The aim of this doctoral thesis is to bridge the gap between theoretical ideals of authenticity and practical authenticity-related problems in healthcare. In this context, authenticity means being "genuine," "real," "true to oneself," or similar, and is assumed to be closely connected to the autonomy of persons. The thesis includes an introduction and four articles related to authenticity. The first article collects various theories intended to explain the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity in a taxonomy that enables oversight and analysis. (...) It is argued that (in-)authenticity is difficult to observe in others. The second article offers a solution to this difficulty in one theory of authenticity. It is proposed that under certain circumstances, it is morally justified to judge that the desires underlying a person's decisions are inauthentic. The third article incorporates this proposition into an already established theory of personal autonomy. It is argued that the resulting conceptualization of autonomy is fruitful for action-guidance in authenticity-related problems in healthcare. The fourth article collects nine cases of possible authenticity-related problems in healthcare. The theory developed in the third article is applied to the problems, when this is allowed by the case-description, to provide guidance with regard to them. It is argued that there is not one universal authenticity-related problem but many different problems, and that there is thus likely not one universal solution to such problems but various particular solutions. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that autonomous decision-making requires that the decision-maker’s desires are authentic, i.e., “genuine,” “truly her own,” “not out of character,” or similar. In this article, it is argued that a method to reliably determine the authenticity (or inauthenticity) of a desire cannot be developed. A taxonomy of characteristics displayed by different theories of authenticity is introduced and applied to evaluate such theories categorically, in contrast to the prior approach of treating them individually. The conclusion is drawn that, (...) in practice, the authenticity of desires cannot be reliably determined. It is suggested that authenticity should therefore not be employed in informed consent practices in healthcare. (shrink)

Value conflicts between individualism and collectivism are common. In philosophy, such conflicts have been conceptualized as conflicts between individuality and conformity, among other things. This article develops a more detailed conceptual framework by combining philosophical analysis with empirical observations. The focus is on value conflicts pertaining to LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) factors in a non-individualist society (Georgia). Conservative or traditional norms sometimes constrain LGBT individuals by influencing them to adapt to social expectations. The phenomenon is intuitively clear and (...) has been reported on in numerous quantitative investigations. A qualitative study has been conducted on how LGBT individuals in Georgia experience the constraining influence of such norms. Deep interviews (n=8) have clarified how, more precisely, the effects of those influences should be conceptualized. The results indicate that important distinctions between different types of influences, as well as different objects of influence, have been overlooked in previous philosophical inquiries about value conflicts in this context. The conceptual framework developed throughout the article should be of use to philosophers and social scientists studying individualism and collectivism, and to policymakers working with LGBT issues. (shrink)

Many libertarians assume that there is a close relation between an individual’s self-ownership and her freedom. That relation needs questioning. In this article it is argued that, even in a pre-property state, self-ownership is insufficient to protect freedom. Therefore, libertarians who believe in self-ownership should either offer a defense of freedom that is independent from their defense of self-ownership, make it explicit that they hold freedom as second to self-ownership (and defend that position), or reconsider the moral basis of their (...) political views. (shrink)

The notion of authenticity, i.e., being “genuine,” “real,” or “true to oneself,” is sometimes held as critical to a person’s autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents the person from making autonomous decisions or leading an autonomous life. It has been pointed out that authenticity is difficult to observe in others. Therefore, judgments of inauthenticity have been found inadequate to underpin paternalistic interventions, among other things. This article delineates what justifies judgments of inauthenticity. It is argued that for persons who wish to (...) live according to the prevailing social and moral standards and desires that are seriously undesirable according to those standards, it is justified to judge that a desire is inauthentic to the extent that it is due to causal factors that are alien to the person and to the extent that it deviates from the person’s practical identity. The article contributes to a tradition of thinking about authenticity which is known mainly from Frankfurt and Dworkin, and bridges the gap between theoretical ideals of authenticity and real authenticity-related problems in practical biomedical settings. (shrink)

This article does three things. First, it asks a new question about transformative education, namely ‘what is the role of power and trust in the decision of whether to transform one’s meaning scheme in the face of new information or whether to simply reject the new information?’ Secondly, it develops a five-stage model which elaborates on the role of this decision in transformative learning. Finally, it uses grounded-theory and the five-stage model to argue that power and trust play an important (...) role in facilitating transformative learning. (shrink)

Respect for autonomy is a central moral principle in bioethics. It is sometimes argued that authenticity, i.e., being “real,” “genuine,” “true to oneself,” or similar, is crucial to a person’s autonomy. Patients sometimes make what appears to be inauthentic decisions, such as when anorexia nervosa patients refuse treatment to avoid gaining weight, despite that the risk of harm is very high. If such decisions are inauthentic, and therefore non-autonomous, it may be the case they should be overridden for paternalist reasons. (...) However, it is not clear what justifies the judgment that someone or something is inauthentic. This article discusses one recent theory of what justifies judgments of inauthenticity. It is argued that the theory is seriously limited, as it only provides guidance in three out of nine identified cases. There are at least six authenticity-related problems to be solved, and autonomy theorists thus have reason to engage with the topic of authenticity in practical biomedicine. (shrink)

Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent’s cognitive architecture are met. Epistemologists, however, worry that in so far as such cognitively integrated processes are epistemically relevant, agents could thus come to enjoy an untoward explosion of knowledge. This paper develops and defends an approach to cognitive integration—cluster-model functionalism—which finds application in (...) both domains of inquiry, and which meets the challenge posed by putative cases of cognitive or epistemic bloat. (shrink)

Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the internalism/externalism distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In light of the above dividing lines, we then examine first (...) the extent to which content externalism is compatible with epistemic externalism; second, whether active externalism entails epistemic externalism; and third whether there are varieties of epistemic externalism that are better suited to accommodate active externalism. Finally, we examine whether the combination of epistemic and cognitive externalism is necessary for epistemology and we comment on the potential ramifications of this move for social epistemology and philosophy of science. (shrink)

According to some critics of liberal individualism, it is fundamentally problematic that individualists focus on rights instead of community and on decision-making processes instead of substantial goods. Among other things, it is claimed that liberal individualism therefore fails to provide meaning to people’s lives. The view has recently gained momentum as it has been incorporated in novel conservative and nationalist arguments. This article presents an individualist theory of meaning in response to a recent nationalist reiteration of the critique. The theory (...) is that a continuous pursuit of self-endorsement by a perfected, liberal, version of oneself provides purpose and direction in life. This allows the individual to be the ultimate arbiter in meaning-building matters, as the theory locates meaning in the individual’s decision-making processes rather than in factors external to her. The theory acknowledges the interdependence of human beings but remains loyal to the view that the value of the individual generally trumps competing values, such as that of the collective. (shrink)

The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended-memory cases’ ; though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in §1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC only if its epistemic assessments (...) do not violate what we call ‘the epistemic parity principle’. In §2, we show how the constraint of respecting the epistemic parity principle stands in what appears to be a prima facie intractable tension with mainstream thinking about cases of propositional memory. We then outline and evaluate in §3 several lines of response. (shrink)

Respect for autonomy is a central moral principle in bioethics. The concept of autonomy can be construed in various ways. Under the non-ideal conceptualization proposed by Beauchamp and Childress, everyday choices of generally competent persons are autonomous to the extent that they are intentional and are made with understanding and without controlling influences. It is sometimes suggested that authenticity is important to personal autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents otherwise autonomous persons from making autonomous decisions. Building from Beauchamp and Childress’s theory, (...) this article develops a non-ideal authenticity-based conceptualization of personal autonomy. Factors that indicate inauthentic decision-making are explicated, and the full concept is defended from three expected objections. The theory is then tested on a paradigm case which has concerned theorists and practitioners for some time, namely the possible inauthenticity of anorexia nervosa patients’ decision-making. It is concluded that the theory seems to be fruitful in analyses of the degree of autonomy of patients’ decision-making, and that it succeeds in providing reliable action-guidance in practical contexts. (shrink)

Is the statement "I think, therefore I am" true or false? At first glance, it sounds plausible. Even trivial. However, this statement should not be judged at "face value", but in light of René Descartes's process of "methodological doubt". On that basis, I come to the conclusion that the statement is logically false. But it gets even worse, the statement is only a tautology.

While it is widely regarded that intellectual humility is among the intellectual virtues, there is as of yet little consensus on the matter of what possessing and exercising intellectual humility consists in, and how it should be best understood as advancing our epistemic goals. For example, does intellectual humility involve an underestimation of one’s intellectual abilities, or rather, does it require an accurate conception? Is intellectual humility a fundamentally interpersonal/social virtue, or might it be valuable to exercise in isolation? To (...) what extent does intellectual humility demand of us an appreciation of how the success of our inquiries depends on features of our social and physical environment beyond our control? These are just a few of the many questions that are crucial to getting a grip on this intellectual virtue and why we might aspire to cultivate it. Furthermore, and apart from the nature and value of humility, it is worthwhile to consider how this notion, properly understood, might have import for other philosophical debates, including those about (for example) scepticism, assertion, epistemic individualism and anti-individualism, and the philosophy of education. This special issue brings together a range of different philosophical perspectives on these and related questions to do with intellectual humility with an aim to contributing to this important and timely topic. (shrink)

