During multiple testing, researchers often adjust their alpha level to control the familywise error rate for a statistical inference about a joint union alternative hypothesis (e.g., “H1,1 or H1,2”). However, in some cases, they do not make this inference. Instead, they make separate inferences about each of the individual hypotheses that comprise the joint hypothesis (e.g., H1,1 and H1,2). For example, a researcher might use a Bonferroni correction to adjust their alpha level from the conventional level of 0.050 to 0.025 (...) when testing H1,1 and H1,2, find a significant result for H1,1 (p < 0.025) and not for H1,2 (p > .0.025), and so claim support for H1,1 and not for H1,2. However, these separate individual inferences do not require an alpha adjustment. Only a statistical inference about the union alternative hypothesis “H1,1 or H1,2” requires an alpha adjustment because it is based on “at least one” significant result among the two tests, and so it refers to the familywise error rate. Hence, an inconsistent correction occurs when a researcher corrects their alpha level during multiple testing but does not make an inference about a union alternative hypothesis. In the present article, I discuss this inconsistent correction problem, including its reduction in statistical power for tests of individual hypotheses and its potential causes vis-à-vis error rate confusions and the alpha adjustment ritual. I also provide three illustrations of inconsistent corrections from recent psychology studies. I conclude that inconsistent corrections represent a symptom of statisticism, and I call for a more nuanced inference-based approach to multiple testing corrections. (shrink)

Research on the specific features of daydreaming compared with mind-wandering and night dreaming is a neglected topic in the philosophy of mind and the cognitive neuroscience of spontaneous thought. The extant research either conflates daydreaming with mind-wandering (whether understood as task-unrelated thought, unguided attention, or disunified thought), characterizes daydreaming as opposed to mind-wandering (Dorsch, 2015), or takes daydreaming to encompass any and all “imagined events” (Newby-Clark & Thavendran, 2018). These dueling definitions obstruct future research on spontaneous thought, and are insufficiently (...) precise to guide empirical studies. They also fail to illuminate the phenomenal core of daydreaming, namely, its dreamlike qualities. Although daydreaming is related to both mind-wandering and narrative imagination, it is not reducible to either. We argue that daydreams are experiences of spontaneous, immersive imagination in the waking state. The main task of our investigation is to distinguish daydreaming, conceptually and phenomenologically, from mind-wandering, on the one hand, and night dreaming, on the other. Although daydream experiences can vary widely, we distinguish prototypical experiences of daydreaming from adjacent imaginative activity, including fleeting imagery and “focused daydreaming,” or crafted visualization. We consider our phenomenological analysis as preparatory work for conceptually distinguishing different spontaneous and imaginative states so that they can be investigated accordingly with questionnaires and qualitative methods. We argue that precision about the phenomenal character of daydreaming can guide neurophenomenological investigations, help delimit studies on individual variance in daydreaming features, and identify differences among daydreaming, mind-wandering, and night dreaming conceptually and phenomenologically, and possibly eventually in terms of neural correlates. (shrink)

Exploring the intimate tie between body movement and space and time, Lee begins with the position that body movement generates space and time and explores the ethical implications of this responsibility for the situations one’s body movements generate. Whiteness theory has come to recognize the ethical responsibility for situations not of one’s own making and hence accountability for the results of more than one’s immediate personal conscious decisions. Because of our specific history, whites have developed a particular embodiment and body (...) movement that generates places that can only be characterized as more comfortable and more enabling to whites. (shrink)

Recent work in the philosophy of emotion focuses on challenging dualistic conceptualizations. Three of the most obvious dualisms are the following: 1. emotion opposes reason; 2. emotion is subjective, while reason is objective; 3. emotion lies internal to the subject, while reason is external. With challenges to these dualisms, one of the more interesting questions that has surfaced is the idea of emotional appropriateness in a particular context. Here, consider a widely held belief in the United States associates racialized groups (...) with specific emotions—most notably African American women with anger. Clearly these emotional attributions are essentialistic--and hence racist. But this response is too easy. The acknowledgement that emotion lies both internally in the subject and externally in the world opens the possibility of attributing an emotional temperament to a population group. Yet if an identity group has an emotional temperament, can they be accountable for emotionally appropriate behavior? (shrink)

Simple idealized models seem to provide more understanding than opaque, complex, and hyper-realistic models. However, an increasing number of scientists are going in the opposite direction by utilizing opaque machine learning models to make predictions and draw inferences, suggesting that scientists are opting for models that have less potential for understanding. Are scientists trading understanding for some other epistemic or pragmatic good when they choose a machine learning model? Or are the assumptions behind why minimal models provide understanding misguided? In (...) this paper, using the case of deep neural networks, I argue that it is not the complexity or black box nature of a model that limits how much understanding the model provides. Instead, it is a lack of scientific and empirical evidence supporting the link that connects a model to the target phenomenon that primarily prohibits understanding. (shrink)

