Considerable variation exists not only in the kinds of transposable elements (TEs) occurring within the genomes of different species, but also in their abundance and distribution. Noting a similarity to the assortment of organisms among ecosystems, some researchers have called for an ecological approach to the study of transposon dynamics. However, there are several ways to adopt such an approach, and it is sometimes unclear what an ecological perspective will add to the existing co-evolutionary framework for explaining transposon-host interactions. This (...) review aims to clarify the conceptual foundations of transposon ecology in order to evaluate its explanatory prospects. We begin by identifying three unanswered questions regarding the abundance and distribution of TEs that potentially call for an ecological explanation. We then offer an operational distinction between evolutionary and ecological approaches to these questions. By determining the amount of variance in transposon abundance and distribution that is explained by ecological and evolutionary factors, respectively, it is possible empirically to assess the prospects for each of these explanatory frameworks. To illustrate how this methodology applies to a concrete example, we analyzed whole-genome data for one set of distantly related mammals and another more closely related group of arthropods. Our expectation was that ecological factors are most informative for explaining differences among individual TE lineages, rather than TE families, and for explaining their distribution among closely related as opposed to distantly related host genomes. We found that, in these data sets, ecological factors do in fact explain most of the variation in TE abundance and distribution among TE lineages across less distantly related host organisms. Evolutionary factors were not significant at these levels. However, the explanatory roles of evolution and ecology become inverted at the level of TE families or among more distantly related genomes. Not only does this example demonstrate the utility of our distinction between ecological and evolutionary perspectives, it further suggests an appropriate explanatory domain for the burgeoning discipline of transposon ecology. The fact that ecological processes appear to be impacting TE lineages over relatively short time scales further raises the possibility that transposons might serve as useful model systems for testing more general hypotheses in ecology. (shrink)

Zwischen 1987 und 1994 sandte ich 20 Briefe an Karl Popper. Die meisten betrafen Fragen bezüglich seiner Antiinduktionsbeweise und seiner Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, einige die organisatorische und inhaltliche Vorbereitung eines Fachgesprächs mit ihm in Kenly am 22. März 1989 (worauf hier nicht eingegangen werden soll), einige schließlich ganz oder in Teilen nicht-fachliche Angelegenheiten (die im vorliegenden Bericht ebenfalls unberücksichtigt bleiben). Von Karl Popper erhielt ich in diesem Zeitraum 10 Briefe. Der bedeutendste ist sein siebter, bestehend aus drei Teilen, geschrieben am (...) 21., 22. und 23. Oktober 1992, in dem er eine Vorform jener Definition der probabilistischen Unabhängigkeit entwickelte, die er 1994 im neuen Anhang *XX der 10. Auflage seiner Logik der Forschung (LdF) der wissenschaftstheoretischen Forschergemeinde vorstellte. Der berührendste ist sein letzter, geschrieben am 26. Juli 1994, in dem er trotz Erschöpfung mit Humor schildert, wie mühselig der Druck des Anhangs *XX verlaufen ist. Mein Bericht ist zugleich chronologisch und systematisch gegliedert: die ersten, vergleichsweise wenigen Briefe, großteils 1987 geschrieben, handeln von der Induktion; der große Rest, zeitlicher Schwerpunkt 1992, beschäftigt sich mit der Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie. Das Kapitel 1 über Induktion ist in vier Abschnitte unterteilt: 1.1 Das Popper/Miller-Argument: eine Nachkonstruktion, 1.2 Karl Poppers Brief vom 25.8.1987: Deduktive Stützung, 1.3 Karl Poppers Brief vom 29.9.1987: Nochmals zur deduktiven Stützung, 1.4 Echt induktive Stützung und Schwächung: zwei eigene Beweise. Das Kapitel 2 über Wahrscheinlichkeit ist ebenfalls in vier Abschnitte unterteilt: 2.1 Ein Mangel an Überschußgesetzen in der Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2.2 Probabilistische Unabhängigkeit, 2.3 Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie und Wahrscheinlichkeitssemantik, 2.4 Die neue Unabhängigkeitsdefinition im Anhang *XX der LdF. (shrink)

This article deals with the relationship between philosophy and science in the writings of Karl Jaspers and with its reception in the wider scholarly literature. The problem discussed is how to characterize the relationship that exists between science—defined on pure Kantian grounds as a universally valid knowledge of phenomenal objects—and philosophy—conceived by Jaspers as the transcending mode of thinking of personal Existenz rising towards the totality and unity of Being. Two solutions to that problem arise from Jaspers’s writings. The (...) oppositionist view is based in his earlier philosophy of Existenz. It describes the discrepancy between determinateness, bestowed by science to its objects, and freedom of self-determination, which is both a synonym and a condition of possibility for Existenz. The reciprocal view is based in Jaspers’s later works, where he focuses on exploration of his concept of Being. By contrast with most of Jaspers’s commentators, the present interpretation is anchored in a developmentaland contextual understanding of Jaspers’s thought. Showing the transcendental background of this topic, the proposed interpretation allows us to abstain from viewing the two solutions as incoherent or contradictory and instead to see them as constitutive of a single philosophical course. (shrink)

The two principal models of design in methodological circles in architecture—analysis/synthesis and conjecture/analysis—have their roots in philosophy of science, in different conceptions of scientific method. This paper explores the philosophical origins of these models and the reasons for rejecting analysis/synthesis in favour of conjecture/analysis, the latter being derived from Karl Popper’s view of scientific method. I discuss a fundamental problem with Popper’s view, however, and indicate a framework for conjecture/analysis to avoid this problem.

On the basis of Karl-Otto Apels’ diagnosis of the shortcomings of philosophical ethics in general, and any ethics of individual accountability in particular, I give an outline how these shortcoming are currently to be articulated in the context of ecological crisis and socio-technical change. This will be followed with three interpretations of Karl-Otto Apels’ proposal for an ethics of collective coresponsibility. In conclusion, I will advocate that only a further social evolution of the systems of science, economy and (...) law will enable a possible institutionalization of collective co-responsibility by means of a new innovation paradigm: responsible innovation. (shrink)

Karl Popper’s critique of philosophical idealism manifests itself with the application of his method, falsification, to metaphysics, epistemology, social and political philosophy. According to Popper, who identifies himself as a philosophical realist, idealism has emerged as a result of the idea that reality cannot be known by reason and of the search for certainty which is erroneous,and it has begotten two mistaken and detrimental views. These views are historicism, the notion that history has an irresistible course, and holism, the (...) notion that social wholes are organic structures that amount to more than the individuals constituting them. Historicism and holism have become the philosophical underpinnings of closed societies throughout the history, such as the totalitarian regimes in the 20th century. Therefore, with a practical leaning, Popper actually takes aim at these pernicious consequences of idealism while criticizing it. In this study, philosophical idealism and the contours of Popper’s philosophy are examined, and then Popper’s metaphysical, epistemological, social, and political critiques against idealism are investigated. Keywords: Karl Popper, idealism, historicism, holism, falsificationism. (shrink)

