Vetter (2015) develops a localised theory of modality, based on potentialities of actual objects. Two factors play a key role in its appeal: its commitment to Hardcore Actualism, and to Naturalism. Vetter’s commitment to Naturalism is in part manifested in her adoption of Aristotelian universals. In this paper, we argue that a puzzle concerning the identity of unmanifested potentialities cannot be solved with an Aristotelian conception of properties. After introducing the puzzle, we examine Vetter’s attempt at amending the Aristotelian conception (...) in a way that avoids the puzzle, and conclude that this amended version is no longer to be considered naturalistic. Potentiality theory cannot be both actualist and naturalist. We then argue that, if naturalism is to be abandoned by the actualist, there are good reasons to adopt a Platonist conception of universals, for they offer a number of theoretical advantages and allow us to avoid some of the problems facing Vetter’s theory. (shrink)

Establishing Dispositionalism as a viable theory of modality requires the successful fulfilment of two tasks: showing that all modal truths can be derived from truths about actual powers, and offering a suitable metaphysics of powers. These two tasks are intertwined: difficulties in one can affect the chances of success in the other. In this paper, I generalise an objection to Dispositionalism by Jessica Leech and argue that the theory in its present form is ill-suited to account for de re truths (...) about merely possible entities. I argue that such difficulty is rooted in a problem in the metaphysics of powers. In particular, I contend that the well-known tension between two key principle of powers ontology, namely Directedness and Independence has received an unsatisfactory solution so far, and that it is this unsatisfactory solution concerning the status of “unmanifested manifestations” that makes it hard for Dispositionalism to account for mere possibilia. I develop a novel account of the status of unmanifested manifestations and an overall metaphysics of powers which allows to better respond to Leech's objection and handle mere possibilia. The central idea of the proposal is that unmanifested manifestations are akin to mere logical existents, and are best characterised as non-essentially non-located entities. (shrink)

This paper explores mutable futurism, the view according to which the future can literally change—that is, it can happen that a future time t changes from containing an event E to lacking it. Mutable futurism has received little attention so far, and the details and implications of the view are underexplored in the literature. For instance, it currently lacks a precise metaphysical model and a formal semantics. Although we do not endorse mutable futurism, our goal here is to strengthen the (...) case for mutable futurism and help establish it as a worthy contender in the debate on the philosophy of time. To attain this goal, we try to make mutable futurism, along with its metaphysical and inferential commitments, as clear as possible, by providing it with a coherent metaphysical model and a plausible semantics, and we show that it can be backed by theoretical reasons. (shrink)

While growing empirical evidence suggests a continuity between human and non-human psychology, many philosophers still think that only humans can act and form beliefs rationally. In this paper, we challenge this claim. We first clarify the notion of rationality. We then focus on the rationality of beliefs and argue that, in the relevant sense, humans are not the only rational animals. We do so by first distinguishing between unreflective and reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons in belief formation and revision. We (...) argue that unreflective responsiveness is clearly within the reach of many animals. We then defend that a key demonstration of reflective responsiveness would be the ability to respond to undermining defeaters. We end by presenting some empirical evidence that suggests that some animal species are capable of processing these defeaters, which would entail that even by the strictest standards, humans are not the only rational animals. (shrink)

We focus on Timothy Williamson’s recent attack on the epistemological significance of the a priori–a posteriori distinction, and offer an explanation of why, fundamentally, it does not succeed. We begin by setting out Williamson’s core argument, and some of the background to it and move to consider two lines of conciliatory response to it—conciliatory in that neither questions the central analogy on which Williamson's argument depends. We claim, setting aside a methodological challenge to which Williamson owes an answer, that no (...) satisfactory such reconciliation is in prospect. Rather, as we then argue, —and it is on this that we base our overall negative assessment of his argument—Williamson’s core analogy is flawed by an oversight. We conclude with some brief reflections on Williamson’s ideas about the imagination as a source of knowledge. Our principal conclusion is only that Williamson’s argument fails to perform as advertised. A constructive case for confidence, to the contrary, that the intuitive contrast between a priori and a posteriori reflects something of fundamental epistemological significance is prefigured in our final section, but will not be elaborated here. (shrink)

The concept of branching time is widely utilized to counter fatalistic arguments to the conclusion that whatever will happen is already unavoidable. The most common semantics for branching time, such as Ockhamism, Peirceanism, and Supervaluationism, offer a formal explanation for why fatalistic arguments are flawed. This paper explores a different type of argument, one that borders on fatalism and is concerned with what might possibly happen in the future. In the paper, I show how this type of argument poses a (...) new fatalistic threat to branching time. (shrink)

