Initial responses to questionnaires used to assess participants' understanding of informed consent for malaria vaccine trials conducted in the United States and Mali were tallied. Total scores were analyzed by age, sex, literacy (if known), and location. Ninety-two percent (92%) of answers by United States participants and 85% of answers by Malian participants were correct. Questions more likely to be answered incorrectly in Mali related to risk, and to the type of vaccine. For adult participants, independent predictors of higher scores (...) were younger age and female sex in the United States, and male sex in Mali. Scores in the United States were higher than in Mali (P = 0.005). Despite this difference participants at both sites were well informed overall. Although interpretation must be qualified because questionnaires were not intended as research tools and were not standardized among sites, these results do not support concerns about systematic low understanding among research participants in developing versus developed countries. (shrink)

M. Klimczuk-Kochańska, A. Klimczuk, Podregion białostocko-suwalski a podregiony: krośnieńsko-przemyski, obwód zakarpacki i obwód grodzieński, [in:] B. Plawgo, Współpraca transgraniczna małych i średnich przedsiȩbiorstw jako czynnik rozwoju regionalnego. Na przykładzie podregionu białostocko-suwalskiego i podregionu krośnieńsko-przemyskiego w Polsce, obwodu zakarpackiego na Ukrainie oraz obwodu Grodzieńskiego na Białorusi, Białostocka Fundacja Kształcenia Kadr, Białystok 2015, pp. 29-85.

Celem artykułu jest analiza prawnych i etycznych sposobów uzasadnienia dopuszczalności stosowania polityki namierzania i zabijania. Pojawiły się próby usprawiedliwienia tego typu działań poprzez odwołanie do egzekwowania prawa, reguł rządzących konfliktami zbrojnymi, sprawiedliwej odpłaty, prawa do obrony własnej. W artykule dokonuję analizy tych sposobów usprawiedliwiania polityki namierzania i zabijania, a następnie rozważam, które z nich faktycznie mogą uzasadniać tego typu politykę. Rozważania prowadzę w świetle głównej hipotezy projektu badawczego, który obecnie prowadzę, zakładającej, że normy regulujące dopuszczalność i sposoby toczenia konfliktów zbrojnych (...) i używania przemocy w stosunkach międzynarodowych powinny być spójne z moralnymi intuicjami dotyczącymi stosowania przemocy w przypadkach indywidualnych. (shrink)

A. Klimczuk, Kształcenie zawodowe w społeczeństwach i gospodarkach opartych na wiedzy i kreatywności, [in:] M. Juchnicka, Doradcze i edukacyjne aspekty reorientacji zawodowej i wsparcia zatrudnienia zwalnianych pracowników oświaty, Izba Rzemieślnicza i Przedsiȩbiorczości, Białystok 2015, pp. 13-36.

A. Klimczuk, Rekonwersja i outplacement nauczycieli i instruktorów praktycznej nauki zawodu, [in:] M. Juchnicka, Doradcze i edukacyjne aspekty reorientacji zawodowej i wsparcia zatrudnienia zwalnianych pracowników oświaty, Izba Rzemieślnicza i Przedsiȩbiorczości, Białystok 2015, pp. 157-233.

A. Klimczuk, M. Skarzyński, Wnioski i rekomendacje, [in:] M. Juchnicka, Doradcze i edukacyjne aspekty reorientacji zawodowej i wsparcia zatrudnienia zwalnianych pracowników oświaty, Izba Rzemieślnicza i Przedsiȩbiorczości, Białystok 2015, pp. 289-306.

review of Béatrice Longuenesse latest book on Kant and self-consciousness I, Me, Mine (Oxford 2017).

Translation of Aristotle's Physics I-II into Portuguese, with commentaries. Tradução para o português dos livros I e II da Física de Aristóteles, com comentários.

The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity of (...) a thinking subject. To begin with, what exactly does Kant mean when he states that I is a simple and empty representation? Secondly, can the features of the representation I and the correlative transcendental designation explain the indexical nature of the I? Thirdly, do the Kantian considerations on indexicality anticipate any of the semantic elements or, if nothing else, the spirit of the direct reference theory? (shrink)

This review confirms Herman’s work as a praiseworthy contribution to East-West and comparative philosophical literature. Due credit is given to Herman for providing English readers with access to Buber’s commentary on, a personal translation of, the Chuang-Tzu; Herman’s insight into the later influence of I and Thou on Buber’s understanding of Chuang-Tzu and Taoism is also appropriately commended. In latter half of this review, constructive criticisms of Herman’s work are put forward, such as formatting inconsistencies, a tendency toward verbosity and (...) jargon, and a neglect of seemingly important hermeneutical issues. Such issues, seemingly substantive but neglected by Herman, are the influence of Buber’s prior familiarity with Hasidic teachings on his encounter with Chuang-Tzu, as well as the prevalence of Hasidic and Taoist thought in Buber’s conception of good and evil. (shrink)

I am in an ordered state of my limited perception, which will be in another state for there is no past, there is no present and there is no future, these exists in the limits of my perception.

The aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational nature. It (...) proves helpful to interpret the “transcendental subject” in formal terms as a concept that, mutatis mutandis, has the same function of the concept of the “transcendental object.”. (shrink)

Clarence I. Lewis (1883-1964) delineated the structure of mind based on his “conceptual pragmatism.” Human mind grounds itself on the ongoing dynamic interaction of relational processes, which is essentially mediated and structural. Lewis’s pragmatism anchors itself on the theory of knowledge that has the triadic structure of the given or immediate data, interpretation, and the concept. Lewis takes the a priori given as a starting point of meaningful experience. The interpretative work of mind is the mediator of the a priori (...) given and the concepts. The a priori given is the principle that determines the application of concepts in our interpretative process. Our mind interprets the given in relating to other possible experience. In other words, the meaning of the a priori given is determined by mind, the subject of interpretative process, which performs constructive and legislative activity, and allows room for the existence of alternatives. Lewis’s theory of knowledge calls for pragmatic justification of value experience. In his ethical theory, Lewis pursues to find answers for how to build up the objectivity of value experience regarding the work of mind as conceptual apparatus. For Lewis, knowledge is a claim about valuation and normativity. In our value experience, the normative significance of our empirical assessments for action comprises objective significance for future experience. Mind is “principle- content apparatus” composed of imperatives as the a priori given principles and the contents of experience as a whole.Imperatives are the result of lessons accumulated from the past and function as rules for the future. Individuals start their experience from imperatives and organize their own experience by doing based on the inferential process, which is directional from the past to the future. (shrink)

We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let (...) alone a priori true. This further reinforces Glezakos’s objections against the set-up of Frege’s puzzle, while also raising what we think is an acute problem for Fregeans, insofar as I-thought (and indexical thinking more generally), understood in their way, turns out to be incompatible with some basic features of rationality. (shrink)

Współcześnie rośnie znaczenie badań interdyscyplinarnych oraz z zakresu zróżnicowania kulturowego, wielokulturowości i współpracy międzykulturowej. Istotne jest także uwzględnianie globalnych procesów zmian związanych z upowszechnianiem cyfrowych technologii informatycznych i telekomunikacyjnych. Jedną z teorii mających podstawowe znaczenie w tym obszarze badań jest koncepcja autorstwa E. Sapira i B.L. Whorfa. Celem artykułu jest przybliżenie aktualności sporu naukowego dotyczącego poglądów tych autorów na relacje pomiędzy językiem a poznaniem. Opracowanie opiera się na krytycznej analizie literatury przedmiotu. W podsumowaniu wskazane zostały główne wnioski i rekomendacje co (...) do dalszych kierunków badań. ** Nowadays is growing importance of interdisciplinary research and in the field of cultural diversity, multiculturalism and intercultural cooperation. It is important also to take into account the global processes of changes associated with the dissemination of digital information and communication technologies. One of the theories which are essential in this area of research is the concept by E. Sapir and B.L. Whorf. The purpose of the article is to introduce into a current condition of scientific dispute concerning the views of these authors on the relationship between language and cognition. Paper is based on a critical analysis of the literature. In conclusion, the main findings and recommendations for further research were identified. (shrink)

The problem of satisfaction conditions arises from the apparent difficulties of explaining the nature of the mental states involved in our emotional responses to tragic fictions. Greg Currie has recently proposed to solve the problem by arguing for the recognition of a class of imaginative counterparts of desires - what he and others call i-desires. In this paper I will articulate and rebut Currie's argument in favour of i-desires and I will put forward a new solution in terms of genuine (...) desires. To this aim I will show that the same sort of puzzling phenomenon involved in our responses to tragic fictions arises also in a non-fictional case, and I will offer a solution to the problem of satisfaction conditions that dispenses with i-desires. The key to the explanation is in the notion of condition-dependent desires triggered by fictions. (shrink)

Perry and Recanati describe I-thoughts or de se thoughts as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphysical questions. The aim of this paper is to highlight that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the I doesn’t perform a referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. Particularly, as far as the genesis of the (...) Cartesian illusion concerning the thinking subject’s immaterial nature is concerned – one of the issues addressed in the Blue Book and in the first Critique – Kant and Wittgenstein seem to share the same philosophical concerns, as they both focus, although not exclusively, on the type of reference involved in the I, obviously via extremely different philosophical paths and with what may appear antipodal, metaphysical assumptions at first sight. (shrink)

Opracowanie przybliża wyzwania zwi¸a}zane ze starzeniem siȩ populacji ludzkich przyw uwzglȩdnieniu wyłaniania siȩ społeczeństw i gospodarek kreatywnych. Na pocz¸a}tku XXI wieku przemianom pracy i czasu wolnego towarzysz¸a} kwestie utrzymania solidarności pokoleń i przeciwdziałania wykluczeniu robotycznemu. W artykule zarysowane zostały najważniejsze cechy nowych instytucji kultury typu "medialab", laboratoriów mediów, które mog¸a zostać wykorzystane do realizacji działań na rzecz kształtowania pozytywnych odpowiedzi wobec tych wyzwań w ramach wspierania rozwoju "srebrnej gospodarki" i gerontechnologii. Zwraca siȩ również uwagȩ na potrzeby i możliwości umocowania ich (...) w politykach rozwoju miȩdzypokoleniowości. ** Essay approximates challenges of an ageing population and emergencing creative societies and economies. In the early XXI century transformations of work and leisure time is accompanied by issues of maintaining the solidarity of generations and preventing robotic exclusion. The article outlines the most vital features of the medialabs - new type of cultural institutions which can be used to implement actions towards the development of positive responses to these challenges by supporting development of the silver economy and gerontechnology. Work also draws attention to the needs and possibilities of attachment them into the development of intergenerational policies. (shrink)

A. Klimczuk, Outplacement w warunkach wzrostu ryzyka i elastyczności organizacji, [in:] M. Skarzyński, ESP, czyli Jak wyjść z zakrȩtu w rozwoju firmy, Narodowe Forum Doradztwa Kariery, Białystok 2015, pp. 11-53.