Modifying the descriptive and theoretical generalizations of Relativized Minimality, we argue that a significant subset of weak island violations arise when an extracted phrase should scope over some intervener but is unable to. Harmless interveners seem harmless because they can support an alternative reading. This paper focuses on why certain wh-phrases are poor wide scope takers, and offers an algebraic perspective on scope interaction. Each scopal element SE is associated with certain operations (e.g., not with complements). When a wh-phrase scopes (...) over some SE, the operations associated with that SE are performed in its denotation domain. The requisite operations may or may not be available in a domain, however. We present an empirical analysis of a variety of wh-phrases. It is argued that the wh-phrases that escape all weak islands (i.e., can scope over any intervener) are those that range over individuals, the reason being that all Boolean operations are defined for their domain. Collectives, manners, amounts, numbers, etc. all denote in domains with fewer operations and are thus selectively sensitive to scopal interveners—a “semantic relativized minimality effect”. (shrink)

PurposeIn this article, we aim to present and defend a contextual approach to mathematical explanation.MethodTo do this, we introduce an epistemic reading of mathematical explanation.ResultsThe epistemic reading not only clarifies the link between mathematical explanation and mathematical understanding, but also allows us to explicate some contextual factors governing explanation. We then show how several accounts of mathematical explanation can be read in this approach.ConclusionThe contextual approach defended here clears up the notion of explanation and pushes us towards a pluralist vision (...) on mathematical explanation. (shrink)

Much of contemporary research ethics was developed in the latter half of the twentieth century as a response to the unethical treatment of human beings in biomedical research. Research ethical considerations have subsequently been extended to cover topics in the sciences and technology such as data handling, precautionary measures, engineering codes of conduct, and more. However, moral issues in the humanities have gained less attention from research ethicists. This article proposes an ethical principle for reading for research purposes: Respect the (...) author. (shrink)

The Centre for Society and Genomics (CSG) was established in 2004, funded by NGI (the Netherlands Genomics Initiative). Funding was continued in 2008. This report summarises the basic outcomes of almost a decade of interactive societal research, in close collaboration with the other centres of the NGI network. There are two reasons for presenting these results. First of all, at the end of this year, the CSG Next programme (2008-2013), encompassing more than 50 research projects conducted at 10 Dutch universities, (...) will be completed. Moreover, we are currently preparing ourselves for the years to come. The network of principal investigators, together with the research communities they represent and the societal and international networks they are involved in, have agreed to continue to work together, on the basis of mutual learning, transdisciplinary collaboration and collegial support. Notably, we offer our networks, experiences and expertise to help prepare the ground for promoting Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) in the context of Horizon2020, together with our European colleagues. This report summarises what our type of research can achieve and how we want to continue our activities in the future. After a concise sketch of the life sciences landscape as it has evolved during the past seven decades or so, we explain how CSG came about and what kind of approach we have developed. Subsequently, we list our main results, notably in the form of project vignettes, so as to make the harvest of the CSG Next programme as tangible and concrete as possible. Finally, we explain how we see our role in the future. As is already indicated by the title: this is not merely a retrospective summary of our results (CSG harvest), but an invitation to readers (from academia, industry, policy and civil society) to reassemble and to optimally prepare ourselves for things to come, by strengthening and broadening our collaborative efforts, building on what we have achieved so far. (shrink)

Along with offering an historically-oriented interpretive reconstruction of the syntax of PM ( rst ed.), I argue for a certain understanding of its use of propositional function abstracts formed by placing a circum ex on a variable. I argue that this notation is used in PM only when de nitions are stated schematically in the metalanguage, and in argument-position when higher-type variables are involved. My aim throughout is to explain how the usage of function abstracts as “terms” (loosely speaking) is (...) not inconsistent with a philosophy of types that does not think of propositional functions as mind- and language-independent objects, and adopts a nominalist/substitutional semantics instead. I contrast PM’s approach here both to function abstraction found in the typed λ-calculus, and also to Frege’s notation for functions of various levels that forgoes abstracts altogether, between which it is a kind of intermediary. (shrink)

Frans de Waal (1948-2024) transformed our understanding of primate cognition and social behavior, shaping the perspectives of scientists, philosophers, and the general public through his groundbreaking research and engaging popular books.

En esta obra monumental de Jesper Lützen sobre la mecánica de Heinrich Hertz encontramos una magnífica exposición de la vida y obra de este insigne físico germano. Un interesante relato de las influencias intelectuales que modelaron su pensamiento científico, culmina con un exhaustivo análisis de la reformulación de la mecánica clásica que Hertz planteó poco antes de su prematuro fallecimiento.

Jesper Kallestrup has provided an insightful response to our paper, “Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge”. Kallestrup identifies some important issues pertaining to our non-summative, non-supervenient account of group knowledge which we did not address in our original paper. Here, we develop our view further in light of Kallestrup’s helpful reply.