The fictional worlds of science fiction can stimulate philosophical speculation towards socio-technical scenarios and trends that are extrapolated from our physical reality. This widely accepted observation highlights but one of the ways to pursue philosophy with the aid of fiction and science fiction in particular. In this paper, we argue that fiction can in itself constitute a philosophical, academic work and need not merely represent the subject about which such work speculates. This idea questions the currently predominant, institutional paradigm which (...) identifies philosophical works with written texts and specifically with a single kind of text: the paper-format (§1). To suggest an alternative way of doing philosophy, we analyse the structure and content of the recent, experimental science fiction book, The Clouds, and propose that its hybrid textuality – which leverages at once fiction, theory, and meta-commentary – offers a possible corrective to the cognitive closure and rigidity of expression encouraged by the institutionally accepted approach to philosophical work (§ 2). (shrink)

In this paper I argue that even the most radical metaphysics of powers (such as that adopted by Mumford & Anjum, Cartwright, or Groff) are compatible with eternalism. I first offer a taxonomy of powers ontologies, and attempt to characterise the difference between moderate and radical powers ontologies – the latter are characterised by an emphasis on production and dynamicity. I consider an argument by C. Friebe to the effect that the productive character of powers is inconsistent with Eternalism and (...) find it wanting. I then elucidate the notion of dynamicity that radical powers theorists employ by making apparent their link with an ontology of irreducible processes. Finally, I respond to an argument by Donatella Donati to the effect that eternalism entails a reductive account of change which is inconsistent with process ontologies, and show that the the two are compatible. I conclude that we have no reason to think that radical powers metaphysics (and, a fortiori, every powers ontology) are not compatible with eternalism. (shrink)

Dispositionalism is the theory of modality according to which all (metaphysical and natural) modal truths are made true by some actual irreducibly dispositional property. The relationship between Dispositionalism and time is yet to be satisfactorily explored. In this paper we contribute to this task by examining how Dispositionalism deals with ‘dated truths’: propositions involving a specific time, e.g. “It might rain at 12.30”. We examine two possible accounts: the first, 'Dated Manifestations Strategy', is the idea that powers are very fine-grained, (...) and tend towards temporally very specific manifestations. We argue that such strategy should not be adopted, for it leads to unnecessary violations of ontological parsimony; it is unable to accommodate an ontology of platonic universals; and it is incapable of offering a principled explanation of the forward-looking nature of powers. We offer an alternative account, the "Duration Strategy", which relies on an independently determined arrow of time and the existence of some “duration facts” that specify how long a power takes to bring about its manifestation. We argue that the Duration Strategy is to be preferred. We then flesh out the account by exploring the connection between powers, duration facts, and processes. (shrink)

In this paper I address issues related to the problem of future contingents and the metaphysical doctrine of fatalism. Two classical responses to the problem of future contingents are the third truth value view and the all-false view. According to the former, future contingents take a third truth value which goes beyond truth and falsity. According to the latter, they are all false. I here illustrate and discuss two ways to respectively argue for those two views. Both ways are similar (...) in spirit and intimately connected with fatalism, in the sense that they engage with the doctrine of fatalism and accept a large part of a standard fatalistic machinery. (shrink)

This text provides an introduction to the topic of rational decision making as well as a brief overview of the most common biases in judgment and decision making. "Decision Making" is relatively short (300 pages) and richly illustrated with approximately 100 figures. It is suitable for both self-study and as the basis for an upper-division undergraduate course in judgment and decision making. The book is written to be accessible to anybody with minimum knowledge of mathematics (high-school level algebra and some (...) elementary notions of set theory and probability, which are reviewed in the book). At the end of each chapter there is a collection of exercises that are grouped according to that chapter’s sections. Complete and detailed answers for each exercise are given in the last section of each chapter. The book contains a total of 121 fully solved exercises. (shrink)

I extend the Higher-Order View of Undermining Defeat (HOVUD) defended in Melis (2014) to account for the defeat of propositional justification. In doing so, I clarify the important notion of higher-order commitment, and I make some considerations concerning the defeat of externalist epistemic warrants.

