In this introduction to The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism special issue on the aesthetics of creative activism, we canvas influential scholarship of political aesthetics to sculpt a broad typology of six interconnected mechanisms by which art might intervene in the world. We label these: Documentation, Disruption, Recognition, Participation, Imagination, and Beauty. Each has a compelling tradition of theory and application, augmented, extended, and sometimes challenged by the thirteen fresh and provocative contributions in the special issue. Yet, we ask, (...) if both politically minded artists and culturally minded activists are convinced of the power of art to provoke social change, and if we live a world that by almost all measures is now saturated with politically inclined, aesthetically informed practices, interfaces, objects, and texts, why does art not seem to be making a difference? Clearly, we need to think harder about the relationships between art and action, a task the articles assembled here call upon us to take seriously. (shrink)

This essay examines whether or not absurdity is intrinsic to human life. It takes Camus’ interpretation of ‘The Absurd’ as its conceptual starting point. It traces such thought back to Schopenhauer, whose work is then critically analysed. This analysis focuses primarily on happiness and meaning. This essay accepts some of Schopenhauer’s premises, but rejects his conclusions. Instead, it considers Nietzsche’s alternatives and the role of suffering in life. It posits that suffering may help people acquire meaning and escape absurdity. It (...) then analyses the role of compassion in absurdity, in reference to Nietzsche’s work and Buddhist teachings. Lastly, it examines absurdity in relation to death, rejecting the notion that death exacerbates absurdity. This paper understands absurdity to be a natural part of the human condition, as characterised by suffering, death and an absence of meaning. It concludes that although human life is absurd by nature, it need not remain so. (shrink)

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, large-scale research and pharmaceutical regulatory processes have proceeded at a dramatically increased pace with new and effective, evidence-based COVID-19 interventions rapidly making their way into the clinic. However, the swift generation of high-quality evidence and the efficient processing of regulatory authorisation have given rise to more specific and complex versions of well-known research ethics issues. In this paper, we identify three such issues by focusing on the authorisation of Molnupiravir, a novel antiviral medicine aimed (...) at reducing the ability of SARS-CoV-2 to multiply in the body, for clinical use by the National Health Service in England and the concomitant testing of Molnupiravir through the large-scale PANORAMIC randomised control trial. By analysing the ways in which the authorisation and clinical use of Molnupiravir complicate standard approaches to clinical equipoise, standard of care, and participant consent in the PANORAMIC randomised control trial we will explain some of ethical implications for clinical trials that aim to study the efficacy and safety of new COVID-19 and other therapeutics when conditional authorisation has already been granted and when such treatments have already been made available to patients by national health providers. (shrink)

Background There has been debate on whether a global or unified field of bioethics exists. If bioethics is a unified global field, or at the very least a closely shared way of thinking, then we should expect bioethicists to behave the same way in their academic activities anywhere in the world. This paper investigates whether there is a 'global bioethics' in the sense of a unified academic community. Methods To address this question, we study the web-linking patterns of bioethics institutions, (...) the citation patterns of bioethics papers and the buying patterns of bioethics books. Results All three analyses indicate that there are geographical and institutional differences in the academic behavior of bioethicists and bioethics institutions. Conclusion These exploratory studies support the position that there is no unified global field of bioethics. This is a problem if the only reason is parochialism. But these regional differences are probably of less concern if one notices that bioethics comes in many not always mutually understandable dialects. (shrink)

Phenomenology gives rise to certain ontological considerations that have far-reaching implications for standard conceptions of patient autonomy in medical ethics, and, as a result, the obligations of and to patients in clinical decision-making contexts. One such consideration is the phenomenological reduction in classical phenomenology, a core feature of which is the characterisation of our primary experiences as immediately and inherently meaningful. This paper builds on and extends the analyses of the phenomenological reduction in the works of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty (...) in order to identify and explain its implications for our current understanding of the principle of respect for patient autonomy and the norms of clinical decision making. (shrink)

“Bodily autonomy” has received significant attention in bioethics, medical ethics, and medical law in terms of the general inviolability of a patient’s bodily sovereignty and the rights of patients to make choices (e.g., reproductive choices) that concern their own body. However, the role of the body in terms of how it can or does contribute to a patient’s capacity for, or exercises of their autonomy in clinical decision-making situations has not been explicitly addressed. The approach to autonomy in this paper (...) is aligned with traditional theories that conceive autonomy in terms of an individual’s capacities for, and exercises of rational reflection. However, at the same time, this paper extends these accounts by arguing that autonomy is, in part, embodied. Specifically, by drawing on phenomenological conceptions of the experience of autonomy, we argue that, in principle, the body is a necessary component of the capacity for autonomy. Secondly, through the presentation of two different cases, we highlight ways in which a patient’s body can contribute to the autonomy of treatment choices. Ultimately, we hope to encourage others to explore additional conditions under which a concept of embodied autonomy should be employed in medical decision making, how its underlying principles might be operationalised in clinical situations, and its consequences for approaches to patient autonomy in healthcare practice, policy, and law. (shrink)

Dr. Thomas Sowell is a philosophical force. It may surprise some to hear this, given that the man is rarely (if ever) referenced as a philosopher by professional academics. It will be the primary objective of this thesis to systematize a thoroughgoing metaphysics from Sowell’s disparate works, in order to establish that Sowell’s work contains a consistent and rigorous philosophical viewpoint. As a corollary of this fact, it will be demonstrated that Sowell is a philosopher deserving of a place in (...) the contemporary cannon, even though he is currently not regarded as such by most professional philosophers. While much more can be said about Sowell’s social, political, ethical, and wide-ranging epistemological views, this paper will primarily focus on the metaphysical grounding that this other work relies on as its pre-condition. Certain aspects of Sowell’s epistemological work will also be considered, as such pertain to his system of metaphysics. Trained as an economist and famous for his conservative social commentary, Sowell is more than a domain-specific expert in a given field, he’s a systematic thinker who gives a nuanced philosophical account for not only his views, but for the fundamental premises on which they rely. Unfortunately, Sowell currently enjoys little consideration as an academic philosopher, as he does not write in the ecosystem of journals constructed for professional philosophers, nor does his philosophical focus concern itself with much of the contemporary debates in the field. Yet, a philosopher he is by virtue of his work: he writes about what is, how we know it, and what we should do about it. This thesis will systematize Sowell’s metaphysical commitments while explaining a limited portion of his related work on epistemological concerns. With this systemization in place, a straightforward argument follows that he is ultimately a pragmatist philosopher with an account of reality that is consistent and thorough enough to warrant the title. With the above in mind, this thesis aims to make Sowell’s philosophy more concise and accessible to academic philosophers by showing it for the rigorous system that it is. Resultant from this, professional philosophers may be well-advised to make some room in the cannon for Dr. Thomas Sowell. (shrink)

