Ce texte est la préface à la réédition d'un certain nombre de textes du philosophe français Jean-Toussaint Desanti, philosophe des mathématiques qui a été marqué par la phénoménologie husserlienne et la pensée de Jean Cavaillès. Nous nous efforçons d'y rassembler les thèmes et thèses centraux de la pensée de Desanti, telle qu’elle s’élabore dans ces textes publiés dans différentes revues : en premier lieu, le thème de l’historicité des idéalités mathématiques et la récusation du sujet comme instance productrice (...) de ces objets. (shrink)

In this paper our purpose is to explane and discuss the essential objections Cavaillès raised to Husserlian phenomenology in his last text “On Logic and Theory of Science”. In this text Cavaillès questioned the foundational status of cogito and the capacity of consciousness to produce new ideal objects.; and he replaced this capacity with an anonymous generating necessity that would be dialectical and would take place intin the ideal domains of objects. We have to determine if such objections question every (...) philosophy philosophy of consciousness in general, or if they only question a particular interpretation of Husserlian transcendental subject; and if they necessarily lead us toward a Spinozist or Hegelian position in philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B , and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B . The first is that both the indicative conditional and the conditional bet are related to the conditional probability, P(B|A). The second is that de Finetti's three-valued truth table has psychological reality for both types of conditional— true , false , or void for indicative conditionals and win , lose (...) , or void for conditional bets. The participants were presented with an array of chips in two different colours and two different shapes, and an indicative conditional or a conditional bet about a random chip. They had to make judgements in two conditions: either about the chances of making the indicative conditional true or false or about the chances of winning or losing the conditional bet. The observed distributions of responses in the two conditions were generally related to the conditional probability, supporting the first hypothesis. In addition, a majority of participants in further conditions chose the third option, “void”, when the antecedent of the conditional was false, supporting the second hypothesis. (shrink)

I examine the once popular claim according to which interpersonal comparisons of welfare are necessary for social choice. I side with current social choice theorists in emphasizing that, on a narrow construal, this necessity claim is refuted beyond appeal. However, I depart from the opinion presently prevailing in social choice theory in highlighting that on a broader construal, this claim proves not only compatible with, but even comforted by, the current state of the field. I submit that all in all, (...) the most accurate philosophical assessment consists not in flatly rejecting this necessity claim, but in accepting it in a suitably revised form. (shrink)

Physical reality is all the reality we have, and so physical theory in the standard sense is all the ontology we need. This, at least, was an assumption taken almost universally for granted by the advocates of exact philosophy for much of the present century. Every event, it was held, is a physical event, and all structure in reality is physical structure. The grip of this assumption has perhaps been gradually weakened in recent years as far as the sciences of (...) mind are concerned. When it comes to the sciences of external reality, however, it continues to hold sway, so that contemporary philosophers B even while devoting vast amounts of attention to the language we use in describing the world of everyday experience B still refuse to see this world as being itself a proper object of theoretical concern. Here, however, we shall argue that the usual conception of physical reality as constituting a unique bedrock of objectivity reflects a rather archaic view as to the nature of physics itself and is in fact incompatible with the development of the discipline since Newton. More specifically, we shall seek to show that the world of qualitative structures, for example of colour and sound, or the commonsense world of coloured and sounding things, can be treated scientifically (ontologically) on its own terms, and that such a treatment can help us better to understand the structures both of physical reality and of cognition. (shrink)

Supra-Bayesianism is the Bayesian response to learning the opinions of others. Probability pooling constitutes an alternative response. One natural question is whether there are cases where probability pooling gives the supra-Bayesian result. This has been called the problem of Bayes-compatibility for pooling functions. It is known that in a common prior setting, under standard assumptions, linear pooling cannot be nontrivially Bayes-compatible. We show by contrast that geometric pooling can be nontrivially Bayes-compatible. Indeed, we show that, under certain assumptions, geometric and (...) Bayes-compatible pooling are equivalent. Granting supra-Bayesianism its usual normative status, one upshot of our study is thus that, in a certain class of epistemic contexts, geometric pooling enjoys a normative advantage over linear pooling as a social learning mechanism. We discuss the philosophical ramifications of this advantage, which we show to be robust to variations in our statement of the Bayes-compatibility problem. (shrink)

