be a serious option in contemporary discussions of personal identity and the philosophy of mind, it is almost exclusively either Cartesian dualism or property dualism that is considered. The more traditional dualism defended by Aristotelians and Thomists, what I call hylemorphic dualism, has only received scattered attention. In this essay I set out the main lines of the hylemorphic dualist position, with particular reference to personal identity. First I argue that overemphasis (...) of the problem of consciousness has had an unhealthy effect on recent debate, claiming instead that we should emphasize the concept of form. Then I bring in the concept of identity by means of the notion of substantial form. I continue by analyzing the relation between form and matter, defending the traditional theses of prime matter and of the unicity of substantial form. I then argue for the immateriality of the substantial form of the human person, viz. the soul, from an account of the human intellect. From this follows the soul's essential independence of matter. Finally, although the soul is the immaterial bearer of personal identity, that identity is still the identity of an essentially embodied being. I explain how these ideas are to be reconciled. Footnotesa I am grateful to Stephen Braude, John Cottingham, John Haldane, David Jehle, Joel Katzav, Eduardo Ortiz, and Fred Sommers for helpful comments and discussion of a draft of this essay. I would also like to thank Ellen Paul, whose suggestions have helped greatly to improve the essay's style and content. (shrink)

It can seem natural to say that, when in pain, we undergo experiences which present to us certain experience-dependent particulars, namely pains. As part of his wider approach to mind and world, John McDowell has elaborated an interesting but neglected version of this account of pain. Here I set out McDowell’s account at length, and place it in context. I argue that his subjectivist conception of the objects of pain experience is incompatible with his requirement that such experience be presentational, (...) rationalizing, and classificatory. (shrink)

Many philosophers embrace grounding, supposedly a central notion of metaphysics. Grounding is widely assumed to be irreflexive, but recently a number of authors have questioned this assumption: according to them, it is at least possible that some facts ground themselves. The primary purpose of this paper is to problematize the notion of self-grounding through the theoretical roles usually assigned to grounding. The literature typically characterizes grounding as at least playing two central theoretical roles: a structuring role and an explanatory role. (...) Once we carefully spell out what playing these roles includes, however, we find that any notion of grounding that isn’t irreflexive fails to play these roles when they are interpreted narrowly, and is redundant for playing them when they are interpreted more broadly. The upshot is that no useful notion of grounding can allow a fact to ground itself. (shrink)

Actualists of a certain stripe—dispositionalists—hold that metaphysical modality is grounded in the powers of actual things. Roughly: p is possible iff something has, or some things have, the power to bring it about that p. Extant critiques of dispositionalism focus on its material adequacy, and question whether there are enough powers to account for all the possibilities we intuitively want to countenance. For instance, it seems possible that none of the actual contingent particulars ever existed, but it is impossible to (...) explain this by appealing to the powers of some actual thing or things to bring it about. I argue instead that dispositionalism, in the simple form championed by its proponents, is formally inadequate. Dispositionalists interpret the modal operators as simple existential claims about powers, but if we interpret the operators that way, the resulting system of modal logic is too weak to capture metaphysical modality. I argue that we can modify the standard dispositionalist interpretations of the operators to secure formal adequacy, but at the cost of accepting that not all modality is grounded in powers. This, I shall suggest, is not a bad thing—the resulting theory still has powers at its core and has certain attractive features, in addition to formal adequacy, that the standard theory lacks. (shrink)

Philosophers of language have drawn on metamathematical results in varied ways. Extensionalist philosophers have been particularly impressed with two, not unrelated, facts: the existence, due to Frege/Tarski, of a certain sort of semantics, and the seeming absence of intensional contexts from mathematical discourse. The philosophical import of these facts is at best murky. Extensionalists will emphasize the success and clarity of the model theoretic semantics; others will emphasize the relative poverty of the mathematical idiom; still others will question the aptness (...) of the standard extensional semantics for mathematics. In this paper I investigate some implications of the Gödel Second Incompleteness Theorem for these positions. I argue that the realm of mathematics, proof theory in particular, has been a breeding ground for intensionality and that satisfactory intensional semantic theories are implicit in certain rigorous technical accounts. (shrink)