In the debates regarding the ethics of human organoid biobanking, the locus of donor autonomy has been identified in processes of consent. The problem is that, by focusing on consent, biobanking processes preclude adequate engagement with donor autonomy because they are unable to adequately recognise or respond to factors that determine authentic choice. This is particularly problematic in biobanking contexts associated with organoid research or the clinical application of organoids because, given the probability of unforeseen and varying purposes for which (...) a donor’s organoids could be employed and given the different ways in which a donor can relate to her biospecimens, a donor can value her organoids differently in different contexts and her reasons for autonomously permitting use of her cells and tissues in one case may not support an autonomous decision in another. In response, this paper has three aims: firstly, to make the case for why organoid biobanks ought to respect donor autonomy conceived as authentic choice; secondly, to explore the autonomy-respecting limits of established and widely prevalent models of biobank consent; and thirdly, to propose certain conditions that organoid biobanks ought to support or facilitate in order to respect donor autonomy. (shrink)

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, large-scale research and pharmaceutical regulatory processes have proceeded at a dramatically increased pace with new and effective, evidence-based COVID-19 interventions rapidly making their way into the clinic. However, the swift generation of high-quality evidence and the efficient processing of regulatory authorisation have given rise to more specific and complex versions of well-known research ethics issues. In this paper, we identify three such issues by focusing on the authorisation of molnupiravir, a novel antiviral medicine aimed (...) at reducing the ability of SARS-CoV-2 to multiply in the body, for clinical use by the National Health Service in England and the concomitant testing of molnupiravir through the large-scale Platform Adaptive trial of Novel antiviRals for eArly treatMent of COVID-19 In the Community randomised control trial. By analysing the ways in which the authorisation and clinical use of molnupiravir complicate standard approaches to clinical equipoise, standard of care and participant consent in the PANORAMIC randomised control trial, we will explain some of ethical implications for clinical trials that aim to study the efficacy and safety of new COVID-19 and other therapeutics when conditional authorisation has already been granted and when such treatments have already been made available to patients by national health providers. (shrink)

Smajdor argues that “recognition” is the solution to the “reifying attitude” that results from “the urge to protect ‘vulnerable’ people through exclusion from research”. Drawing on theories of reification, we argue that it is the concepts of autonomy and vulnerability themselves that have been reified, resulting in the impoverishment of approaches to autonomy at law and in research ethics. Overcoming such reification demands a deeper consideration of the grounds on which vulnerable individuals are owed recognition and thereby the forms such (...) recognition should take. Smajdor argues for a recognition that appeals to autonomy and that manifests in providing vulnerable individuals with the opportunity to assent. The problem is that this kind of recognition is dependent on a more fundamental kind. It is this second form of recognition that would need to do the heavy lifting for assent-based frameworks to avoid the same problems we find with consent. (shrink)

At the centenary of Frank H. Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, we explore the continuing relevance of Knightian uncertainty to the theory and practice of entrepreneurship. There are three challenges facing such assessment. First, RUP is complex and difficult to interpret. The key but neglected element of RUP is that Knight’s account is not solely about risk and uncertainty as states of nature, but about how an agent’s beliefs about uncertain outcomes and confidence in those beliefs guide their choices. Second, (...) RUP is Knight’s only effort in this area. His subsequent career led elsewhere, so he did not engage with subsequent interpretations of this work. Third, much of the current literature emphasizes that decisions must be different under the two states of nature with a consequent misunderstanding of entrepreneurial agency. This paper addresses each challenge in sequence. First, we explicate Knight’s approach and explain why that approach is murky. Second, as a complement to Knight’s interpretation, we examine Frank P. Ramsey’s approach to subjective probabilities to help clarify Knight’s murky approach. What links Knight and Ramsey is a shared pragmatism about entrepreneurial agency under uncertainty that depends upon the beliefs about, and confidence in, their judgments of possible outcomes. This Knight-Ramsey approach does not require actor’s behaviors to be determined by the class of uncertain environment they face. We focus on the response by the entrepreneur to the existence of uncertainty in all its forms. We argue that this reductive account provides a foundation to examine common problems in management, including managerial hubris, the interaction between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, and the need for experimentation in advance of new product and venture launches. Third, we critique current literature that favors epistemic purism about the ontology of risk and uncertainty and ignores Knight-Ramsey pragmatism in meeting uncertainty, such as using formal and informal institutions for uncertainty mitigation. Our account locates Frank Knight’s subtleties in entrepreneurial behavior firmly in the literature on entrepreneurial agency a century later. (shrink)

Research ethics committees and institutional review boards spend considerable time developing, scrutinising, and revising specific consent processes and materials for survey-based studies conducted on crowdsourcing and online recruitment platforms such as MTurk and Prolific. However, there is evidence to suggest that many users of ICT services do not read the information provided as part of the consent process and they habitually provide or refuse their consent without adequate reflection. In principle, these practices call into question the validity of their consent. (...) In this paper we argue that although the ‘no read problem’ and the routinisation of consent may apply to research participants’ consent practices for studies on crowdsourcing platforms, this is not a serious problem. Furthermore, given that the informational requirements for informed consent in these contexts are minimal, we argue that these participants are, nevertheless, sufficiently informed to give valid consent. We conclude that research ethics committees and institutional review boards should only agonise over the precise details of the informed consent process and materials in those rare cases where appreciable risks to research participants need to be managed. (shrink)

What constitutes a scientific discovery? What role do discoveries play in science, its dynamics and social practices? Must every discovery be attributed to an individual discoverer (or a small number of discoverers)? The paper explores these questions by first critically examining extant philosophical explications of scientific discovery—the models of scientific discovery, propounded by Kuhn, McArthur, Hudson, and Schindler. As a simple, natural and powerful alternative, we proffer the “change-driver model”: in a nutshell, it takes discoveries to be cognitive scientific results (...) that have epistemically advanced science. The model overcomes the shortcomings of its precursors, whilst preserving their insights. We demonstrate its intensional and extensional superiority, especially with respect to the link between scientific discoveries and the dynamics of science, as well as the award system of science. Both as an illustration, and as an application to a recent scientific and political controversy, we apply the considered models of discovery to one of the most momentous discoveries of science: the expansion of the universe. We oppose the 2018 proposal of the International Astronomers’ Union as too simplistic vis-`a-vis the historical complexity of the episode. The change- driver model yields a more nuanced and circumspect verdict: (i) The redshift-distance relation shouldn’t be named the “Hubble-Lemaître Law”, but “Slipher-Lundmark-Hubble-Humason Law”; (ii) Its interpretation in terms of an expanding universe, however, Lemaître ought to be given credit for; but (iii) The establishment of the expansion of the universe, as an evidentially sufficiently warranted result, is a communal achievement, emerging in the 1950s or 1960s. (shrink)

Abortion remains a highly controversial issue in many countries and subject to intense public debate. The aim of this chapter is to summarize the most prominent assumptions and arguments concerning the moral and legal dimensions of abortion on which this debate rests. Where the moral justifiability of abortion is concerned, this chapter focuses on arguments relating to the moral status of the fetus or embryo, the notion of personhood, the biological development of the embryo or fetus, and the moral relevance (...) of specific points in the developmental process. In terms of the legal aspects, we consider concepts and principles invoked at law, principally, the rights of pregnant women and the medical concept of viability. For each moral and legal position in the abortion debate, we provide an overview of the principal assumptions and arguments and acknowledge the main criticisms. (shrink)

For more than 25 years, research misconduct is defined as fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism —although other research misbehaviors have been also added in codes of cond...