This paper examines the preference-based approach to the identification of beliefs. It focuses on the main problem to which this approach is exposed, namely that of state-dependent utility. First, the problem is illustrated in full detail. Four types of state-dependent utility issues are distinguished. Second, a comprehensive strategy for identifying beliefs under state-dependent utility is presented and discussed. For the problem to be solved following this strategy, however, preferences need to extend beyond choices. We claim that this a necessary feature (...) of any complete solution to the problem of state-dependent utility. We also argue that this is the main conceptual lesson to draw from it. We show that this lesson is of interest to both economists and philosophers. (shrink)

This study focuses on the essential difference between Kant’s and Husserl’s transcendental Idealism. In fact, Husserl describes in the «Cartesian Meditations» his own ontological thesis as a «transcendental idealism», in which all sorts of entities have to be constituted by an activity of the transcendental subjectivity, so that we have to regard pure consciousness as the ontological origin of all entities in the world. But this study is interested in the two opposite signications of the Kantian copernican inversion. On the (...) one hand, the Copernican inversion has the same sense as the phenomenological reduction, which implies that Husserl can’t agree with Kant’s presupposition of absolute things in themselves; on the second hand, it involves a relativistic and anthropologistic orientation, so that the aprioristic structures of given objects are founded on the universal structures of finite subjectivity, on pure forms and faculties of human consciousness. At the opposite, Husserl enounces a methodological prescription for any phenomenological elucidation: it is not allowed to presuppose in phenomenology any given faculty or given nature of transcendental subjectivity. This prescription has important consequences on which this study focuses. First the ontological difference between intuitus originarius and intuitus derivatus, in nite and nite type of intuition, doesn’t have any validity: the difference between factual and rational truths only depends on the essence of the truth itself, and doesn’t have its foundation on the ontological difference between creative and receptive sort of intuition. Secondly, this first thesis admits an immediate application on the level of subjective constitution of objects: the modality in which an object appears to the subjectivity doesn’t depend on the universal structure of finite subject, but is exclusively founded on the essence of the object itself, so that it is impossible to consider the aprioristic constitutive structure as a merely subjective structure. Thirdly, in this transcendental phenomenology everything has to be constituted by subjectivity: the aprioristic character of the pure forms of sensibility is not founded on the structure of finite subjectivity, but rather on the essential connection between sensual material and form; so that it is not allowed to presuppose any facticity of time and space; the pure forms of sensibility have to be constituted by a special type of synthesis that we have to elucidate in opposition to other types of higher levels. The profound signication of Husserl’s anticopernican inversion is that the field of transcendental phenomenology consists of the essential form of an eidos ego, which is «more objective than any objectivity», as Levinas said; and that transcendental phenomenology is completely dominated by the principium reddendae rationis. (shrink)

Dans l’histoire de la métaphysique, l’époque initiée par Descartes se caractérise par le projet de tirer toute connaissance de son propre fonds. C’est ce que Kant a exprimé par la révolution copernicienne : les structures universelles des objets de l’expérience (temporalité, spatialité, grandeur, force, mathématisabilité, etc.) se règlent sur les structures a priori impliquées dans la constitution du sujet transcendantal (les facultés et leurs formes pures). Par là, toute l’ontologie de l’objet d’expérience possible trouve son fondement dans une présupposition transcendantale (...) : celle de la préconstitution invariante du sujet transcendantal, caractérisée par un système de facultés (sensibilité, imagination, entendement, raison) et de formes pures (intuitions, schèmes, concepts et Idées pures). N’est-il pas possible d’élaborer une philosophie transcendantale qui fasse l’économie d’un tel présupposé ? Tel est le projet que l’auteur voit dans la phénoménologie husserlienne : un dépassement de la révolution copernicienne, dont le but n’est nullement de restaurer une ontologie réaliste, mais d’élucider l’essence du sujet transcendantal sans en présupposer l’identité, ni les facultés invariantes. En voici le principe : toute catégorie d’objets prescrit au sujet transcendantal une structure régulatrice, de sorte que le système des facultés du sujet peut être réélaboré au fil conducteur des types d’objets possibles. Dès lors se présente un cercle apparemment insoluble : l’essence du sujet pur se lit à partir des catégories d’objets, mais ces mêmes objets sont constitués par l’activité synthétique du sujet. Or, comment peut-on admettre le paradoxe selon lequel le sujet serait le produit de ses produits ? (shrink)

Est-il possible de parler de ce qui n’est pas ou d’y penser sans présupposer une forme d’être pour cela même que nous pensons ne pas exister? La vieille énigme parménidienne, qui hante toujours la philosophie contemporaine, est au cœur non seulement de la philosophie médiévale mais aussi des études médiévales, comme en témoigne le récent ouvrage d’Alain de Libera sur la référence vide. L’objet de cette étude est en comparaison beaucoup plus...