We argued in a recent issue of this journal that if abortion is restricted,1 then there are parallel obligations for parents to donate body parts to their children. The strength of this obligation to donate is proportional to the strength of the abortion restrictions. If abortion is never permissible, then a parent must always donate any organ if they are a match. If abortion is sometimes permissible and sometimes not, then organ donation is sometimes obligatory and sometimes not. Our argument (...) was based on the following ideas: (a) that a fetus has full moral status, (b) that parents have special obligations to their offspring, fetus or not, and (c) that this special obligation is to protect them. The result is the conclusion that abortion restrictivists cannot also consistently deny that organ donation should be compulsory. (shrink)

Disturbances to one's sense of self, the feeling that one has ‘lost a part of oneself’ or that one ‘no longer feels like oneself,’ are frequently recounted throughout the bereavement literature. Engaging Allan Køster's important contribution to this issue, this article reinforces his suggestion that, by rupturing the existential texture of self-familiarity, bereavement can result in experiences of estrangement that can be meaningfully understood according to the concept of self-alienation. Nevertheless, I suggest that whilst Køster's relational interpretation of alienation as (...) the withdrawal of heteronomy can be applied to the experience of world-collapse in bereavement, what sets bereavement apart from other limit situations is the fact that it involves an intersubjective relation between the living and the dead. In contrast to Køster, therefore, I suggest that the experience of self-alienation that is distinctive to bereavement results from the fact that the bereaved is exposed to, and co-opted by, the absolute alterity of death itself. (shrink)

When a loved one dies, it is common for the bereaved to feel profoundly lonely, disconnected from the world with the sense that they no longer belong. In philosophy, this experience of ‘loss and loneliness’ has been interpreted according to both a loss of possibilities and a loss of the past. But it is unclear how these interpretations apply to the distinctive way in which loss and loneliness manifest in old age. Drawing on the phenomenological analyses of old age given (...) by de Beauvoir and Améry, I consider how the diminishment of the capacity for projection and recollection complicate recent interpretations of loss and loneliness, whilst nevertheless reinforcing the conclusion that in old age subjectivity is necessarily impoverished. Developing a critical stance on de Beauvoir and Améry’s underlying conception of subjectivity, I turn to Levinas in considering whether or not there is a way to reimagine subjectivity such that the estrangement and alienation of older adults might be ameliorated rather than exacerbated. Grounded in the passive body-in-itself rather than the self-transcending capacity of the body-for-itself, I suggest it becomes possible to reconceptualise the experience of loss and loneliness in old age; both in terms of what is lost and what needs to be restored if older adults are to be helped to find themselves at home in the world in the midst of, and indeed because of, manifold loss. (shrink)

Boredom is an affective experience that can involve pervasive feelings of meaninglessness, emptiness, restlessness, frustration, weariness and indifference, as well as the slowing down of time. An increasing focus of research in many disciplines, interest in boredom has been intensified by the recent Covid-19 pandemic, where social distancing measures have induced both a widespread loss of meaning and a significant disturbance of temporal experience. This article explores the philosophical significance of this aversive experience of ‘pandemic boredom.’ Using Heidegger’s work as (...) a unique vantage point, this article draws on survey data collected by researchers in an ongoing project titled ‘Experiences of Social Distancing During the Covid-19 Pandemic’ to give an original phenomenological interpretation of the meaninglessness and monotony of pandemic boredom. On a Heideggerian interpretation, pandemic boredom involves either a situative confrontation with relative meaninglessness that upholds our absorption in the everyday world, or an existential confrontation with absolute meaninglessness that forces us to take up the question of our existence. Arguing that boredom during the pandemic makes this distinction difficult to sustain, I consider some of the ways in which pandemic boredom might be seen to expose and then exceed the distinctive methodological limitations of Heidegger’s philosophical interpretation of boredom. (shrink)

Standpoint theorists have long been clear that marginalization does not make better understanding a given. They have been less clear, though, that social dominance does not make ignorance a given. Indeed, many standpoint theorists have implicitly committed themselves to what I call the strong epistemic disadvantage thesis. According to this thesis, there are strong, substantive limits on what the socially dominant can know about oppression that they do not personally experience. I argue that this thesis is not just implausible but (...) politically pernicious; it is an excuse for ignorance and silence that stifles our ability to address many injustices. Moreover, I argue that if we are to avoid lending support to the SEDT while working within a standpoint theory framework, we must hold that the socially dominant can achieve marginalized standpoints. So, we must hold that men can achieve feminist standpoints, that white women (and men) can achieve black feminist standpoints, and so on. (shrink)

Melancholia is an attunement of despair and despondency that can involve radical disruptions to temporal experience. In this article, I extrapolate from the existing analyses of melancholic time to examine some of the important existential implications of these temporal disruptions. In particular, I focus on the way in which the desynchronization of melancholic time can complicate the melancholic’s relation to death and, consequently, to the meaning and significance of their life. Drawing on Heidegger’s distinction between death and demise, I argue (...) that melancholic time leaves the melancholic in an impossible state of existing, where they are both unable to live and unable to die. Turning to the role of the physician, I consider the significant role that clinical interventions might have in resynchronizing the melancholic with time and examine these ideas further through a case study on physician-assisted suicide. In so doing, I demonstrate that the desynchronization of melancholic time should indeed be understood as a matter of life and death. (shrink)

I argue that ML models used in science function as highly idealized toy models. If we treat ML models as a type of highly idealized toy model, then we can deploy standard representational and epistemic strategies from the toy model literature to explain why ML models can still provide epistemic success despite their lack of similarity to their targets.