Der Begriff der Vernunft gehört zu den Begriffen, die für Jaspers‘ philosophisches Denken und schriftliche verfaßte Philosophie eine besonders wichtige Rolle spielen. Gleichwohl kann es im Folgenden nicht um Jaspers‘ ganze Philosophie gehen, sondern nur um seinen Begriff der Vernunft. Sein Begriff der Vernunft ist jedoch für die wesentlichen Grundzüge seiner Philosophie konstitutiv und charakteristisch. Im ersten Teil werde ich kurz auf die Entwicklung der Schriften eingehen, in denen Jaspers hauptsächlich sein Verständnis von Vernunft dargelegt hat. Im zweiten Teil werde (...) ich dann Jaspers‘ Begriff der Vernunft anhand einiger wichtiger Aussagen in den genannten Werken rekonstruieren. Dabei kann jedoch nur der wesentliche Gehalt seines Begriffes der Vernunft berücksichtigt werden und nicht alle Strukturen, Formen und Funktionen der Vernunft, die dann für seine Philosophie charakteristisch und konstitutiv sind. Im dritten Teil werde ich dann kurz den systematischen Ort und Stellenwert von Jaspers‘ Begriff der Vernunft in seiner Vernunftphilosophie beleuchten. (shrink)

Karl Popper (1902-1994) was one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century. He made significant contributions to debates concerning general scientific methodology and theory choice, the demarcation of science from non-science, the nature of probability and quantum mechanics, and the methodology of the social sciences. His work is notable for its wide influence both within the philosophy of science, within science itself, and within a broader social context. Popper’s early work attempts to solve the problem (...) of demarcation and offer a clear criterion that distinguishes scientific theories from metaphysical or mythological claims. Popper’s falsificationist methodology holds that scientific theories are characterized by entailing predictions that future observations might reveal to be false. When theories are falsified by such observations, scientists can respond by revising the theory, or by rejecting the theory in favor of a rival or by maintaining the theory as is and changing an auxiliary hypothesis. In either case, however, this process must aim at the production of new, falsifiable predictions. While Popper recognizes that scientists can and do hold onto theories in the face of failed predictions when there are no predictively superior rivals to turn to. He holds that scientific practice is characterized by its continual effort to test theories against experience and make revisions based on the outcomes of these tests. By contrast, theories that are permanently immunized from falsification by the introduction of untestable ad hoc hypotheses can no longer be classified as scientific. Among other things, Popper argues that his falsificationist proposal allows for a solution of the problem of induction, since inductive reasoning plays no role in his account of theory choice. Along with his general proposals regarding falsification and scientific methodology, Popper is notable for his work on probability and quantum mechanics and on the methodology of the social sciences. Popper defends a propensity theory of probability, according to which probabilities are interpreted as objective, mind-independent properties of experimental setups. Popper then uses this theory to provide a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, though its applicability goes beyond this specific case. With respect to the social sciences, Popper argued against the historicist attempt to formulate universal laws covering the whole of human history and instead argued in favor of methodological individualism and situational logic. Table of Contents 1. Background 2. Falsification and the Criterion of Demarcation a. Popper on Physics and Psychoanalysis b. Auxiliary and Ad Hoc Hypotheses c. Basic Sentences and the Role of Convention d. Induction, Corroboration, and Verisimilitude 3. Criticisms of Falsificationism 4. Realism, Quantum Mechanics, and Probability 5. Methodology in the Social Sciences 6. Popper’s Legacy 7. References and Further Reading a. Primary Sources b. Secondary Sources -/- . (shrink)

Mit seinem Einfluß auf die Entwicklung der Physiologie, Physik und Geometrie ist Hermann von Helmholtz wie kaum ein anderer Wissenschaftler der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts repräsentativ für die Naturforschung in Deutschland. Nicht weniger repräsentativ nimmt sich die Entwicklung seiner Wissenschaftsauffassung aus. Während er bis in die späten 60er Jahre einen emphatischen Wahrheitsanspruch der Wissenschaft vertrat, begann er in der nachfolgenden Zeit, die Geltungsbedingungen der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis einer Relativierung zu unterwerfen, die zusammenfassend als Hypothetisierung bezeichnet werden kann. Helmholtz entwickelte damit (...) schon im vergangenen Jahrhundert Ansätze einer Wissenschaftsauffassung , die in erstaunlichem Umfang in die Richtung der Moderne weisen. Wie nah er späteren Wissenschaftsauffassungen bereits gekommen ist, kann ein Vergleich mit Karl R. Poppers Forschungslogik illustrieren. In seiner Forschungslogik ist die Hypothetisierung der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis entschieden weiter vorangeschritten als in Heimholtz' Wissenschaftstheorie. Was sich bei Helmholtz erst vage abzuzeichnen beginnt, ist bei ihm bereits explizit formuliertes Programm geworden. Obwohl HeImholtz und Popper in keiner direkten wissenschaftstheoretischen Entwicklungslinie stehen und Popper sich in seinen Schriften auch nur sehr selten und beiläufig auf Helmholtz bezieht, finden sich dennoch überraschende und bisher nicht beachtete Berührungspunkte, die insbesondere dann hervortreten, wenn man Heimholtz' Wissenschaftsauffassung vor dem Hintergrund von Poppers Forschungslogik betrachtet. (shrink)

There are two motivations commonly ascribed to historical actors for taking up statistics: to reduce complicated data to a mean value (e.g., Quetelet), and to take account of diversity (e.g., Galton). Different motivations will, it is assumed, lead to different methodological decisions in the practice of the statistical sciences. Karl Pearson and W. F. R. Weldon are generally seen as following directly in Galton’s footsteps. I argue for two related theses in light of this standard interpretation, based on a (...) reading of several sources in which Weldon, independently of Pearson, reflects on his own motivations. First, while Pearson does approach statistics from this "Galtonian" perspective, he is, consistent with his positivist philosophy of science, utilizing statistics to simplify the highly variable data of biology. Weldon, on the other hand, is brought to statistics by a rich empiricism and a desire to preserve the diversity of biological data. Secondly, we have here a counterexample to the claim that divergence in motivation will lead to a corresponding separation in methodology. Pearson and Weldon, despite embracing biometry for different reasons, settled on precisely the same set of statistical tools for the investigation of evolution. (shrink)