The Sure-Thing Principle famously appears in Savage’s axiomatization of Subjective Expected Utility. Yet Savage introduces it only as an informal, overarching dominance condition motivating his separability postulate P2 and his state-independence postulate P3. Once these axioms are introduced, by and large, he does not discuss the principle any more. In this note, we pick up the analysis of the Sure-Thing Principle where Savage left it. In particular, we show that each of P2 and P3 is equivalent to a dominance condition; (...) that they strengthen in different directions a common, basic dominance axiom; and that they can be explicitly combined in a unified dominance condition that is a candidate formal statement for the Sure-Thing Principle. Based on elementary proofs, our results shed light on some of the most fundamental properties of rational choice under uncertainty. In particular they imply, as corollaries, potential simplifications for Savage’s and the Anscombe- Aumann axiomatizations of Subjective Expected Utility. Most surprisingly perhaps, they reveal that in Savage’s axiomatization, P3 can be weakened to a natural strengthening of so-called Obvious Dominance. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the decision-theoretic status of risk attitudes. I start by providing evidence showing that the risk attitude concepts do not play a major role in the axiomatic analysis of the classic models of decision-making under risk. This can be interpreted as reflecting the neutrality of these models between the possible risk attitudes. My central claim, however, is that such neutrality needs to be qualified and the axiomatic relevance of risk attitudes needs to be re-evaluated accordingly. Specifically, (...) I highlight the importance of the conditional variation and the strengthening of risk attitudes, and I explain why they establish the axiomatic significance of the risk attitude concepts. I also present several questions for future research regarding the strengthening of risk attitudes. (shrink)

In this paper we focuse on how the first Heidegger changed the essential idea of phenomenology: if the terms of intentionality, pure consciousness, transcendental subject, noema and noesis radically disappear from Heidegger’s conceptuality, what does it mean exactly? Does Heidegger preserve anything from the idea of intentionality, from Husserl’s task of clarifying the aprioristic correlation between consciousness and object, and from Husserl’s relation of foundation of intentional modalities of higher level on modalities of lower level? We want here to emphasize (...) some essential changes concerning the idea of phenomenology: the holistic structure of experience, the task of clarifying the structure of transcendance as a foundation of intentionality, and the inversion of Husserl’s relation of foundation. On the contrary, we show how Husserl’s concept of sense is essentially different from that of ideal signification. (shrink)

The representational theory of measurement has long been the central paradigm in the philosophy of measurement. Such is not the case anymore, partly under the influence of the critique according to which RTM offers too poor descriptions of the measurement procedures actually followed in science. This can be called the metrological critique of RTM. I claim that the critique is partly irrelevant. This is because, in general, RTM is not in the business of describing measurement procedures, be it in idealized (...) form. To support this claim, I present various cases where RTM can be said to investigate measurement without providing any measurement procedure. Such limit cases lead to a better understanding of the RTM project. They also illustrate some of the questions which the philosophy of measurement can explore, when it is ready to go beyond the metrological viewpoint. (shrink)

Bringing together two aspects of Thomas Aquinas's thought that have been studied separately: his theory of God's concurrence and his theory of instrumental causality, I show how he uses the latter (which I discuss first) to clarify the Proclusian principle that the first cause has a greater influence on an effect than the proximate causes. Thanks to this theory, Aquinas accounts for the fact that it is God who confers existence to every new being that is produced by natural processes, (...) without however negating the agency of secondary, created causes. (shrink)

The basic axioms or formal conditions of decision theory, especially the ordering condition put on preferences and the axioms underlying the expected utility formula, are subject to a number of counter-examples, some of which can be endowed with normative value and thus fall within the ambit of a philosophical reflection on practical rationality. Against such counter-examples, a defensive strategy has been developed which consists in redescribing the outcomes of the available options in such a way that the threatened axioms or (...) conditions continue to hold. We examine how this strategy performs in three major cases: Sen's counterexamples to the binariness property of preferences, the Allais paradox of EU theory under risk, and the Ellsberg paradox of EU theory under uncertainty. We find that the strategy typically proves to be lacking in several major respects, suffering from logical triviality, incompleteness, and theoretical insularity. To give the strategy more structure, philosophers have developed “principles of individuation”; but we observe that these do not address the aforementioned defects. Instead, we propose the method of checking whether the strategy can overcome its typical defects once it is given a proper theoretical expansion. We find that the strategy passes the test imperfectly in Sen's case and not at all in Allais's. In Ellsberg's case, however, it comes close to meeting our requirement. But even the analysis of this more promising application suggests that the strategy ought to address the decision problem as a whole, rather than just the outcomes, and that it should extend its revision process to the very statements it is meant to protect. Thus, by and large, the same cautionary tale against redescription practices runs through the analysis of all three cases. A more general lesson, simply put, is that there is no easy way out from the paradoxes of decision theory. (shrink)