The protection of rare species abounds with scientific and ethical considerations. An ethical dilemma can emerge when the life of one species is valued higher than that of another, and so we discuss the basis of ranking, protection, and valuation of plants and animals. A duty to protect rare species exists in this age of great losses to plant and animal life, but the scientific and public communities are not always in agreement regarding what species deserve protection. Using a case (...) study, we illustrate how the decision to kill beavers to protect a rare plant and rare animals found in a tidewater creek demanded an ecological ethic approach. We present the concept of a" conservation mediator" and how its use may help find a common ground between stakeholders and decision-makers in similar situations. (shrink)

Holm (2022) argues that a class of algorithmic fairness measures, that he refers to as the ‘performance parity criteria’, can be understood as applications of John Broome’s Fairness Principle. We argue that the performance parity criteria cannot be read this way. This is because in the relevant context, the Fairness Principle requires the equalization of actual individuals’ individual-level chances of obtaining some good (such as an accurate prediction from a predictive system), but the performance parity criteria do not guarantee any (...) such thing: the measures merely ensure that certain population-level ratios hold. (shrink)

SummaryHolm Tetens develops in his book „Gott denken. Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie“ theoretical and practical arguments against a naturalistic and in favour of a theistic understanding of reality. In my paper I focus on Teten’s claim that we are rationally justified to hope for the truth of classical theism. I distinguish between rationally justified and unjustified forms of hope and argue that we are rationally justified to hope for the redemption of reality as promised by classical theism. However, this (...) hope has a weaker basis of justification than Tetens seems to assume because serious objections to classical theism ought to be taken into consideration as well. (shrink)

Commentators of the judicial decisions of Justice Holmes have often situated the decisions inside the doctrines of freedom of expression and the rules and tests approach to legal analysis. This Paper situates his judgments in the context of a political theory. Drawing from his articles, lectures and correspondence, the Paper highlights Holmes’ reaction to the idealism and rationalism of the intellectual current before him. His view of human nature, conditioned by his war experience, is elaborated. The Paper especially (...) examines his theory of political struggle with the process-oriented view that the dominant social groups invariably become the political elite. The Paper then connects his theory of human nature to his legal doctrines, the role of the judiciary, the nature of the state, and a legal right. (shrink)

Recently, a number of authors have suggested that we understand scientific models in the same way as fictional characters, like Sherlock Holmes. The biggest challenge for this approach concerns the ontology of fictional characters. I consider two responses to this challenge, given by Roman Frigg, Ronald Giere and Peter Godfrey-Smith, and argue that neither is successful. I then suggest an alternative approach. While parallels with fiction are useful, I argue that models of real systems are more aptly compared to (...) works that portray real people, like the Emperor Claudius. This approach will allow us to avoid problems with fictional characters. (shrink)

According to possibilism, or non-actualism, fictional characters are possible individuals. Possibilist accounts of fiction do not only assign the intuitively correct truth-conditions to sentences in a fiction, but has the potential to provide powerful explanatory models for a wide range of phenomena associated with fiction (though these two aspects of possibilism are, I argue, crucially distinct). Apart from the classic defense by David Lewis the idea of modeling fiction in terms of possible worlds have been widely criticized. In this article, (...) I provide a defense of a possibilist account against some lines of criticism. To do so, I assume that names for fictional characters are directly referential and a possible-worlds model that accommodates transworld identity. On this background, I argue, it is possible to construct an elegant model of fictional discourse using familiar models of information exchange in ordinary discourse, and I sketch how this model can be used to i) make a natural distinction between fictional and counterfactual discourse, ii) account for creativity, and iii) sustain a natural definition of truth-in-fiction that avoids certain familiar objections to possibilism. Though I set aside questions about the metaphysical commitments of a possible-world interpretation here, there is accordingly reason to think that the battle over possibilist treatments of fiction will have to be fought over metaphysical foundations rather than technical shortcomings. (shrink)

Abstract: Many, if not most philosophers, deny that a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ could be true. However, this attitude conflicts with the assignment of true to that sentence by natural language speakers. Furthermore, this process of assigning truth values to sentences like ‘Sherlock Holes smokes’ seems indistinguishable from the process that leads speakers to assign true to other sentences, those like ‘Bertrand Russell smokes’. I will explore the idea that when speakers assign the value true to the first (...) sentence, they are not mistaken or confused — that we ought to take these assignments at face value. I show how the most popular alternative to this idea is inadequate for explaining various sentences involving fictional names. In addition, I offer evidence that these truth value assignments to sentences are tracking semantic content rather than pragmatic effects. (shrink)

In “Semantics of Fictional Terms,” Garcia-Carpintero critically surveys the most recent literature on the topic of fictional names. One of his targets is realism about fictional discourse. Realists about fictional discourse believe that: (a) it contains true sentences that have fictional names as their subjects; (b) sentences containing names can be true only if those names have referents; (c) fictional names have fictional characters – abstract objects – as their referents. The fundamental problem that arises for realists is that not (...) all true sentences containing fictional names are plausibly about abstract objects. This leads to the need to introduce disjunctive conceptions of property attribution that Garcia-Carpintero claims are implausible, and that realism should therefore be rejected. He also maintains, however, that (a) is correct. I agree. Furthermore, I am also committed to anti-realism about fictional discourse – that fictional names have no referents. Garcia-Carpintero claims that my view is simply a notational variant of realism. I argue that this is false – that my view could not possibly be a notational variant of any extant realist theory. (shrink)

In recent years, apparently the Big Bang as described by the Lambda CDM-Standard Model Cosmology has become widely accepted by majority of physics and cosmology communities. Even some people have concluded that it has no serious alternative in horizon. Is that true? First, as we argued elsewhere, Big Bang story relies on singularity. In other words, when we are able to describe the observed data without invoking singularity, then Big Bang model is no longer required. Therefore, here we explore a (...) few alternative stories other than Big Bang story, which most cosmologists believe it is the nearest to Biblical account of creation. We would argue that re-reading of Genesis 1:2 will lead us to another viable story, albeit the alternative has not been developed rigorously as LCDM theories. We also briefly discuss a fluid Maxwell equations of Prof. Tsutomu Kambe based on vortex sound theory. (shrink)