Obwohl Jaspers in seiner Philosophie Methoden und Motive der Phänomenologie Husserls und der Hermeneutik Diltheys aufgenommen hatte, hat er sich nicht besonders für die Leibphilosophie interessiert. Das bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass der menschliche Leib in seinem Denken gar nicht vorkommt. Aber es handelt sich bei ihm jedoch nicht um ein Schlüsselthema, sondern um ein randständiges Phänomen. Der menschliche Leib ist bei Jaspers die vitale Basis der überlieferten Trias von Leib, Seele und Geist. Damit steht Jaspers in der klassischen Traditionslinie des (...) europäischen Denkens von Platon und Aristoteles bis zu Descartes und Kant. Anders als beim platonischen Sokrates gibt es bei Jaspers jedoch keine Herabsetzung des Körpers oder Abwertung des Leiblichen. Und anders als in der subversiven Tradition der empiristischen Skepsis gibt es bei ihm aber auch keine Vernachlässigung des Geistes. Im Vergleich des Menschen mit den Tieren ist der Geist nicht nur irgendein beliebiges, auf Sprache, Denken und Vernunft basierendes Merkmal, das den Menschen zufällig von den Tieren unterscheidet, sondern die wesentliche menschliche Eigenart, die es zu verstehen gilt, wenn man die spezifisch menschliche Art und Weise des Daseins in der Welt verstehen möchte, die Jaspers 'Existenz' nennt. Existenz zu verstehen ist die eigentliche Aufgabe der Philosophie, zumal die Wissenschaften dies nicht leisten können. (shrink)

This is a review of Henk Woldring's book on Karl Mannheim.

With his influence on the development of physiology, physics and geometry, Hermann von Helmholtz – like few scientists of the second half of the 19th century – is representative of the research in natural science in Germany. The development of his understanding of science is not less representative. Until the late sixties, he emphatically claimed the truth of science; later on, he began to see the conditions for the validity of scientific knowledge in relative terms, and this can, in summary, (...) be referred to as hypothesizing. Already in the past century, HeImholtz made first approaches to an understanding of science, which were incompatible with his own former position and which pointed to the modern age to an astonishingly large extent. A comparison with Karl R. Popper's logic of research will illustrate how closely he nevertheless approached modern understanding of science. In Popper's logic of research, hypothesizing of scientific knowledge is definitely much more advanced than in Helmholtz's theory of science. What begins vaguely to emerge with Helmholtz has already become an explicitly formulated programme with Popper. Although HeImholtz and Popper are not on a direct line of epistemological development and Popper refers to HeImholtz only rarely and casually, there are in fact surprising points of contact which have not been taken notice of so far and which appear above all if one looks at Helmholtz's understanding of science against the background of Popper's logic of research. (shrink)

Popper first developed his theory of scientific method – falsificationism – in his The Logic of Scientific Discovery, then generalized it to form critical rationalism, which he subsequently applied to social and political problems in The Open Society and Its Enemies. All this can be regarded as constituting a major development of the 18th century Enlightenment programme of learning from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards a better world. Falsificationism is, however, defective. It misrepresents the real, problematic aims (...) of science. We need a new conception of scientific method, a meta-methodology which provides a framework for the improvement of the aims and methods of science as scientific knowledge improves. This aim-oriented empiricist idea can be generalized to form a conception of rationality – aim-oriented rationality – which helps us improve problematic aims and methods whatever we may be doing. In this way, Popper’s version of the Enlightenment programme can be much improved, indeed transformed. (shrink)

Karl Homann ist vor allem als Wirtschaftsethiker bekannt. Er war der erste Inhaber eines wirtschaftsethischen Lehrstuhls und gilt als einer derjenigen Autoren, die das Fach Wirtschaftsethik im deutschen Sprachraum maßgeblich geprägt haben. Dabei hat Homann seinen wirtschaftsethischen Theorieentwurf nie als eine schlichte Anwendung ethischer Grundsätze auf Fragen des Wirtschaftens verstanden. Vielmehr begriff er ihn als allgemeinen ethischen Ansatz mit ökonomischer Methode. Im Rahmen dieses Ansatzes sollte die abendländische Moral ökonomisch rekonstruiert werden, um sie so unter den Bedingungen moderner Gesellschaften (...) mit institutionalisiertem marktwirtschaftlichen Wettbewerb überlebensfähig zu machen. Mit seiner neuen Monographie Sollen und Können stellt Karl Homann dieses Grundmodell einem weiteren Leserkreis vor. Er will sein Buch also nicht als einen neuen Beitrag zur Wirtschaftsethik-Debatte verstanden wissen, sondern als allgemeinen philosophischen Ethikentwurf. Die Argumentation, die Homann in Sollen und Können vorstellt, soll im Folgenden selektiv zusammengefasst und kritisch gewürdigt werden. (shrink)

A brief intellectual biography of Sir Karl Popper.

Karl Popper is the greatest philosopher of the 20th century. No other philosopher of the period has produced a body of work that is as significant. What is best in Popper's output is contained in his first four published books. These tackle fundamental problems with ferocious, exemplary integrity, clarity, simplicity and originality. They have widespread, fruitful implications, for science, for philosophy, for the social sciences, for education, for art, for politics and political philosophy. This article provides a critical survey (...) of Popper’s work. (shrink)

An introduction to Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge for a textbook.

Karl Popper is famous for having proposed that science advances by a process of conjecture and refutation. He is also famous for defending the open society against what he saw as its arch enemies – Plato and Marx. Popper’s contributions to thought are of profound importance, but they are not the last word on the subject. They need to be improved. My concern in this book is to spell out what is of greatest importance in Popper’s work, what its (...) failings are, how it needs to be improved to overcome these failings, and what implications emerge as a result. The book consists of a collection of essays which dramatically develop Karl Popper’s views about natural and social science, and how we should go about trying to solve social problems. Criticism of Popper’s falsificationist philosophy of natural science leads to a conception of science that I call aim-oriented empiricism. This makes explicit metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe that are an implicit part of scientific knowledge – implicit in the way science excludes all theories that are not explanatory, even those that are more successful empirically than accepted theories. Aim-oriented empiricism has major implications, not just for the academic discipline of philosophy of science, but for science itself. Popper generalized his philosophy of science of falsificationism to arrive at a new conception of rationality – critical rationalism – the key methodological idea of Popper’s profound critical exploration of political and social issues in his The Open Society and Its Enemies, and The Poverty of Historicism. This path of Popper, from scientific method to rationality and social and political issues is followed here, but the starting point is aim-oriented empiricism rather than falsificationism. Aim-oriented empiricism is generalized to form a conception of rationality I call aim-oriented rationalism. This has far-reaching implications for political and social issues, for the nature of social inquiry and the humanities, and indeed for academic inquiry as a whole. The strategies for tackling social problems that arise from aim-oriented rationalism improve on Popper’s recommended strategies of piecemeal social engineering and critical rationalism, associated with Popper’s conception of the open society. This book thus sets out to develop Popper’s philosophy in new and fruitful directions. The theme of the book, in short, is to discover what can be learned from scientific progress about how to achieve social progress towards a better world. (shrink)