Revisionary ontologies seem to go against our common sense convictions about which material objects exist. These views face the so-called Problem of Reasonableness: they have to explain why reasonable people don’t seem to accept the true ontology. Most approaches to this problem treat the mismatch between the ontological truth and ordinary belief as superficial or not even real. By contrast, I propose what I call the “uncompromising solution”. First, I argue that our beliefs about material objects were influenced by evolutionary (...) forces that were independent of the ontological truth. Second, I draw an analogy between the Problem of Reasonableness and the New Evil Demon Problem and argue that the revisionary ontologist can always find a positive epistemic status to characterize ordinary people’s beliefs about material objects. Finally, I address the worry that the evolutionary component of my story also threatens to undermine the best arguments for revisionary ontologies. (shrink)

In the past few years, a number of philosophers ; Horgan and Tienson 2002; Pitt 2004) have maintained the following three theses: there is a distinctive sort of phenomenology characteristic of conscious thought, as opposed to other sorts of conscious mental states; different conscious thoughts have different phenomenologies; and thoughts with the same phenomenology have the same intentional content. The last of these three claims is open to at least two different interpretations. It might mean that the phenomenology of a (...) thought expresses its intentional content, where intentional content is understood as propositional, and propositions are understood as mind-and language-independent abstract entities. And it might mean that the phenomenology of a thought is its intentional content—that is, that the phenomenology of a thought, like the phenomenology of a sensation, constitutes its content. The second sort of view is a kind of psychologism. Psychologistic views hold that one or another sort of thing—numbers, sentences, propositions, etc.—that we can think or know about is in fact a kind of mental thing. Since Frege, psychologism has been in bad repute among analytic philosophers. It is widely held that Frege showed that such views are untenable, since, among other things, they subjectivize what is in fact objective, and, hence, relativize such things as consistency and truth to the peculiarities of human psychology. The purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of the thesis that intentional mental content is phenomenological and to try to reach a conclusion about whether it yields a tenable view of mind, thought and meaning. I believe the thesis is not so obviously wrong as it will strike many philosophers of mind and language. In fact, it can be defended against the standard objections to psychologism, and it can provide the basis for a novel and interesting account of mentality. (shrink)

Hylomorphists hold that substances are, in some sense, composites of matter and form. The form of a substance is typically taken to play a fundamental role in determining the unity or identity of the whole. Staunch hylomorphists think that this role is of a kind that precludes the ontological reduction of form to the physical and thus take their position to be inconsistent with physicalism. Forms, according to staunch hylomorphism, play a fundamental role in grounding their bearers’ proper parts and (...) that, it seems, rules out the physical grounding of form itself. I shall develop a physicalist version of hylomorphism that treats form as geometric structure and which, I shall argue, entails many of the central theses endorsed by staunch hylomorphists. Based on Shoemaker’s notion of conditional powers, I shall argue that the geometric structures of complex wholes are the conditions on at least some of the conditional powers of their bearers’ proper parts, transforming those powers into powers simpliciter. Thus, forms play a fundamental role in the dynamical evolution of the physical world, but without bestowing causal powers themselves and hence without violating any empirically plausible version of the causal closure of the physical domain. If a substance’s proper parts are taken to be individuated by their powers simpliciter, then those parts derive their identities from their places in the whole. The form of a whole thus determine the identities of its proper parts, as Aristotle claimed, but on my position, it does so without intrinsic change. (shrink)

This paper offers both a theoretical and an experimental perspective on the relationship between connectionist and Classical (symbol-processing) models. Firstly, a serious flaw in Fodor and Pylyshyn’s argument against connectionism is pointed out: if, in fact, a part of their argument is valid, then it establishes a conclusion quite different from that which they intend, a conclusion which is demonstrably false. The source of this flaw is traced to an underestimation of the differences between localist and distributed representation. It has (...) been claimed that distributed representations cannot support systematic operations, or that if they can, then they will be mere implementations of traditional ideas. This paper presents experimental evidence against this conclusion: distributed representations can be used to support direct structure-sensitive operations, in a man- ner quite unlike the Classical approach. Finally, it is argued that even if Fodor and Pylyshyn’s argument that connectionist models of compositionality must be mere implementations were correct, then this would still not be a serious argument against connectionism as a theory of mind. (shrink)

