Results for 'Foreknowledge'

99 found
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  1. Foreknowledge requires determinism.Patrick Todd - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (1):125-146.
    There is a longstanding argument that purports to show that divine foreknowledge is inconsistent with human freedom to do otherwise. Proponents of this argument, however, have for some time been met with the following reply: the argument posits what would have to be a mysterious non-causal constraint on freedom. In this paper, I argue that this objection is misguided – not because after all there can indeed be non-causal constraints on freedom (as in Pike, Fischer, and Hunt), but because (...)
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  2. Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.
    Many philosophers maintain that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with comprehensive divine foreknowledge but incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. But the Fixity of the Past principle underlying the rejection of compatibilism about the ability to do otherwise and determinism appears to generate an argument also for the incompatibility of the ability to do otherwise and divine foreknowledge. By developing an account of ability that appeals to the notion of explanatory dependence, we can replace the (...)
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  3. Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Dependence: A Dialectical Intervention.Taylor W. Cyr & Andrew Law - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):145-154.
    Recently, several authors have utilized the notion of dependence to respond to the traditional argument for the incompatibility of freedom and divine foreknowledge. However, proponents of this response have not always been so clear in specifying where the incompatibility argument goes wrong, which has led to some unfounded objections to the response. We remedy this dialectical confusion by clarifying both the dependence response itself and its interaction with the standard incompatibility argument. Once these clarifications are made, it becomes clear (...)
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  4. Foreknowledge & Divine Emotions.Tyler McNabb & Michael DeVito - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (3):115-128.
    . In this essay, we move to further advance the work done on God and emotions by RT Mullins, exploring the role exhaustive divine foreknowledge plays as it relates to God’s emotional life. Given our preliminary investigation at the intersection of divine foreknowledge and divine emotions, and focusing specifically on the neoclassical theistic conception of God, we argue that in light of God’s foreknowledge, his emotional life is dissimilar when compared to that of his creation. That said, (...)
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  5. Foreknowledge and Fatalism : Why Divine Timelessness Doesn’t Help.Alan R. Rhoda - 2014 - In L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.), Debates in the Metaphysics of Time. London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 253-274.
    Argues that divine timelessness is at best irrelevant and at worst counterproductive for addressing the problem of foreknowledge and future contingents.
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  6. Infallible Divine Foreknowledge cannot Uniquely Threaten Human Freedom, but its Mechanics Might.T. Ryan Byerly - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):73-94.
    It is not uncommon to think that the existence of exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge uniquely threatens the existence of human freedom. This paper shows that this cannot be so. For, to uniquely threaten human freedom, infallible divine foreknowledge would have to make an essential contribution to an explanation for why our actions are not up to us. And infallible divine foreknowledge cannot do this. There remains, however, an important question about the compatibility of freedom and (...). It is a question not about the existence of foreknowledge, but about its mechanics. (shrink)
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  7. Freedom, foreknowledge, and betting.Amy Seymour - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):223-236.
    Certain kinds of prediction, foreknowledge, and future‐oriented action appear to require settled future truths. But open futurists think that the future is metaphysically unsettled: if it is open whether p is true, then it cannot currently be settled that p is true. So, open futurists—and libertarians who adopt the position—face the objection that their view makes rational action and deliberation impossible. I defuse the epistemic concern: open futurism does not entail obviously counterintuitive epistemic consequences or prevent rational action.
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  8. Decision and foreknowledge.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):77-105.
    My topic is how to make decisions when you possess foreknowledge of the consequences of your choice. Many have thought that these kinds of decisions pose a distinctive and novel problem for causal decision theory (CDT). My thesis is that foreknowledge poses no new problems for CDT. Some of the purported problems are not problems. Others are problems, but they are not problems for CDT. Rather, they are problems for our theories of subjunctive supposition. Others are problems, but (...)
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  9. Bootstrapping Divine Foreknowledge? Comments on Fischer.Alan R. Rhoda - 2017 - Science, Religion and Culture 4 (2):72-78.
    Critiques John Martin Fischer's bootstrapping model of divine foreknowledge. Invited contribution to a special journal issue on John Martin Fischer's _Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will_ (Oxford, 2016).
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  10. Foreknowledge Without Determinism.Nathan Rockwood - 2019 - Sophia 58 (2):103-113.