Habermas frequentemente adota o termo Estado de direito na sua obra Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. O objetivo deste artigo, então, consiste na investigação da possibilidade desse conceito, no seu fundamento e na apresentação dos problemas dele decorrentes, contrapondo-o especificamente a sua antítese, isto é, ao monismo entre Estado e direito de Kelsen. Ocorre que a filosofia habermasiana, conforme entendimento do artigo, implica a adoção de uma teoria dualista entre os conceitos de Estado e de direito. Observa-se, assim, (...) o compromisso do filósofo alemão com a reformulação de uma doutrina jurídica específica e sua radical incompatibilidade com o positivismo kelseniano. (shrink)

Social epistemologists should be well-equipped to explain and evaluate the growing vulnerabilities associated with filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization in social media. However, almost all social epistemology has been built for social contexts that involve merely a speaker-hearer dyad. Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization all presuppose much larger and more complex network structures. In this paper, we lay the groundwork for a properly social epistemology that gives the role and structure of networks their due. In particular, (...) we formally define epistemic constructs that quantify the structural epistemic position of each node within an interconnected network. We argue for the epistemic value of a structure that we call the (m,k)-observer. We then present empirical evidence that (m,k)-observers are rare in social media discussions of controversial topics, which suggests that people suffer from serious problems of epistemic vulnerability. We conclude by arguing that social epistemologists and computer scientists should work together to develop minimal interventions that improve the structure of epistemic networks. (shrink)

Pretendeu-se estudar a aquisição da virtude em Aristóteles a partir da interpretação de M. F. Burnyeat. Para esse, a virtude aristotélica exige dimensões cognitivas e emocionais, sendo que ao aprendiz não basta conhecer os princípios e as regras gerais da ação, mas deve ter internalizado, através do hábito, uma vontade de praticar ações nobres e justas. Compete ao sujeito virtuoso, portanto, ter o conhecimento do que é correto (the that), assim como, subsidiariamente, a justificativa do porquê é apropriada determinada ação (...) (the because). Da análise dessas variáveis, o autor procura esclarecer a figura conflituosa do akratic (incontinente) e do akalastos (perverso) e elucidar a hipótese do desenvolvimento moral. Concomitantemente este artigo pretende introduzir o problema criminológico da ideia de ressocialização ou da pena capital, entendendo ser o argumento aristotélico ainda influente para a filosofia da virtude e jurídica hodierna e necessário quando se discutem novos paradigmas éticos e jurídicos. (shrink)

Under what conditions does machine learning (ML) model opacity inhibit the possibility of explaining and understanding phenomena? In this article, I argue that nonepistemic values give shape to the ML opacity problem even if we keep researcher interests fixed. Treating ML models as an instance of doing model-based science to explain and understand phenomena reveals that there is (i) an external opacity problem, where the presence of inductive risk imposes higher standards on externally validating models, and (ii) an internal opacity (...) problem, where greater inductive risk demands a higher level of transparency regarding the inferences the model makes. (shrink)

There is an undeniable tendency to dismiss women’s sexual assault allegations out of hand. However, this tendency is not monolithic—allegations that black men have raped white women are often met with deadly seriousness. I argue that contemporary rape culture is characterized by the interplay between rape myths that minimize rape, and myths that catastrophize rape. Together, these two sets of rape myths distort the epistemic resources that people use when assessing rape allegations. These distortions result in the unjust exoneration of (...) people we cannot conceive of as monstrous, while making it too easy to believe that some marginalized people could be rapists. I also argue that rape myths enable a novel kind of epistemic injustice. This injustice concerns how our assessments of trustworthiness and our assessments of plausibility interact. I argue that rape myths can result in runaway credibility deflations that can explain both why people fail to believe most women, and also why people may unjustly believe false allegations that white women have been raped by black men. (shrink)

Standpoint epistemology has been linked with increasing calls for deference to the socially marginalized. As we understand it, deference involves recognizing someone else as better positioned than we are, either to investigate or to answer some question, and then accepting their judgment as our own. We connect contemporary calls for deference to old objections that standpoint epistemology wrongly reifies differences between groups. We also argue that while deferential epistemic norms present themselves as a solution to longstanding injustices, habitual deference prevents (...) the socially dominant from developing for themselves the skills necessary to expand their capacity for empathy, to deftly probe for evidence, and to ask critical questions. Consequently, we argue that standpoint epistemology must be understood as calling for inclusion, not deference. (shrink)

