There is growing concern that decision-making informed by machine learning (ML) algorithms may unfairly discriminate based on personal demographic attributes, such as race and gender. Scholars have responded by introducing numerous mathematical definitions of fairness to test the algorithm, many of which are in conflict with one another. However, these reductionist representations of fairness often bear little resemblance to real-life fairness considerations, which in practice are highly contextual. Moreover, fairness metrics tend to be implemented in narrow and targeted toolkits that (...) are difficult to integrate into an algorithm’s broader ethical assessment. In this paper, we derive lessons from ethical philosophy and welfare economics as they relate to the contextual factors relevant for fairness. In particular we highlight the debate around acceptability of particular inequalities and the inextricable links between fairness, welfare and autonomy. We propose Key Ethics Indicators (KEIs) as a way towards providing a more holistic understanding of whether or not an algorithm is aligned to the decision-maker’s ethical values. (shrink)

An increasing number of financial services (FS) companies are adopting solutions driven by artificial intelligence (AI) to gain operational efficiencies, derive strategic insights, and improve customer engagement. However, the rate of adoption has been low, in part due to the apprehension around its complexity and self-learning capability, which makes auditability a challenge in a highly regulated industry. There is limited literature on how FS companies can implement the governance and controls specific to AI-driven solutions. AI auditing cannot be performed in (...) a vacuum; the risks are not confined to the algorithm itself, but rather permeates the entire organization. Using the risk of unfairness as an example, this paper will introduce the overarching governance strategy and control framework to address the practical challenges in mitigating risks AI introduces. With regulatory implications and industry use cases, this framework will enable leaders to innovate with confidence. (shrink)

Mặc dù vẫn còn những nghi ngờ về sự thay đổi khí hậu trong một số tài liệu nghiên cứu, sự đồng thuận mạnh mẽ trong cộng đồng khoa học vẫn xác định rằng nhiệt độ bề mặt toàn cầu đã tăng trong vài thập kỷ gần đây. Biến đổi khí hậu, chủ yếu là kết quả của hoạt động con người, đang trở thành một trong những thách thức toàn cầu cấp bách nhất của thời đại chúng ta. Trong (...) thập kỷ vừa qua, con người đã thực hiện những nỗ lực đáng kể để đối phó với cuộc khủng hoảng biến đổi khí hậu và đã đạt được những ảnh hưởng nhất định trong việc chống lại biến đổi khí hậu và tạo ra nhận thức sâu rộng về hậu quả của nó. Tuy nhiên, câu hỏi tiếp tục đặt ra là liệu chúng ta đang đi đúng hướng để giải quyết cuộc khủng hoảng này một cách hiệu quả hay không? Bài tiểu luận này sẽ xem xét những thành tựu trong cuộc chiến chống biến đổi khí hậu, nhận thức ngày càng tăng về tác động của nó, mức độ nghiêm trọng ngày càng tăng của khủng hoảng khí hậu và liệu hành động của chúng ta đã đi đúng hướng chưa hay liệu chúng ta có cần xem xét lại cách tiếp cận của mình hay không. (shrink)

Trong nhiều biện pháp chống biến đổi khí hậu thế giới đang nghiên cứu và áp dụng, không phải lúc nào cũng là những thứ tối tân, hiện đại và lớn lao kỳ vĩ. Có những biện pháp thuộc về cải tiến phương thức nuôi trồng, và thực tế đã cho thấy, hiệu quả đo đếm được, bằng những tín chỉ có khả năng quy đổi thành giá trị tiền tệ thông qua mậu dịch carbon. Hiệu quả này có thể (...) xem như vế số 1 của mệnh đề nguyên lý trao đổi giá trị môi sinh-tiền tệ, trường hợp tạo ra thặng dư sinh thái. Bài viết này đề cập tới một trường hợp tiêu biểu của thế giới, và xem xét cơ sở khoa học của nguyên lý vận hành, trực tiếp liên quan. Sau cùng, một số ý kiến về những điều kiện cần có chuẩn bị cho triển khai trong thực tiễn tại Việt Nam sẽ được trình bày. (Tạp chí Kinh tế & Dự báo; ngày 4-10-2023). (shrink)