There is a tension between Dispositionalism––the view that all metaphysical modality is grounded in actual irreducible dispositional properties––and the possibility of time travel. This is due to the fact that Dispositionalism makes it much harder to solve a potentiality-based version of the grandfather paradox. We first present a potentiality-based version of the grandfather paradox, stating that the following theses are inconsistent: 1) time travel is possible, 2) powers fully ground modality, 3) self-defeating actions are impossible, 4) time-travellers retain their intrinsic (...) powers upon time-travelling, and 5) time-travellers are ordinary agents with basic intrinsic potentialities. We then consider a number of potential solutions, and find them wanting. We argue that the metaphysical impossibility of performing a self-defeating action acts as a necessary perfect mask––while time-travel lets us “slip” the potentiality under the mask, thus generating the contradiction. We conclude considering what are the options for the dispositionalist. (shrink)

This paper introduces a new kind of explanation that we describe as ‘purely theoretical’. We first present an example, E, of what we take to be a case of purely theoretical explanation. We then show that the explanation we have in mind does not fit neatly into any of the existing categories of explanation. We take this to give us prima facie motivation for thinking that purely theoretical explanation is a distinctive kind of explanation. We then argue that it can (...) earn its keep via application to two existing literatures: the literature on how we explain the truth of true negative existential propositions and the literature on how we explain the truth of true propositions about the past. We reply to some possible concerns regarding the introduction of purely theoretical explanations. We conclude that there is nothing obviously wrong with them and explore the ramifications for particular debates in metaphysics. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to defend the general tenet that time travelers cannot change the past within B-theoretical models of time, independently of how many temporal dimensions there are. Baron Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98, 129–147 offered a strong argument intended to reach this general conclusion. However, his argument does not cover a peculiar case, i.e. a B-theoretical one-dimensional model of time that allows for the presence of internal times. Loss Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96, 1–11 used the latter model (...) to argue that time travelers can change the past within such model. We show a way to debunk Loss’s argument, so that the general tenet about the impossibility of changing the past within B-theoretical models is maintained. (shrink)

This paper addresses a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics, i.e. superdeterminism. In short, superdeterminism i) takes the world to be fundamentally deterministic, ii) postulates hidden variables, and iii) contra Bell, saves locality at the cost of violating the principle of statistical independence. Superdeterminism currently enjoys little support in the physics and philosophy communities. Many take it to posit the ubiquitous occurrence of hard-to-digest conspiratorial and coincidental events; others object that violating the principle of statistical independence implies the death of the (...) scientific methodology. In this paper, we offer a defense to these and other objections. To counter the conspiracy objection, we draw upon the philosophical literature on time travel, and conclude that the picture of the world offered by the superdeterminist does not need to be particularly surprising or conspiratorial. We then move on to other recent objections, in particular those that focus on the methodology of science and the nature of the physical laws compatible with superdeterminism. A key ingredient of our arguments is that the principle of statistical independence may be violated in theory, but valid for practical purposes. Our overarching goal is to offer a defense of superdeterminism with respect to its main objections, so that it can earn its keep as a legitimate contender among the possible interpretations of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Branching time is a popular theory of time that is intended to account for the openness of the future. Generally, branching-time models the openness of the future by positing a multiplicity of concrete alternative futures mirroring all the possible ways the future could unfold. A distinction is drawn in the literature among branching-time theories: those that make use of moment-based structures and those that employ history-based ones. In this paper, I introduce and discuss a particular kind of openness relative to (...) the possibility that time ends (doomsday). I then show that whereas moment-based branching structures cannot represent this kind of openness, history-based structures can account for it. The conclusion is that history-based structures have an advantage over moment-based ones. (shrink)

This essay gives an account of epistemic deference for agents with imprecise credences. I look at the two main imprecise deference principles in the literature, known as Identity Reflection and Pointwise Reflection (Moss, 2021). I show that Pointwise Reflection is strictly weaker than Identity Reflection, and argue that, if you are certain you will update by conditionalisation, you should defer to your future self according to Identity Reflection. Then I give a more general justification for Pointwise and Identity Reflection from (...) the assumption that you defer to someone whenever you consider their doxastic state to be better than yours, in the sense of leading to better decision-making. (shrink)

One emerging issue in contemporary epistemology concerns the relation between animal knowledge, which can be had by agents unable to take a view on the epistemic status of their attitudes, and reflective knowledge, which is only available to agents capable of taking such a view. Philosophers who are open to animal knowledge often presume that while many of the beliefs of human adults are formed unreflectively and thus constitute mere animal knowledge, some of them—those which become subject of explicit scrutiny (...) or are the result of a deliberative effort—may attain the status of reflective knowledge. According to Sanford Goldberg and Jonathan Matheson (2020), however, it is impossible for reflective subjects to have mere animal knowledge. If correct, their view would have a number of repercussions, perhaps most notably the vindication of a dualism about knowledge, which would frustrate attempts to provide a unified account of knowledge-attributions to human adults, very young children, and non-human animals. I discuss Goldberg and Matheson’s proposal, outline some of the ways in which it is insightful, and argue that it is ultimately unsuccessful because it neglects the inherent temporal dimension of knowledge acquisition. While the article is pitched as a reply to Goldberg and Matheson, its primary aim is to highlight significant connections between the debates on the relation between animal and reflective knowledge, propositional and doxastic justification, and the theory of epistemic defeat. (shrink)