Scattered skeptical remarks and a general austerity that infused his writings have given Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes a reputation as some type of nihilist. Noted commentators such as Richard Posner and Albert Alschuler have claimed as much. This article seeks to correct this misunderstanding. Holmes was not a nihilist in the sense of being melancholy due to a belief that the world has no absolute moral values or gods. Instead, Holmes was a pragmatist in the spirit of (...) William James and John Dewey. While Holmes had doubts about moral truth and deities, he ultimately thought that their existence (or non-existence) should have no bearing on our behavior or the law. We must, through our collective efforts, find values that work for us. (shrink)

Holmes exists is false. How can this be, when there is no one for the sentence to misdescribe? Part of the answer is that a sentence’s topic depends on context. The king of France is bald, normally unevaluable, is false qua description of the bald people. Likewise Holmes exists is false qua description of the things that exist; it misdescribes those things as having Holmes among them. This does not explain, though, how Holmes does not exist (...) differs in cognitive content from, say, Vulcan does not exist. Our answer builds on an observation of Kripke’s: even if Holmes exists, he is not in this room, for we were all born too late. (shrink)

As a fan of Sherlock Holmes from a young age it occurred to me recently to wonder what the great detective would have made of the 'hard' problem of consciousness. Here is one possible scenario.

Does Sherlock Holmes exist? Maybe we would answer, no, because Sherlock Holmes is a fictional entity. But, with the same logic, we can say that Sherlock Holmes is a detective and not a police. How do we believe and know the truth-value of Sherlock Holmes when Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist? Fictional objects underwent a various number of puzzles in their ontological and metaphysical resolutions. Philosophers have tried to solve this puzzle by inventing various theories. This (...) article means to explore the historical development of fictional objects and the puzzle surrounding it. This article finds that the theories in fictional objects include two big-streams of metaphysical assumptions that contradict each other which are(1) mind-dependent and (2) mind-independent. This article also means to invent a theory called theory-n to solve fictional objects puzzles that are assigned by Kripke (1979). This article solves the fictional objects mind-dependent and/or mind-independentpuzzleor belief puzzle with rather relational-semantic approaches instead of flat-semantics. Further, theory-n finds that new fictionalism with relational-semantic admits fictional objects as foundation to make sense of objects (any objects, including actual objects is reducible to fiction). (shrink)

This essay reexamines Holmes Rolston’s evocative notion of “storied residence” and evaluates it for its fitness for environmental virtue ethics. Environmental virtue ethics (or EVE) continues to garner attention among environmental philosophers, and recently Brian Treanor has argued for the indispensability of narrative approaches as part of that discourse. In this paper, I endorse this indispensability thesis generally, but I argue that narrative environmental virtue ethics must be supplemented either by “storied residence” or a similar environmentally, scientifically, culturally, and (...) historically rich concept of narrative. Rolston himself has criticized environmental virtue ethics for being too agent-centered. Fortunately, an adequate sense of storied-residence is precisely what is needed to avoid triggering the vicious anthropocentrism that concerns Rolston. More concretely, storied-residence makes place(s) central to environmental virtue ethics by giving expression to features of the more-than-human world that often become secondary considerations to agency in accounts of environmental virtue. (shrink)

Conversational exculpature is a pragmatic process whereby information is subtracted from, rather than added to, what the speaker literally says. This pragmatic content subtraction explains why we can say “Rob is six feet tall” without implying that Rob is between 5'0.99" and 6'0.01" tall, and why we can say “Ellen has a hat like the one Sherlock Holmes always wears” without implying Holmes exists or has a hat. This article presents a simple formalism for understanding this pragmatic mechanism, (...) specifying how, in context, the result of such subtractions is determined. And it shows how the resulting theory of conversational exculpature accounts for a varied range of linguistic phenomena. A distinctive feature of the approach is the crucial role played by the question under discussion in determining the result of a given exculpature. (shrink)

This paper offers a positive account of an important but under-explored class of mental states, non-propositional attitudes such as loving one’s department, liking lattice structures, fearing Freddy Krueger, and hating Sherlock Holmes. In broadest terms, the view reached is a representationalist account guided by two puzzles. The proposal allows one to say in an elegant way what differentiates a propositional attitude from an attitude merely about a proposition. The proposal also allows one to offer a unified account of the (...) non-propositional attitudes that captures both empty and non-empty cases by properly locating the posited representations in the metaphysical structure of the attitudes. (shrink)

This paper defends a theory of fictional truth. According to this theory, there is a fact of the matter concerning the number of hairs on Sherlock Holmes' head, and likewise for any other meaningful question one could ask about what's true in a work of fiction. We argue that a theory of this form is needed to account for the patterns in our judgments about attitude reports that embed fictional claims. We contrast our view with one of the dominant (...) approaches to fictional truth, which originates with David Lewis. Along the way we explore the relationship between fiction, counterfactuals, and vagueness. (shrink)

This paper draws on MacIntyre’s ethical thought to illuminate a hitherto underexplored religious context for business ethics, that of the Amish. It draws on an empirical study of Amish settlements in Holmes County, Ohio, and aims to deepen our understanding of Amish business ethics by bringing it into contact with an ethical theory that has had a signifcant impact within business ethics, that of Alasdair MacIntyre. It also aims to extend MacIntyrean thought by drawing on his neglected critique of (...) modernity in the context of business ethics. The Amish context allows us to appreciate the relationship between MacIntyre’s critique of modernity, his conception of practices and communities, and his distinctive approach to the virtues. It also helps us to better understand how the ethical life is possible within our emotivist culture. (shrink)

In this paper I confront what I take to be the crucial challenge for fictional realism, i.e. the view that fictional characters exist. This is the problem of accounting for the intuition that corresponding negative existentials such as ‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist’ are true (when, given fictional realism, taken literally they seem false). I advance a novel and detailed form of the response according to which we take them to mean variants of such claims as: there is no (...) concrete x such that x is Sherlock Holmes. (shrink)