Consider a subjective expected utility preference relation. It is usually held that the representations which this relation admits differ only in one respect, namely, the possible scales for the measurement of utility. In this paper, I discuss the fact that there are, metaphorically speaking, two additional dimensions along which infinitely many more admissible representations can be found. The first additional dimension is that of state-dependence. The second—and, in this context, much lesser-known—additional dimension is that of act-dependence. The simplest implication of (...) their usually neglected existence is that the standard axiomatizations of subjective expected utility fail to provide the measurement of subjective probability with satisfactory behavioral foundations. (shrink)

We investigate risk attitudes when the underlying domain of payoffs is finite and the payoffs are, in general, not numerical. In such cases, the traditional notions of absolute risk attitudes, that are designed for convex domains of numerical payoffs, are not applicable. We introduce comparative notions of weak and strong risk attitudes that remain applicable. We examine how they are characterized within the rank-dependent utility model, thus including expected utility as a special case. In particular, we characterize strong comparative risk (...) aversion under rank-dependent utility. This is our main result. From this and other findings, we draw two novel conclusions. First, under expected utility, weak and strong comparative risk aversion are characterized by the same condition over finite domains. By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Second, under expected utility, weak comparative risk aversion is characterized by the same condition when the utility functions have finite range and when they have convex range. By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Thus, considering comparative risk aversion over finite domains leads to a better understanding of the divide between expected and non-expected utility, more generally, the structural properties of the main models of decision-making under risk. (shrink)

It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...) level of intentional mode or attitude. I first argue that this proposal fails to make emotions intelligible as value apprehensions. There are reasons to suppose that emotions do not apprehend value to begin with, but are related to values in a different, non-epistemic sense. I then go on to show that the notion of an evaluative intentional mode can still help elucidate the evaluative character of emotion. I argue that there is a plausible non-epistemic understanding of the view that emotions are evaluative modes. On this account, emotions are not ways of apprehending values, but ways of acknowledging values. (shrink)

It is widely held that under ordinal utility, utility differences are ill-defined. Allegedly, for these to be well-defined (without turning to choice under risk or the like), one should adopt as a new kind of primitive quaternary relations, instead of the traditional binary relations underlying ordinal utility functions. Correlatively, it is also widely held that the key structural properties of quaternary relations are entirely arbitrary from an ordinal point of view. These properties would be, in a nutshell, the hallmark of (...) cardinal utility. While much is obviously true in these two tenets, this note explains why, as stated, they should be abandoned. Any ordinal utility function induces a rich quaternary relation. There is such a thing as ordinal utility differences. Furthermore, this induced quaternary relation respects, apart from completeness, the most standard structural properties of quaternary relations. These properties are, from an ordinal point of view, anything but arbitrary; from a quaternary perspective only completeness should be considered the hallmark—if any—of cardinal utility. These facts are explained to be especially relevant to the critical appreciation of the ordinalist methodology. (shrink)

How to reconcile monadic simplicity with the successive plurality of the monadic states ? The doctrine of continued creation seems to entail the existence of independent temporal parts and thus lead to the thesis that the world contains only transitory things. I try to show how Leibniz has the resources to get out of this quandary. The analysis of the concept of extension shows that a plurality of states does not constitute a divisible aggregate. Then I examine the Leibnizian interpretation (...) of continued creation, by com- paring it to the scholastic and Cartesian Background. From thence I conclude that Leibniz’s final thesis is that monads are wholly present at each moment of their duration. (shrink)