This paper generalises an argument for probabilism due to Lindley [9]. I extend the argument to a number of non-classical logical settings whose truth-values, seen here as ideal aims for belief, are in the set $\{0,1\}$, and where logical consequence $\models $ is given the “no-drop” characterization. First I will show that, in each of these settings, an agent’s credence can only avoid accuracy-domination if its canonical transform is a (possibly non-classical) probability function. In other words, if an agent values (...) accuracy as the fundamental epistemic virtue, it is a necessary requirement for rationality that her credence have some probabilistic structure. Then I show that for a certain class of reasonable measures of inaccuracy, having such a probabilistic structure is sufficient to avoid accuracy-domination in these non-classical settings. (shrink)

The article reassesses Schelling’s philosophy of art in the System of Transcendental Idealism, focusing on its practical philosophy and the concept of the artefact. Often unexplored, this perspective offers a new account of Schelling’s early aesthetics, linking aesthetic experience to historical becoming. The discussion begins with an analysis of Schelling’s theory of intentional action, followed by a reconstruction of his understanding of artefact. It argues that Schelling integrates both social and material dimensions into his concept of artefacts. The paper then (...) examines Schelling’s comparison between artefacts in general and works of art, asserting that aesthetic experience in the context of the System exemplifies ‘hermeneutic obstinacy’. This characteristic, typical of works of art, correlates with the open nature of historical reality. (shrink)

John McDowell articulated a radical criticism of normative inferentialism against Robert Brandom’s expressivist account of conceptual contents. One of his main concerns consists in vindicating a notion of intentionality that could not be reduced to the deontic relations that are established by discursive practitioners. Noticeably, large part of this discussion is focused on empirical knowledge and observational judgments. McDowell argues that there is no role for inference in the application of observational concepts, except the paradoxical one of justifying the content (...) of an observational judgment in terms of itself. This paper examines the semantical consequences of the analysis of the content of empirical judgments in terms of their inferential role. These, it is suggested, are distinct from the epistemological paradoxes that McDowell charges the inferentialist approach with. (shrink)

There is an ongoing debate in the philosophical literature whether the conditionals that are central to deliberation are subjunctive or indicative conditionals and, if the latter, what semantics of the indicative conditional is compatible with the role that conditionals play in deliberation. We propose a possible-world semantics where conditionals of the form “if I take action _a_ the outcome will be _x_” are interpreted as material conditionals. The proposed framework is illustrated with familiar examples and both qualitative and probabilistic beliefs (...) are considered. Issues such as common-cause cases and ‘Egan-style’ cases are discussed. (shrink)

Dispositionalism is the theory of modality that grounds all modal truths in powers: all metaphysically possible and necessary truths are to be explained by pointing to some actual power, or absence thereof. One of the main reasons to endorse dispositionalism is that it promises to deliver an especially desirable epistemology of modality. However, so far this issue has not be fully investigated with the care it is due. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. We will cast (...) some doubts on whether the dispositionalist really is in a better position to explain our modal knowledge. In fact, we argue that there is a tension between some core tenets of a powers metaphysics and the very features that make dispositionalism the ideal backdrop for a desirable epistemology of modality. We conclude that this leaves dispositionalists who want to deliver the promised epistemology with a hard, currently unfulfilled, task. (shrink)

The future is different from the past. What is past is fixed and set in stone. The future, on the other hand, is open insofar as it holds numerous possibilities. Branching-tree models of time account for this asymmetry by positing an ontological difference between the past and the future. Given a time t, a unique unified past lies behind t, whereas multiple alternative existing futures lie ahead of t. My goal in this paper is to show that there is an (...) incompatibility between the way branching-tree models account for the open future and the possibility of time travel. That is, I argue that once time travel enters the picture, branching time fails to model the openness of the future by means of alternative future branches. I show how this holds independently of whether branching-time models are cashed out in A-theoretic or B-theoretic terms. (shrink)