The paper presents the idea of cross‐cultural philosophy, which have inspired the organizers of the cyclic global conferences held at the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, USA, since 193 First, the author discusses some definitions of the comparative method applied in contemporary philosophy and promoted, among others, through the project of the “East‐West Philosophers’ Conference”. Then, she reports the major themes and panel topics raised during the eleventh conference organized in Honolulu, May 25–31, 2016.

A. Klimczuk, D. Borowski, Organizacja i formy świadczenia pracy na styku oświaty, rzemiosła i instytucji rynku pracy – stan prawny, [in:] M. Juchnicka, Formalnoprawne aspekty modernizacji szkolnictwa zawodowego, Izba Rzemieślnicza i Przedsiȩbiorczości, Białystok 2014, pp. 21-76.

A. Klimczuk, Szkolnictwo zawodowe w Polsce - nauczanie i wyzwania, [in:] M. Juchnicka, Formalnoprawne aspekty modernizacji szkolnictwa zawodowego, Izba Rzemieślnicza i Przedsiȩbiorczości, Białystok 2014, pp. 11-19.

In this paper, I discuss the question whether objective criteria could be provided for judging something to be a mental illness. I consider the two most prominent objectivist or naturalistic accounts of mental illness, evolutionary and bio-statistical account, which offer such a criterion by relying on the notion of biological function. According to such suggestions, illness is a condition in which there is dysfunciton in some feature of an organism. In this context, I consider different accounts for ascribing functions in (...) biologyand their relationship with the suggested accounts of illnesses. Special focus is placed on the objections according to which the ascription of functions, as envisaged in naturalistic accounts of illness, is incompatible with actual medical and psychiatric practice. I conclude that these objections are legitimate insofar we want to an account of illness that preserves the current practice of ascribing illness. However, the question remains, could a theory that tries to capture the actual medical practice be value-neutral, since our ordinary conception of illness is permeated with value judgments that indirectly enter into medical practice. In that respect, it seems that the requirement for pure objectivity is too strong and thus, it is not reasonable to expect that naturalistic accounts can satisfy it. (shrink)

Autorka przedstawia analizę pojęcia wstrząsu jako kategorii estetycznej użytej przez Th. Adorno w kontekście niemożności odbioru muzyki nowej. Nawiązując do Filozofii nowej muzyki oraz Teorii estetycznej autorka wyznacza kilka sposobów opisu i rozumienia wstrząsu, jakie znaleźć można u Adorno. Przy okazji śledząc tok myślenia filozofa zadaje sobie pytanie o to, czy wstrząs, o którym pisze Adorno jest zasadniczo czymś negatywnym, czym też może autor widzi w tym, gwałtownym sposobie reakcji na muzykę nową – ratunek.

The paper discusses peculiarity of the comparative method applied in philosophysince 1920s. It presents its basic foundations and objectives, as well as the early and most recent definitions of “comparative philosophy”. The author aims at reconsidering in terms of philosophy both the reasons for bias against this method and its advantages in the context of cross-cultural comparative studies. The crucial question is whether various incommensurate schemata of thought, including these which are determined by distinct cultural milieus, may be the subject (...) of comparison at all. To answer this question, she refers, among others, to Ludwik Fleck’s conception of a socially constructed “thought style” and“the truth”, being completely determined within a thought style. The author also consults the conceptions of Stanisław Schayer, Daya Krishna, Bimal K. Matilal and Jitendra NathMohanty who recommend the comparative method as highly useful for the on-going philosophical debates as long as it is not confined to tracing merely similarities between different intellectual traditions, i.e. analogical ideas and equivalent arguments. What seems to the present author the most valuable philosophical contribution to the comparative studies is the perspective of polilogue suggested by Franz M. Wimmer, and the metacomparative self-reference recognized by Wilhelm Halbfass and Robert W. Smid as precious enhancement and challenge for profound philosophical inquiry as such. (shrink)

Proces starzenia się społeczeństw stanowi istotne wyzwanie dla krajów Unii Europejskiej. W napływie emigrantów z młodszych regionów świata - głównie Azji i Afryki - dostrzega się sposobu na uzupełnienie malejących zasobów pracy, co prowadzi do wzrostu obaw w zakresie możliwości ich integracji w wymiarze międzypokoleniowym ze społecznościami przyjmującymi. Jednocześnie upatruje się korzyści z migracji seniorów oraz możliwości kształtowania gospodarek regionalnych i lokalnych tak by sprzyjały zaspokajaniu ich potrzeb. Celem opracowania jest przybliżenie koncepcji ageizmu (dyskryminacji ze względu na wiek) w formie (...) zwielokrotnionej, zarządzania różnorodnością, polityki kreatywności oraz związków wielokulturowości z konstruowaniem srebrnych gospodarek. Podsumowanie zawiera potencjalne kierunki dalszych badań nad wielokulturowymi aspektami srebrnej gospodarki. ** Process of ageing is important challenge for European Union countries. Influx of immigrants from younger regions of the world - mainly in Asia and Africa - is considered to be a way of supplementing dwindling labour resources, which leads to an increase in concern for their possible inclusion in the intergenerational dimension of the host communities. At the same time sees the benefits of migration and seniors opportunities to develop regional economies and encourage local authorities in order to meet their needs. Aim of this paper is to present concepts of multiple age discrimination, diversity management, creativity policy and relationships of multicultural society with construction of silver economies. Summary contains potential directions for further research on multicultural aspects of silver economy. (shrink)

