There was a time when 'logic' just meant classical logic. The climate is slowly changing and non-classical logic cannot be dismissed off-hand. However, a metatheory used to study the properties of non-classical logic is often classical. In this paper, we will argue that this practice of relying on classical metatheories is problematic. In particular, we will show that it is a bad practice because the metatheory that is used to study a non-classical logic often rules out the very logic it (...) is designed to study. (shrink)

What does it mean for the laws of logic to fail? My task in this paper is to answer this question. I use the resources that Routley/Sylvan developed with his collaborators for the semantics of relevant logics to explain a world where the laws of logic fail. I claim that the non-normal worlds that Routley/Sylvan introduced are exactly such worlds. To disambiguate different kinds of impossible worlds, I call such worlds logically impossible worlds. At a logically impossible world, the laws (...) of logic fail. In this paper, I provide a definition of logically impossible worlds. I then show that there is nothing strange about admitting such worlds. (shrink)

The problem of how to accommodate inconsistencies has attracted quite a number of researchers, in particular, in the area of database theory. The problem is also of concern in the study of belief change. For inconsistent beliefs are ubiquitous. However, comparatively little work has been devoted to discussing the problem in the literature of belief change. In this paper, I examine how adequate the AGM theory is as a logical framework for belief change involving inconsistencies. The technique is to apply (...) to Grove’s sphere system, a semantical representation of the AGM theory, logics that do not infer everything from contradictory premises, viz., paraconsistent logics. I use three paraconsistent logics and discuss three sphere systems that are based on them. I then examine the completeness of the postulates of the AGM theory with respect to the systems. At the end, I discuss some philosophical implications of the examination. (shrink)

In his book review of Graham Priest's The Fifth Corner of Four, Mark Siderits, while criticising Priest's philology, suggests that Priest's work is 'of considerable interest' for two reasons. First, 'when two independent traditions use similar methods to work on similar issues, it is always possible that one may have hit on approaches that the other missed'. Second, 'the decentering that can be induced by looking at another tradition may trigger fresh insights, even if those insights are not ones that (...) were actually developed by the tradition marked 'other''. The main task of this paper is to unpack Siderits' thought. By analysing some of Priest's work, I will suggest a decentering that must have taken place in China when Buddhism was 'exported to China in Buddhist shipping containers'. For anyone familiar with the forms of Buddhist philosophy developed in India, various forms of Chinese Buddhism can often look strange. Some ideas that were debated and defended by Indian Buddhists do not appear anywhere in Chinese Buddhism and some assumptions have been quietly added to Buddhism by Chinese Buddhists. By showing that Priest's work brings out the 'innovation' that Chinese Buddhists gave to Buddhism, I will suggest that it is this decentering that Siderits suggests Priest makes use of. (shrink)

Logic in Buddhist Philosophy concerns the systematic study of anumāna (often translated as inference) as developed by Dignāga (480-540 c.e.) and Dharmakīti (600-660 c.e.). Buddhist logicians think of inference as an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) and, thus, logic is considered to constitute part of epistemology in the Buddhist tradition. According to the prevalent 20th and early 21st century ‘Western’ conception of logic, however, logical study is the formal study of arguments. If we understand the nature of logic to be formal, (...) it is difficult to see what bearing logic has on knowledge. In this paper, by weaving together the main threads of thought that are salient in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīti’s texts, I shall re-conceive the nature of logic in the context of epistemology and demarcate the logical part of epistemology which can be recognised as logic. I shall demonstrate that we can recognise the logical significance of inference as understood by Buddhist logicians despite the fact that its logical significance lies within the context of knowledge. (shrink)

Max Cresswell and Hilary Putnam seem to hold the view, often shared by classical logicians, that paraconsistent logic has not been made sense of, despite its well-developed mathematics. In this paper, I examine the nature of logic in order to understand what it means to make sense of logic. I then show that, just as one can make sense of non-normal modal logics (as Cresswell demonstrates), we can make `sense' of paraconsistent logic. Finally, I turn the tables on classical logicians (...) and ask what sense can be made of explosive reasoning. While I acknowledge a bias on this issue, it is not clear that even classical logicians can answer this question. (shrink)

Buddhist philosophers have developed a rich tradition of logic. Buddhist material on logic that forms the Buddhist tradition of logic, however, is hardly discussed or even known. This article presents some of that material in a manner that is accessible to contemporary logicians and philosophers of logic and sets agendas for global philosophy of logic.