We consider a basic logic with two primitive uni-modal operators: one for certainty and the other for plausibility. The former is assumed to be a normal operator, while the latter is merely a classical operator. We then define belief, interpreted as “maximally plausible possibility”, in terms of these two notions: the agent believes \ if she cannot rule out \ ), she judges \ to be plausible and she does not judge \ to be plausible. We consider four interaction properties (...) between certainty and plausibility and study how these properties translate into properties of belief. We then prove that all the logics considered are minimal logics for the highlighted theorems. We also consider a number of possible interpretations of plausibility, identify the corresponding logics and show that some notions considered in the literature are special cases of our framework. (shrink)

This is a two-volume set that provides an introduction to non-cooperative Game Theory. Volume 1 covers the basic concepts, while Volume 2 is devoted to advanced topics. The book is richly illustrated with approximately 400 figures. It is suitable for both self-study and as the basis for an undergraduate course in game theory as well as a first-year graduate-level class. It is written to be accessible to anybody with high-school level knowledge of mathematics. At the end of each chapter there (...) is a collection of exercises accompanied by detailed answers. The book contains approximately 180 exercises. (shrink)

Edmund Burke, known for his full condemnation of the French Revolution, has ascribed to the French philosophes the making of that turn of mind which eventually created the conditions for the total subversion of France. This paper aims at investigating Burke’s interpretation of Rous- seau: in fact, him he considers to be the father of that disposition – which he calls vanity – that has inflamed the spirits of an entire population. «A silent revolution in the moral world preceded the (...) political, and prepared it», Burke writes. Hence, by delving into A Letter to a Member of the National Assembly (1791), known to be Burke’s most extensive critique of Rousseau’s thought, and by constantly referring to his broader intellectual production, this paper tackles the question on the charges Burke imputes to Rousseau in fermenting that very disposition of mind which prepared the ground for the Revolution. Not political doctrines, but examples derived from Rousseau’s very life and his proper pedagogic reflections, according to Burke, have had the great- est responsibility in shaping the revolutionary mind. (shrink)

AI-based technologies are increasingly pervasive in a number of contexts. Our affective and emotional life makes no exception. In this article, we analyze one way in which AI-based technologies can affect them. In particular, our investigation will focus on affective artificial agents, namely AI-powered software or robotic agents designed to interact with us in affectively salient ways. We build upon the existing literature on affective artifacts with the aim of providing an original analysis of affective artificial agents and their distinctive (...) features. We argue that, unlike comparatively low-tech affective artifacts, affective artificial agents display a specific form of agency, which prevents them from being perceived by their users as extensions of their selves. In addition to this, we claim that their functioning crucially depends on the simulation of human-like emotion-driven behavior and requires a distinctive form of transparency—we call it emotional transparency—that might give rise to ethical and normative tensions. (shrink)

Edmund Burke’s political philosophy is generally known as the theoretical foundation of Western conservatism. In his intellectual elaboration, society is an organic complex organized in many stratified social classes. But who has the right to lead the community towards the common good? Burke’s answer to that question is: the natural aristocracy. Being the society «a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society» – so writes Burke –, all creatures are «each in their appointed place». And the group destined (...) to lead the whole is represented by the natural aristocracy. However, this aristocracy shouldn’t be entirely confused with the big landowners and with the traditional nobility; rather, Burke’s vision is founded over a classical concept based on virtue and wisdom, and the natural aristocrats are described as «those who are virtute et honore majores». Hence, the aristocracy of birth and wealth is only a part of it — and every civil society will develop a natural aristocracy, or else fall into chaos and subversion. (shrink)

Deleuze said that he detested Hegelianism and dialectics: this paper claims that Deleuze is contra Hegel because he has and proposes a different philosophical system. Thus, I suggest that if we want to understand the reason of such a “disgust,” we need to focus the philosophical question that moves the entire Deleuzian system (§ 1). Then, I explain that if the ground-question of Hegel’s philosophy is “how is it possible that things are surpassed, that they go on?”, the Deleuzian one (...) is “how is it that there is always something new, that things come out?” (§ 2). Finally, I discuss how desire can be considered as a key-example for seeing how the perspectives of the two thinkers diverge (§ 3). (shrink)

Book review of Wasserman, R. (2017), Paradoxes of Time Travel, OUP.