Supervenience is necessary co-variation between two sets of entities. In the good old days, supervenience was considered a useful philosophical tool with a wide range of applications in the philosophy of mind, metaethics, epistemology, and elsewhere. In recent years, however, supervenience has fallen out of favor, giving place to grounding, realization, and other, more metaphysically “meaty”, notions. The emerging consensus is that there are principled reasons for which explanatory theses cannot be captured in terms of supervenience, or as the slogan (...) goes: “Supervenience Is Nonexplanatory”. While SIN is widely endorsed, it is far from clear what it amounts to and why we should believe it. In this paper, I will distinguish various theses that could be meant by it, and will argue that none of them is both interesting and plausible: on some interpretations of ‘explanatory’, we have no reason to believe that supervenience is unexplanatory, while on other interpretations, supervenience is indeed unexplanatory, but widely accepted textbook cases of explanatory relations come out as unexplanatory, too. This result raises doubts as to whether there is any interesting sense in which SIN is true, and suggests that the contemporary consensus about supervenience is mistaken. (shrink)

The causal closure of the physical poses a familiar causal exclusion problem for the special sciences that stems from the idea that if closure is true, then fundamental physical properties do all the causal work involved in bringing about physical effects. In this paper I aim to show that the strongest causal closure principle that is not ruled out by some simple physics in fact allows for a certain kind of downward causation, which in turn makes room for robust special (...) science autonomy. I focus on the case of vector composition, arguing that it involves irreducibly multilevel causation. To give a complete causal explanation of what goes on in cases that involve the effects of multiple forces, we need to appeal not only to the fundamental properties that generate those forces, but also to geometric properties that determine how multiple vectors compose. However, if all the causal work involved in such cases were due to fundamental physical properties, there would be a one-level explanation available. Hence, I argue, it cannot be the case that fundamental physical properties do all the causal work. The extra causal work, I suggest, comes from the fact that the causal powers bestowed by fundamental physical properties have irreducibly geometric manifestation conditions. I defend the resulting form of downward causation as a solution to the problem of special science autonomy, and discuss two potential accounts of its source, in terms of the debate between kinematic and dynamic theories of the origins of spacetime symmetries. (shrink)

Are the special sciences autonomous from physics? Those who say they are need to explain how dependent special science properties could feature in irreducible causal explanations, but that’s no easy task. The demands of a broadly physicalist worldview require that such properties are not only dependent on the physical, but also physically realized. Realized properties are derivative, so it’s natural to suppose that they have derivative causal powers. Correspondingly, philosophical orthodoxy has it that if we want special science properties to (...) bestow genuinely new causal powers, we must reject physical realization and embrace a form of emergentism, in which such properties arise from the physical by mysterious brute determination. In this paper, I argue that contrary to this orthodoxy, there are physically realized properties that bestow new causal powers in relation to their realizers. The key to my proposal is to reject causal-functional accounts of realization and embrace a broader account that allows for the realization of shapes and patterns. Unlike functional properties, such properties are defined by qualitative, non-causal specifications, so realizing them does not consist in bestowing causal powers. This, I argue, allows for causal novelty of the strongest kind. I argue that the molecular geometry of H2O—a qualitative, multiply realizable property—plays an irreducible role in explaining its dipole moment, and thereby bestows novel powers. On my proposal, special science properties can have the kind of causal novelty traditionally associated with strong emergence, without any of the mystery. (shrink)

An introduction to our edited volume, The Metaphysics of Relations, covering a range of issues including the problem of order, the ontological status of relations, reasons for ancient scepticism about relational properties, and two ways of drawing the distinction between internal and external relations.