The relation between extension and impenetrability is a major issue in the Descartes-More correspondence, which implies an analysis of the concept of extension. The mereological structure partes extra partes is a crucial element here. Both philosophers hold two opposed views of this mereological structure. I try to show that these two views can be traced back to scholastic discussions on quantity’s relation to extension. This background provides a vantage point, which enables to propose a new construal of the argumentative exchange (...) around impenetrability, and which casts some light too on our understanding of two properties – spissitude and indiscerpibility – which More attributes to spiritual extension in his later writings. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the betting behavior of a decision-maker who can influence the likelihood of the events upon which she is betting. In decision theory, this is best known as a situation of moral hazard. Focusing on a particularly simple case, I sketch the first systematic analysis of moral hazard in the canonical Savage framework. From the results of this analysis, I draw two philosophical conclusions. First, from an observational and a descriptive point of view, there need to (...) be no incompatibility between moral hazard and the Savage framework. This qualifies the incompatibility view, that is ubiquitous in decision theory. Second, in general, moral hazard is not sufficient to overcome the challenges posed by state-dependent utility to the behavioral identification of beliefs. This qualifies the sufficiency view, that is influential in decision theory. These two philosophical conclusions are the main contributions of my paper. (shrink)

State-dependent utility is a problem for the behavioural branch of decision theory under uncertainty. It questions the very possibility that beliefs be revealed by choice data. According to the current literature, all models of beliefs are equally exposed to the problem. Moreover, the problem is solvable only when the decision-maker can influence the resolution of uncertainty. This article gives grounds to reject these two views. The various models of beliefs can be shown to be unequally exposed to the problem of (...) state-dependent utility. The problem can be argued to be solved even when the decision-maker has no influence over the resolution of uncertainty. The implications of such reappraisal for a philosophical appreciation of the revealed preference methodology are discussed. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that emotions are evaluative. Moreover, many authors suppose that emotions are important or valuable as evaluations. According to the currently dominant version of cognitivism, emotions are evaluative insofar as they make us aware of value properties of their intentional objects. In attributing to emotions an epistemic role, this view conceives of them as epistemically valuable. In this paper, I argue that proponents of this account mischaracterize the evaluative character of emotions and, a fortiori, their value. Moreover, (...) I propose an alternative view of emotional evaluation, according to which emotions are practically rather than epistemically important. As I argue, emotions are ways of acknowledging their intentional objects as (dis)valuable. As such, they do not apprehend values but make them count. I elaborate this idea by drawing an analogy with legal and political sanctions. The resulting view has it that emotions are practically important in that they affirm the cares and concerns which serve as standards of emotional evaluation. (shrink)

This article reflects on the skills required in trades services to people dedicated to coordinate services in complex clinical situations because of their multidimensionality and chronicity. All human activity requires for its proper effectuation, the coordination of interdependencies between actors. Coordination of interdependencies is done in ordinary mode, in everyday activities, but also in dedicated mode, that is to say, through a practice that has a primary mandate to manage them in a conscious, voluntary and accountable for intervention situations whose (...) complexity is high. This passage from the ordinary form in the form of dedicated coordination undertakes a transformation of skills and professional knowledge mobilized in the professional gesture. Further skills and knowledge relating to the disciplinary control of clinical objects, the case manager or professional figure who best embodies this form of coordination, should mobilize expertise and procedural knowledge (assessment, planning, communication, negotiation, activation networks, etc..) required to control the interfaces between technical systems and professional and organizational actors, posing as the interdependence of actants primary purpose in work. For this he must do it in a time of temporality combining organizational project in clinical time. Le présent article réfléchit aux compétences requises dans les métiers de services aux personnes dédiés à coordonner les services dans les situations cliniques complexes en raison de leur multi-dimensionnalité et leur chronicité. Toute activité humaine exige, pour sa bonne effectuation, la coordination des interdépendances entre les acteurs concernés. La coordination des interdépendances se réalise en mode ordinaire, dans les activités de tous les jours, mais aussi en mode dédié, c’est-à-dire à travers une pratique qui a pour mandat principal de les gérer de manière consciente, volontaire et imputable pour les situations d’intervention dont la complexité est grande. Ce passage de la forme ordinaire à la forme dédiée de coordination engage une transformation des compétences et savoirs professionnels mobilisés dans le geste professionnel. En outre des compétences et savoirs relatifs à la maîtrise des objets cliniques disciplinaires, le gestionnaire de cas, soit la figure professionnelle qui incarne le mieux cette modalité de coordination, doit mobiliser des compétences et savoirs procéduraux (évaluation, planification, communication, négociation, activation de réseaux, etc.) requis à la maîtrise des interfaces entre systèmes techniques et acteurs professionnels et organisationnels, en posant l’interdépendance des actants comme objet premier de son action professionnelle. Pour cela, il doit effectuer cette dernière dans une temporalité conjuguant le temps du projet organisationnel au temps clinique. (shrink)