This doctoral thesis was prepared in 1975-77 at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, under the supervision of Prof. Raymond ARON. It was submitted in 1977 in fulfilment of the requirements for a Ph.D. degree in Social Sciences (Doctorat de 3e cycle en sciences sociales). The oral examination (soutenance de thèse) was held in January 1978, with the examination committee consisting of Prof. Aron, Bartoli, Boudon and Brochier. This 250 page unpublished dissertation was the first study ever written (...) in French on Karl Marx's Grundrisse - a 1857-58 manuscript preparatory to Marx's main economic work, Capital. The dissertation reviews Marx's successive projects for his economic work since the 1844 Manuscripts and then proceeds to a presentation and critical discussion of Grundrisse. The proposed interpretation explains the linkage that Marx operated in 1857-58 between Ricardo's economics and Hegel's dialectics, and it emphasizes that Marx was at that time primarily trying to reconstruct the dynamics of capitalism, without going to the stage of developing a formal theory of value and exploitation, as he will eventually do in Capital. (shrink)

Scheler, like Jaspers, gives a key importance to the relations with alterity and grounds both the individual formation and social ontology on the practices of “sharing emotions”. My work attempts to interpret the impairments related to the capacities of communication – that Jaspers places at the roots of psychopathology and that the Japanese psychiatrist Bin Kimura has more recently argued to be the core of schizophrenia – as impairment of what Scheler calls ordo amoris, that is the “order of feeling” (...) of a person: like a "Psychopathology of the Ordo Amoris". (shrink)

"Capital is moved as much and as little by the degradation and final depopulation of the human race, as by the probable fall of the earth into the sun. Apres moi le deluge! is the watchword of every capitalist and of every capitalist nation" (Marx, CAPITAL Vol 1, 380-381).

Natural science, properly understood, provides us with the methodological key to the salvation of humanity. First, we need to acknowledge that the actual aims of science are profoundly problematic, in that they make problematic assumptions about metaphysics, values and the social use of science. Then we need to represent these aims in the form of a hierarchy of aims, which become increasingly unproblematic as one goes up the hierarchy; as result we create a framework of relatively unproblematic aims and methods, (...) high up in the hierarchy, within which much more problematic aims and methods, low down in the hierarchy, may be improved as scientific knowledge improves. Then, we need to generalize this hierarchical, aims-and-methods-improving methodology so that it becomes fruitfully applicable to any worthwhile endeavour with problematic aims. Finally, we need to apply this methodology to the immensely problematic task of making progress towards as good a world as feasible. (shrink)

Karl Popper, as a critical rationalist, was an opponent of all forms of skepticism, conventionalism and relativism in science. A major argument of Popper is Hume's critique of induction, arguing that induction should never be used in science. But he disagrees with the skepticism associated with Hume, nor with the support of Bacon and Newton's pure "observation" as a starting point in the formation of theories, as there are no pure observations that do not imply certain theories. Instead, Popper (...) proposes falsifiability as a method of scientific investigation. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11481.36967 . (shrink)

În această lucrare argumentez faptul că, în ciuda criticilor teoriei falsificabilității propuse de Karl Popper pentru demarcarea între știință și ne-știință, în principal pseudoștiință, acest criteriu este încă foarte util, și perfect valabil după perfecționarea lui de către Popper și adepții lui. Mai mult, chiar și în versiunea sa inițială, considerată de Lakatos ca ”dogmatică”, Popper nu a afirmat că această metodologie este un criteriu absolut de demarcare: un singur contra-exemplu nu este suficient pentru a falsifica o teorie; mai (...) mult, o teorie poate fi salvată în mod legitim de falsificare prin introducerea unei ipoteze auxiliare. În comparație cu teoria lui Kuhn a revoluțiilor, de care el însuși s-a dezis ulterior transformând-o într-o teorie a ”micro-revoluțiilor”, consider că metodologia de demarcare a lui Popper, împreună cu dezvoltarea ulterioară propusă de acesta, inclusiv coroborarea și verosimilitudinea, deși imperfectă, nu numai că este valabilă și azi, dar este încă cea mai bună metodologie de demarcare. Pentru argumentare, m-am folosit de principalele lucrări ale lui Popper care tratează această problemă, și a principalilor săi critici și susținători. După o scurtă prezentare a lui Karl Popper, și o introducere în problema demarcației și metodologia falsificabilității, trec în revistă principalele critici aduse și argumentele susținătorilor săi, accentuând pe ideea că Popper nu a pus niciodată semnul egalității între falsificare și respingere. În final prezint propriile concluzii în această problemă. (shrink)

Karl Popper a propus falsificabilitatea ca un criteriu important în diferențierea dintre știință și pseudoștiință. El susține că verificarea și confirmarea nu pot juca niciun rol în formularea unui criteriu satisfăcător de delimitare. În schimb, propune ca teoriile științifice să se deosebească de teoriile ne-științifice prin pretenții testabile pe care viitoarele observații le-ar putea dezvălui a fi false. Popper atrage atenția asupra faptului că teoriile științifice sunt caracterizate prin existența unor falsificatori potențiali - declarații care ar putea fi descoperite (...) ca fiind false. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25228.67202. (shrink)

Despite the criticism of Karl Popper's falsifiability theory for the demarcation between science and non-science, mainly pseudo-science, this criterion is still very useful, and perfectly valid after it was perfected by Popper and his followers. Moreover, even in his original version, considered by Lakatos as "dogmatic", Popper did not assert that this methodology is an absolute demarcation criterion: a single counter-example is not enough to falsify a theory; a theory can legitimately be saved from falsification by introducing an auxiliary (...) hypothesis. Compared to Kuhn's theory of revolutions, which he himself later dissociated from it transforming it into a theory of "micro-revolutions," I consider that Popper's demarcation methodology, along with the subsequent development proposed by him, including the corroboration and the verisimilitude, though imperfect, is not only valid today, but it is still the best demarcation methodology. For argumentation, I used the main works of Popper dealing with this issue, and his main critics and supporters. After a brief presentation of Karl Popper, and an introduction to the demarcation problem and the falsification methodology, I review the main criticisms and the arguments of his supporters, emphasizing the idea that Popper has never put the sign of equality between falsification and rejection. Finally, I present my own conclusions on this issue. CONTENTS -/- Abstract Introduction 1 The demarcation problem 2 Pseudoscience 3 Falsifiability 4 Falsification and refutation 5 Extension of falsifiability 6 Criticism of falsifiability 7 Support of falsifiability 8 The current trend Conclusions Bibliography Notes -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22522.54725. (shrink)