Dâwûd al-Qarisî (Dâvûd al-Karsî) was a versatile and prolific 18th century Ottoman scholar who studied in İstanbul and Egypt and then taught for long years in various centers of learning like Egypt, Cyprus, Karaman, and İstanbul. He held high esteem for Mehmed Efendi of Birgi (Imâm Birgivî/Birgili, d.1573), out of respect for whom, towards the end of his life, Karsî, like Birgivî, occupied himself with teaching in the town of Birgi, where he died in 1756 and was buried next to (...) Birgivî. Better known for his following works on Arabic language and rhetoric and on the prophetic traditions (hadith): Sharḥu uṣûli’l-ḥadîth li’l-Birgivî; Sharḥu’l-Ḳaṣîdati’n-nûniyya (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Şarḥu’l-Emsileti’l-mukhtalifa fi’ṣ-ṣarf (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Sharḥu’l-Binâʾ; Sharḥu’l-ʿAvâmil; and Sharḥu İzhâri’l-asrâr, Karsî has actually composed textbooks in quite different fields. Hence the hundreds of manuscript copies of his works in world libraries. Many of his works were also recurrently printed in the Ottoman period. One of the neglected aspects of Karsî is his identity as a logician. Although he authored ambitious and potent works in the field of logic, this aspect of him has not been subject to modern studies. Even his bibliography has not been established so far (with scattered manuscript copies of his works and incomplete catalogue entries). This article primarily and in a long research based on manuscript copies and bibliographic sources, identifies twelve works on logic that Karsî has authored. We have clarified the works that are frequently mistaken for each other, and, especially, have definitively established his authorship of a voluminous commentary on al-Kâtibî’s al-Shamsiyya, of which commentary a second manuscript copy has been identified and described together with the other copy. Next is handled his most famous work of logic, the Sharhu Îsâghûcî, which constitutes an important and assertive ring in the tradition of commentaries on Îsâghûcî. We describe in detail the nine manuscript copies of this work that have been identified in various libraries. The critical text of Karsî’s Sharhu Îsâghûcî, whose composition was finished on 5 March 1745, has been prepared based on the following four manuscripts: (1) MS Kayseri Raşid Efendi Kütüphanesi, No. 857, ff.1v-3v, dated 1746, that is, only one year after the composition of the work; (2) MS Bursa İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, No.794B, ff.96v-114v, dated 1755; (3) MS Millet Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri Efendi Arapça, No. 1752, ff.48v-58r, dated 1760; (4) MS Beyazıt Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Beyazıt, No. 3129, ff.41v-55v, dated 8 March 1772. While preparing the critical text, we have applied the Center for Islamic Studies (İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, İSAM)’s method of optional text choice. The critical text is preceded by a content analysis. Karsî is well aware of the preceding tradition of commentary on Îsâghûcî, and has composed his own commentary as a ‘simile’ or alternative to the commentary by Mollâ Fanârî which was famous and current in his own day. Karsî’s statement “the commentary in one day and one night” is a reference to Mollâ Fanârî who had stated that he started writing his commentary in the morning and finished it by the evening. Karsî, who spent long years in the Egyptian scholarly and cultural basin, adopted the religious-sciences-centered ‘instrumentalist’ understanding of logic that was dominant in the Egypt-Maghrib region. Therefore, no matter how famous they were, he criticized those theoretical, long, and detailed works of logic which mingled with philosophy; and defended and favored authoring functional and cogent logic texts that were beneficial, in terms of religious sciences, to the seekers of knowledge and the scholars. Therefore, in a manner not frequently encountered in other texts of its kind, he refers to the writings and views of Muhammad b. Yûsuf al-Sanûsî (d.1490), the great representative of this logical school in the Egyptian-Maghrib region. Where there is divergence between the views of the ‘earlier scholars’ (mutaqaddimûn) like Ibn Sînâ and his followers and the ‘later scholars’ (muta’akhkhirûn), i.e., post-Fakhr al-dîn al-Râzî logicians, Karsî is careful to distance himself from partisanship, preferring sometimes the views of the earliers, other times those of the laters. For instance, on the eight conditions proposed for the realization of contradiction, he finds truth to be with al-Fârâbî, who proposed “unity in the predicative attribution” as the single condition for the realization of contradiction. Similarly, on the subject matter of Logic, he tried to reconcile the mutaqaddimûn’s notion of ‘second intelligibles’ with the muta’akhkhirûn’s notion of ‘apprehensional and declarational knowledge,’ suggesting that not much difference exists between the two, on the grounds that both notions are limited to the aspect of ‘known things that lead to the knowledge of unknown things.’ Karsî asserts that established and commonly used metaphors have, according to the verifying scholars, signification by correspondence (dalâlat al-mutâbaqah), adding also that it should not be ignored that such metaphors may change from society to society and from time to time. Karsî also endorses the earlier scholars’ position concerning the impossibility of quiddity (mâhiyya) being composed of two co-extensive parts, and emphasizes that credit should not be given to later scholars’ position who see it possible. According to the verifying scholars (muhaqqîqûn), it is possible to make definition (hadd) by mentioning only difference (fasl), in which case it becomes an imperfect definition (hadd nâqis). He is of the opinion that the definition of the proposition (qadiyya) in al-Taftâzânî’s Tahdhîb is clearer and more complete: “a proposition is an expression that bears the possibility of being true or false”. He states that in the division of proposition according to quantity what is taken into consideration is the subject (mawdû‘) in categorical propositions, and the temporal aspect of the antecedent (muqaddam) in hypothetical propositions. As for the unquantified, indefinite proposition (qadiyya muhmalah), Karsî assumes that if it is not about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a particular proposition (qadiyya juz’iyyah); but if it is about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a universal proposition (qadiyya kulliyyah). This being the general rule about the ambiguous (muhmal) propositions, he nevertheless contends that, because its subject (mawdû‘) is negated, it is preferable to consider a negative ambiguous (sâliba muhmalah) proposition like “human (insân) is not standing” to be a virtually/potentially universal negative (sâliba kulliyyâh) proposition. He states that a disjunctive hypothetical proposition (shartiyya al-munfasila) that is composed of more than two parts/units is only seemingly so, and that in reality it cannot be composed of more than two units. Syllogism (qiyâs), according to Karsî, is the ultimate purpose (al-maqsad al-aqsâ) and the most valuable subject-matter of the science of Logic. For him, the entire range of topics that are handled before this one are only prolegomena to it. This approach of Karsî clearly reveals how much the ‘demonstration (burhân)-centered’ approach of the founding figures of the Muslim tradition of logic like al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ has changed. al-Abharî, in his Îsâghûjî makes no mention of ‘conversion by contradiction’ (‘aks al-naqîd). Therefore, Karsî, too, in his commentary, does not touch upon the issue. However, in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd Karsî does handle the conversion by contradiction and its rules. Following the method of Îsâghûjî, in his commentary Karsî shortly touches on the four figures (shakl) of conjuctive syllogism (qiyâs iqtirânî) and their conditions, after which he passes to the first figure (shakl), which is considered ‘the balance of the sciences’ (mi‘yâr al-‘ulûm), explaining the four moods (darb) of it. In his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd, however, Karsî handles all the four figures (shakl) with all their related moods (darb), where he speaks of fife moods (darb) of the fourth figure (shakl). The topic of ‘modal propositions’ (al-muwajjahât) and of ‘modal syllogism’ (al-mukhtalitât), both of which do not take place in the Îsâghûjî, are not mentioned by Karsî as well, either in his commentary on Îsâghûjî or in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd. Karsî proposes that the certainties (yaqîniyyât), of which demonstration (burhân) is made, have seven, not six, divisions. After mentioning (1) axioms/first principles (awwaliyyât), (2) observata/sensuals (mushâhadât), (3) experta/empiricals (mujarrabât), (4) acumenalia (hadthiyyât), (5) testata (mutawâtirât), and (6) instictives (fitriyyât), that is, all the ‘propositions accompanied by their demonstrations,’ Karsî states that these six divisions, which do not need research and reflection (nazar), are called badîhiyyât (self-evidents), and constitute the foundations (usûl) of certainties (yaqîniyyât). As the seventh division he mentions (7) the nazariyyât (theoreticals), which are known via the badîhiyyât, end up in them, and therefore convey certainty (yaqîn). For Karsî, the nazariyyât/theoreticals, which constitute the seventh division of yaqîniyyât/certainties, are too numerous, and constitute the branches (far‘) of yaqîniyyât. Every time the concept of ‘Mughâlata’ (sophistry) comes forth in the traditional sections on the five arts usually appended to logic works, Karsî often gives examples from what he sees as extreme sûfî sayings, lamenting that these expressions are so widespread and held in esteem. He sometimes criticizes these expressions. However, it is observed that he does not reject tasawwuf in toto, but excludes from his criticism the mystical views and approaches of the truth-abiding (ahl al-haqq), shârî‘â-observant (mutasharri‘) leading sufis who have reached to the highest level of karâmah. (shrink)