Philosophical inquiries into morality are as old as philosophy, but it may turn out that morality itself is much, much older than that. At least, that is the main thesis of prima- tologist Frans De Waal, who in this short book based on his Tanner Lectures at Princeton, elaborates on what biologists have been hinting at since Darwin’s (1871) book The Descent of Man and Hamilton’s (1963) studies on the evolution of altruism: morality is yet another allegedly human characteristic (...) that turns out to be built over evolutionary time by natural. (shrink)

Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein and more recently by Searle to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human life but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the (...) Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). After summarizing the framework worked out by Wittgenstein and Searle, as extended by myself and by modern reasoning research, I comment on this first book in a trilogy on Human Nature by P.M.S. Hacker, the leading authority on Wittgenstein and one of the best modern philosophers. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

El estudio y análisis de las argumentaciones cotidianas entendidas como interacciones discursivas e intencionales encaminadas a dar cuenta de algo con el fin de lograr que aquello que se sostiene sea aceptado, sería inconcebible sin la aparición de la teoría de los actos de habla de Austin (1962), la propuesta de Searle (1969), el trabajo de Grice sobre la teoría de la conversación (1975) y el importante estudio sistemático de Hamblin sobre el argumento falaz (1970). Como una reelaboración de dichas (...) obras cabe entender la teoría pragmadialéctica de la argumentación propuesta inicialmente por Frans H. van Eemeren y Rob Grootendorst (1984). Algunos autores (Blair, 2006: 11; Woods, 1992) creen ver en ella, más que una teoría, una amalgama de varias teorías y una particular versión de la teoría pragmadialéctica de la argumentación, entendiendo ésta bajo una acepción más general. Otros consideran que ni es útil ni tampoco especulativamente productivo sostener que de toda argumentación pueda buscarse un modelo según el cual ésta buscaría resolver una diferencia de opinión (Goodwin, 1999). (shrink)

This essay examines the recent Planet of the Apes films through the lens of recent research in primatology. The films lend imaginary support to primatologist Frans de Waal’s evolutionary moral sentimentalism; however, the movies also show that truly moral motions outstrip the cognitive capacities of the great apes. The abstract moral principles employed by the ape community in the movie require the ability to understand and apply a common underlying explanation to perceptually disparate situations; in contrast, recent research in (...) comparative psychology demonstrates that the great apes lack this capacity. Since the capacity for abstraction is required on even the most basic version of moral sentimentalism—Shaun Nichols’ sentimental rules account—the lack of the capacity for abstraction reveals a qualitative distinction between primate social behavior and human morality. (shrink)

La oposición a una estricta separación entre las dimensiones dialéctica y retórica de la actividad argumentativa es una de las aportaciones más destacadas y peculiares de la denominada escuela holandesa sobre argumentación. Frans H. van Eemeren y Peter Houtlosser reaccionaron contra una separación estricta entre dialéctica y retórica en varios trabajos, pero uno de los más inspiradores es sin duda su artículo “William the Silent’s argumentative discourse” (1998) presentado en la ciudad de Ámsterdam con ocasión de la cuarta conferencia (...) organizada por la International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). Sobre este tema siguieron investigando para presentar un análisis de la perspectiva dialéctica inherente al caso de Guillermo I de Orange en un congreso de la Japan Debate Association en Tokio (van Eemeren y Houtlosser, 2000). (shrink)

Bu yazıda Fransız Devrimi'nin Eylül 1793’ten Temmuz 1794’e kadar süren Terör Dönemi ve devrimin önderlerinden Robespierre’in bu dönemdeki rolü incelenmektedir. Bu amaçla öncelikle Terör Dönemi’nde neler yaşandığından kısaca söz edilecek, sonrasında ise Robespierre kendini nasıl bu dönemin merkezinde bulduğu araştırılacaktır. Son olarak Robepierre’in terör tartışmalarında gündeme getirdiği “erdemli terör” kavramının ne anlama geldiği tartışılacaktır.

Psychological momentum (PM) is thought to be a force that influences judgment, emotion, and performance. Based on a review of the extant literature, we elucidate two distinct approaches that researchers have adopted in their study of PM: the input-centered approach and the output-centered approach. Consistent with the input-centered approach, we conceptualize PM as a process whereby temporal and contextual PM-like stimuli (i.e., perceptual velocity, perceptual mass, perceptual historicity, and perceptually interconnected timescales)—initially perceived as an impetus—are extrapolated to imagined future outcomes (...) through mental simulation. In turn, and consistent with the output-centered approach, we posit that mental simulation elicits experiential (e.g., perceptual, cognitive, emotional) and behavioral states that govern goal pursuit, and that the pursuit of goals further influences perceptions of self, environment, and action quality. In all, we suggest that PM is interdependently linked to perceptions and behaviors in the sense that PM both influences and is influenced by changes in self-perceptions, environmental perceptions, and behavior, and we conclude by linking the PM construct to recent work on prospection. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell was one of the best-known proponents of logicism: the theory that mathematics reduces to, or is an extension of, logic. Russell argued for this thesis in his 1903 The Principles of Mathematics and attempted to demonstrate it formally in Principia Mathematica (PM 1910–1913; with A. N. Whitehead). Russell later described his work as a further “regressive” step in understanding the foundations of mathematics made possible by the late 19th century “arithmetization” of mathematics and Frege’s logical definitions of arithmetical (...) concepts. The logical system of PM sought to improve on earlier attempts by solving the contradictions found in, e.g., Frege’s system, by employing a theory of types. In this article, I also consider and critically evaluate the most common objections to Russell’s logicism, including the claim that it is undermined by Gödel’s incompleteness results, and Putnam's charge of “if-thenism”. I suggest that if we are willing to accept a slightly revisionist account of what counts as a mathematical truth, these criticisms do not obviously refute Russell’s claim to have established that mathematical truths generally are a species of logical truth. (shrink)