This article reflects on the skills required in trades services to people dedicated to coordinate services in complex clinical situations because of their multidimensionality and chronicity. All human activity requires for its proper effectuation, the coordination of interdependencies between actors. Coordination of interdependencies is done in ordinary mode, in everyday activities, but also in dedicated mode, that is to say, through a practice that has a primary mandate to manage them in a conscious, voluntary and accountable for intervention situations whose (...) complexity is high. This passage from the ordinary form in the form of dedicated coordination undertakes a transformation of skills and professional knowledge mobilized in the professional gesture. Further skills and knowledge relating to the disciplinary control of clinical objects, the case manager or professional figure who best embodies this form of coordination, should mobilize expertise and procedural knowledge (assessment, planning, communication, negotiation, activation networks, etc..) required to control the interfaces between technical systems and professional and organizational actors, posing as the interdependence of actants primary purpose in work. For this he must do it in a time of temporality combining organizational project in clinical time. e présent article réfléchit aux compétences requises dans les métiers de services aux personnes dédiés à coordonner les services dans les situations cliniques complexes en raison de leur multi-dimensionnalité et leur chronicité. Toute activité humaine exige, pour sa bonne effectuation, la coordination des interdépendances entre les acteurs concernés. La coordination des interdépendances se réalise en mode ordinaire, dans les activités de tous les jours, mais aussi en mode dédié, c’est-à-dire à travers une pratique qui a pour mandat principal de les gérer de manière consciente, volontaire et imputable pour les situations d’intervention dont la complexité est grande. Ce passage de la forme ordinaire à la forme dédiée de coordination engage une transformation des compétences et savoirs professionnels mobilisés dans le geste professionnel. En outre des compétences et savoirs relatifs à la maîtrise des objets cliniques disciplinaires, le gestionnaire de cas, soit la figure professionnelle qui incarne le mieux cette modalité de coordination, doit mobiliser des compétences et savoirs procéduraux (évaluation, planification, communication, négociation, activation de réseaux, etc.) requis à la maîtrise des interfaces entre systèmes techniques et acteurs professionnels et organisationnels, en posant l’interdépendance des actants comme objet premier de son action professionnelle. Pour cela, il doit effectuer cette dernière dans une temporalité conjuguant le temps du projet organisationnel au temps clinique. (shrink)

This paper examines the problem of the basis of time’s asymmetry. I hold the view that there is an objective temporal asymmetry in Leibniz’s philosophy of time. I closely examine various asymmetrical phenomena, which can be candidates as an explanation of time’s asymmetry: (1) causation; (2) the flow of time; (3) the modal difference between past and present; (4) counterfactual dependence; and, finally (5) the asymmetry of the world’s progress and its direction and (6) of the progress of rational creatures. (...) I conclude that time’s asymmetry involves an irreducibly pragmatic aspect: the asymmetry of agency itself on which all other asymmetrical phenomena rely. (shrink)

It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological (...) aspects of their objects. Instead it proposes that they are ways of taking a stand or position on the world. I refer to this as the Position-Taking View of emotion. Whilst some authors seem sympathetic to this view, this it has so far not been systematically motivated and elaborated. In this paper, I fill this gap and propose a more adequate account of our emotional engagement with the world than the predominant epistemic paradigm. I start by highlighting the specific way in which emotions are directed at something, which I contrast with the intentionality of perception and other forms of apprehension. I then go on to offer a specific account of the valence of emotion and show how this account and the directedness of emotions makes them intelligible as a way of taking a position on something. (shrink)

Original title : 「ドガの『舞姫』」『深田康算全集』[Œuvres complètes de Fukada Yasukazu]. Machida, Tamagawa Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1972–1973, 3 : 9–15.