Seeing with Ears, Hearing with Eyes. How Technology Molds Synesthesia Within Us -/- The subject of consideration within this lecture is the contribution of existing scientific discoveries on the visual and musical connection within the perceptual plane. Points of reference are the studies of Amir Amedi, Jacob Jolij and Maaieke Meurs, Harry McGurk, as well as, the works of Iwona Sowińska, Roger Scruton, Oliver Sacks, and a cultural analysis of Joshua Bell’s performance. I will also consider how the senses effect (...) each other, pursuing the diversified reception of vision, which consists of the sense of hearing [sic!], on which I would like to focus attention. -/- Paper structure:  Introduction to key concepts in the fields of research and development,  The visual outlook on hearing,  The aural perspective on vision,  Relationships to related sciences,  Summary of multimedia examples,  An attempt to extend the “techno-view” to the auditory senses within synesthesia. (shrink)

Wśród kluczowych wyzwań rozwojowych Polski na początku XXI wieku znajdują ograniczanie negatywnych efektów procesu starzenia się społeczeństwa oraz wzrost kapitału społecznego obywateli, ich umiejętności współpracy przy rozwiązywaniu problemów w różnych sferach życia społecznego i gospodarczego. Artykuł przybliża łączną analizę tych zagadnień w odniesieniu do kształtowania kapitału społecznego ludzi starych. Kolejno omówione zostają podstawowe pojęcia wykorzystywane w dyskursie o aktywizacji społecznej osób starszych, założenia kształtowania współczesnych wielopoziomowych polityk publicznych w tym zakresie oraz typologie przykładowych rozwiązań na rzecz budowy zasobów kapitału społecznego. (...) ** Among the key development challenges at the beginning of 21st century in Poland are reducing negative effects of an ageing population and increasing the social capital of citizens, their ability to work together to solve problems in various areas of social and economic development. Article brings analysis of these issues in relation to shaping older people social capital. Consecutively discussed are: the basic terms used in the discourse of social activation of the elderly, the assumptions of modern multi-level shaping of public policies in this area as well as typologies of sample solutions for building social capital resources. (shrink)

Na pocz¸a}tku XXI wieku zachodz¸a} istotne przemiany w relacjach pracy i czasu wolnego. Dostrzega siȩ też rozwój gospodarki kreatywnej wraz z wyłanianiem siȩ nowej stratyfikacji społecznej i zmian¸a} czynników rozwojowych. Coraz wiȩksze znaczenie w przemianach społeczno-gospodarczych ma sektor kultury oraz działania na rzecz kształtowania przemysłów kultury i kreatywnych, wraz z ich powi¸a}zaniami z sektorami zależnymi jak np. turystyka, architektura i wzornictwo przemysłowe. Celem artykułu jest odniesienie tych procesów i zjawisk do warunków województwa podlaskiego oraz przybliżenie głównych przesłanek powołania Regionalnego Obserwatorium (...) Kultury. Artykuł wskazuje na potrzebȩ i potencjalne korzyści z zarz¸a}dzania wiedz¸a na temat kultury na poziomie regionalnym poprzez prowadzenie prac teoretycznych i metodologicznych w ramach obserwatorium. Opracowanie na podstawie analizy danych zastanych i wyników badań własnych zwraca uwagȩ na główne cechy regionu, potrzeby informacyjne instytucji kulturalnych i artystycznych, możliwe modele obserwatorium kultury, potencjalne obszary działalności obserwatorium i korzyści z niej wynikaj¸ace. ** At the beginning of the XXI century, there are significant changes in relations of work and leisure time. The development of creative economy is also recognized along with emergence of a new social stratification and changes in developmental factors. Increasingly im- portant in the socio-economic transformation is cultural sector as well as promotion of culture and creative industries development including their linkages with dependent sectors such as tourism, architecture and industrial design. The aim of this article is to refer these processes and phenomena to the conditions of Podlaskie Voivodship and to discuss the main reasons of Regional Observatory of Culture establishment. Article indicates the need for and potential benefits of knowledge management on culture at the regional level by conducting theoretical and methodological work within the observatory. Essay based on an analysis of existing data and own research results highlights the main features of the region, information needs of cultural and art institutions, culture observatory possible models, potential activity areas of the regional observatory and the arising benefits from its activities. (shrink)

In my paper I make a summary assessment of the connection between Eugeni Crexells and Eugeni d'Ors and that of both of them with pragmatism. I organize it in three sections: 1. First, the philosophical formation of Crexells and its relation with D'Ors; 2. Eugeni d'Ors and pragmatism, and 3. Joan Crexells and pragmatism.

A. Klimczuk, Uzasadnienie modelu w kontekście zmian demograficznych i wyzwań rynku pracy, [in:] M. Skarzyński, Przyszłość edukacji zawodowej. Kierunki reorientacji i nowe obszary aktywności zawodowej nauczycieli zawodu, Izba Rzemieślnicza i Przedsiȩbiorczości, Białystok 2015, pp. 19-114.

Wittgenstein’s concepts shed light on the phenomenon of schizophrenia in at least three different ways: with a view to empathy, scientific explanation, or philosophical clarification. I consider two different “positive” wittgensteinian accounts―Campbell’s idea that delusions involve a mechanism of which different framework propositions are parts, Sass’ proposal that the schizophrenic patient can be described as a solipsist, and a Rhodes’ and Gipp’s account, where epistemic aspects of schizophrenia are explained as failures in the ordinary background of certainties. I argue that (...) none of them amounts to empathic-phenomenological understanding, but they provide examples of how philosophical concepts can contribute to scientific explanation, and to philosophical clarification respectively. (shrink)

The abstract Everyone who gets to know deeper with the Nietzsche philosophy is forced to think about a mutual relationship of a culture and a biology. The main problem to correct show of above relationships is the understanding of the meaning of a language with reference to the culture and the biology. Considerations which are represented here are inspired by the Nietzsche philosophy. They are split by three parts. In the first part there is shown the meaning of the language (...) to create the herd in the Nietzsche philosophy. The second part develops his qualification of the language as a shortening of communication. The final part tries to refer the functioning of the language to the sphere of a biological human being. As I think, only the biological perspective permits to overstep the rhetoric of the individualism expressed in the Nietzsche philosophy by the opposition among weak and strong, or else among a priest and a superman. Thanks to drawn consequence from accepted by Nietzsche of the reduction my to the animal sort we are forced to the reversal of the perspective of his thought. The herd is not a centre to create the superman as the aim of the all mankind, but the sense of the exceptionality of an each subject is a centre to a fixation of the reproduction of the genetic definite population. (shrink)