I årtusenden har människan försökt definiera livet – hur levande djur och växter skiljer sig från död materia. Problemet är dock att livet är mångfacetterat, och varje regel har sitt undantag. Vi försöker möta kommande utmaningar med nya livsformer, genom att lyfta fram en ny definition av liv.

Prospective memory (PM) enables people to remember to complete important tasks in the future. Failing to do so can result in consequences of varying severity. Here, we investigated how PM error-consequence severity impacts the neural processing of relevant cues for triggering PM and the ramification of that processing on the associated prospective task performance. Participants role-played a cafeteria worker serving lunches to fictitious students and had to remember to deliver an alternative lunch to students (as PM cues) who would otherwise (...) experience a moderate or severe aversive reaction. Scalp-recorded, event-related potential (ERP) measures showed that the early-latency frontal positivity, reflecting the perception-based neural responses to previously learned stimuli, did not differ between the severe versus moderate PM cues. In contrast, the longer-latency parietal positivity, thought to reflect full PM cue recognition and post retrieval processes, was elicited earlier by the severe than the moderate PM cues. This faster instantiation of the parietal positivity to the severe-consequence PM cues was then followed by faster and more accurate behavioral responses. These findings indicate how the relative importance of a PM can be neurally instantiated in the form of enhanced and faster PM cue recognition and processing and culminate into better PM. (shrink)

Analytic philosophers have, since the pioneering work of B.K. Matilal, emphasized the contributions of Nyāya philosophers to what contemporary philosophy considers epistemology. More recently, scholarly work demonstrates the relevance of their ideas to argumentation theory, an interdisciplinary area of study drawing on epistemology as well as logic, rhetoric, and linguistics. This paper shows how early Nyāya theorizing about argumentation, from Vātsyāyana to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, can fruitfully be juxtaposed with the pragma-dialectic approach to argumentation pioneered by Frans van Eemeren. I (...) illustrate the implications of this analysis with a case study from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s satirical play, Much Ado about Religion (Āgamaḍambara). (shrink)

A new way to transpose the virtue epistemologist’s ‘knowledge = apt belief’ template to the collective level, as a thesis about group knowledge, is developed. In particular, it is shown how specifically judgmental belief can be realised at the collective level in a way that is structurally analogous, on a telic theory of epistemic normativity (e.g., Sosa 2020), to how it is realised at the individual level—viz., through a (collective) intentional attempt to get it right aptly (whether p) by alethically (...) affirming that p. An advantage of the proposal developed is that it is shown to be compatible with competing views—viz., joint acceptance accounts and social-distributive accounts—of how group members must interact in order to materially realise a group belief. I conclude by showing how the proposed judgment-focused collective (telic) virtue epistemology has important advantages over a rival version of collective virtue epistemology defended in recent work by Jesper Kallestrup (2016). (shrink)

Air pollution is a significant environmental concern that affects human health, ecosystems, and climate change. Effective monitoring and management of outdoor air quality are crucial for mitigating its adverse effects. This paper presents an advanced approach to outdoor pollution measurement utilizing Internet of Things (IoT) technology, combined with optimization techniques to enhance system efficiency and data accuracy. The proposed framework integrates a network of IoT sensors that continuously monitor various air pollutants, such as particulate matter (PM), carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur (...) dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen dioxide (NO₂), and ozone (O₃), across different geographic locations. The data collected by these sensors are transmitted to a centralized system where optimization algorithms, such as Genetic Algorithms (GA), Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO), and Simulated Annealing (SA), are applied to optimize sensor placement, data transmission, and processing efficiency. This ensures accurate, real-time pollution monitoring and data analysis, providing actionable insights for policymakers, environmental agencies, and the general public. (shrink)