This paper asks what should be the basis of a global environmental ethics. As Gao Shan has argued, the environmental ethics of Western philosophers such as Holmes Rolston and Paul Taylor is based on extending the notion of intrinsic value to that of objects of nature, and as such it is not very compatible with Chinese ethics. This is related to Gao’s rejection of most—if not all—Western “rationalist” environmental ethics, a stance that I grant her for pragmatic reasons (though (...) I remain neutral about it theoretically). Gao argues that the Daoist notion of living in harmony with nature can instead become the basis of a Chinese environmental ethics. However, the involved Daoist conception of living in harmony with nature is, in my view, based on an aesthetic property. The paper argues that despite the appeal of the Daoist view for a Chinese environmental ethics, an aesthetic property cannot provide the basis for a global environmental ethics. The paper also considers another version of Daoist environmental ethics, which does not rely on an aesthetic notion, but I argue that it too fails as such a candidate. As an alternative, the paper considers and applies contemporary Western thinkers on gratitude (such as Robert Emmons and Elizabeth Loder), proposing that gratitude to nature (environmental gratitude) can indeed provide the needed basis. (shrink)

Recently, there has been much discussion of ‘fair machine learning’: fairness in data-driven decision-making systems (which are often, though not always, made with assistance from machine learning systems). Notorious impossibility results show that we cannot have everything we want here. Such problems call for careful thinking about the foundations of fair machine learning. Sune Holm has identified one promising way forward, which involves applying John Broome's theory of fairness to the puzzles of fair machine learning. Unfortunately, his application of Broome's (...) theory appears to be fatally flawed. This article attempts to rescue Holm's central insight – namely, that Broome's theory can be useful to the study of fair machine learning – by giving an alternative application of Broome's theory, which involves thinking about fair machine learning in counterfactual (as opposed to merely statistical) terms. (shrink)

Although the character of the “lady detective”is a staple of the cozy mystery genre, we contend that there are no great lady detectives to rival Holmes or Poirot. This is not because there are no clever or interesting lady detective characters, but ratherbecause the concept of greatness is sociallyconstructed and, like coolness, depends on public acclaim and perception. We explore the mechanics of genre formation, arguing that the very structure of cozy mysteries precludes female greatness. To create a “great”character,theauthor (...) cannot just endowher with certain attributes; she must actively work to overcome her audience’s tendency to import structures of oppression into the story, and she must wrestle against the conventions of the genre. In doing so, however, authors risk setting their stories in a wholly different genre. (shrink)

Creationism is the conjunction of the following theses: (i) fictional individuals (e.g. Sherlock Holmes) actually exist; (ii) fictional names (e.g., 'Holmes') are at least sometimes genuinely referential; (iii) fictional individuals are the creations of the authors who first wrote (or spoke, etc.) about them. CA Creationism is the conjunction of (i) - (iii) and the following thesis: (iv) fictional individuals are contingently existing abstracta; they are non-concrete artifacts of our world and various other possible worlds. TakashiYagisawa has recently (...) provided a number of arguments designed to show that Creationism is unjustified. I here critically examine three of his challenges to CA Creationism. I argue that each fails to undermine this version of Creationism. (shrink)

In recent metaphysics, the questions of whether fictional entities exist, what their nature is, and how to explain truths of statements such as “Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street” and “Holmes was created by Arthur Conan Doyle” have been subject to much debate. The main aim of my thesis is to wrestle with key proponents of the abstractionist view that fictional entities are abstract objects that exist (van Inwagen 1977, 2018, Thomasson 1999 and Salmon 1998) as well (...) as Walton’s (1990) pretense view, which denies the existence of such entities. In the process, I propose modifications to these views to deal with problems they face and show how the modifications better account for the philosophical data. -/- Key abstractionists (van Inwagen 1977, Thomasson 1999) make a strict distinction between discourse within fiction, in which statements about literary characters cannot be literally true, and discourse about fiction, as it occurs in literary criticism, where statements about fictional characters can be literally true. Fictional objects are postulated to account for the truth of the latter. This runs into trouble because statements thought to be literally true are not literal. (Yagisawa 2001, Friend 2002) I provide a uniform analysis to account for the truth of statements involving fictional characters by appealing to a presupposition involving a metaphor in both contexts. The presupposition is that there is an x such that x is fictional; x is likened to a real person; and x is and ought to be treated/counted as a real person for all relevant intents and purposes. -/- More generally, I adopt Everett and Schroeder’s (2015) realist view that fictional characters are ideas constituted by mental representations. This, to me, better accounts for how fictional characters are created within the world’s causal nexus (unlike non-spatiotemporal entities in abstractionism), among other things. One key challenge they face is to explain how ideas can possess properties such as being a detective. I present a fine-grained version of their view, according to which the mental representations constituting fictional entities encode mind-dependent properties. Moreover, I explain how reference to such representations is possible, using Bencivenga’s (1983) Neo-Kantian view of reference and Karttunen’s (1976) view on discourse referents. Finally, I suggest that the identity of fictional characters is interest-relative. The constant, and sometimes radical, change of properties that, fictional characters can undergo is taken to be a consequence of the fact that unified mental representations are bundles of simpler mental representations. As change occurs, simpler representations are replaced by others. -/- A key theme that runs through the thesis is that neither fictionality nor pretense is relevant to the semantics of fictional sentences—a claim bolstered by Matravers’ (2014) arguments. Whether or not my account works, this claim, as well as the new philosophical data I bring up, are some of the challenges I pose to the heart of established views. (shrink)

ABSTRACT It is fruitless to interpret Constant's modern liberty from the binary perspective of either the negative/positive freedom opposition or the liberal/republican freedom opposition. Both oppositional perspectives reduce the relationally complex nature of modern liberty to one or another component of the relation. Such reduction inevitably results in an incomplete and, therefore, inadequate interpretation of Constant's modern liberty. Consequently, either of these binary frames of interpretation obscures rather than illuminates the full nature of Constant's modern liberty. Boxed into their irreconcilably (...) opposed alternatives, both binary perspectives fail to appreciate that Constant's conception of modern liberty is a complex achievement irreducible without loss to either liberal negative liberty as non-interference or republican freedom as non-domination. Nor does combining liberal negative freedom and positive freedom (in the sense of ancient liberty), as Holmes well establishes, adequately tells the whole story of Constant's modern liberty. As a complex achievement, Constant's conception of modern liberty, I shall argue, blends negative freedom as associated with neo-Roman republican freedom as non-subjection to arbitrary power, negative freedom as non-interference, associated with the liberal tradition, positive freedom in the sense of inner self-development, and positive freedom as collective self-government or civic republican freedom. (shrink)