The purpose of this paper is to address a well-known dilemma for physicalism. If mental properties are type identical to physical properties, then their causal efficacy is secure, but at the cost of ruling out mentality in creatures very different to ourselves. On the other hand, if mental properties are multiply realizable, then all kinds of creatures can instantiate them, but then they seem to be causally redundant. The causal exclusion problem depends on the widely held principle that realized properties (...) inherit their causal powers from their realizers. While this principle holds for functional realization, it fails on a broader notion of realization that permits the realization of complex qualitative properties such as spatial and temporal patterns. Such properties are best seen as dependent powerful qualities, which have their causal roles in virtue of being the qualities they are, and do not inherit powers from their realizers. Recent studies have identified one such property—neural synchrony—as a correlate of consciousness. If synchrony is also partially constitutive of consciousness, then phenomenal properties are both multiply realizable and causally novel. I outline a version of representationalism about consciousness on which this constitution claim holds. (shrink)

Desarrollar el recuento de la producción filosófica contemporánea no es una tarea sencilla. Más en nuestro país, donde se hacen pocos esfuerzos para comprender la dimensión real del pensamiento mexicano. Ello se debe a varios factores, entre los que pueden señalarse la apatía por conocer las reflexiones alrededor de temas nacionales, el poco interés que despiertan pensadores locales, la casi nula difusión que tienen algunas propuestas filosóficas y los esfuerzos aislados por componer una historia de la “filosofía de provincia”. En (...) la mayoría de los estados de la república, no existe una tradición sólida para publicar y debatir sistemáticamente la filosofía; tan lamentable carencia deviene con regularidad en la alimentación de una filosofía ficticia o en aislamiento de meditaciones originales y novedosas que no tienen la difusión que merecen. Para comprender parte de las causas de este problema, se propone, como experimento historiográfico, hacer una revisión de cuatro tesis vinculadas con la filosofía presentadas en el estado de Chihuahua entre 1968 y 1993; se incluye también la de José Fuentes Mares, defendida en la unam en 1944. Se parte del supuesto que en trabajos de esta naturaleza puede verse con cierta claridad la vocación, talento y disposición filosófica de los autores. Dado que no participa un comité editorial o un corrector de estilo, más allá de la guía del director de tesis, es poco el mejoramiento metodológico y estilístico que reciben las tesis, con lo que se evidencian carencias y fortalezas de los sustentantes. Se revisará tan sólo una muestra; sin embargo, estos trabajos son clave porque dos de ellos son de filósofos con reconocimiento nacional (Fuentes Mares y Rico Bovio), una es la primera tesis de la extinta maestría en Filosofía de la Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez (David Mariscal). Dos más fueron escritas por profesores que no se han dedicado a la investigación filosófica (Gilberto Vargas y Rubén Lau), y otras dos fueron escritas por exrectores de universidades chihuahuenses (Rubén Lau y Fuentes Mares). Los temas tocados (filosofía del derecho, antropología filosófica, filosofía griega e historia de la filosofía mexicana) brindan una panorámica de intereses y líneas de investigación –si así pudiera llamárseles– a los que se asoman los tesistas chihuahuenses. De esta manera, se está en condiciones de esbozar un “mapa intelectual” superficial en el que también podrán visualizarse ciertas tendencias en la docencia dentro del estado. -/- Palabras clave: historiografía de la filosofía, filosofía mexicana, filosofía contemporánea del norte de México. (shrink)

Se cumplen 100 años del nacimiento de Gilles Deleuze, discípulo de Foucault, uno de los principales ideólogos de la izquierda progresista -/- Gilles Deleuze, profesor y filósofo francés, nació el 18 de enero de 1925 en París y se le considera uno de los más influyentes del siglo XX. Escritor de obras, junto a Félix Guattari, como El Anti-Edipo (1972) y Mil Mesetas (1980), Deleuze se convirtió en uno de los pensadores de referencia para la izquierda progresista del siglo XXI. (...) De sus ideas se extrae un relativismo tan absoluto que deriva en nihilismo. Y su teoría de los «cuerpos sin órganos» se puede asociar con los desvaríos de género actuales de la ideología woke. -/- Con motivo del centenario de su nacimiento, la Fundación Disenso publica un nuevo Ideas sobre el pensamiento de Gilles Deleuze. Este especial recoge el pensamiento nihilista del filósofo francés, de suma influencia en el movimiento de Mayo de 1968. Todo a través del análisis de especialistas como el filósofo Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz; la doctora en Filosofía Mariona Gúmpert; el catedrático de Filosofía de la UCM Gabriel Albiac; el profesor David Cerdá y David Souto Alcalde, doctor en Estudios Hispánicos por la New York University. (shrink)