O artigo analisa a leitura crítica de Hans Kelsen acerca da concepção jurídico-política de Thomas Hobbes, considerando críticas posteriores à própria interpretação de Kelsen. Para tanto, investigou-se primeiramente a posição de Kelsen sobre o jusnaturalismo buscando esclarecer conceitos centrais como os do ser e dever-ser e como o autor os associa a Hobbes. Nesse sentido, observouse a limitação da leitura de Kelsen em relação à filosofia jurídica do autor – uma doutrina jusnaturalista metafísica, tendo na regra de ouro o fundamento (...) natural para o direito positivo. Em contraposição, procurou-se apresentar uma postura crítica, que contesta a posição jusnaturalista atribuída a Hobbes e sustenta a tese de que o autor inglês é um precursor do positivismo jurídico. (shrink)

O artigo tem como objetivo apresentar o problema da determinação do sentido das normas para o Kelsen considerando a flexibilidade do quadro de interpretações. Expõe, primeiramente, a suposta transição do conceito de interpretação normativa, passando de um formalismo-normativismo restritivo para um realismo jurídico a partir das suas últimas obras; em um segundo momento apresenta o decorrente conflito ainda atual constituído por essas reformulações. Finalmente, defende a hipótese de superação da dicotomia formalismo-normativismo versus realismo jurídico através de uma leitura realista normativista.

O trabalho busca esclarecer dois pontos centrais da Filosofia política de Maquiavel – as figuras da Virtù e da Fortuna. A virtú deve ser vista como uma forma do livre-arbítrio do governante, sendo a principal variável na condução do principado.Destaca-se, também, a utilização da variável nacontestação aos valorestradicionais. Já a Fortuna constitui-se na indeterminabilidade de parte dos resultadosdo governo: ela deve ser dominada, conquistada para o benefício do príncipe.

O objetivo do artigofoi especular sobre a epistemologia proposta por David Hume (1711-1776), especificamente a perspectiva empirista e cética. Procurou-se, assim, expor os principais conceitos da sua filosofia, especialmente acrítica à concepção de causalidade, o problema da probabilidade e os conceitos de percepções, imagens e ideias. Finalmente buscou-se expor uma interpretação que entende haver um ceticismo mitigado no autor e a superação de uma teoria do conhecimento exclusivamente psicológica.

O presente artigo aborda o problema da soberania para Hans Kelsen. Tem como objetivo analisar a posição do autor sobre o tema (especialmente através do texto Sovereignty), traçando paralelamente algumas considerações. Ocorre que para Kelsen o conceito de soberania mostra-se impreciso a partir da doutrina tradicional. Ainda, mesmo superando essa doutrina e a teoria dualista, também o conteúdo do direito nacional e internacional permanece inalterado. Portanto, prova-se a irrelevância de tal para a teoria jurídica.

A separação entre o ser, isto é, o ato, e o dever-ser, ou seja, o sentido de comando, permissão etc.. do ato é parte fundamental para o entendimento da epistemologia proposta por Hans Kelsen. Dessa discriminação entre o ser e o dever-ser há o principal argumento do autor para a separação do direito das ciências causais e, principalmente, a superação da falácia naturalista no âmbito teórico e moral. Nesse sentido, também o artigo se propôs a analisar a refutação de Kelsen (...) a doutrinas morais e jurídicas negadoras de tal distinção e, consequentemente o reflexo de tal posicionamento na perspectiva da responsabilidade. (shrink)

O artigo investigou o método para uma filosofia intercultural a partir da Ibero-América, de Raul Fornet-Betancourt. Partiu-se especificamente do texto do autor para posteriormente fornecer considerações críticas aos seus posicionamentos. Nesse sentido, analisou-se a originalidade do tema, a filosofia da libertação como modelo de diálogo intercultural, seus pressupostos hermenêuticos e epistemológicos e, por fim, o pensamento ibero-americano como base para uma filosofia intercultural. No final do trabalho apresentou-se seis críticas ao texto estudado – o problema da arrogância e dissimulação filosófica, (...) a adoção tácita de um platonismo e a não originalidade filosófica, o problema da falácia naturalista e do falsificacionismo e, finalmente, a não razoabilidade política das propostas. (shrink)

A separação entre o ser, isto é, o ato, e o dever-ser, ou seja, o sentido de comando, permissão etc.. do ato é parte fundamental para o entendimento da epistemologia proposta por Hans Kelsen. Dessa discriminação entre o ser e o dever-ser há o principal argumento do autor para a separação do direito das ciências causais e, principalmente, a superação da falácia naturalista no âmbito teórico e moral. Nesse sentido, também o artigo se propôs a analisar a refutação de Kelsen (...) a doutrinas morais e jurídicas negadoras de tal distinção e, consequentemente o reflexo de tal posicionamento na perspectiva da responsabilidade. (shrink)

Com este artigo procura-se introduzir a questão da origem social das normas morais e jurídicas a partir da obra de Hans Kelsen e solucionar, de forma breve, o problema da conciliação do método lógico-transcendental da Teoria pura com a filosofia positivista e empirista do autor.