    A number of philosophers and theologians have argued that if God has knowledge of future human actions then human agents cannot be free. This argument rests on the assumption that, since God is essentially omniscient, God cannot be wrong about what human agents will do. It is this assumption that I challenge in this paper. My aim is to develop an interpretation of God’s essential omniscience according to which God can be wrong even though God never is wrong. If this (...)
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  11. Foreknowledge and Free Will.Alex Blum - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):55-57.
    We contend that since what is true cannot be false, foreknowledge is transparently incompatible with free will. We argue that what is crucial to the conflict is the role of truth in foreknowledge and that the identity of the one who foreknows is irrelevant.
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  12. Divine foreknowledge and providence in the commentaries of Boethius and Aquinas on the De interpretatione 9 by Aristotle.David Torrijos-Castrillejo - 2020 - Biblica Et Patristica Thoruniensia 13:151-173.
    Boethius represents one of the most important milestones in Christian reflection about fate and providence, especially considering that he takes into account Proclus’ contributions to these questions. For this reason, The Consolation of philosophy is considered a crucial work for the development of this topic. However, Boethius also exposes his ideas in his commentary on the book that constitutes one of the oldest and most relevant texts on the problem of future contingents, namely Aristotle’s De interpretatione. Although St. Thomas refers (...)
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  13. Human Foreknowledge.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):50-69.
    I explore the motivation and logical consequences of the idea that we have some (limited) ability to know contingent facts about the future, even in presence of the assumption that the future is objectively unsettled or indeterminate. I start by formally characterizing skepticism about the future. This analysis nudges the anti-skeptic towards the idea that if some propositions about the future are objectively indeterminate, then it may be indeterminate whether a suitably positioned agent knows them. -/- Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 35, (...)
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  14.  34
    Foreknowledge and Human Freedom in Augustine.Vance G. Morgan - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Research 19:223-242.
    In this paper, I consider Augustine’s attempted solution of the problem of divine foreknowledge and free will. I focus on two distinct notions of God’s relationship to time as they relate to this problem. In Confessions XI, Augustine develops an understanding of time and foreknowledge that cIearly offers a possible solution to the foreknowledge/free will problem. I then turn to On Free Will 3.1-4, where Augustine conspicuously declines to use a solution similar to the one in the (...)
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  15. Freedom, foreknowledge, and Frankfurt.David Hunt - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 159--183.
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  16. Fischer on Foreknowledge and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4):51-61.
    I explore several issues raised in John Martin Fischer’s Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will. First I discuss whether an approach to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge that appeals directly to the claim that God’s beliefs depend on the future is importantly different from Ockhamism. I suggest that this dependence approach has advantages over Ockhamism. I also argue that this approach gives us good reason to reject the claim that the past is fixed. Finally, I discuss (...)
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  17. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will.Linda Zagzebski - 1985 - Religious Studies 21 (3):279-298.
    If God knows everything he must know the future, and if he knows the future he must know the future acts of his creatures. But then his creatures must act as he knows they will act. How then can they be free? This dilemma has a long history in Christian philosophy and is now as hotly disputed as ever. The medieval scholastics were virtually unanimous in claiming both that God is omniscient and that humans have free will, though they disagreed (...)
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  18. Does Molinism Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?Justin Mooney - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (2):131-148.
    John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly’s recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer’s claim is ambiguous, and that it may turn out to be false on at least one reading, but only if the Molinist can explain how God knows true counterfactuals of freedom.
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  19. Providence, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Loops: A Reply to Robinson.David P. Hunt - 2004 - Religious Studies 40 (4 (Dec 2004)):485-491.
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  20.  21
    Time Travel, Foreknowledge, and Dependence: A Response to Cyr.Andrew Law - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
    The dependence solution claims that God’s foreknowledge is no threat to our freedom because God’s foreknowledge depends (in a relevant sense) on our actions. The assumption here is that those parts of the world which depend on our actions are no threat to the freedom of those actions. Recently, Taylor Cyr has presented a case which challenges this assumption. Moreover, since the case is analogous to the case of God’s foreknowledge, it would seem to establish that, even (...)
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  21. Time, Truth, Actuality, and Causation: On the Impossibility of Divine Foreknowledge.Michael Tooley - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):143 - 163.