Priest holds anti-exceptionalism about logic. That is, he holds that logic, as a theory, does not have any exceptional status in relation to the theories of empirical sciences. Crucial to Priest’s anti-exceptionalism is the existence of ‘data’ that can force the revision of logical theory. He claims that classical logic is inadequate to the available data and, thus, needs to be revised. But what kind of data can overturn classical logic? Priest claims that the data is our intuitions about the (...) validity of inferences. In order to make sense of this claim, I will appeal to the Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher Candrakīrti. I will then pose a problem for Priest’s anti-exceptionalism. Finally, I will suggest a way out of the problem for Priest. Whether or not he accepts my solution, I will let him decide. (shrink)

Some philosophers of mind, cognitive scientists, phenomenologists as well as Buddhist philosophers have claimed that an awareness of an object is not just an experience of that object but also involves self-awareness. It is sometimes argued that being aware of an object without being aware of oneself is pathological. As anyone who has been involved in martial arts, as well as any sports requiring quick responses such as cricket and tennis, can testify, however, awareness of the self at the time (...) of acting becomes problematic: you would not be able to respond to the slight movement of your opponent if you were aware of yourself responding to it. This suggests that it must be possible for us to be aware without being aware of ourselves. The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of self-awareness and its relation to the self by investigating the phenomenology of the martial artist who is ‘in the act’. I shall argue that we can make sense of self-awareness without invoking awareness of oneself. (shrink)

Buddhist philosophers have investigated the techniques and methodologies of debate and argumentation which are important aspects of Buddhist intellectual life. This was particularly the case in India, where Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy originated. But these investigations have also engaged philosophers in China, Japan, Korea and Tibet, and many other parts of the world that have been influenced by Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy. Several elements of the Buddhist tradition of philosophy are thought to be part of this investigation. -/- There are (...) interesting reasoning patterns discernible in the writings of Buddhist philosophers. For instance, the Mādhyamika philosopher Nāgārjuna presents arguments for the emptiness of all things in terms of catuṣkoṭi (four ‘corners’: roughly speaking, truth, false, both, neither). There are also the Indian vāda (debate) literature and Tibetan bsdus grwa (collected topics) that list techniques of debates. -/- The main interest here is the tradition of Buddhist philosophy, sometimes referred to as Pramāṇavāda, whose central figures are Dignāga (approx. 480–540 CE) and Dharmakīrti (6th– 7th CE). This philosophy is understood to be the Buddhist school of logic-epistemology. ‘Pramāṇavāda’ is not a doxographical term traditionally used to refer to a recognised school of Buddhist philosophy. It is a conventional term that is sometimes used in modern literature. Nevertheless, in what follows, we think of it as a tradition within Buddhist philosophy and ‘Buddhist logic’ refers to what is developed in this tradition. -/- Buddhist logicians have systematically analysed the kind of reasoning involved in acquiring knowledge. They hold that there are valid ways to reason that are productive of knowledge. In what follows, some of the main elements of their analyses will be described. Note, however, that, while exegetical studies of Buddhist texts are important, we must step back from them and consider what is involved in taking a Buddhist approach to logic in light of modern formal logic. This analysis will be done against the backdrop of the contemporary literature on logic and related subjects in contemporary philosophy to make sense of the logical studies by Buddhist logicians. (shrink)

Nearly a decade has past since Grove gave a semantics for the AGM postulates. The semantics, called sphere semantics, provided a new perspective of the area of study, and has been widely used in the context of theory or belief change. However, the soundness proof that Grove gives in his paper contains an error. In this note, we will point this out and give two ways of repairing it.

At the end of his review of The Fifth Corner of Four: An Essay on Buddhist Metaphysics and the Catuṣkoṭi by Graham Priest, Mark Siderits (2019) remarks.

How can Buddhists prove that non-existent things do not exist? With great difficulty. For the Buddhist, this is not a laughing matter as they are largely global error theorists and, thus, many things are non-existent. The difficulty gets compounded as the Buddhist and their opponent, the non-Buddhist of various kinds, both agree that one cannot prove a thesis whose subject is non-existent. In this paper, I will first present a difficulty that Buddhist philosophers have faced in proving that what they (...) take to be non-existent does not exist. I will then survey two main solutions that they have provided. Those 'solutions' may not solve the problem or solve the problem but creates other problems. I will not survey the Buddhist treatment of the problem of proving about non-existence in order to present a new solution that we have yet to see. Instead, I will articulate a problem about non-existence that is unique to Buddhist philosophers. I will do so in order to present an interesting puzzle about non-existence that has largely escaped attention in the 'Western' literature. (shrink)

Book Review of Impossible Worlds, by Francesco Berto and Mark Jago. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