Perhaps the most striking phenomenon of visual awareness is inattentional blindness (IB), in which a surprisingly salient event right in front of you may go completely unseen when unattended. Does IB reflect a failure of perception, or only of subsequent memory? Previous work has been unable to answer this question, due to a seemingly intractable dilemma: ruling out memory requires immediate perceptual reports, but soliciting such reports fuels an expectation that eliminates IB. Here we introduce a way of evoking repeated (...) IB in the same subjects and the same session: we show that observers fail to report seeing salient events’ not only when they have no expectation, but also when they have the wrong expectations about the events nature. This occurs when observers must immediately report seeing anything unexpected, even mid-event. Repeated IB thus demonstrates that IB is aptly named: it reflects a genuine deficit in moment-by-moment conscious perception, rather than a form of inattentional amnesia. (shrink)

Pretendeu-se dissertar acerca do conceito kantiano do Direito a partir da gênese da sua fundamentação moral, ressaltando a aprioricidade da mesma e seu reflexo na doutrina jurídica. Contrariamente ao moral sense da Filosofia empirista inglesa, a moralidade kantiana baseia-se completamente a priori, abdicando de uma antropologia em sua exposição e formulando-se como pura metafísica, a partir de conhecimentos abstratos. Coaduna à concepção de moralidade kantiana o seu conceito de Direito, que também não possui, portanto, qualquer fundamento na experiência. Desta forma, (...) pretende-se fornecer uma interpretação sistemática em relação aos problemas da doutrina do direito, especificamente sobre a sua exterioridade, a função da coerção e a formação do Estado. (shrink)

O objetivo do trabalho é auxiliar o jurista desocupado responsável pelo ensino da cadeira de filosofia do direito. A situação mais frequente nas faculdades de direito são as aulas de filosofia e de outras cadeiras do eixo fundamental serem tapeadas por qualquer bacharel sem nada melhor para fazer. Ocorre que tais ociosos juristas muitas vezes se veem receosos quando instituídos nos seus cargos, isso porque não possuem qualquer conhecimento na matéria em que lecionam, ao mesmo tempo em que são lançados (...) em sala de aula expostos às dúvidas e críticas dos alunos. Nesse sentido apresento a esses professores, juristas desocupados, uma técnica pedagógica resumida e de fácil compreensão para ministrarem sem maiores sobressaltos a cadeira de filosofia do direito. Seguindo os passos propostos, o jurista desocupado não terá riscos de ser questionado pelos alunos ou pela instituição, mantendo seu complemento de renda garantido. (shrink)

O presente artigo apresentou a interpretação de Paul Guyer acerca da filosofia jurídica de Kant, delimitando seu objeto no oitavo capítulo da obra “Kant”. Procurou-se, por estratégia argumentativa, fixar-se no texto de Guyer, apresentado claramente o problema envolvido, a sua hipótese a e análise das variáveis. Concomitantemente procurou-se inserir uma breve apreciação crítica na forma de notas numéricas. Buscou-se, dessa forma, privilegiar o texto do autor, focando especificamente nos problemas por ele apresentado, sem, contudo, deixar de apresentar uma crítica aos (...) pontos mais cruciais do artigo. Guyer sistematizou a filosofia jurídica de Kant, requerendo à interpretação uma visão mais abrangente da obra do filósofo prussiano, isto é, Guyer procurou correlacionar o conceito de direito kantiano com a filosofia prática, fornecendo, assim, uma ótica em que direito apresenta-se como uma autorização e uma obrigação da razão prática. Nessa sequência, o direito de propriedade, os direitos de família, direitos contratuais, direito público e direito internacional segue uma fundamentação sistemática da obra kantiana. (shrink)

[penultimate draft; prepared for publication in Aristotle’s Parts of Animals: A Critical Guide, ed. Sophia Connell – please cite final version] -/- Parts of Animals II.10 makes a new beginning in Aristotle’s study of animals. In it, Aristotle proposes to “now speak as if we are once more at an origin, beginning first with those things that are primary” (655b28-9). This is the start of his account of the non-uniform parts of blooded animals: parts such as eyes, noses, mouths, etc., (...) as opposed to uniform parts like blood and flesh. PA II.10 proposes a new strategy for studying these parts: “one ought to speak about the human kind first” (656a10). Beginning “first” with the “primary” things thus amounts to beginning with humans (655b28-9). -/- Why does Aristotle think this strategy is appropriate for his project? One answer is that it reflects a fundamental anthropocentrism. Lloyd, for instance, has raised the possibility that the basic assumptions that guide Aristotle’s biology may to some extent reflect the anthropocentrism of his culture, where the relation of humans to animals was “a preoccupation of popular beliefs”. In this paper, I develop an interpretation that both builds on and challenges this suggestion. I do so by investigating how Aristotle thinks this strategy works in theory and in practice: his justifications for adopting it and its interaction with his scientific commitments. I argue that Aristotle adopts it in part because he thinks that humans are such that his scientific concepts apply to them in a particularly clear way. (This too is a form of anthropocentrism: one that might be resisted by arguing that humans are not the best illustrations of these concepts—that Aristotle ought to look elsewhere for models with the features he desires.) -/- More specifically, Aristotle holds that starting with humans helps establish the causal explanations of the parts of other animals, particularly when they are recalcitrant. What makes humans suitable for this role is a special teleological relation between their parts and the ends they serve: in humans, he supposes, this connection is particularly tight (in a way I explain below). Consequently, Aristotle thinks he can use humans to illuminate which sorts of features tend to be for the sake of which ends, and then extend the results of this inquiry to the parts of the other animals. (shrink)