Karl Popper, ca raționalist critic, a fost un oponent al tuturor formelor de scepticism, convenționalism și relativism în știință. În 1935 a scris Logica cercetării (Logik der Forschung. Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft), traducând ulterior cartea în engleză și publicând-o sub titlul The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) considerată ca o lucrare de pionierat în domeniu. Multe dintre argumentele din această carte sunt îndreptate împotriva membrilor "Cercului Vienez", precum Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Rudolph Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Carl Hempel și (...) Herbert Feigl. Popper este de acord cu aceștia cu privire la aspectele generale ale metodologiei științifice și neîncrederea lor în metodologia filosofică tradițională, dar soluțiile sale au fost semnificativ diferite. Popper a contribuit semnificativ la dezbaterile privind metodologia științifică generală, demarcarea științei de pseudoștiință, natura probabilității și metodologia științelor sociale. (shrink)

WEBARTIGOS -/- KARL MARX: TRABALHO E CLASSES SOCIAIS Publicado em 12 de June de 2019 por Emanuel Isaque cordeiro da silva -/- KARL MARX: TRABALHO E CLASSES SOCIAIS(1) -/- KARL MARX: WORK AND SOCIAL CLASSES -/- Alana Thaís Mayza da Silva - CAP-UFPE(2) Eduarda Carvalho da Silva Fontain - CAP-UFPE(3) Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ, CAP-UFPE e UFRPE(4) -/- Dentro do mundo marxista, como para a Sociologia, a fundamental e principal obra de Karl Marx (...) foi O capital (1867 o primeiro volume e os demais volumes -2- foram publicados pós-morte de Marx, em 1883). Karl Marx é considerado um dos maiores pensadores da Economia, da Sociologia e da Filosofia de seu tempo até os dias atuais. Seus estudos centraram-se na devassa dos nexos de força entre os sujeitos. Para Marx, a principal questão para a elucidação das metamorfoses sociais é o nexo conflituoso entre forças sociais, isto é, entre esferas sociais divergentes entre si e com interesses completamente contrários. -/- Nessa perspectiva, Marx explana: -/- A história de toda a sociedade até aqui é a história de lutas de classes. [Homem] livre e escravo, patrício e plebeu, barão e servo [Leibeigener], burgueses de corporação [Zunftbürger] e oficial, em suma, opressores e oprimidos, estiveram em constante oposição uns aos outros, travaram uma luta ininterrupta, ora oculta ora aberta, uma luta que de cada vez acabou por uma reconfiguração revolucionária de toda a sociedade ou pelo declínio comum das classes em luta. [...] A moderna sociedade burguesa, saída do declínio da sociedade feudal, não aboliu as oposições de classes. Apenas pôs novas classes, novas condições de opressão, novas configurações de luta, no lugar das antigas. A nossa época a época da burguesia, distingue-se, contudo, por ter simplificado as oposições de classes. A sociedade toda cinde-se, cada vez mais, em dois grandes campos inimigos, em duas grandes classes que diretamente se enfrentam: burguesia e proletariado. (MARX e ENGELS, 1988).(5) -/- A alegação principal de Marx é a de que os corpos sociais se fracionam em esferas ou classes sociais. Esse fracionamento é consequência de um processo histórico de embates em que uma das esferas/classes torna-se hegemônica e imperante e acaba subjugando os interesses das demais classes. No capitalismo, o filósofo observa que a chamada burguesia(6), tornou-se hegemônica e imperante em todo os países industrializados. A burguesia, primeiramente venceu a nobreza e a hegemonia do feudalismo, o sistema que imperava na Europa até a Revolução Francesa e, posteriormente, instaura um novo tipo de sodalismo(7). A elite(8) ou a alta sociedade, ou ainda, os burgueses, passaram a designar e constituir as formas de governo, a cultura e a política, de acordo com seus interesses. Isso implica dizer que as regras sodalísticas, as leis instauradas mediante o diálogo social e os magistrados, as normas coercitivas ou não, os gostos e os arquétipos de consumo, de estruturação e conformação da economia, da ciência e da política passaram a ser estabelecidas e designadas pelos anseios e interesses da elite. Isto é, o corpo social capitalista em que subsistimos tem como primordial finalidade a reprodução da forma de vida da elite, alicerçada na formação do lucro e arquitetada na produção de mercadorias. Para demonstrar o feitio de vida da elite, é imprescindível que haja uma esfera que produza as mercadorias, cujo trabalho dessa classe produtora é explorado pelos capitalistas. Com efeito, ao passo em que se constitui historicamente uma classe de elite, também é formada uma esfera antagônica à burguesia, que nada mais é do que a classe dos trabalhadores, ou como Marx designa de proletariado(9). Diante do processo histórico de estruturação e organização do capitalismo, a elite que acabara de nascer já gozava da exploração do trabalho de pequenos produtores. Logo, ao passo da ascensão desse feitio de produção, a elite torna-se imperante e o coletivo de laboradores, antigos servos e agricultores, também ascende vigorosamente conformando-se em um feitio de proletariado industrial. Logo, as esferas sociais essenciais do corpo social capitalista são a elite de burgueses (a classe capitalista, que detém o poderio) e os laboradores ou o proletariado. -/- Não obstante, aparecem algumas indagações quanto ao dualismo burgueses e proletários, e uma das principais questões gira em torno do por que a classe laboral deixa ser explorada? E por que não há uma equidade econômica entre os sujeitos? Segundo o filósofo, ao longo da História, a esfera laboral foi desapoderada de seus meios de produção, isto é, de suas propriedades, de suas ferramentas e de seus locais de trabalho. A elite que se empoderou dos meios de produção dos trabalhadores, passaram a subjugar os trabalhadores a vender seu trabalho em troca de um salário.