The general topic of this paper is the ontological commitment to so-called "fictitious objects", that is, things and characters of fictional stories, like Sherlock Holmes and Pegasus. Discourse about fiction seems to entail an ontological commitment to fictitious entities, a commitment that is often deemed inconsistent with empirical facts. For instance, "Pegasus is a flying horse" seems to entail "There are flying horses" as well as "Pegasus exists" (according to some widely accepted logical principles). I discuss two solutions that (...) have been proposed in the literature. The first one amounts to rejecting sentences like "Pegasus is a flying horse" as false, at least if they are taken at face value. This solution is called the "story operator strategy". It consists in paraphrasing sentences like "Pegasus is a flying horse" by means of the expression "according to a story" such that they are interpreted as an elliptic formulation of, e.g., "According to a story, Pegasus is a flying horse". I spell out the difficulties of the story operator strategy and opt for a realist ontology of fiction. A novel interpretation of the story operator "according to a story" is given, which is not only consistent with but even sheds new light on such a realist ontology. In particular, it is shown how the story operator can be used as a tool to introduce the so-called "modes of predication distinction" (which is an essential ingredient of many realist ontologies of fiction) in a commonsensical way. (shrink)

The idea that education should equip people to lead flourishing lives and help others to do so is now becoming salient in policy-making circles. Philosophy of education can help here by clarifying what flourishing consists in. This essay examines one aspect of this. It rejects the view that well-being goods are derivable from human nature, as in the theories of Howard Gardner and Edmond Holmes. It locates them, rather, as cultural products, but not culturally-relative ones, drawing attention to the (...) proliferating forms they have taken over the past three or four centuries. It looks to aesthetics and art criticism as a guide to a philosophical treatment of well-being goods more generally. It also takes off from aesthetics and art criticism in seeking to identify reliable authorities on the flourishing life. On this, it rejects elitist conceptions in favour of a more democratic model, emphasising its importance in education for citizenship. (shrink)

‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express different propositions, even though neither ‘Ahab’ nor ‘Holmes’ has a referent. This seems to constitute a theoretical puzzle for the Russellian view of propositions. In this paper, I develop a variant of the Russellian view, Plenitudinous Russellianism. I claim that ‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express distinct gappy propositions. I discuss key metaphysical and semantic differences between Plenitudinous Russellianism and Traditional Russellianism and respond (...) to objections that stem from those differences. (shrink)