    In this essay, my goal is, first, to describe the most important contemporary philosophical approaches to the nature of time, and then, secondly, to discuss the ways in which those different accounts bear upon the question of the possibility of divine foreknowledge. I shall argue that different accounts of the nature of time give rise to different objections to the idea of divine foreknowledge, but that, in addition, there is a general argument for the impossibility of divine (...) that is independent of one’s account of the nature of time. (shrink)
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  22. Foreknowledge and Freedom.John Martin Fischer - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (1):89-93.
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  23. ‘All is Foreseen, and Freedom of Choice is Granted’: A Scotistic Examination of God's Freedom, Divine Foreknowledge and the Arbitrary Use of Power.Liran Shia Gordon - 2019 - Heythrop Journal 60 (5):711-726.
    Following an Open conception of Divine Foreknowledge, that holds that man is endowed with genuine freedom and so the future is not definitely determined, it will be claimed that human freedom does not limit the divine power, but rather enhances it and presents us with a barrier against arbitrary use of that power. This reading will be implemented to reconcile a well-known quarrel between two important interpreters of Duns Scotus, Allan B. Wolter and Thomas Williams, each of whom supports (...)
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  24. Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge.David P. Hunt - 1993 - Faith and Philosophy 10 (3):394-414.
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  25. Contra Hasker: Why Simple Foreknowledge Is Still Useful.Hunt David - 2009 - Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 52 (3):545-550.
    In my "The Providential Advantage of Divine Foreknowledge" (2009) I respond to John Sanders' defense of the claim, made by many open theists, that foreknowledge of future contingents provides God with no providential advantage over a God who lacks such knowledge. William Hasker responded to that paper with a defense of Sanders, and the current paper is a response to Hasker's response.
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  26. On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia.Alfred J. Freddoso (ed.) - 1988 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    Luis de Molina was a leading figure in the remarkable sixteenth-century revival of Scholasticism on the Iberian peninsula.
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  27. Co o przyszłości Petera Van Inwagena wiedzą Istota Wszechwiedząca i on sam? Krytyka argumentu za sprzecznością przedwiedzy Boga i ludzkiego wolnego działania / What do Peter Van Inwagen and the omniscient being know about Peter Van Inwagen's future? Criticism of the argument for the contradiction of God's foreknowledge and human free action,.Marek Pepliński - 2019 - Przegląd Religioznawczy 272 (2):87-101.
    The article analyzes and criticizes the assumptions of Peter Van Inwagen’s argument for the alleged contradiction of the foreknowledge of God and human freedom. The argument is based on the sine qua non condition of human freedom defined as access to possible worlds containing such a continuation of the present in which the agent implements a different action than will be realized de facto in the future. The condition also contains that in every possible continuation of the present state (...)
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  28. The Eternity Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge.Michael Rota - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):165 - 186.
    In this paper I defend the eternity solution to the problem of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. After motivating the problem, I sketch the basic contours of the eternity solution. I then consider several objections which contend that the eternity solution falsely implies that we have various powers (e.g., to change God’s beliefs, or to affect the past) which, according to the objector, we do not in fact have.
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  29. Middle knowledge: The “foreknowledge defense”.David Paul Hunt - 1990 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 28 (1):1 - 24.
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  30. "On Zimmerman's 'The Providential Usefulness of Simple Foreknowledge'".Donald Smith - 2012 - In Kelly James Clark & Michael Reason Rea (eds.), Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga. , US: Oup Usa. pp. 197-202.
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  31. Restating Augustinian Recipe to Divine Foreknowledge-Libertarian Freewill Dilemma and its Theodical Implication.Adeboye Godwin Oriyomi - manuscript
    Restating Augustinian Recipe to Divine Foreknowledge-Libertarian Freewill Dilemma and its Theodical Implications Abstract The divine foreknowledge-freewill dilemma has been the focus of much recent philosophico-theological discourse, even though the problem is centuries old. In the attempt to solve the dilemma, there have been some modifications on the traditional definition of divine foreknowledge. Some of the philosophical attempts to solve the dilemma include Molinism, Boethianism, Ochamism, Opentheism and others. While these attempts are noteworthy, their basic flaws lie in (...)
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  32. Jumalan ennaltatietäminen ja luotujen vapaus molinismin mukaan (in Finnish) [God's Foreknowledge and Creaturely Freedom according to Molinism].Ari Maunu - 2014 - Ajatus 71:143-172.