(10)(11) Com a desapropriação de suas posses e a oferta de empregos para subsistência, os trabalhadores são submetidos a oferecer seu labour-power(12) a determinado salário, a certas condições e jornadas de trabalho, a um ritmo ditado pelo burguês e, sobretudo, a uma certa demanda de produtividade. Com todas essas determinações da elite, a esfera laboral não tem escolha. Se o trabalhador quiser sobreviver nesse mundo capitalista, deve a todo momento vender seu labour-power a um capitalista, seja no meio comercial, seja no meio industrial, seja numa instituição de ensino particular ou até mesmo à campo, cortando cana-de-açúcar para uma usina produtora de álcool. A esfera capitalista (elite) tem como ponto motriz de sua imperância a reprodução e a exploração do trabalho. Para tanto, a produção industrial caba se tornando cada vez mais incrementada, tanto na esfera dos feitios de gerência quanto as novas tecnologias que são introduzidas para maximizar a produção e produtividade. Com efeito, surgem implicações como o por que é tão essencial a introdução de mais e mais tecnologias para desenvolver a produção de mercadorias? O filósofo entende que quanto mais o trabalhador é comedido, maior será sua produtividade, todavia menor será seu poder político no corpo social. Dessarte, a permuta do trabalhador por uma máquina é uma tendência do capitalista para obtenção maximizada de mercadorias, ascendendo a produtividade da atividade laboral. Vale salientar que com a máquina a produção ascende, mas também aumenta o controle do capitalista sobre os trabalhadores, uma vez que os mesmos, para não perder o emprego, terão que responder ao mesmo ritmo que as máquinas. Isto é, o patrão goza da máquina ou robô para aumentar a produtividade e para aumentar seu poder político sobre os trabalhadores. Ao submeter o trabalhador ao mesmo ritmo da máquina, ritmo esse que ele não comanda, o patrão subjuga a aumentar sua produtividade com relação ao seu trabalho para que o mesmo não venha a perder seu emprego. -/- Podemos sintetizar essa inquirição com uma frase de Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa(13): "é preciso que tudo mude para que tudo se mantenha”. Isto quer dizer que é essencial desenvolver novas tecnologias para a produção e feitios de organização, fazendo com que: 1. Ascenda a produção e, com efeito, o lucro dos capitalistas também maximizem; 2. É importante também que aumente o controle e o poderio do patrão sobre a esfera laboral. Em vista disso, para Karl, a ascensão desenfreada do capitalismo é alicerçada mediante a exploração e imperância da classe trabalhadora pela esfera capitalista. Assim, as esferas sociais esbarram-se e as metamorfoses históricas e sociais se desenrolam. -/- Ante todo o supracitado texto, observemos que de um lado estão os proletários, que reivindicam seus direitos por intermédio de sindicatos, na busca por melhores salários e condições de trabalho. Em contrapartida, estão os burgueses ou os capitalistas, que visam somente a maximização de seus lucros. Logo, ante esse dualismo, existe um embate entre forças sociais completamente divergentes e opostas. Os capitalistas querem maximizar os lucros, e para isso empregam técnicas produtivas cada vez mais sofisticadas; a outra esfera, a dos trabalhadores, resiste, com o objetivo de manter e/ou ampliar suas condições materiais de sobrevivência na sociedade. Temos, assim, um corpo social alicerçado em relações divergentes, que inspiram embates políticos provindos da fragmentação social em classes. -/- Notas: -/- (1) In. AMORIM, H.; BARROS, C. R. de.; MACHADO, I. J. de R. Sociologia Hoje. 1ª. ed. São Paulo: Ática, 2013. 127-129. -/- (2) Estudante do Colégio de Aplicação da Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (2018-2020). Cursa Especialização em História Geral e do Brasil na Universidade Católica de Pernambuco. (3) Atualmente estuda o ensino médio no Colégio de Aplicação da Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (2018-2020). Cursa Inglês e Francês no Instituto Brasileiro de Línguas no Bairro Derby em Recife. Cursa ballet clássico na Escola de Ballet Marisa Queiroga. -/- (4) Bacharelando em Zootecnia pela Universidade Federal Rural de Pernambuco – UFRPE (2019-). Tecnólogo em Agropecuária pelo Instituto Federal de Pernambuco Campus Belo Jardim (2016-2018). Normalista (magistério) pela Escola Estadual Frei Cassiano Comacchio (2014-2017). Professor substituto e de reforço do Colégio de Aplicação da UFPE e do Colégio Santa Maria. Pesquisador assíduo de assuntos com cunho educacional, filosófico, político e social. Contatos: eisaque335@gmail.com / eics@discente.ifpe.edu.br e WhatsApp: (82)9.8143-8399. -/- (5) ENGELS, F.; MARX, K. Manifesto do Partido Comunista. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1988. p. 66-67. -/- (6) Para o professor Emanuel Isaque, por burguesia pode-se entender a camada ou classe social de Capitalistas modernos (ao tempo de Marx) ou contemporâneos, proprietários de indústrias ou quaisquer meios lucrativos e de produção social e que empregam por meio do trabalho assalariado, em que o indivíduo trabalha por horas semanais e ao fim do mês é lhe conferido um salário correspondente ao seu trabalho. -/- (7) Para o professor Emanuel Isaque, Sodalismo nada mais é do a doutrina relacionada à tudo que se conecta diretamente com a sociedade, à exemplo, vida sodalícia significa vida em sociedade. Nada mais é do que um simples sinônimo. -/- (8) O termo burguesia é trocado pelo termo elite para designar a classe social que detém o poder político, econômico, etc. -/- (9) Para o professor Emanuel Isaque, por proletariado pode-se entender a classe de trabalhadores assalariados modernos, aos quais não tendo meios próprios de produção nem de subsistência, são reduzidos a vender sua força de trabalho (labour-power) para que possam viver no corpo social capitalista. -/- (10) O professor Emanuel Isaque diz que é sumamente essencial lembrar e salientar que para o filósofo, o trabalho que enfrentamos cotidianamente tem como suma finalidade a geração de lucros para o capitalista. Toda a produção de uma indústria, à exemplo, é organizado de acordo com essa finalidade suprema. Todavia, os proletários ficam apenas com uma pequena parcela equivalente à produção. O resto é exatamente o lucro do capitalista proveniente do labour-power do trabalhador. -/- (11) Uma profícua ampliação do tema poderá ser encontrado em: MAIOR, J. L. S. Um conceito marxista de salário. Germinal: Marxismo e Educação em Debate, Salvador, v. 6, n. 2, p. 95-109, dez. 2014. -/- (12) Nota de Engels à edição inglesa do manifesto do Partido Comunista de 1888. -/- (13) Escritor italiano (1896-1957). -/- -/- SBS - Sociedade Brasileira de Sociologia PUCRS - PPG em Ciências Sociais Avenida Ipiranga, 6681 - Partenon CEP: 90619-900 - Porto Alegre, RS secretaria@sbsociologia.com.br -/- Quaisquer meios de reprodução do artigo é extremamente proibida. Os infratores estarão sujeitos à pena de três meses à um ano de prisão conforme artigo 184 do Código Penal e Lei 9.610/98. -/- Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva. ©2019. (shrink)

El artículo revela cómo la filosofía que desarrolló Karl Marx estuvo centrada en el tema de la vida. La esencia de la comprensión marxiana de la sociedad y la historia no radica en una primacía abstracta de lo económico, sino en el proceso real de producción y reproducción de la vida. Es la vida –y no la economía por sí misma– la que constituye el fundamento de la concepción materialista de la historia desarrollada por Marx.