Pretendeu-se dissertar sobre a segunda conferênciada obra O Liberalismo Político de John Rawls. A exposição trata dométodo de justificação do autor, concentrada nos termos racionalidade(concepção de bem) e razoabilidade (senso de justiça);subsequentemente aborda as variáveis – cooperação, voluntariedade,autonomia, limites do juízo, discordância, pluralismo, reciprocidade,imparcialidade, publicidade, justificação, democracia e tolerância. Nessesentido, parte-se da obra supracitada para a sistematização da teoria eresolução de problemas: uma referência histórica em Kant; uma respostaàs hipóteses comunitaristas; a convergência de modelos de justificação,sobretudo uma deontologia com uma (...) concepção substancial de justiça; eos argumentos epistemológicos fundacionistas e coerentistas. Conclui-se,além da unidade da obra, a tipificação contratualista na história daFilosofia, um compatibilismo ético e o caráter epistemológico coerentista. (shrink)

In “Melancholia, temporal disruption, and the torment of being both unable to live and unable to die”, I discuss the way in which the temporal desynchronization of melancholia can disrupt the melancholic’s relation to their own death and, on a Heideggerian interpretation, the meaning and significance of their life. In their thoughtful commentaries, Kevin Aho and Gareth Owen draw out some important points for further elaboration and clarification, the most pressing of which invoke Heidegger’s interpretation of time and the radical (...) temporalities of fundamental attunements. As Aho anticipates, this is the conception of time that underpins my interpretation of melancholia and, because this is important... (shrink)

Some people oppose abortion on the grounds that fetuses have full moral status and thus a right to not be killed. We argue that special obligations that hold between mother and fetus also hold between parents and their children. We argue that if these special obligations necessitate the sacrifice of bodily autonomy in the case of abortion, then they also necessitate the sacrifice of bodily autonomy in the case of organ donation. If we accept the argument that it is obligatory (...) to override a woman’s bodily autonomy for the sake of an unborn child’s survival, we must continue to override the bodily autonomy of parents to ensure the survival of their living children, until the parent no longer has a special obligation to their child to the same degree as their special obligation to the fetus. And if the life of a child is truly more important than the bodily autonomy of its parents, as must be the case to force women to carry unwanted pregnancies to term, this should remain true until such a time that their children are no longer considered their responsibility. Thus, parity of reasoning suggests that policies compelling the gestation of a fetus should be accompanied by policies compelling organ donation. (shrink)

Our in-the-moment experience of the world can feel vivid and rich, even when we cannot describe our experience due to limitations of attention, memory or other cognitive processes. But the nature of visual awareness is quite sparse, as suggested by the phenomena of failures of awareness, such as change blindness and inattentional blindness. I will argue that once failures of memory or failures of comparison are ruled out as explanations for these phenomena, they present strong evidence against rich awareness. To (...) accommodate and explain these massive failures of awareness, any theory of phenomenal consciousness must downgrade phenomenology to a degree where it is functionless or, ironically, does not reflect what we experience. (shrink)

Despite frequent calls by players, managers and fans, FIFA's resistance to the implementation of goal-line technology (GLT) has been well documented in national print and online media as well as FIFA's own website. In 2010, FIFA president Sepp Blatter outlined eight reasons why GLT should not be used in football. The reasons given by FIFA can be broadly separated into three categories; those dealing with the nature and value of the game of football, those related to issues of justice, and (...) those concerned with the practical implementation of GLT. This paper intends to evaluate these eight reasons in order to assess whether there are, indeed, any good arguments against GLT in football. (shrink)

A presente dissertação tem como tema central a proposta da abordagem hermenêutica da decisão judicial em Hans Kelsen considerando seu relativismo filosófico. No primeiro momento expõe a concepção de decisão judicial no autor e as suas reformulações conceituais no decorrer das suas obras – as passagens do formalismo normativista das primeiras obras até o ceticismo de regras na Teoria geral das normas. Também propõe a dissolução entre as leituras formalistas e realistas através da possibilidade de uma leitura realista moderada. Após (...) expõe a filosofia relativista do autor e seu resultado na exclusão dos elementos da moralidade do conceito de direito. Finalmente deduz regras de interpretação a partir de uma visão abrangente das obras do autor. O objetivo da dissertação, nesse sentido, é analisar a dinâmica da criação normativa pelo judiciário, a discricionariedade daí resultante e a possibilidade de interpretar os vários sentidos das normas sem recorrer a qualquer moralismo para tal. (shrink)