L’objet de cet article est de dégager, sur l’exemple de la prédication, ce qu’est le propre d’une logique phénoménologique. On montre qu’elle se caractérise par plusieurs démarches essentielles : régression du domaine de la signification idéale vers les modes de visée, de comportement et d’évidence subjectifs propres à l’étant qui, par son discours, vise les formes syntaxiques, donc depuis les articulations syntaxiques de la signification vers celles de la pensée ; et surtout, un déplacement de l’orientation thématique depuis le domaine (...) de la signification idéale vers un champ infralinguistique et pré-idéal où ce dernier a sa source, afin de rechercher l’origine ultime du logos dans des structures prélogiques (formes noétiques de l’expérience perceptive, structures ontologiques de l’étant percu, modalités de la compréhension ontologique. Ne se limitant pas à la pensée logique au sens strict, on opère un élargissement considérable de la notion de logique, pour restituer les échafaudages qui mènent à l’élaboration de la syntaxe et replacer la pensée logifiante dans le mode d’être, de comprendre et de faire-expérience du sujet ou du Dasein. (shrink)

A formalism is introduced to represent the connective organization of an evolving neuronal network and the effects of environment on this organization by stabilization or degeneration of labile synapses associated with functioning. Learning, or the acquisition of an associative property, is related to a characteristic variability of the connective organization: the interaction of the environment with the genetic program is printed as a particular pattern of such organization through neuronal functioning. An application of the theory to the development of the (...) neuromuscular junction is proposed and the basic selective aspect of learning emphasized. (shrink)

Cet article s’attache à dégager le sens de la doctrine phénoménologique husserlienne de la raison en l'opposant à la théorie kantienne. Pour Kant, la raison et les Idées rationnelles sont constitutives de la nature du sujet fini en général, de sorte qu'il n'est pas possible de fournir une déduction transcendantale ou une légitimation des Idées rationnelles, mais seulement d'en opérer une dérivation à partir de la nature du sujet fini. A contrario, dans le cadre de la phénoménologie transcendantale, les facultés (...) ne doivent plus être comprises comme des composantes de la nature subjective, mais doivent être déchiffrées au fil conducteur des types d’objets constituables par la conscience pure. Nous tâchosn donc d'élucider ce que peut être une telle théorie de la raison orientée sur un tel principe anticopernicien. (shrink)

It is popular to hold that our primary epistemic access to specific response-dependent properties like the fearsome or admirable (or so-called ‘affective properties’) is constituted by the corresponding emotion. I argue that this view is incompatible with a widely held meta-ethical view, according to which affective properties have deontic force. More specifically, I argue that this view cannot accommodate for the requirement that deontic entities provide guidance. If affective properties are to guide the formation of the corresponding emotion, our primary (...) access to them cannot be provided by that same emotion. (shrink)

RESUMÉ – Situe historiquement au confluent de l’arithmétisation de l’analyse et de l’élaboration de la théorie des nombres transfinis, “De l’infini mathématique” s’attache à reconnaître à l’infini le statut de véritable objet mathématique ; mais le problème véritable, une fois mise en évidence l’insuffisance de la genèse arithmétique et algébrique des concepts et principes mathématiques, réside dans la possibilité de leur fondation philosophique sur des notions et principes rationnels et extramathématiques.

In this paper we want to focus on Husserl’s critique of Kantian ethics and to develop the following questions. Against the merely empiristic orientation of Hume’s ethics, the Kantian foundation of ethics has an aprioristic character; but does this aprioristic character have to be identified with the origin of ethical principles in the pure subjectivity, and if not, which is its phenomenological signification? The sense of the Copernican revolution is that the structures of the objects are in accordance with the (...) universal structures of the finite subject; a contrario, Husserl refuses this Copernican principle and assumes that every sort of object determines a regulative structure in the subject; is it possible to apply this anticopernican principle to the ethical sphere? As opposed to the Kantian principle of the supremacy of practical reason, we find in Husserl’s thought a supremacy of the theoretical reason; but which is the sense of this inversion? The concept of foundation has in Husserlian phenomenology a cardinal importance: all sorts of truth of superior degree are founded on the inferior level of sensible truth; is it possible to apply this principle of foundation to the ethical sphere, so that ethical consciousness would be founded on feelings? At last the Kantian concept of liberty is not an empirical one, but a cosmological and practical idea; which is the phenomenological sense of liberty? (shrink)

Au-delà de l’intérêt purement historiographique, nous tentons ici de dégager l’intérêt proprement philosophique de thèses fondamentales du philosophe Carl Stumpf : l’appel à une méthode intuitionniste, c’est-à-dire au retour à ce qui est effectivement donné ; le principe fondamental de l’autonomie de la sphère du sensible ou (dans la terminologie husserlienne) du domaine hylétique, c’est-à-dire son indépendance vis-à-vis des activités noétiques ; le dégagement d’un concept non purement empiriste et non atomiste de la sensibilité ; le principe anti-associationniste et anti-kantien (...) qui est inhérent à la méthode d’analyse des parties psychologiques (psychologische Theile) ou de contenus partiels (Theilinhalte) ; enfin, la désubjectivation de l’a priori, qui s’oppose de manière radicale à la conception kantienne de l’a priori qui l’identifie à l’élément formel de la connaissance, c’est-à-dire à une forme subjective. Et nous tentons de mettre en évidence mettre en évidence la manière dont ces principes œuvrent déjà au sein de l’analyse de l’origine de la représentation de l’espace, telle qu’elle se présente dans l’ouvrage de 1874 “Sur l’origine psychologique de la représentation de l’espace”. (shrink)

An obituary of Philippe Mongin (1950-2020).