Wir wissen, dass eine Transformation von globalem Ausmaß bereits begonnen hat, und wir wissen, dass ihre Entfaltung nicht vorhersehbar ist. Wir können sicher sein, dass es eine Herausforderung sein wird: Wir werden inmitten tiefgreifender Veränderungen leben, unser Überleben wird ständig auf dem Spiel stehen. Werden wir das Verständnis, die Weisheit erreichen, um diese Herausforderung zu bestehen? Hier sind einige Gedanken und Überlegungen, die uns helfen, den Zustand zu erreichen, in dem wir eine positive Antwort geben können. -/- Zurückblicken, um nach (...) vorne zu sehen -/- Dies wird nicht das erste Mal in der Geschichte sein, dass für die Menschheit eine Periode der Transformation auf globaler Ebene angebrochen ist. Der Wissenschaftsphilosoph Holmes Rolston wies darauf hin, dass unsere „große Geschichte“ drei solcher Transformationen umfasst – wahre „Urknalle“.1 Die erste war der physische Urknall, der vermutlich vor etwa 13,8 Milliarden Jahren stattfand. Es gebar das manifeste Universum mit seinen Quantenteilchen, vielfältigen Arten von Energien und Milliarden von Galaxien. Es führte zur Bildung von Sonnensystemen mit Sonnen und Planeten und Energieflüssen, die die Entwicklung von lebenden (glücklich gelegenen) Planeten ermöglichen, die aktive Sonnen umkreisen. Eine weitere grundlegende Transformation – ein „zweiter Urknall“ – war die Entstehung lebender Organismen in den komplexen Systemen, die sich auf der Erde und vermutlich auch auf anderen Planeten entwickelt haben. Es wird angenommen, dass diese Transformation vor etwa 3,8 Milliarden Jahren stattgefunden hat. Es begann mit der Entstehung einzelliger Prokaryoten in der Ursuppe, die die Oberfläche des Planeten bedeckte. Der „dritte Urknall“ soll vor etwa 120.000 Jahren stattgefunden haben. Es hat das Bewusstsein unserer Spezies grundlegend verändert – „entwickelt“. Homo soll sapiens geworden sein. Zu den evolutionären Vorteilen des weiterentwickelten Bewusstseins gehörte eine flexiblere und schnellere Form der Kommunikation. Die Kommunikation war nicht mehr auf halbautomatische Reaktionen beschränkt, die durch wiederkehrende Bedingungen und Ereignisse ausgelöst wurden; Anstatt sich auf Zeichen zu beschränken, basierte die menschliche Kommunikation auf einvernehmlich entwickelten Symbolen. -/- Die Entwicklung der Symbolsprache war ein großer Sprung. Einerseits brachte es soziale Strukturen hervor, die auf kollektiv erworbener Bedeutung beruhten, und andererseits produzierte es verbesserte manipulative Fähigkeiten. Gesellschaften könnten sich auf der Grundlage gemeinsamer Kulturen entwickeln, die mächtige Technologien einsetzen. Homo sapiens begann andere Arten zu dominieren und wurde zu einem Schlüsselfaktor in der Evolution des Lebens in der Biosphäre. Der dritte Urknall erzeugte eine Explosion der menschlichen Bevölkerung, aber er brachte nicht die Weisheit hervor, die sicherstellen würde, dass die erweiterte Bevölkerung das Gleichgewicht aufrechterhalten könnte, das für das Gedeihen des Lebens auf diesem Planeten unerlässlich ist. Diese Gleichgewichte wurden immer mehr beeinträchtigt. Der kurzsichtige Einsatz von Technologie und die Missachtung natürlicher Kontrollmechanismen brachten die Menschheit dorthin, wo sie heute ist: an einen „Chaos-Punkt“, an dem die Wahl klar ist: zwischen Zusammenbruch und Durchbruch.2 Eine weitere globale Transformation ist unvermeidlich geworden und ist es noch tatsächlich im Gange: ein vierter Urknall. Es ist an der Zeit, die Lehren aus der Geschichte zu ziehen. Der Aufbau unserer Herrschaft auf dem Planeten hängt davon ab, ob wir die Herausforderung dieser Transformation meistern. -/- Die erste und grundlegende Lektion ist einfach und offensichtlich. Wir haben uns von der natürlichen Welt getrennt und müssen zurückkommen – nicht um Wilde und „Primitive“ zu werden, sondern Wesen, die auf die Welt um sie herum eingestimmt sind, die im Einklang mit den Rhythmen und Gleichgewichten der Natur leben und kompatibel erschaffen und nachhaltige eigene Rhythmen und Balancen. Wir sind nicht mehr auf die Rhythmen und Balancen der Natur ausgerichtet. Obwohl wir durch unsere biologische Evolution in diese Rhythmen und Balancen „eingebaut“ sind, haben wir unsere eigenen künstlichen Rhythmen und gefährlichen Balancen geschaffen, die die natürlichen Rhythmen ignorieren und oft mit ihnen in Konflikt stehen. Mit der Sonne aufzugehen und sich mit der Sonne zurückzuziehen bedeutet, sich an den zirkadianen 24-Stunden-Rhythmus anzupassen, der durch die Bewegung der Erde um die Sonne geschaffen wurde, und die sogenannten primitiven Menschen leben immer noch in Harmonie damit, und das tun die meisten auch die restlichen indigenen und traditionellen Kulturen. Aber moderne Menschen missachten die Rhythmen und Gleichgewichte der Natur und glauben, dass sie sie ersetzen können, indem sie Lichter und andere künstliche Annehmlichkeiten mit dem Umlegen eines Schalters ein- und ausschalten. Doch der menschliche Körper passt sich nicht den künstlichen Rhythmen an, und wir leiden unter den Folgen. -/- 3Die Wirksamkeit des Immunsystems ist beeinträchtigt, und trotz einer Flut von biochemischen Medikamenten breiten sich Krankheiten aus. Moderne Bevölkerungen sind Stadtbewohner und haben nur begrenzten Kontakt mit der Natur. Sie leben in einer künstlichen Welt und denken, dass es die reale Welt ist. Sie halten sich anderen Lebensformen überlegen und glauben, die Natur nach Belieben beherrschen zu können. Noch vor fünfzig Jahren musste die Tierintelligenzforscherin Jane Goodall gegen die damals noch vorherrschende Überzeugung ankämpfen, dass ChiMenschen sind biochemische Reiz-Reaktions-Mechanismen, keine lebenden und fühlenden Wesen. Heute erkennen wir, dass nicht nur höhere Säugetiere, alle lebenden Organismen und sogar Bäume und Pflanzen sensible Lebewesen sind und sich in dieser Hinsicht nicht grundlegend von uns unterscheiden. Es liegt im besten Interesse unseres körperlichen und geistigen Wohlbefindens, dass wir diese Missverständnisse und fehlerhaften Verhaltensweisen korrigieren. Wenn wir dies tun, gewinnen wir unsere natürliche Gesundheit und Vitalität zurück. Die heilende Wirkung natürlicher Substanzen und Lebensweisen war schon in der Antike Heilern und Weisen bekannt. Seit Hippokrates, der als Vater der modernen Medizin gilt, suchen Mediziner nach Substanzen und Methoden, die das Gleichgewicht und die Verbindung zwischen Mensch und Natur wiederherstellen. Heute wird dieser Anspruch überschattet von einer oft kommerziell motivierten Abhängigkeit von synthetischen Substanzen und naturverachtenden Praktiken. Die Szene ist nicht nur negativ: Wie wir sehen werden, gibt es positive Entwicklungen in allen Bereichen des menschlichen Strebens, einschließlich Heilung und Medizin. Die Verbindung mit der Natur ist ein Hauptziel der alternativen Heilmethoden, die als Informations- und Energiemedizin bekannt sind. Diese Form der Heilung erlebt in verschiedenen Teilen der Welt, vor allem im Orient, eine Renaissance. Shirin yoku, die japanische Kunst des Waldbadens, ist ein Paradebeispiel. Um es zu praktizieren, müssen wir in einen Wald gehen und uns auf seine Rhythmen und Energien eingestimmt fühlen – den Wind durch die Blätter rauschen hören, das Lichtspiel auf der Oberfläche eines Teichs spüren, mit den Wolken schweben, wenn sie sich durch den Himmel bewegen. Psychotherapeuten finden, dass sogar die Geräusche der Natur, das Zwitschern der Vögel, das Rauschen der Bäche heilend wirken. Einfach in einem Wald zu sein oder neben einem Baum zu stehen, beruhigt und heilt das Nervensystem. Eine weitere wesentliche Aufgabe ist es, positive Entwicklungen in der Gesellschaft zu erkennen und daran anzuknüpfen. -/- Es gibt positive Entwicklungen in der Gesellschaft, und es gibt gesunde, lebensspendende und erhaltende Prozesse in der Natur. Wir könnten wieder in die Natur eintauchen und an positiven Entwicklungen in der Gesellschaft teilhaben. Und doch gelingt uns das nicht. Wir beschreiten einen Weg, der eher zum Zusammenbruch als zum Durchbruch führt. Wir müssen überdenken, wie wir gehen, und vor