The Mahdi is the eschatological figure of Islam who will rule over the world at the end of time after having rid humanity of evil. During the whole Islamic history, many rulers have claimed to be the long-awaited Mahdi, thus creating the conditions for political revolutions based on prophetic statements. The present paper will study this subject as it occurs in contemporary history, first outlining such messianic character in the light of Muhammad’s revelation, then finding the different meanings of Mahdist (...) claims (the man-oriented and the message-oriented inclinations, the Mahdi as a renewal and the Mahdi as an apocalyptic personality), finally studying different self-proclaimed Mahdis in recent history, in Africa as well as in the Middle East. The last paragraph will be dedicated to the messianic dispositions of the terroristic organization Islamic State which has deeply affected the political-revolutionary strategy adopted by the group. (shrink)

Nel contributo, partendo da una prospettiva teoretica, ci si prefigge di analizzare i rapporti fra la filosofia indiana di Śaṃkara (il massimo filosofo del Vedānta, vissuto nell’VIII sec. d. C.) e il pensiero di Bergson. Da un simile punto di vista diviene infatti possibile una riflessione critica e interpretativa sui testi dei due autori, utile a chiarire alcuni problemi ermeneutici del pensiero śaṃkariano. Reciprocamente, la conoscenza del pensiero di Śaṃkara permette di illuminare e chiarire aspetti problematici della filosofia bergsoniana, in (...) particolare il rapporto fra materia e memoria e l’autentico significato di élan vital. Il saggio utilizza il concetto di advaita (non-dualità) - uno degli elementi chiave della filosofia vedantica – verso un superamento del dualismo materia/spirito, così come è stato affrontato anche dal filosofo francese nel xx secolo. Per svolgere questa interpretazione si approfondiscono poi i concetti di coscienza nei due filosofi, e la nozione di brahman-ātman intesa come trascendentale “non kantiano”, nella logica di smarcamento dalla prospettiva kantiana che era l’obiettivo dichiarato fin dai primi sviluppi della filosofia bergsoniana, contenuti nell’opera del 1889, Saggio sui dati immediati della coscienza. (shrink)

La rivoluzione arginata è un'opera misteriosa. Si tratta della traduzione di un discorso parlamentare di Edmund Burke che, come recita il frontespizio, è stato «per la prima volta italianizzato». Da chi, però, non è dato saperlo. Pubblicato nel 1798, fin da subito l'opuscolo di appena 32 pagine è avvolto da un fitto mistero: il traduttore è anonimo, sicché è un enigma anche il motivo della stessa operazione editoriale. Si sa solo che il tipografo è Francesco Andreola e che la città (...) della stampa è Venezia. Altri dettagli sono oscuri e, presumibilmente, ormai perduti per sempre. Non è perduta però l'opera in sé, ancora rinvenibile in qualche biblioteca e qui per la prima volta digitalizzata. (shrink)

Nāgārjuna, vissuto in India attorno al primo secolo dopo Cristo, è certamente una delle figure più importanti del pensiero buddhista. In una delle sue opere principali, le ‘Strofe sulla via di mezzo ’, egli elabora in modo compiuto la nozione di ‘vuoto’, che diverrà uno dei concetti fondamentali di tutto il buddhismo successivo, dando vita alla ‘scuola del vuoto’, la quale avrà grande fortuna in Tibet, Cina e Giappone. Per vuoto non si intende certo il nulla, bensì l’inconsistenza rivelata dal (...) reale quando considerato alla luce della critica di Nāgārjuna. Tale critica si esplica innanzitutto sul piano del linguaggio, e possiede quindi una evidente dimensione pragmatica. Il ‘vuoto’ nāgārjuniano sarà allora non solo una non-ontologia, ma anche una non-predicazione, che ammetterà però il giudizio, e quindi la determinazione, solo ed esclusivamente dal punto di vista della prassi del dire. Al linguaggio non è richiesto di parlare dell’essere, bensì di testimoniare, attraverso la propria inconsistenza, dell’assoluta coincidenza di essere e non-essere. (shrink)

«The world is about to get rid of morality, becoming total organization that is total destruction. Progress tends to culminate in a catastrophe». This few words sum up the fears of the late Horkheimer, who is increasingly worried about the effects of the dialectic of enlightenment. The fatal outcome of such dialectic has led the world to the brink of annihilation. According to Horkheimer, the root of the dialectic of enlightenment is an instrumental reason tending to the dominion (the dominion (...) of man over nature and the dominion of man over man). With his theoretical production, Horkheimer has tried to prevent the disastrous effects of this instrumental reason, ending up framing the longing for the Totally Other. In our opinion, the Totally Other plays an anti-dialectic function over enlightenment, having the triple meaning of transcendence as other than immanence; of utopia as an other society than the present one; and of an other reason than the instrumental reason, as a promise of a thought that is not anymore allied to the dominion. A new interpretation of the Totally Other would free its critical power, and it would be a “negative” attempt (in the sense of negative theology) to prevent the catastrophe towards which we all are pushed by what Horkheimer calls the immanent logic of history. (shrink)