Karl Popper, en tant que rationaliste critique, a été un opposant à toutes les formes de scepticisme, de conventionnalisme et de relativisme scientifique. En 1935, il a écrit Logik der Forschung. Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft, traduisant plus tard le livre en anglais et le publiant sous le titre The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), considéré comme un travail de pionnier dans son domaine. De nombreux arguments de ce livre sont dirigés contre les membres du « Cercle de Vienne (...) », tels que Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Rudolph Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Carl Hempel et Herbert Feigl. Popper est d'accord avec eux sur les aspects généraux de la méthodologie scientifique et sur leur méfiance à l'égard de la méthodologie philosophique traditionnelle, mais ses solutions ont été sensiblement différentes. Popper a largement contribué aux débats sur la méthodologie scientifique générale, la démarcation de la pseudo-science, la nature des probabilités et la méthodologie des sciences sociales. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.12087.57763. (shrink)

Článek se zabývá způsobem, jakým vnímá vztah vědecké metody a demokracie Karl Popper. Toto sepětí je jedním ze základních atributů Popperova myšlení. Pro jeho pochopení je třeba zasadit Poppera do historického kontextu vývoje liberálního myšlení a poukázat na možné souvislosti se Schumpeterovou redefinicí demokracie. Výchozím bodem je však interpretace základních episte- mologických předpokladů Popperova myšlení - konceptů provizornosti vědeckého poznání a ratio negativa. Primárním cílem článku je kontextualizace těchto předpokladů s politologickými a sociologickými důsledky. Ty lze spatřovat nejen s (...) odmítnutím positivismu a esencialismu, ale také v Popperově preferenci volebních a stranických systémů. Na závěr je rozpracována problematika kritického racionalismu, hodnot a otevřené společnosti na základě možných námitek vůči Popperově teorii. (shrink)

This is a study of the work of the German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), from his beginnings as a young psychiatrist to his mature days as an existentialist philosopher. This critical study of Jasper's philosophy traces his effort to instill meaning into the human quest for self-understanding and reveals the difficulties and frustrations inherent in this search. The book presents to the reader Jasper's attempts to deal with these difficulties by means of a philosophical approach to the concept of (...) being as a whole, beyond the individual – the other, the world and transcendence. In this book the author conducts an ongoing dialogue with existing research on Jasper's works and proposes a new reading for them. Along with a critical interpretation, the author reveals the challenges that the figure of Jaspers posed to his readers. Unlike most researchers, who ignored Jasper's early writings dealing with psychiatry and psychology, this book proposes a philosophical reading of these works, revealing the unity of the world in which Jaspers created – first as a psychologist and later as a philosopher. This approach enables the reader to discover in Jasper's work a daring effort to formulate an original philosphy regarding two basic concepts central to philosophy and human culture throughout all times – "selfhood" and "being". (shrink)

Karl Jasper is one of the greatest German existentialists. His philosophy of existence is both immanent and transcendental, making self realization not just a thing of the individual alone, but communal and dependent on a being that transcends material world. We exist to actualize our full potentials not by preying on others, but by coexisting peacefully.

Malgré les critiques de la théorie de Karl Popper sur la falsifiabilité pour la démarcation entre la science et la non-science, principalement la pseudo-science, ce critère est toujours très utile et parfaitement valide après avoir été perfectionné par Popper et ses disciples. De plus, même dans sa version originale, qualifiée de « dogmatique » par Lakatos, Popper n’a pas affirmé que cette méthode constituait un critère absolu de démarcation : un seul contre-exemple ne suffit pas à falsifier une théorie (...) ; une théorie peut légitimement être sauvée de la falsification en introduisant une hypothèse auxiliaire. Comparé à la théorie des révolutions de Kuhn, de qui lui-même s'est dissocié pour la transformer en une théorie des « micro-révolutions », j'estime que la méthode de démarcation de Popper, ainsi que le développement ultérieur proposé par lui, incluant la corroboration et la vraisemblance, même imparfait, n’est pas seulement valable aujourd’hui, mais c’est la meilleure méthodologie de démarcation. -/- SOMMAIRE: -/- Abstract Introduction 1. Le problème de la démarcation 2. Pseudoscience 3. Falsifiabilité 4 Falsification et réfutation 5 Extension de la falsifiabilité 6. Critiques de la falsifiabilité 7 Support de la falsifiabilité 8 Tendance actuelle Conclusions Bibliographie Notes -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.19124.60805 . (shrink)

Resumen: El presente artículo busca presentar sumariamente las principales críticas elaboradas por Karl Löwith y Leo Strauss en su recepción del clásico trabajo de Carl Schmitt Der Begriff des Politischen [El concepto de lo político]. Se intentará explorar, en un primer apartado, la acusación löwithiana de “ocasionalismo ateológico”, formulada, aunque bajo pseudónimo, en un texto crítico de 1935 cuyo título original fue luego reemplazado por aquel con el que se lo conoce actualmente: Der okkasionelle Dezisionismus von Carl Schmitt [El (...) decisionismo ocasional de Carl Schmitt]. En la segunda sección, siguiendo principalmente la lectura propuesta de Heinrich Meier, se buscará dar cuenta de la interpretación que aparece en los Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen [Comentarios sobre El concepto de lo político de Carl Schmitt], las notas de Leo Strauss, publicadas en 1932, que sugieren entender la afirmación de lo político en la obra de Schmitt como constitutiva de la posterior crítica schmittiana de la filosofía política de Thomas Hobbes. Palabras clave: político, ocasionalismo, decisión, teología política, liberalismo. Abstract: This article seeks to briefly present the main criticisms elaborated by Karl Löwith and Leo Strauss in their reception of the classic work of Carl Schmitt Der Begriff des Politischen [The Concept of the Political]. It will be explored, in a f irst section, the Löwithian accusation of “atheological occasionalism”, offered, although under a pseudonym, in a text of 1935 whose original title was later replaced by that with which it is currently known: Der okkasionelle Dezisionismus von Carl Schmitt [The Occasional Decisionism of Carl Schmitt]. In the second section, following mainly the reading of Heinrich Meier, I will seek to give an account of the interpretation present in the Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen [Comments on Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political], the critical notes by Leo Strauss, published in 1932, which suggest understanding the assertion of politics in Schmitt’s work as constitutive for the later Schmittian critique of Thomas Hobbes’ political philosophy. Keywords: political, occasionalism, decision, politcal theoology, liberalism. (shrink)