This paper argues for what I call modest ethical veganism: the view that it is typically wrong to use or eat products made from or by animals such as cows, pigs, or chickens. The argument has three central parts. First, I argue that a central explanation for the wrongness of causing suffering rests upon what it is like to experience such suffering, and that we have good reasons to think that animals suffer in ways that are relevantly analogous to humans. (...) Second, I argue that animals can have better and worse lives, and that a central explanation for the wrongness of killing is that it deprives the victim of the valuable life that they would otherwise have had. Third, I argue that it is wrong to cooperate with massive wrongdoing. By consuming animal products, we typically support institutions that engage in massive and systematic wrongful treatment of animals. We thus ought to become vegan. (shrink)

I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the (...) bulk of the paper I address six objections to OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

Harry Frankfurt has argued that Descartes’s madness doubt in the First Meditation is importantly different from his dreaming doubt. The madness doubt does not provide a reason for doubting the senses since were the meditator to suppose he was mad his ability to successfully complete the philosophical investigation he sets for himself in the first few pages of the Meditations would be undermined. I argue that Frankfurt’s interpretation of Descartes’s madness doubt is mistaken and that it should be understood as (...) playing the same role as his more famous dreaming doubt. I focus my discussion around four questions: (Q1) What does the meditator have in mind when speaking of madness?, (Q2) Why does the meditator so quickly dismiss the madness doubt but take seriously the dreaming doubt?, (Q3) Does the madness doubt have the same scope as the dreaming doubt?, and (Q4) Why does the meditator bring up the madness doubt at all? (shrink)

Knowledge and skill are intimately connected. In this essay, I discuss the question of their relationship and of which (if any) is prior to which in the order of explanation. I review some of the answers that have been given thus far in the literature, with a particular focus on the many foundational issues in epistemology that intersect with the philosophy of skill.

At the beginning of the XXI century, human societies are entering a period of "late modernity" characterized by new forms of trust and risk, untransparent social situations and economic, political and cultural globalization. These processes are associated with the presence of abstract systems that surround people and which require support of people with expertise in the fields which include transport, telecommunications, finance, security, media, energy. At the same time, it is noted that the expertise cult is born and specialists not (...) only meet the identified needs, but also produce new, thus contributing to the development of a culture of narcissism. Article aims to explain the characteristics of expert systems and cultural narcissism, experts role as a participant in social change, model types and kinds of experts with their arcane in to ontological and epistemological structures of the social world. I also highlight the problems associated with the suppression of restrictions in to the access of expertise knowledge. ** Wraz z początkiem XXI wieku społeczeństwa ludzkie wchodzą w okres „późnej nowoczesności” cechujący się nowymi formami zaufania i ryzyka, nieprzejrzystością sytuacji społecznych oraz postępującą globalizacją ekonomiczną, polityczną i kulturową. Procesy te wiążą się z obecnością systemów abstrakcyjnych, które otaczają ludzi i do funkcjonowania wymagają wsparcia osób z wiedzą specjalistyczną z zakresu m.in. transportu, telekomunikacji, finansów, bezpieczeństwa, mediów, energetyki. Jednocześnie zauważa się, iż rodzi się kult ekspertyzy a specjaliści nie tylko zaspokajają rozpoznane potrzeby, ale też wytwarzają nowe, przyczyniając się tym samym do rozwoju kultury narcyzmu. Artykuł ma na celu przybliżenie specyfiki systemów eksperckich i narcyzmu kulturowego, roli eksperta jako uczestnika przemian społecznych, modelowych typów ekspertów i rodzajów ich wtajemniczeń w struktury ontologiczne i epistemologiczne świata społecznego oraz zwrócenie uwagi na problemy związane ze znoszeniem ograniczeń dostępu do wiedzy specjalistycznej. -/- . (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics I into Portuguese, with a few notes, experimental glossary and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2003/4, was preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

This paper is an opinionated guide to the literature on normative epistemic reasons. After making some distinctions in §1, I begin in §2 by discussing the ontology of normative epistemic reasons, assessing arguments for and against the view that they are mental states, and concluding that they are not mental states. In §3, I examine the distinction between normative epistemic reasons there are and normative epistemic reasons we possess. I offer a novel account of this distinction and argue that we (...) in fact ought to acknowledge a threefold distinction between objective, possessed, and apparent normative epistemic reasons. In §4, I discuss the question of which normative reasons for doxastic attitudes are the epistemic ones, evaluating reasons against a simple evidentialist answer. Finally, in §5, I look at the role of reasons in epistemology, considering challenges to viewing reasons as the building blocks of epistemic normativity and maintaining that the challenges recommend a novel bi-level epistemology rather than a marginalization of reasons in epistemology. (shrink)

In this field guide, I distinguish five separate senses with which the term ‘mechanism’ is used in contemporary philosophy of science. Many of these senses have overlapping areas of application but involve distinct philosophical claims and characterize the target mechanisms in relevantly different ways. This field guide will clarify the key features of each sense and introduce some main debates, distinguishing those that transpire within a given sense from those that are best understood as concerning distinct senses. The ‘new mechanisms’ (...) sense is at the center of most of these contemporary debates and will be treated at greater length; subsequent senses of mechanism will be primarily distinguished from this one. In part I of this paper, I distinguish two senses of the term ‘mechanism’, both of which are explicitly hierarchical and nested in character, such that any given mechanism is comprised of smaller sub-mechanisms, in turn comprised of yet smaller sub-sub-mechanisms and so on. While both of the senses discussed here are anti-reductive, they differ in their focus on scientific practice versus metaphysics, in the degree of regularity they attribute to mechanisms, and in terms of their relationships to the discussions of mechanisms in the history of philosophy and science. (shrink)