The thought of Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) helps to place Islamist terrorism within a certain tradition of warfare and political theory. In fact, this form of violence can be clarified by Schmitt’s theoretical endowment, as this brief paper attempts to do. The end of the legal framework of the jus publicum europaeum and the emergence of non-state actors have put into question centuries-old certainties. Schmitt’s theory could help to put order in political concepts today ideologically misused. And his opposition to any (...) universalistic tendencies questions not only Jihadi ideology but also Western anti-terroristic rhetoric, which is equally part of the ongoing global war of annihilation feared by Schmitt during his entire life. (shrink)

Revolutionary Gnosticism is a religious–philo- sophical category introduced in the academic debate by the philosopher Eric Voegelin (1901–1985). Starting from his important work, several philosophers and sociologists have adopted Gnosticism as a useful explanatory notion to frame and define numerous modern and contemporary political and cultural movements. The immanentization of the eschaton, which is a renowned Voegelian expression, intimately defines the politico–cultural project of revolutionary Gnosticism. The destruction of the past for the creation of a new world, the last aeon, (...) demarcates the vision of history of revolutionary Gnosticism. Hence, according to a similar Weltanschauung, man replaces God, giving birth to «the idea of a transfiguration of mankind through a process of auto–redemption (grace replaced by revolution)» (Augusto Del Noce). The paper aims to investigate in broad terms the vast time span in which the concept of rev- olutionary Gnosticism has taken shape, from ancient Gnosis to Late Middle Ages, through seventeenth century Puritanism and Jacobinism, until twentieth–century totalitarianisms, eventually suggesting further lines of research. The present study intends to suggest a new interpretation for politico–revolutionary phenomena that have emerged in the whole West and in all epochs, with the purpose of finding a recurrent pattern that reflects one of the most disruptive intellectual engine for radical politics. (shrink)

In "Tre memoriali sulla questione francese" Edmund Burke prosegue la sua polemica con la Rivoluzione francese. I tre memoriali, datati rispettivamente 1791, 1792 e 1793 ma resi pubblici postumi nel 1797, rappresentano un’energica esortazione di Burke rivolta al governo inglese per contrastare l’immobilismo del primo ministro William Pitt il Giovane ed entrare così in guerra contro la Francia rivoluzionaria. Nel primo memoriale è contenuta la celebre espressione «It is a Revolution of doctrine and theoretick dogma». Due gli argomenti principali degli (...) scritti: la natura filosofica dell’esperienza rivoluzionaria e il nefasto ruolo geopolitico della Francia per il continente europeo. -/- Introduzione, traduzione e note a cura di Giacomo Maria Arrigo. (shrink)

La riflessione filosofica di Eric Voegelin sembra possedere una certa forza teorica per far fronte speculativamente alla metanarrazione islamista, specialmente nella versione del salafismo-jihadismo di marca qaedista e pseudo-califfale. Il concetto di religione politica sviluppato da Voegelin nella giovinezza, già applicato all’islamismo da diversi pensatori, risulta però inadeguato, essendo stato peraltro rigettato dallo stesso Voegelin per la sua vaghezza. Pertanto, seguendo l’itinerario voegeliano abbiamo recuperato le tre componenti che vivificano la nozione (rivisitata) di religione politica – la componente metastatica, apocalittica (...) e gnostica –, concetti sviluppati da un Voegelin ormai maturo, e li abbiamo applicati al salafismo- jihadismo, ottenendo come risultato quello di rendere maggiormente intelligibile il fenomeno islamista. L’Islam politico appare alfine come una religione politica a tutti gli effetti, ovverosia una degenerazione secolarizzata della fede tradizionale che confida nella violenza per mutare magicamente la natura del reale. (shrink)

«L’opera del filosofo Schopenhauer non è superata». Con queste parole Max Horkheimer definisce il suo rapporto con il pensiero del filosofo di Danzica. Accanto alla componente marxista, infatti, in Horkheimer confluiscono curiosamente le suggestioni metafisiche del Mondo come volontà e rappresentazione. Il risultato è un pensiero singolare e parecchio attuale, scaturito da alleanze impossibili e armonie inedite, il cui risultato è un mosaico di indicazioni politiche e impressioni metafisiche.