This study focuses on the influence of the work of Carl Stumpf on the thought of Karl Bühler. Our working hypothesis is based on the philosophical program that Bühler attributes to Stumpf and to which several of his works are largely indebted. It is divided into five parts. The first is intended to establish a relationship between Bühler and the School of Brentano to which Stumpf belongs. In the second, I show that Bühler became aware of Brentano's ideas and (...) of Stumpf's program during a stay at the Institute of Psychology of Berlin during the winter semester 1904-1905, and I briefly comment, in the third part, Bühler's references to the work of Stumpf and two of his books in which he defends Stumpf's program against his critics. After having established the solid knowledge that Bühler had of Stumpf's work, I outline, in the fourth part, the main aspects of this program and evaluate, in the fifth, how Bühler uses it in the field of sensory phenomena (gestalt). I conclude this study with several remarks on Stumpf's positive evaluation of the work of Bühler. (shrink)

Karl Popper has often been cast as one of the most solitary figures of twentieth-century philosophy. The received image is of a thinker who developed his scientific philosophy virtually alone and in opposition to a crowd of brilliant members of the Vienna Circle. This paper challenges the received view and undertakes to correctly situate on the map of the history of philosophy Popper’s contribution, in particular, his renowned fallibilist theory of knowledge. The motive for doing so is the conviction (...) that the mainstream perspective on Popper’s philosophy makes him more difficult to understand than might otherwise be the case. The thinker who figures most significantly in the account of Popper developed in these pages is Leonard Nelson. Both a neo-Friesian and neo-Kantian, this philosopher deeply influenced Popper through his student Julius Kraft, who met with Popper on numerous occasions in the mid 1920s. It is in the light of this influence that we understand Popper’s recollection that when he criticized the Vienna Circle in the early 1930s, he looked upon himself “as an unorthodox Kantian”. (shrink)

It is an irony to attack a more sceptical epistemology than one's own in the name of scepticism and defend, instead, an epistemology that is positively illogical. And yet that is what Martin Gardner has done in his “A Skeptical Look at Karl Popper.”.

Walter Reese-Schäfer, Karl-Otto Apel, Zur Einführung (with an Afterword by Jürgen Habermas), Junis Verlag GmbH, Hamburg 1990, 176pp. DM 17.80 -/- The author, presently a freelance writer published in the newspaper “Die Zeit” and the magazine “Stern,” pro­vides in this small book a clear and concise introduction to sources, themes and conclusions in the philosophy of Karl-Otto Apel. Apel, Emeritus Pro­fessor at Frank­furt, and close colleague of Habermas, characterizes his viewpoint as a “transcen­dental pragmatism” in which a Kantian (...) concern for question regarding “the conditions for the possi­bility of some­thing,” (p.10) mixes with deontological discourse-ethics, semeiotic themes from Peirce, an ap­proach to fallibilism, the demand for “final justifica­tions” (Letzt­begründung) and German her­meneutics. In view of the “den­sity and concentration” of Apel’s texts, which often have a “deterrent effect” upon those not already at home with “the phil­osophical language game,” it is the announced aim of this book to provide a work of translation and clarification of Apel’s special­ized efforts --in effect an orientation to Apel’s work. The book divides into an Introduction, 8 chapters and a summary conclusion --with Habermas’ appreciation, “A Master Builder with Hermeneutic Feeling --The Way of Philosopher Karl-Otto Apel,” bringing up the rear. There is also a bibliography of primary and secondary sources and a short table outlining highlights of Apel’s career. The “Introduction” provides a good overview of the aims of the book and gets one started on central themes. (shrink)

Largely neglected today, the work of Karl Philipp Moritz was a highly influential source for Early German Romanticism. Moritz considered the form of myth as essential to the absolute nature of the divine subject. This defence was based upon his aesthetic theory, which held that beautiful art was “disinterested”, or complete in itself. For Moritz, Myth, like art, constitutes a totality providing an idiom free from restriction in the imitation of the divine. This examination offers a consideration of Moritz’s (...) aesthetics and mythography, before turning briefly to consider his influence on the authors of Early German Romanticism. An understanding of the role of Moritz’s thought supports a number of recent claims that challenge the conventional reading of Romanticism. At the same time it allows us to see Romanticism’s unconventional realist theological programme, permitting us to overcome the problematic secularising readings of the movement. I would like to thank Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, as well as Fredrick Beiser and Lars Fischer for their help with this project. (shrink)

La falsifiabilité de Popper a été critiquée à la fois pour avoir exclu la science légitime et pour avoir accordé un statut scientifique aux pseudo-sciences. Selon Larry Laudan, « cela a la conséquence fâcheuse de considérer comme « scientifique » toute demande faisant de fausses allégations de manière concluante ». Certains reprochent à Popper en disant que sa théorie ne constitue pas une alternative légitime aux propositions inductives qu’il critique. Jeffrey soutient que le bayésianisme, qui insiste sur le point de (...) savoir dans quelle mesure les preuves empiriques appuient une hypothèse, est beaucoup plus proche de la pratique scientifique que la falsifiabilité de Popper. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.21235.27680. (shrink)

Suporterii lui Popper au susținut că cele mai multe critici se bazează pe o interpretare neînțeleasă a ideilor sale. Ei afirmă că Popper nu ar trebui interpretat în sensul că falsificabilitatea este o condiție suficientă pentru delimitarea științei. Unele pasaje par să sugereze că el o consideră doar o condiție necesară. Alte pasaje ar sugera că, pentru ca o teorie să fie științifică, Popper impune (pe lângă falsificabilitate) și alte teste, și că rezultatele negative ale testelor sunt acceptate. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22639.79521.

Bu çalışmada bilginin kazandığı doğru nitelemesi ve bilimsel bilgide doğrunun bir dogma haline gelmesi, kökenleriyle birlikte tartışılacaktır. Bu hususta Karl Popper'ın yanlışlamacı bilim imgesinin anlatıldığı bu çalışmada ikili bir yol izlenecektir. İlki; Popper'ın neye, neden karşı çıktığı üzerine, ikincisi ise bu karşı çıkış sonucunda açılan boşluğun nasıl doldurulduğudur. Dolayısıyla birinci aşama Popper açısından geleneksel imgeye yapılan bir kritik niteliğinde olurken, ikinci aşama ise Poppercı bilim imgesinin serimlendiği bölümü oluşturacaktır. Nihayetinde Popper yenilikleriyle bilimsel düşünüşe yeni bir soluk getirirken, son bölümde (...) sisteminin ne gibi eksiklikler barındırdığı tartışılacaktır. Bu eksiklikler ise Ayer ve Duhem-Quine tezi ile sırasıyla yanlışlamanın mantıksal olarak imkânsızlığı ve kuramın yanlışlanmasında holistik yaklaşımın gerekliliğini kapsayacaktır. (shrink)

Concentration of the world’s wealth in the hands of a few, corporate owners as heads of state – these are facts that lend plausibility to Marx' pronouncements. Yet, how should we evaluate his ideas from today’s vantage point?