I examine Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge in Posterior Analytics 71b 9-12 and try to understand how it relates to the sophistical way of knowing and to "kata sumbebekos knowledge". I claim that scientific knowledge of p requires knowing p by its appropriate cause, and that this appropriate cause is a universal (katholou) in the restricted sense Aristotle proposes in 73b 26-27 ff., i.e., an attribute coextensive with the subject (an extensional feature) and predicated of the subject in itself (an (...) intensional feature). Kata sumbebekos knowledge, on the other hand, can occur even when the predicate of a conclusion is coextensive with its subject and is proved by a convertible meson which is not the most appropriate from an explanatory standpoint. (shrink)

I defend the normativity of meaning against recent objections by arguing for a new interpretation of the ‘ought’ relevant to meaning. Both critics and defenders of the normativity thesis have understood statements about how an expression ought to be used as either prescriptive or semantic. I propose an alternative view of the ‘ought’ as conveying the primitively normative attitudes speakers must adopt towards their uses if they are to use the expression with understanding.

In the Meditations and related texts from the early 1640s, Descartes argues that the self can be correctly considered as either a mind or a human being, and that the self’s properties vary accordingly. For example, the self is simple considered as a mind, whereas the self is composite considered as a human being. Someone might object that it is unclear how merely considering the self in different ways blocks the conclusion that a single subject of predication—the self—is both simple (...) and composite, which is contradictory. In response to this objection, this paper develops a reading of Descartes’s various ways of considering the self. I argue that the best reading of Descartes’s qualified claims about the self, i.e. about the self qua mind or the self qua human being, ultimately presupposes an account of the unqualified self, that is, of the self simpliciter. I argue that the self simpliciter is not a mind, and that it is not a human being either. This result might suggest the pessimistic conclusion that Descartes’s view of the self is simply incoherent. To avoid this result, I introduce a new metaphysical account of the Cartesian self. On my view, the self is individuated by a unified mental life. The self is constituted by the beings that jointly produce this mental life, and derives its unity from it. (shrink)

In this article , I first engage in some conceptual clarification of what the words "imagine," "imagining," and "imagination" can mean. Each has a constructive sense, an attitudinal sense, and an imagistic sense. Keeping the senses straight in the course of cognitive theorizing is important for both psychology and philosophy. I then discuss the roles that perceptual memories, beliefs, and genre truth attitudes play in constructive imagination, or the capacity to generate novel representations that go well beyond what's prompted by (...) one's immediate environment. (shrink)

Statements such as “X is beautiful but I don’t like how it looks” or “I like how X looks but it is not beautiful” sound contradictory. How contradictory they sound might however depend on the object X and on the aesthetic adjective being used (“beautiful”, “elegant”, “dynamic”, etc.). In our study, the first sentence was estimated to be more contradictory than the latter: If we describe something as beautiful, we often intend to evaluate its appearance, whereas it is less counterintuitive (...) to appreciate an appearance without finding it beautiful. Furthermore, statements including “beautiful” appeared more contradictory than those including “elegant” and “dynamic”, pointing to its greater evaluative component. When related to artworks, sentences could appear less contradictory due to readers’ consideration of the divergence between conventional beauty and art-related sensory pleasures that can even include negative valence. Such ambivalence might be more frequent in art-objects than in other artefacts. Indeed, in our study, sentences referring to artworks were estimated to be less contradictory compared to sentences referring to other artefacts. Meanwhile, an additional small group of graphic design students showed a less clear difference between art-related and non-art-related sentences. We discuss the potential influence of art experience and interest as well as theoretical and methodological challenges like the conceptualization of beauty. (shrink)

Multisensory processing encompasses all of the various ways in which the presence of information in one sensory modality can adaptively influence the processing of information in a different modality. In Part I of this survey article, I begin by presenting a cartography of some of the more extensively investigated forms of multisensory processing, with a special focus on two distinct types of multisensory integration. I briefly discuss the conditions under which these different forms of multisensory processing occur as well as (...) their important perceptual consequences and interrelations. In Part II, I then turn to examining of some of the different possible ways in which the structure of conscious perceptual experience might also be characterized as multisensory. In addition, I discuss the significance of research on multisensory processing and multisensory consciousness for philosophical attempts to individuate the senses. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics I-III into Portuguese, with a few notes and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2007, is preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

[ https://plus.google.com/108060242686103906748/posts/cwvdB6mK3J6 ]"As Literature germinates within me, my words are-“Literature is something, that I need to be acclaimed for, I need to know more...it’s my life that has given me birth, my way of thoughts that I am visualizing in the perspective of all dimensions, my frailties, my faults...my every comprehensive discussion even after my death, my spiritualism, my haunting towards the ecology of the cosmic world, and the way that I have brought up at my elbows to enhance myself (...) more in the bloom of dissolved doomed tragedy of a human life! It is indeed ravenous…but we the beings to run through this midst of life, as I need to pace up with at every inception and the idealistic phenomenal moments…!”. . (http://philpapers.org/profile/112741.). (shrink)