The evidential value of moral intuitions has been challenged by psychological work showing that the intuitions of ordinary people are affected by distorting factors. One reply to this challenge, the expertise defence, claims that training in philosophical thinking confers enhanced reliability on the intuitions of professional philosophers. This defence is often expressed through analogy: since we do not allow doubts about folk judgments in domains like mathematics or physics to undermine the plausibility of judgments by experts in these domains, we (...) also should not do so in philosophy. In this paper I clarify the logic of the analogy strategy, and defend it against recent challenges by Jesper Ryberg. The discussion exposes an interesting divide: while Ryberg’s challenges may weaken analogies between morality and domains like mathematics, they do not affect analogies to other domains, such as physics. I conclude that the expertise defence can be supported by analogical means, though care is required in selecting an appropriate analog. I discuss implications of this conclusion for the expertise defence debate and for study of the moral domain itself. (shrink)

Helen Frowe (2014) depicts the following fictional case: Fran is being raped by Eric and can’t stop him with violent resistance. Nevertheless, she resists and breaks Eric’s wrist. The infliction of defensive harm on Eric is intuitively permissible, yet it runs counter to the dominant view that defensive harms must stand a reasonable chance of success. Call this the Success Condition (SC). To solve this problem, Daniel Statman (2008) contends that even if Victim’s defensive harms fail to prevent her rape, (...) they do prevent the destruction of another good, her honor, and thus SC is satisfied. Recently, Joseph Bowen (2016) has critiqued Statman’s proposal by showing that honor-based justifications for defensive harming are too permissive. In this paper, I contend that Statman’s proposal is too restrictive. First, I review Statman’s accounts of honor, dishonor, and non-honor. Second, I argue that Statman’s account requires Fran’s honor to be lost or damaged if she doesn’t resist—a highly offensive conclusion about rape victims. Third, I explain why the best alternative to this (i.e., allowing Fran’s honor to be maintained either way) satisfies SC but not the necessity condition. I conclude that we ought to reject Statman’s solution. (shrink)

In a series of papers, Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard argue that the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive success because of cognitive ability (robust virtue epistemology) is incompatible with the idea that whether or not an agent’s true belief amounts to knowledge can significantly depend upon factors beyond her cognitive agency (epistemic dependence). In particular, certain purely modal facts seem to preclude knowledge, while the contribution of other agents’ cognitive abilities seems to enable it. Kallestrup and Pritchard’s arguments are (...) targeted against views that hold that all it takes to manifest one’s cognitive agency is to properly exercise one’s belief-forming abilities. I offer an account of the notion of cognitive ability according to which our epistemic resources are not exhausted by abilities to produce true beliefs as outputs, but also include dispositions to stop belief-formation when actual or modal circumstances are not suitable for it (precautionary cognitive abilities). Knowledge, I argue, can be accordingly conceived as a cognitive success that is also due to the latter. The resulting version of robust virtue epistemology helps explain how purely modal facts as well as other agents’ cognitive abilities may have a bearing on the manifestation of one’s cognitive agency, which shows in turn that robust virtue epistemology and epistemic dependence are not incompatible after all. (shrink)

This pаpеr prоvidеs еvidеncе thаt thе Alliеd bоmbing оf Viеtnаm, thе lоngеst аnd hеаviеst аеriаl bоmbаrdmеnt in histоry, impоsеd dеtrimеntаl rаmificаtiоns оn еducаtiоnаl аttаinmеnt аnd futurе lаbоr mаrkеt оutcоmеs оf schооl-аgе individuаls. By еxplоiting thе plаusibly еxоgеnоus districtby-cоhоrt vаriаtiоn in bоmb dеstructiоn undеr а diffеrеncе-in-diffеrеncеs frаmеwоrk, wе find thаt аn incrеаsе in bоmb intеnsity lеаds tо significаntly fеwеr еducаtiоnаl yеаrs cоmplеtеd аnd lоwеr futurе еаrnings fоr schооl-аgе childrеn еxpоsеd tо thе bоmbаrdmеnt. Wе furthеr shоw thаt bоth thе supply-sidе fаctоrs (inаdеquаtе (...) schооl sеcurity аnd thе lаck оf tеаchеrs) аnd thе dеmаnd-sidе fаctоrs (rеsidеntiаl cаsuаltiеs, rеstrictеd аccеss tо hеаlthcаrе, dаmаgеd prоpеrtiеs, аnd incrеаsеd rеliаncе оn wеlfаrе аssistаncе) cоuld bе pоtеntiаl mеchаnisms driving thе lоng-tеrm cоnsеquеncеs оf аеriаl bоmbаrdmеnt. Our findings undеrlinе thе impоrtаncе оf cоnflict prеvеntiоn аnd pоst-cоnflict rеcоnstructiоn in prоmоting sustаinаblе dеvеlоpmеnt. (shrink)