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  33. T. Ryan Byerly: The mechanics of divine foreknowledge and providence: a time-ordering account: Bloomsbury Publishing, New York, 2014, 131 pages, $100. [REVIEW]Michael Almeida - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):255-259.
    One major aim of the book is to articulate a view of the mechanics of infallible divine foreknowledge that avoids commitment to causal determinism, explains how infallible foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom, and explains how God’s divine providence is compatible with human freedom and indeterministic events. The modest epistemic goal is to articulate a view that enjoys a not very low epistemic status. But even with such modest goals, I think the view cannot credibly be said to (...)
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  34. Restating Augustinian Recipe to Divine Foreknowledge-Libertarian Freewill Dilemma and its Theodical Implications.Adeboye Godwin - manuscript
    Restating Augustinian Recipe to Divine Foreknowledge-Libertarian Freewill Dilemma and its Theodical Implications Abstract The divine foreknowledge-freewill dilemma has been the focus of much recent philosophico-theological discourse, even though the problem is centuries old. In the attempt to solve the dilemma, there have been some modifications on the traditional definition of divine foreknowledge. Some of the philosophical attempts to solve the dilemma include Molinism, Boethianism, Ochamism, Opentheism and others. While these attempts are noteworthy, their basic flaws lie in (...)
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  35. The Providential Advantage of Divine Foreknowledge.David P. Hunt - 2009 - In Kevin Timpe (ed.), Arguing about religion. New York: Routledge. pp. 374-385.
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  36. Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):249-254.
    In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge (G-scenario). Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God’s foreknowing an agent’s act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsible for his act in a Frankfurt-type scenario also hold in a G-scenario. In reply, (...)
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  37. No (New) Troubles with Ockhamism.Garrett Pendergraft & D. Justin Coates - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 5:185-208.
    The Ockhamist claims that our ability to do otherwise is not endangered by God’s foreknowledge because facts about God’s past beliefs regarding future contingents are soft facts about the past—i.e., temporally relational facts that depend in some sense on what happens in the future. But if our freedom, given God’s foreknowledge, requires altering some fact about the past that is clearly a hard fact, then Ockhamism fails even if facts about God’s past beliefs are soft. Recent opponents of (...)
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  38. Making Sense of Locke’s Confession.Andrea Guardo - manuscript
    After having given in the "Essay" a definition of freedom which straightforwardly entails its compatibility with – among other things – God's foreknowledge, Locke surprisingly writes in a 1693 letter to Molyneux that he does not see how human liberty can coexist with divine prescience. I argue that the confession to Molyneux can be made consistent with the "Essay"'s definition by embracing the view that the problem Locke had in mind when he drafted it was not a problem concerning (...)
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  39. Richard Swinburne's False Dilemma.Owen Crocker - 2020 - UBC Journal of Philosophical Enquiries 1 (1):63-80.
    Richard Swinburne recently released a paper titled, “Causation, Time and God’s Omniscience.” In this paper, Swinburne argued that God’s omniscience must be understood in a way that excludes divine foreknowledge. Swinburne deems this a necessary step in order to protect our freedom of the will. The purpose of my paper will be to refute Swinburne’s central argument. The goal of refuting Swinburne’s argument is to maintain the possibility of the compatibility of both divine foreknowledge and free human agency.
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  40. Freedom, Omniscience and the Contingent A Priori.Fabio Lampert - forthcoming - Mind.
    One of the major challenges in the philosophy of religion is theological fatalism—roughly, the claim that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. In this article, I present new reasons to be skeptical of what I consider to be the strongest argument for theological fatalism. First, I argue that divine foreknowledge is not necessary for an argument against free will if we take into account divine knowledge of contingent a priori truths. Second, I show that this argument can be (...)
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  41. Boethius and the Causal Direction Strategy.Jonathan Evans - 2018 - Ancient Philosophy 38 (1):167-185.
    Contemporary work on Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy often overlooks a discussion in CP.V.3 of a Peripatetic strategy for dissolving theological fatalism. Boethius’ treatment of this strategy and the lesson it provides about divine foreknowledge requires a reorientation of our understanding of the Consolation text. The result is that it is not foreknowledge nor any other temporally-conditioned knowledge that motivates Boethian concern but divine knowledge simpliciter.