本文通过对德国著名汉学家、翻译家卫礼贤的最后一部哲学论著《中国哲学导 论》(1929)的翻译和研究,整理归纳了卫礼贤对中国哲学的核心词“道”的五种不同译法, 深入剖析了他如何用“一词多译”的方法,对中国哲学史上不同文本、不同哲学家、不同时代 及不同思想维度中的“道”进行诠释。同时,本文以术语学(Terminologie)为研究方法,聚焦 于卫礼贤用来翻译“道”的几个德语哲学术语,并对这些词汇进行溯源。以此为切入点, 本文 分析了卫礼贤作为对中国哲学与德国哲学均有深刻理解的汉学家,有意识地从跨文化比较哲学 的角度出发,将“道”转换为德国哲学中与之相匹配的哲学概念,并将其介绍给德国思想界的 路径。重新审视卫礼贤对“道”的“一词多译”,在加强当今中外文化互鉴和中文著作外译方面 具有积极且重要的作用。[This contribution is based on the translation and study of the book Chinesische Philosophie: Eine Einführung (Chinese Philosophy: An Introduction, 1929). It is the last philosophy-related work by the famous German sinologist and translator Richard Wilhelm. The article provides a compilation, summary, and in-depth analysis concerning Wilhelm's handling of the translation of "Dao", the "Urwort" (Heidegger) of Chinese philosophy. The study provides insight into how Wilhelm has used a poly-perspective method to (...) interpret the word “Dao" by using five different translation terms in relation to divergent texts, various philosophers, and different periods in the history of Chinese philosophy. Some of the German philosophical terms that were applied in these translations are investigated by tracing their etymological origins and general semantics. Richard Wilhelm was a sinologist with a deep understanding of both Chinese and German philosophical traditions. He deliberately imparted the different philosophical meanings of "Dao" in a way that was compatible with the context of the contemporary German intellectual community. In parts, he presented this semantic field from the perspective of transcultural philosophy. We believe that a re-examination of Richard Wilhelm's variational approaches to translate the term "Dao" can provide important methodological inspirations for the translation of complex Chinese texts as well as concerning the improvement of mutual cultural understanding between Chinese and other cultures.]. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that if tacit knowledge of grammar is analyzable in functional‐computational terms, then it cannot ground linguistic meaning, structure, or sound. If to know or cognize a grammar is to be in a certain computational state playing a certain functional role, there can be no unique grammar cognized. Satisfying the functional conditions for cognizing a grammar G entails satisfying those for cognizing many grammars disagreeing with G about expressions' semantic, phonetic, and syntactic values. This threatens the (...) Chomskyan view that expressions have such values for speakers because they cognize grammars assigning them those values. For if this is true, semantics, syntax, and phonology must be indeterminate, thanks to the indeterminacy of grammar‐cognizing (qua functional‐computational state). So, the fact that a speaker cognizes a grammar cannot explain the determinate character of their language. (shrink)

Self-verifying judgments like _I exist_ seem rational, and self-defeating ones like _It will rain, but I don’t believe it will rain_ seem irrational_._ But one’s evidence might support a self-defeating judgment, and fail to support a self-verifying one. This paper explains how it can be rational to defy one’s evidence if judgment is construed as a mental performance or act, akin to inner assertion. The explanation comes at significant cost, however. Instead of causing or constituting beliefs, judgments turn out to (...) be mere epiphenomena, and self-verification and self-defeat lack the broader philosophical import often claimed for them. (shrink)