In he Problems of Philosophy and other works of the same period, Russell claims that every proposition must contain at least one universal. Even fully general propositions of logic are claimed to contain “abstract logical universals”, and our knowledge of logical truths claimed to be a species of a priori knowledge of universals. However, these views are in considerable tension with Russell’s own philosophy of logic and mathematics as presented in Principia Mathematica. Universals generally are qualities and relations, but if, (...) for example, PM’s disjunction (∨) is a relation, what is it a relation between? There is no obvious answer to this given Russell’s other philosophical commitments at this time, although hints are left in some of the pre-PM manuscripts. In this paper, I explore this tension in Russell's philosophy and relate it to developments both before and after Problems. (shrink)

이 거대한 전문 용어가 가득한 (이 책은 정말 용어집을 필요로합니다!), 무겁게 학문적 인 작업이 교육의 세계에서 베스트 셀러가되었다는 것은 놀랍고 적합합니다. 하나는 전문 용어를 배우고 텍스트의 551 페이지와 노트의 238 페이지를 통해 쟁기 전념해야합니다. 그 동안에, 우리는 이것이 올 것의 단지 개요라고 몇 번이고 들었습니다! 그는 세 운동의 과잉을 심각하게 비판하지만, 이것은 매우 자유롭고 영적 관점에서 종교, 철학 및 행동 과학의 해체및 새로운 시대 신비주의와 포스트 모더니즘 해석이다- 즉, 최악의 데카곤없이, PM과 NAM 전문 용어, 맹렬한 평등주의와 반 과학적 반 지적. (...) 그는 철학, 심리학, 사회학 및 종교의 다양한 세계관을 자세히 분석하여 (주로) 보살핌과 광채로 치명적인 감소론적 결함을드러내지만, 그가 분석하는 대부분의 출처는 오늘날 거의 관련이 없습니다. 그들은 그가 20 년 전에 연구하고 쓸 때 이미 구식이었던 용어와 개념을 사용합니다. 하나는 하버마스, 칸트, 에머슨, 정 대한 전문 용어의 끝없는 페이지를 통해 슬로깅한다. 진주에 도착합니다. 당신은 나쁜 쓰기, 혼란스럽고 오래된 아이디어와 쓸모없는 전문 용어의 훌륭한 샘플링을 얻을. (shrink)

In 1992, Bengt Hägglund put forward a thesis according to which a codex in his possession is based on material Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646) authored in 1611, maintaining that the codex gives us information about Rudbeckius's lectures on _loci theologici_ in Uppsala during the years 1611–1613 and that it reveals to us characteristic features of Rudbeckius's thinking about dogmatics. Hägglund published the codex in 2001. I point out, first, weaknesses in Hägglund's argumentation. Second, I present indirect evidence against his thesis employing (...) the two series of Rudbeckius's published dissertations on dogmatics (1611–1613, 1620–1644) and his own comments about his lectures. Third, I indicate that three parts of the codex that are particularly important for Hägglund's argumentation stem from other authors: the introductory part on the nature of theo­logy, as well as the chapter on _locus de ecclesia_, have their origin in Jesper Brochmand's _Universae theologiae systema_ (1633), while the conclusion is taken from a dissertation that Balthasar Meisner published in 1614. The codex does not allow us to access a work Rudbeckius would have authored in 1611: it contains too many parts he cannot have authored then. In particular, the introduction and the conclusion of the codex do not tell us anything about Rudbeckius's characteristic thoughts on dogmatics. Hägglund's main reason for thinking that the codex is a transcript of Rudbeckius's work from 1611 is a date mentioned at the end of locus of the church. As it happens, this locus is borrowed from Brochmand, not from Rudbeckius. (shrink)

Con el fin de examinar los aspectos exclusivamente morales del suicidio asistido y la eutanasia activa voluntaria, el análisis debe ser llevado a cabo independientemente de la función social de los agentes involucrados, de la opinión de los familiares del paciente terminal y del público en general, y de las consecuencias legales de dichas acciones. En consecuencia, en el presente ensayo se analiza un imaginario caso neutral, aislado del contexto natural de la eutanasia y el suicidio asistido. Utilizando un principio (...) moral—llamado PMS en el ensayo—cuya aplicabilidad depende de la apreciación subjetiva que de él hagan la persona que desea morir y el agente que asiste en su muerte, en el ensayo se concluye que en ciertos casos es posible justificar la obligación moral de asistir en un suicidio o de llevar a cabo una eutanasia activa voluntaria. (shrink)

The present research examines psychological momentum (PM), a perceived force that lay intuition suggests influences performance. PM theory is proposed to account for how momentum perceptions arise, and four studies demonstrate the influence of lay intuitions about PM on expectations regarding performance outcomes. Study 1 establishes that individuals share intuitions about the types of events that precipitate PM, and Study 2 finds that defeating a rival increases momentum perception. Study 3 provides evidence for the lay belief that as more PM (...) accumulates during a prior task, there should be more residual momentum left to carry over to a subsequent task, and Study 4 finds that an individual whose PM is interrupted is expected to have greater difficulty completing a task than is an individual whose steady progress is interrupted. Discussion focuses on linkages between PM and related constructs. (shrink)