The present article seeks to study in detail the ideology of Salafism-Jihadism, presenting a synthesis of the system of thought that lies behind the militants of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, listing its main characteristics and framing it in terms of a modern experience. The account of valuable academic scholars such as Quintan Wiktorowicz, Roel Meijer, Thomas Hegghammer and Shiraz Maher will be taken into consideration. As the paper shows, the effort to isolate a pure Salafi-Jihadi ideological core is a (...) nev- er-ending work, especially because of the complex and multifaceted jihadi galaxy and the struggle for power and leadership between the various militant groups, among all al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Nevertheless, the identity of Salafi-Jihadism as a revolution- ary soteriology is the starting point for any further research: in fact, revolution and salvation combine together in this explosive ideological construction that should be challenged not solely by military actions but also, and even more, by intellectual and cultural disputes. (shrink)

“Dalla filosofia dell’azione alla filosofia della mente” è stato il percorso di alcuni filosofi di nazionalità varia degli anni 1980 – come Paul Churchland negli Stati Uniti o Ansgar Beckermann in Germania – che prima si sono interessati agli aspetti più teorici nella filosofia dell’azione, come il modo di funzionamento delle azioni e la loro spiegazione scientifica, e che poi, con l’arrivo e la diffusione dei personal computers e delle scienze cognitive, hanno ampliato e approfondito questo interesse di ricerca e (...) si sono dedicati alla filosofia della mente più in generale e in particolare alla spiegazione scientifica e filosofica del mentale. Sandro Nannini faceva parte di questo movimento ed è stato uno tra gli inizialmente pochi filosofi italiani che si sono occupati di questi argomenti; successivamente ne è diventato uno dei maggiori specialisti in Italia, proponendo una sua particolare versione di naturalizzazione del mentale. Subordinata agli interessi teorici è stata la sua iniziativa accademica di fondare e promuovere il primo dottorato italiano di ricerca in Scienze Cognitive. Il presente volume tratta dell’opera di Sandro Nannini in contributi che sono riflessioni più o meno specifiche sulle differenti tappe del suo percorso, affrontando temi come l’analisi dell'azione, il libero arbitrio, la discussione di Nannini di vari classici della filosofia, la tendenza del naturalismo a dissolvere la filosofia in un enciclopedismo empirico e la sfida dei qualia e della fenomenologia all’approccio naturalistico alla mente. Il volume contiene inoltre un saggio dello stesso Sandro Nannini, nel quale espone l’ultimo sviluppo della sua filosofia della mente nonché le risposte agli interventi degli altri autori: Mario De Caro, Sara Dellantonio, Rosaria Egidi, Roberta Lanfredini, Christoph Lumer, Paolo Parrini, Pietro Perconti, Claudio Pizzi, Emanuela Scribano e Giuseppe Varnier. (shrink)

Edmund Burke grounds politics and the state over the pre-political network of moral relations, starting from the family, evolving, through the village, the parish and the town, up to the class and corporation, finally arriving to the nation. These subordinate affections can be geometrically imagined as expanding circles of belonging and, though strictly linked to the state, they are not reducible to it, nor can the state replace them. In Burke’s vision, the state of civil society is humankind’s state of (...) nature, for the reason that man is always, and since ever, a member of a community: we are from somewhere, Burke seems to suggest. Thus, politics is grounded in morality, and morality, in turn, is based on God’s will, which within history takes the form of natural law. The French Revolution, on the contrary, has broken the spontaneity of interactions between individuals and intermediate groups, eventually establishing the Terror. (shrink)

Edmund Burke grounds politics and the state over the pre-political network of moral relations, starting from the family, evolving, through the village, the parish and the town, up to the class and corporation, finally arriving to the nation. These subordinate affections can be geometrically imagined as expanding circles of belonging and, though strictly linked to the state, they are not reducible to it, nor can the state replace them. In Burke’s vision, the state of civil society is humankind’s state of (...) nature, for the reason that man is always, and since ever, a member of a community: we are from somewhere, Burke seems to suggest. Thus, politics is grounded in morality, and morality, in turn, is based on God’s will, which within history takes the form of natural law. The French Revolution, on the contrary, has broken the spontaneity of interactions between individuals and intermediate groups, eventually establishing the Terror. (shrink)

This book explores the radical Islamist mindset by adopting the philosophical category of revolutionary Gnosticism. Already used for the study of other revolutionary phenomena such as Nazism, Bolshevism and Jacobinism, never before has this notion been adopted in relation to Salafi -Jihadism, the latest existing revolutionary ideology. The consistency of Salafi -Jihadism with revolutionary Gnosticism reveals a conception of the world that stands in the forgetfulness of a pure transcendent dimension, notwithstanding the apparent spiritual framework and religious justifications that jihadists (...) provide. Through the examination of Islamist sermons and texts in light of a distinct philosophical tradition, this book investigates the activist redemptive effort of Salafi -Jihadism, which leaves God without a clear possibility of intervening in human affairs. (shrink)