A teoria do Direito internacional de Kelsen é monista, ou seja, o autor reúne a legislação nacional e internacional em um único sistema normativo. Com isso, descarta o dualismo e promove uma tese fundada no princípio lógico da não-contradição, traduzido juridicamente para o princípio da imputação. Por essa afirmação, o Direito internacional, considerando o primado estadual, existe a partir do reconhecimento interno da validade da legislação externa; mais, a recepção dos acordos internacionais na legislação nacional acopla internamente o Direito internacional, (...) com seus tratados bi/multilaterais, pactos, instituições, costumes e tribunais. A teoria de Kelsen torna-se complexa, porém, quando, indagando o inverso dessa premissa, o Direito internacional posto e eficaz, já inserido internamente, não reconhece a validade normativa de eventual interpretação ou norma interna e atua como agente determinante da ordem jurídica nacional. Com isso, o Direito externo torna-se decisivo desse mesmo sistema jurídico interno, não necessariamente por uma ação coercitiva, mas por intermédio do seu reconhecimento da validade da legislação interna. Vimos esse fenômeno materializar-se no caso dos dois presidentes simultâneos da Venezuela: tanto o presidente Nicolás Maduro, quando o presidente Juan Guaidó, foram formalmente designados, por países e instituições distintas, como governantes válidos. Sendo assim, o objetivo do livro consiste em compreender esse fenômeno de reconhecimento externo dos sistemas normativos nacionais através da segunda edição da Teoria de pura do Direito como marco teórico. Igualmente, utiliza-se do estudo de caso sobre a determinação do presidente válido da Venezuela como elemento empírico e de falseabilidade. Com isso, defende a hipótese da necessidade do reconhecimento normativo-objetivo do Estado a partir da formação do Direito internacional, independentemente de seu primitivismo. Os quatro primeiros capítulos, na primeira seção, estabelecem uma interpretação sobre a obra de Kelsen, focada em seu aspecto internacionalista. Nos quatro últimos, na seção II, submeto as conclusões teóricas ao caso concreto, falseando-as ou não conforme seu teste empírico. (shrink)

A tese defende o antiplatonismo presente na obra do jusfilósofo Hans Kelsen como núcleo argumentativo da sua teoria do direito. Sustenta que a melhor definição da sua filosofia não é como neokantiana, mas como antiplatônica. Isso porque há significativas inconsistências na sua interpretação de Kant, o que a impossibilita de ser classificada como tal. Além, encontra-se na sua leitura sobre Platão referências mais sólidas e conceitos mais claros. Nesse sentido, advoga a hipótese de que a obra de Kelsen tem como (...) constante e como chave de entendimento a sua objeção e contestação às teses de Platão, sobretudo a questão da separação entre alma e corpo, isto é, forma e matéria. O primeiro e segundo capítulos defendem a hipótese da inconsistência das teses de Kelsen sobre Kant. Entende que a sua pressuposição de contradição entre a razão pura e a razão prática, assim como a ideia de uma contradição entre ser e dever-ser, não se sustenta considerando as próprias obras de Kant e a literatura especializada sobre o autor. No segundo capítulo apresenta a sua leitura sobre Platão, concentrada na obra A Ilusão da justiça (Dei Illusion der Gerechtigkeit). O quarto capítulo expõe, sopesando seu antiplatonismo, as duas principais referências teóricas para Kelsen a par de Kant, isto é, as teorias de David Hume e Sigmund Freud. O quinto capítulo demonstra como o antiplatonismo de Kelsen articula com os principais conceitos de suas teses, isto é, mostra que mesmo refutando a classificação do autor como neokantiano, conceitos como norma fundamental, liberdade, o monismo entre direito e Estado, monismo entre direito internacional e nacional e o problema da decisão judicial possuem justificativa e base filosófica coerente. Finalmente, conclui com a possiblidade da ideia de uma teoria kelseniana do direito desvinculada do neokantismo e fundada sobre os pressupostos céticos humeanos e freudianos, tanto moral, quanto teórico, ou seja, reconhece a unidade das obras do autor, desde que condicionada a sua interpretação como antiplatônica. (shrink)

The author argues for the following as constituents of the moral virtue of open-mindedness: a second-order awareness that is not reducible to first-order doubt; strong moral concern for members of the moral community; and some freedom from reactive habit patterns, particularly with regard to one's self-narratives, or equanimity. Drawing on Buddhist philosophical accounts of equanimity, the author focuses on the third constituent, equanimity, and argues that it is a central, but often ignored, component of the moral virtue of open-mindedness, and (...) its absence can explain many failures of open-mindedness. (shrink)

People sometimes use speech to interfere with other people’s speech, as in the case of a heckler sabotaging a lecture with constant interjections. Some people claim that such interference infringes upon free speech. Against this view, we argue that where competing speakers in a public forum both have an interest in speaking, free speech principles should not automatically give priority to the ‘official’ speaker. Given the ideals underlying free speech, heckling speech sometimes deserves priority. But what can we say, then, (...) about situations in which heckling clearly seems to infringe upon people’s civil liberties, in a way that intuitively justifies intervention? In such cases, we argue, heckling infringes upon people’s associative freedom. We present and defend an ethical framework for the institutional management of ‘Speech Fights’, geared around this insight. (shrink)