Microscopy allows us to observe objects we cannot see with our eyes alone. With a light microscope, we can distinguish objects at the scale of the wavelengths of visible light just under a micrometer. Around 1870 Ernst Abbe, who laid the foundation of modern optics, suggested that the resolution of a microscope would improve by using some yet-unknown radiation with shorter wavelengths than visible light, that is, below 390 nanometers (1 nm = 10−9 m). Electrons can have wavelengths near 1 (...) picometer (1 pm = 10−12 m) and should therefore allow atoms to be distinguished since they are typically at least a few hundred pm apart. In this oversimplified view, further decreasing the wavelength of the radiation should allow us to increase the resolution of electron microscopy even more. However, this can only be done by increasing the energy of the radiation, which would ultimately destroy the samples. Other factors also affect the resolution of electron microscopes, among them non-ideal imaging properties of electromagnetic lenses, which result in false images. It took more than half a century to understand and control these aberrations and separate objects less than 1 Ångstrom (1 Å = 10−10 m) apart. (shrink)

My account of the causal role of consciousness in a physical world is modeled on Dretske’s celebrated explanation of the causal role of beliefs (something that Dretske himself never offered). First, behavior must be understood as a (broadly individuated) process that begins with some external stimulus causing some neurological event C, and ends with causing a bodily movement M (e.g., the Kennedy assassination is a process that begins with Oswald pulling the trigger at 12:30pm CST on November 23 in 1963 (...) in Dallas, Texas, but only ends half an hour later when Kennedy is pronounced dead at 1 pm CST). The internal neurological event C causes bodily movement M, but only by virtue of being recruited by natural selection to represent the instantiation of some external property F when properly stimulated under normal circumstances. But the reason why C causes M lies in the fact that C represents the instantiation of the external property F. I withdraw my hand from a hot surface because the activation of nociceptive specific neurons in my parietal lobe (together with the activation of neuronal patterns in my motor cortices) was recruited by natural selection to represent the tissue damage in my hand. The activation of nociceptive specific neurons causes my hand to withdraw but for the reason that it represents tissue data at the time that I felt pain in my hand. (shrink)

A well known and referenced global result is the nilpotent characterisation of the finite p-groups. This un doubtedly transends into neutrosophy. Hence, this fact of the neutrosophic nilpotent p-groups is worth critical studying and comprehensive analysis. The nilpotent characterisation depicts that there exists a derived series (Lower Central) which must terminate at {ϵ} (an identity), after a finite number of steps. Now, Suppose that G(I) is a neutrosophic p-group of class at least m ≥ 3. We show in this paper (...) that Lm−1(G(I)) is abelian and hence G(I) possesses a characteristic abelian neutrosophic subgroup which is not supposed to be contained in Z(G(I)). Furthermore, If L3(G(I)) = 1 such that pm is the highest order of an element of G(I)/L2(G(I)) (where G(I) is any neutrosophic p-group) then no element of L2(G(I)) has an order higher than pm. (shrink)

These notes contain an annotated edition of the only four extant letters of Burchard de Volder to Philipp van Limborch. In the first letter De Volder provides Van Limborch with some information about the subscription to the Dordrecht Confession of Faith by professors. In the second letter De Volder comments upon Van Limborch’s De veritate religionis Christianae. This letter is interesting as it provides insights into De Volder’s views on religion and theology. The third letter served as a cover letter (...) for De Volder’s sending to Van Limborch a copy of the honestum testimonium on Jacobus Arminius that was requested by Arminius’s widow in 1611. In the fourth letter Volder comments upon the visit that Pieter Burman had paid him. The visit was an episode in the quarrel between Pieter Burman, his brother Frans Burman jr., and Van Limborch, caused by Van Limborch’s remark, in his Theologia Christiana, that Frans Burman sr. had used Spinoza’s words while treating the issue of divine omnipotence in his Synopsis theologiae. (shrink)

Kant was engaged in a lifelong struggle to achieve what he calls in the 1756 Physical Monadology (PM) a “marriage” of metaphysics and geometry (1:475). On one hand, this involved showing that metaphysics and geometry are complementary, despite the seemingly irreconcilable conflicts between these disciplines and between their respective advocates, the Leibnizian-Wolffians and the Newtonians. On the other hand, this involved defining the terms of their union, which meant among other things, articulating their respective roles in grounding Newtonian natural science. (...) In this paper, consider how Kant’s project of marrying metaphysics and geometry evolves from the pre-Critical to the Critical period and how key discussions in the Prolegomena are related to the lifelong marriage project. (shrink)