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  42. Czy wiedzy Boga nie da się pogodzić z wolnością człowieka? Krytyczna analiza niektórych argumentów.Marek Pepliński - 2012 - Filo-Sofija 12 (19, 4):175-192.
    Is Divine Knowledge Incompatible with Human Freedom? An Analysis of Some Arguments The problem that divine omniscience or divine foreknowledge makes free will impossible belongs to notoriously difficult to solve. In XX century one of the most important interpretation of this difficulty was provided by Nelson Pike. If God believes infallibly and in advance how Smith will act, this fact about the past excludes out all alternatives for Smith. But libertarian account of free will requires alternatives possibilities, so, it (...)
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  43. Quantum Molinism.Thomas Harvey, Frederick Kroon, Karl Svozil & Cristian Calude - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (3):167-194.
    In this paper we consider the possibility of a Quantum Molinism : such a view applies an analogue of the Molinistic account of free will‘s compatibility with God’s foreknowledge to God’s knowledge of (supposedly) indeterministic events at a quantum level. W e ask how (and why) a providential God could care for and know about a world with this kind of indeterminacy. We consider various formulations of such a Quantum Molinism, and after rejecting a number of options arrive at (...)
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  44. On Freedom.Émilie du Châtelet - 2021 - Project Vox.
    This is an English translation of Emilie Du Châtelet's "Sur la liberté." This 18th century text discusses freedom of the will, determinism, and divine foreknowledge. Translated from French by Julia Jorati, with the help of Julie Roy. French edition of this text, on which this translation is based: “Sur la liberté,” in Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire, vol. 14, edited by William H. Barber, 484–502. Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1989.
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  45. How Molinists Can Have Their Cake and Eat It Too.Godehard Brüntrup & Ruben Schneider - 2011 - In Christian Kanzian, Winfried Löffler & Josef Quitterer (eds.), The Ways Things Are: Studies in Ontology. Ontos. pp. 221-240.
    Paper on divine foreknowledge and human freedom.
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  46. Boecio sobre la presciencia divina.David Torrijos Castrillejo - 2021 - In Mercedes López Salvá (ed.), En los albores del cristianismo. Rhemata. pp. 405-421.
    Boethius' conception of divine foreknowledge in his commentary on De interpretatione and the Consolation of philosophy. The author defends that the theological point of view is already present in De int. He also provides some texts by Augustine which signify an alternative Christian inspiration for the Neoplatonic philosophical principles that Boethius uses.
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  47. The Dependence Response and Explanatory Loops.Andrew Law - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (3):294-307.
    There is an old and powerful argument for the claim that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A recent response to this argument, sometimes called the “dependence response,” centers around the claim that God’s relevant past beliefs depend on the relevant agent’s current or future behavior in a certain way. This paper offers a new argument for the dependence response, one that revolves around different cases of time travel. Somewhat serendipitously, the argument also paves the (...)
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  48. Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2019 - Noûs 55 (1):102-127.
    At least since Aristotle’s famous 'sea-battle' passages in On Interpretation 9, some substantial minority of philosophers has been attracted to the doctrine of the open future--the doctrine that future contingent statements are not true. But, prima facie, such views seem inconsistent with the following intuition: if something has happened, then (looking back) it was the case that it would happen. How can it be that, looking forwards, it isn’t true that there will be a sea battle, while also being true (...)
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  49. (1 other version)Geachianism.Patrick Todd - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3:222-251.
    The plane was going to crash, but it didn't. Johnny was going to bleed to death, but he didn't. Geach sees here a changing future. In this paper, I develop Geach's primary argument for the (almost universally rejected) thesis that the future is mutable (an argument from the nature of prevention), respond to the most serious objections such a view faces, and consider how Geach's view bears on traditional debates concerning divine foreknowledge and human freedom. As I hope to (...)
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  50. Dependence and the Freedom to Do Otherwise.Taylor Cyr - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
    An increasingly popular approach to reconciling divine foreknowledge with human freedom is to say that, because God’s beliefs depend on what we do, we are free to do otherwise than what we actually do despite God’s infallible foreknowledge. This paper develops a new challenge for this dependence response. The challenge stems from a case of backward time travel in which an agent intuitively lacks the freedom to do otherwise because of the time-traveler’s knowledge of what the agent will (...)
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