In 1A:7 of the Mengzi, Mengzi tries to convince King Xuan of Qi that he is a “true” king. As a reading of Mengzi’s reasoning involved in his attempt at persuasion, David Nivison advances an inferential view, according to which Mengzi’s persuasion involves inferences. In this paper, I consider the assumptions underlying the objections raised against Nivison’s inferential view. I argue that these objections assume a contemporary Western view about the nature of logic and inferences. I propose an alternative characterisation (...) of the relevant sense of inference that, I believe, is more sensitive to the classical Chinese philosophical context and argue that certain insights can be derived from reading Mengzi in light of this alternative characterization of inferences. (shrink)

A logic is called 'paraconsistent' if it rejects the rule called 'ex contradictione quodlibet', according to which any conclusion follows from inconsistent premises. While logicians have proposed many technically developed paraconsistent logical systems and contemporary philosophers like Graham Priest have advanced the view that some contradictions can be true, and advocated a paraconsistent logic to deal with them, until recent times these systems have been little understood by philosophers. This book presents a comprehensive overview on paraconsistent logical systems to change (...) this situation. The book includes almost every major author currently working in the field. The papers are on the cutting edge of the literature some of which discuss current debates and others present important new ideas. The editors have avoided papers about technical details of paraconsistent logic, but instead concentrated upon works that discuss more 'big picture' ideas. Different treatments of paradoxes takes centre stage in many of the papers, but also there are several papers on how to interpret paraconistent logic and some on how it can be applied to philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of language, and metaphysics. (shrink)

In one of his key texts, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nāgārjuna famously sets out to refute the ontology of essence.1 He presents numerous arguments to show that things don’t exist essentially—that is, that things are empty of essence or inherent existence. The doctrine of emptiness has been variously understood by traditional and contemporary commentators. Most radical is the recent interpretation presented by Garfield and Priest. They have rationally reconstructed Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness as an endorsement of the contradictory nature of reality. According (...) to them, Nāgārjuna can be seen to be arguing that the way in which things exist in reality and what we can truly say about them must be... (shrink)

In one of his influential works ‘One the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, Donald Davidson argues against conceptual relativism. According to Davidson, ‘we could not be in a position to judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically different from our own’. Davidson’s thesis seems to have a consequence for comparative philosophy, particularly in a comparative study between Chinese and Western traditions of philosophy which are often considered to differ conceptually. If Davidson is correct, it is not clear whether (...) or not we can have insight into how and why concepts differ between these traditions. -/- In this paper, I philosophically reflect on Davidson’s argument against conceptual relativism. Though this paper retains the backbone of his argument, I reject Davidson’s thesis that different ways of conceptualisation cannot be compared. I do this through a discussion of the comparative studies conducted by David Hall and Roger Ames. In conclusion, I self-reflectively examine the nature of the demarcation between different traditions of philosophy and show how the activities of comparative philosophy can proceed. (shrink)

Narrative views of the self argue that we constitute our self in self-narratives. Embodied views hold that our self is shaped through embodied experiences. In that case, what is the relation between embodiment and narrativity in the process of self-constitution? The question demands a clear definition of embodiment, but existing studies remains unclear on this point (section 2). We offer a correction to this situation by drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the body that highlights its habituality. On this account, the (...) body has an inherent tendency to cultivate an organization of habits through its history of engagement with the world (section 3). Next, we explore its role in narrative self-constitution by distinguishing between two aspects of the narrative self, the narrated I and the narrating I (section 4). We argue on phenomenological grounds that self-narratives are informed by bodily perspectives in both respects. Furthermore, a focus on the habituality of the body allows for a better explanation of self-constitution than those based on implicit self-narratives (section 5). For these phenomenological and theoretical reasons, we conclude that narrative self-constitution is an embodied and embedded practice (section 6). (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that a distinction ought to be drawn between two ways in which a given world might be logically impossible. First, a world w might be impossible because the laws that hold at w are different from those that hold at some other world (say the actual world). Second, a world w might be impossible because the laws of logic that hold in some world (say the actual world) are violated at w. We develop a novel (...) way of modelling logical possibility that makes room for both kinds of logical impossibility. Doing so has interesting implications for the relationship between logical possibility and other kinds of possibility (for example, metaphysical possibility) and implications for the necessity or contingency of the laws of logic. (shrink)

It has been an open question whether or not we can define a belief revision operation that is distinct from simple belief expansion using paraconsistent logic. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of meeting the challenge of defining a belief revision operation using the resources made available by the study of dynamic epistemic logic in the presence of paraconsistent logic. We will show that it is possible to define dynamic operations of belief revision in a paraconsistent setting.