Deception sometimes results in nonconsensual sex. A recent body of literature diagnoses such violations as invalidating consent: the agreement is not morally transformative, which is why the sexual contact is a rights violation. We pursue a different explanation for the wrongs in question: there is valid consent, but it is not consent to the sex act that happened. Semantic conventions play a key role in distinguishing deceptions that result in nonconsensual sex (like stealth condom removal) from those that don’t (like (...) white lies). Our framework is also applicable to more controversial cases, like those implicated in so-called “gender fraud” complaints. (shrink)

Introduction: The experience of disconnection is common in first-person accounts of grief. One way in which this feeling of estrangement can manifest is through the splintering apart of the time of the mourner and the time of the world. Supplementing and extending Thomas Fuchs' influential idea of temporal desynchronization, my aim in this article is to give an account of the heterogeneous ways in which grief can disturb time. -/- Method: I organize these manifold experiences of temporal disruption according to (...) a method of "depth analysis": a phenomenological interpretation of temporal desynchronization that tracks the increasing disconnect between the mourner and the world as it manifests in time. In so doing, I draw on a wide range of descriptive first-person responses to the question "Has your experience of time changed in any way?" - included as part of an online questionnaire on the emotional experience of grief conducted recently with colleagues at the University of York. I then stratify these according to a mild, moderate, and profound level of disruption. -/- Results: Before setting out the results of this analysis, I give a background account of Fuchs' interpretation of temporal desynchronization in phenomenological psychopathology more generally and in grief specifically. In my results, I then supplement and extend his interpretation by setting out my phenomenological depth analysis of the increasing disconnect between the time of the mourner and the time of the world, as demonstrated by the questionnaire data. As I argue, such a fine-grained account is an important step in understanding the way time can shape the meaning and significance of different grief experiences. Following this, in my discussion, I demonstrate how a depth approach might be helpful in differentiating between temporal disturbances in a range of affective disorders and give an illustrative comparison of grief and depression. -/- Conclusion: In conclusion, I reflect briefly on what grief might reveal about the depth and complexity of temporal experience itself. In so doing, I consider how the radical disruptions to time in grief might transform the mourner's experience of time irreversibly but in a way that enables a renewed connection to both their deceased loved one and the world from which they have become estranged. (shrink)

Recently, many have argued that there are certain kinds of abstract mathematical explanations that are noncausal. In particular, the irrelevancy approach suggests that abstracting away irrelevant causal details can leave us with a noncausal explanation. In this paper, I argue that the common example of Renormalization Group explanations of universality used to motivate the irrelevancy approach deserves more critical attention. I argue that the reasons given by those who hold up RG as noncausal do not stand up to critical scrutiny. (...) As a result, the irrelevancy approach and the line between casual and noncausal explanation deserves more scrutiny. (shrink)

Since its inception in the early 1990s, evidence-based medicine (EBM) has become the dominant epistemic framework for Western medical practice. However, in light of powerful criticisms against EBM, alternatives such as casuistic medicine have been gaining support in both the medical and philosophical community. In the absence of empirical evidence in support of the claim that EBM improves patient outcomes, and in light of considerations that it is unlikely that such evidence will be forthcoming, another standard is needed to assess (...) EBM against its alternatives. In this paper, I propose a set of criteria for this purpose based on Helen Longino's criteria for assessing the objectivity of a knowledge productive community. I then apply these criteria to assess EBM against a casuistic framework for medical knowledge. I argue that EBM's strict adherence to a hierarchical organization of knowledge can reasonably be expected to block it from fulfilling a high level of objectivity. A casuistic framework, on the other hand, because it emphasizes critical evaluation in conjunction with the flexibility of a case-based approach, could be expected to better facilitate a more optimal epistemic community. (shrink)

East Asians and Westerners differ in various aspects of perception and cognition. For example, visual memory for East Asians is believed to be more influenced by the contextual aspects of a scene than is the case for Westerners (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). There are also differences in visual search: for Westerners, search for a long line among short is faster than for short among long, whereas this difference does not appear to hold for East Asians (Ueda et al., submitted). However, (...) it is unclear how these group-level differences originate. To investigate the extent to which they depend upon environment, we tested visual search and visual memory in East Asian immigrants who had lived in Canada for different amounts of time. Recent immigrants were found to exhibit no search asymmetry, unlike Westerners who had spent their lives in Canada. However, immigrants who had lived in Canada for more than two years showed performance comparable to that of Westerners. These differences could not be explained by the general analytic/holistic processing distinction believed to differentiate Westerners and East Asians, since all observers showed a strong holistic tendency for visual recognition. Results instead support the suggestion that exposure to a new environment can significantly affect the particular processes used to perceive a given stimulus. (shrink)