According to a well-known view in the philosophy of mind, intentional attitudes by their very nature satisfy requirements of rationality (e.g. Davidson 1980; Dennett 1987; Millar 2004). This view (which I shall call Constitutivism) features prominently as the ‘principle of minimal rationality’ in de Sousa’s monograph The Rationality of Emotion (1987). By explicating this principle in terms of the notion of the formal object of an attitude, de Sousa articulates an interesting and original version of Constitutivism, which differs in important (...) respects from other extant versions. In this paper, I explore this version of Constitutivism against the background of recent developments in the theory of rationality and make explicit its ramifications for the long-standing dispute over whether the mind is essentially normative. My focus will be on how to conceive of the form of the rationality requirements that attitudes as such must satisfy according to this principle. I argue that, although de Sousa seems officially to endorse a structuralist conception of rationality, according to which these requirements are requirements of coherence, his considerations on formal objects suggest that they are more aptly conceived in terms of a reasons-responsive conception of rationality. I further argue that which of these two readings we choose makes a significant difference to the prospect of vindicating the essential normativity of mind by invoking the principle of minimal rationality. (shrink)

Cette note épistémologique porte sur le statut, en théorie de la décision, des concepts d’attitude par rapport au risque. A première vue, l’analyse axiomatique ne les exploite pas, ce qui reflète une certaine neutralité des modèles de décision au sujet de l’attitude par rapport au risque. Mais un examen plus poussé met en valeur la variation conditionnelle et le renforcement de l’attitude par rapport au risque, qui rattachent les concepts d’attitude par rapport au risque à l’analyse axiomatique.

This note considers the conceptual part of Sen’s «Internal Consistency of Choice». Amongst the various claims this paper features, two are singled out. A first, negative, claim is that no formal condition of choice consistency is normatively compelling without exception. A second, positive, claim, is that a formal condition of choice consistency is normatively compelling only under some assumptions involving preference. Here, the puzzling choices Sen puts forward are scrutinized and it is argued that such a scrutiny leads to question (...) the negative claim, but in a subtle way, so that the positive claim is comforted, even strengthened. -/- Cette note examine la partie conceptuelle d’un article de Sen, «Internal Consistency of Choice». Elle isole deux thèses parmi celles que Sen défend. Une première, négative, est qu’aucune condition formelle de cohérence du choix n’est normativement valable sans exception. Une seconde, positive, est qu’une condition formelle de cohérence du choix n’est normativement valable que sous des suppositions faisant intervenir la préférence. Nous procédons à une analyse détaillée des choix énigmatiques dont Sen prend argument et affirmons que cet examen mène à remettre en cause la thèse négative, mais d’une manière subtile qui confirme — même renforce — la thèse positive. (shrink)

It is sometimes alleged that the study of emotion and the study of value are currently pursued as relatively autonomous disciplines. As Kevin Mulligan notes, “the philosophy and psychology of emotions pays little attention to the philosophy of value and the latter pays only a little more attention to the former.” (2010b, 475). Arguably, the last decade has seen more of a rapprochement between these two domains than used to be the norm (cf. e.g. Roeser & Todd 2014). But there (...) still seems to be considerable potential for exchange and dialogue if the situation is compared with their intimate relationship in central strands of early realist phenomenology. The philosopher perhaps most representative of this ecumenical approach is Husserl’s early student Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977). From the very early stages of his philosophical career, Hildebrand has developed one of the most original, comprehensive and nuanced accounts of emotions at whose core is a detailed examination of their connection to value. While his central concern with the ethical significance of our affective life is in many ways continuous with Scheler’s work and draws crucially on Reinach’s philosophy of mind, Hildebrand’s own reflections considerably expand on and substantially modify the picture of the ontology and normative role of emotions defended by these authors. In this article, I reconstruct Hildebrand’s view of emotions with a particular focus on those aspects which represent his most distinctive contribution to this subject. (shrink)