Dharmakīrti argues that there is no pramāṇa (valid means of cognition or source of knowledge) for a thesis that is a self-contradiction (svavacanavirodha). That is, self-contradictions such as ‘everything said is false’ and ‘my mother is barren’ cannot be known to be true or false. The contemporary scholar Tillemans challenges Dharmakīrti by arguing that we can know that self-contradictions are false by means of a formal logical inference. The aims of the paper are to answer Tillemans’ challenge from what we (...) take to be Dharmakīrti’s or Dharmakīrtian (someone who is like Dharmakīrti) perspective and to demonstrate the unique features of Dharmakīrti’s view of inference. By so doing, we show that the epistemology in relation to the formal conception of logic that underlies Tillemans’ challenge is problematic from Dharmakīrti’s or Dharmakīrtian perspective. The paper, thus, presents Dharmakīrti’s view of inference and logical reasoning as well as a Dharmakīrtian challenge to the formal conception of logic that is the dominant contemporary conception. (shrink)

Kenzo saw a slight movement of his opponent. “Now is the time to strike!” he thought. He started moving. But before he had time to raise his shinai (sword) he was struck on the men (head) by his opponent. “Ippon!” the judge called.

This study explores the Burberry apparel brand’s position and its strategic behaviour seeking new customers in the new market. This exploratory research pays particular attention to business potential and opportunities in an emerging market, Vietnam. To evaluate Burberry’s strategies and the potential, the collaborative network relationships are discussed in details, that is followed by the discussion of the key themes for Burberry to consider in the Vietnamese market, where Burberry has recently begun expanding its businesses. The outcome of the study (...) suggests that the Western luxury brand apparel needs to understand the targeted markets’ systems and consumer behaviour, from there it is inevitable to design strategic plan how to engage the stakeholders in the ubiquitous supply chain relationships. In the end, a conceptual model with network perspectives is proposed: The model will be an analytical framework with key agenda items for the luxury brand which aims to enter the new market, and also the research limitations and further research opportunities are discussed. (shrink)

Metacontrast is a visual illusion in which the visibility of a target stimulus is virtually lost when immediately followed by a nonoverlapping mask stimulus. For a colored target, metacontrast is color-selective, with target visibility markedly reduced when the mask and target are the same color, but only slightly reduced when the colors differ. This study investigated neural correlates of color-selective metacontrast for cone-opponent red and green stimuli in the human V1, V2, and V3 using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Neural activity (...) was suppressed when the target was rendered less visible by the same-colored mask, and the suppression was localized in the cortical region retinotopically representing the target, correlating with the perceptual topography of visibility/invisibility rather than the physical topography of the stimulus. Retinotopy-based group analysis found that activity suppression was statistically significant for V2 and V3 and that its localization to the target region was statistically significant for V2. These results suggest that retinotopic color representations in early visual areas, especially in V2, are closely linked to the visibility of color. (shrink)

A 2012 review article for Metascience which explains Mach's realistic brand of empiricism, contrasting it with the common phenomenalist reading of Mach by John Blackmore in two recent books.

In his project of going beyond the “modern worldview,” Hiromatsu Wataru attached great importance to Ernst Mach’s philosophical thought and Einstein’s theory of relativity as challenging the premises of modern philosophy, which he characterized as substantialist and bound by the subject / object schema. This paper surveys Hiromatsu’s analysis of Mach’s phenomenalist element-monism, specifically his critique of Mach’s insufficient break with modern philosophy; his inquiry into Einstein’s relativity theory with a focus on its intersubjective cognitive structure; and the way he (...) extends his views on these themes to a general ontological-epistemological theory of the “fourfold structure.” Finally, it examines questions about Hiromatsu’s arguments regarding the tension between the dimensions of synchronic structure and structuring movement. An earlier version of this paper can be found as “Philosophers” in John T. Blackmore, Itagaki Ryōichi, and Tanaka Setsuko, eds., Ernst Mach’s Influence Spreads, 425–76. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of sight perception from both cognitive and aesthetic perspectives, by examining the limits of visual attention. It discusses how conscious and unconscious mechanisms can influence what individuals see and may experience aesthetically. It also presents empirical research employing eye-tracking to analyze the visual behavior of visitors of an art exhibition viewing a painting of Japanese artist Isson Tanaka (1908-1977). The study demonstrates that indiscernible aspects of vision interact on the limits of perception, which gives (...) birth to new images. Specifically, the eye-tracking records and uncovers the invisible traces of people's eyes as they are observing the painting, providing opportunities for visual poetics based on sensory input and eye movements. Overall, this interdisciplinary approach contributes to a more thorough understanding of the complexities of visual perception in the arts. (shrink)