allem, wohin wir gehen. Wir sind eine von mehr als hundert Millionen Arten in der Biosphäre, wobei jede Art Millionen und in einigen Fällen Milliarden von Individuen umfasst. Unter all diesen Arten und Individuen befinden wir uns in einer privilegierten Position: Wir haben ein hoch entwickeltes Gehirn und Bewusstsein. Dies ermöglicht uns zu fragen, wer wir sind, was die Welt ist und wie wir in der Welt leben können und sollen. Ein fortgeschrittenes Bewusstsein ist eine einzigartige Ressource, und wir machen keinen guten Gebrauch davon. Wir stellen nicht die richtigen Fragen und suchen nicht nach den richtigen Antworten, sondern gehen einfach vorwärts und vertrauen auf das Glück. Wir haben unsere Zahl erhöht, aber nicht die Vorteile, die unser Bewusstsein denen verleihen könnte, die wir in die Welt bringen. Wir haben ausgeklügelte Technologien entwickelt und angewendet, um unseren Bedürfnissen und Wünschen gerecht zu werden, haben aber die Mehrheit der fortgeschrittenen Arten beschädigt oder zum Aussterben gebracht. Fünfzig Prozent aller Wildtiere auf dem Planeten sind verschwunden, und jeden Tag verschwinden vierundvierzigtausend Populationen lebender Arten. Wir sind zu einer Gefahr für das Leben in der Biosphäre geworden. Die Geschichte lehrt uns, dass Urknalle, globale Transformationen, nicht unbedingt eine gerechte und blühende Welt hervorbringen; sie können zu einem Zusammenbruch führen. Wir haben die Schwelle eines vierten Urknalls erreicht, und wir tun nicht, was wir können, um einen Zusammenbruch abzuwenden. Der Großteil der heutigen Bevölkerung ist frustriert und depressiv und wird gewalttätig. Menschen leiden unter einer veränderten -/- über Klima, Umweltverschmutzung und unzählige Formen der Umweltzerstörung. Millionen durchstreifen den Planeten auf der Suche nach einem Ort, an dem sie nur überleben können. Die Lehren der Geschichte liegen vor uns, und wir ignorieren sie. Dennoch könnten wir die Lektionen lernen und unsere Wege korrigieren. Wir sind durchaus in der Lage, auf diesem Planeten zu leben, ohne das Gleichgewicht und die Ressourcen zu zerstören, die für ein gesundes Leben für uns und andere Arten erforderlich sind. Keine Spezies müsste dezimiert, unterworfen oder zum Aussterben getrieben werden, um uns am Leben zu erhalten. Wir könnten nachhaltig leben, mit anderen Arten koexistieren und die Grenzen des Lebens auf dem Planeten respektieren. Wir könnten die Verfügbarkeit lebenswichtiger Ressourcen für alle Menschen und Bevölkerungsgruppen sicherstellen. Dennoch treiben wir unzählige Arten zum Aussterben und schädigen die gemeinsame Umwelt. Die bloße Tatsache, dass wir es geschafft haben, als biologische Spezies fünf Millionen Jahre und als bewusste Spezies fünfzigtausend Jahre zu überleben, ist ein Beweis dafür, dass unsere grundlegende Natur nicht das Problem ist. Es ist nicht die Masse der menschlichen Bevölkerung, die dafür verantwortlich ist, zu einer Geißel des Lebens auf dem Planeten zu werden, sondern nur ein Teil. Die Frage ist, warum dieses Segment unhaltbare und jetzt kritische Bedingungen für geschaffen hat die höheren Formen des Lebens auf der Erde? Und kann es sich rechtzeitig ändern und transformieren, um eine große Katastrophe zu vermeiden? Theologische und mystische Annahmen wurden manchmal als Grund dafür angeführt, dass wir zu dem wurden, was wir sind, aber unser Verhalten göttlichen oder anderen transzendenten Ursachen zuzuschreiben, ist nicht die Antwort. Wir sind weder Engel noch Teufel. Wir wurden zur Geißel, zu der wir unbeabsichtigt geworden sind. Zu Beginn des Neolithikums begann ein Teil der Menschheit, die Ressourcen des Planeten ohne Rücksicht auf irgendetwas und irgendjemanden zu nutzen und sich nur darauf zu konzentrieren, seinen eigenen Komfort und seine eigene Macht zu verbessern. Auf einem endlichen und voneinander abhängigen Planeten führte dies zu unausgewogenen und unhaltbaren Bedingungen. Der egozentrische Umgang mit Ressourcen hat das Netz des Lebens beschädigt. Die menschliche Spezies wurde zu einer Bedrohung für alles Leben auf dem Planeten und auch für sich selbst: Die Gesundheit des Netzes des Lebens ist eine Vorbedingung für die Gesundheit der dort lebenden Spezies. Dies ist eine relativ junge Erkenntnis. Jahrtausendelang gingen die Menschen ihren Daseinsaufgaben nach, ohne sich bewusst zu sein, dass die unreflektierte Verfolgung ihrer eigenen Interessen um sie herum zum Fluch des Lebens wird. -/- Wir sind zu einem Fluch für das Leben auf diesem Planeten geworden; Wir haben die Welt zu einem Spielzeugladen gemacht, in dem wir die leistungsstarken Spielzeuge bauen, die unseren wahrgenommenen Interessen dienen. Wir spielen mit unseren Spielsachen unabhängig davon, ob sie wirklich unseren Bedürfnissen dienen, und ohne Rücksicht auf die Bedürfnisse anderer. Wir setzen die Energie des Atoms frei und nutzen sie, um Systeme anzutreiben, die unsere Bedürfnisse befriedigen. Wir leiten Elektronenströme in integrierte Schaltkreise und verwenden die Schaltkreise, um die Technologien zu beherrschen, die unseren Anforderungen an Kommunikation und Information dienen. Wir spielen im globalen Spielzeugladen ohne Rücksicht auf die Folgen für andere und für den gesamten Laden. Dies ist ein kurzsichtiges und gefährliches Verhalten. Wir greifen auf Energie auf eine Weise zu, die nicht unseren wirklichen Bedürfnissen dient, sondern nur unseren kurzfristigen, egozentrischen Bedürfnissen. Ähnlich kurzsichtig manipulieren wir Informationen. Beispiele dafür sind die Atombombe und das Atomkraftwerk auf der einen Seite und der Computer mit seinem Netzwerk aus globalem Geschwätz auf der anderen Seite. Atomkraft, selbst für friedliche Zwecke, und künstliche Intelligenz, selbst wenn sie gut gemeint ist, sind gefährliche Spielzeuge. Sie können zu technologischen Überschreitungen werden, die am Ende unser Leben und das gesamte Lebensnetz in der Biosphäre schädigen. Wir sind an sich gut, aber egozentrisch und kurzsichtig. Aber das kann nicht unwidersprochen bleiben. Die Zeit, in der wir naiv mit mächtigen Spielzeugen spielen konnten, ist vorbei. Ihre unvorhergesehenen „Nebenwirkungen“ sind zu einer Bedrohung für alles Leben auf dem Planeten geworden, einschließlich unseres eigenen. -/- Vorwärts gehen. -/- Wir sind an der Schwelle des vierten Urknalls angekommen. Was machen wir jetzt? Wenn wir gedeihen oder auch nur überleben wollen, muss sich unser Bewusstsein ändern. Gelingt dies nicht, wird der nächste Urknall unser letzter sein. Eine globale Transformation ist ein riskanter Prozess: Soll sie nicht zum Zusammenbruch, sondern zum Durchbruch führen, muss sie gesteuert werden. Wir können mit der bewussten Führung unserer Evolution beginnen, indem wir Gandhis Rat folgen: Sag anderen nicht, was sie tun sollen; Werde du selbst zu dem, was sie und die Welt werden sollen. Unsere wesentliche Aufgabe ist es, die Transformation der Welt zu werden. Wir müssen Ausdruck eines reifen und gesunden Lebens in der Biosphäre sein. Wenn diese kritische Masse erreicht wird, wird der „vierte Urknall“ nicht das Ende des Lebens auf dem Planeten markieren. Es wird eine disruptive globale Transformation sein, aber keine destruktive. Es wird eine neue Phase in der Amtszeit der Menschheit auf dem Planeten auslösen und nicht das Ende dieser Amtszeit. Es ist an der Zeit, die Lehren aus der Geschichte zu ziehen – zurückzublicken, um nach vorne zu sehen. Das Überleben einer fortgeschrittenen Spezies und die Zukunft des Lebensnetzes auf diesem Planeten liegt in unseren Händen. Noch nie waren so viele von der Weisheit so weniger abhängig. Wir müssen erwachen – um erwachsen zu werden. Die Kraft des Bewusstseins zu nutzen, die in unseren Händen liegt. Es ist nicht an der Zeit zu fragen, ob wir den vierten Urknall, die bereits begonnene globale Transformation, überstehen werden. Es ist an der Zeit, sich daran zu machen, es zu schaffen. (shrink)

I argue that taxation for redistributive purposes is a property rights violation, responding to arguments (due to Nagel, Murphy, Sunstein, and Holmes) claiming that individuals lack ownership of their pretax incomes.