Sự tiến bộ nhanh chóng của các nền tảng Công nghệ Thông tin (CNTT) và ngôn ngữ lập trình đã làm thay đổi hình thái vận động và phát triển của xã hội loài người. Không gian mạng và các tiện ích đi kèm ngày càng được mở rộng, dẫn đến sự chuyển dịch dần từ đời sống trong thế giới thực sang đời sống trong thế giới ảo (còn gọi là không gian mạng hay không gian số). Sự mở (...) rộng và phát triển của các Mô hình Xử lý Ngôn ngữ Tự nhiên (Natural Language Processing – NLP) và Mô hình Ngôn ngữ Lớn (Large Language Model – LLM) thể hiện những đặc điểm giống con người về lập luận, nhận thức, sự chú ý và sáng tạo đã giúp con người vượt qua rào cản về khả năng vận hành. Đi kèm với các tiềm năng to lớn của AI là những lỗ hổng bảo mật mới và các rủi ro về an ninh thông tin phức tạp hơn. Khi xã hội vẫn đang cố gắng chuyển mình sang giai đoạn mới để có thể thích ứng với sự biến đổi công nghệ, cuộc cách mạng AI lại tiếp tục diễn ra đòi hỏi chúng ta phải suy nghĩ lại quỹ đạo của quá trình chuyển đổi xã hội vì nó có thể làm trầm trọng hơn các rủi ro an ninh thông tin được trình bày ở trên. Cụ thể, xã hội cần tiến hóa như thế nào để có thể bắt kịp với sự biến đổi mang tính đột phá tạo ra bởi làn sóng công nghệ AI hiện nay? Làm sao để quản lý và tận dụng sức mạnh của chúng trong khi vẫn đảm bảo được an ninh thông tin khi không gian và thời gian sống trong thế giới ảo của chúng ta ngày càng tăng? Bài viết này sẽ giúp làm sáng tỏ và trả lời các câu hỏi này. (shrink)

Đất đai cần được nhận diện như một đối tượng của tham nhũng để có biện pháp phòng chống tương xứng. Ai được hỏi tính hợp lý của dự án? Ai được hỏi giá đất đền bù bao nhiêu là hợp lý, rồi việc thu hồi, mua bán có làm lợi cho quan chức nào? Khi từng thông tin trên phải được công bố, cơ chế giám sát rõ thì nguồn lực của nhà nước được bảo toàn và người dân (...) cũng được lợi. (shrink)

Trong nhiều biện pháp chống biến đổi khí hậu thế giới đang nghiên cứu và áp dụng, không phải lúc nào cũng là những thứ tối tân, hiện đại và lớn lao kỳ vĩ. Có những biện pháp thuộc về cải tiến phương thức nuôi trồng, và thực tế đã cho thấy hiệu quả đo đếm được, bằng những tín chỉ có khả năng quy đổi thành giá trị tiền tệ thông qua mậu dịch carbon. Hiệu quả này có thể (...) xem như vế số 1 của mệnh đề nguyên lý trao đổi giá trị môi sinh-tiền tệ, trường hợp tạo ra thặng dư sinh thái. Bài viết này đề cập tới một trường hợp tiêu biểu của thế giới, và xem xét cơ sở khoa học của nguyên lý vận hành, trực tiếp liên quan. Sau cùng, một số ý kiến về những điều kiện cần có chuẩn bị cho triển khai trong thực tiễn tại Việt Nam sẽ được trình bày. (shrink)

Sự tiến bộ nhanh chóng của các nền tảng Công nghệ Thông tin (CNTT) và ngôn ngữ lập trình đã làm thay đổi hình thái vận động và phát triển của xã hội loài người. Không gian mạng và các tiện ích đi kèm ngày càng được mở rộng, dẫn đến sự chuyển dịch dần từ đời sống trong thế giới thực sang đời sống trong thế giới ảo (còn gọi là không gian mạng hay không gian số). Sự mở (...) rộng và phát triển của các Mô hình Xử lý Ngôn ngữ Tự nhiên (Natural Language Processing – NLP) và Mô hình Ngôn ngữ Lớn (Large Language Model – LLM) thể hiện những đặc điểm giống con người về lập luận, nhận thức, sự chú ý và sáng tạo đã giúp con người vượt qua rào cản về khả năng vận hành. Đi kèm với các tiềm năng to lớn của AI là những lỗ hổng bảo mật mới và các rủi ro về an ninh thông tin phức tạp hơn. Khi xã hội vẫn đang cố gắng chuyển mình sang giai đoạn mới để có thể thích ứng với sự biến đổi công nghệ, cuộc cách mạng AI lại tiếp tục diễn ra đòi hỏi chúng ta phải suy nghĩ lại quỹ đạo của quá trình chuyển đổi xã hội vì nó có thể làm trầm trọng hơn các rủi ro an ninh thông tin được trình bày ở trên. Cụ thể, xã hội cần tiến hóa như thế nào để có thể bắt kịp với sự biến đổi mang tính đột phá tạo ra bởi làn sóng công nghệ AI hiện nay? Làm sao để quản lý và tận dụng sức mạnh của chúng trong khi vẫn đảm bảo được an ninh thông tin khi không gian và thời gian sống trong thế giới ảo của chúng ta ngày càng tăng? Phần một của bài viết sẽ bàn về các vấn đề và rủi ro ảnh hưởng đến an ninh thông tin trong kỷ nguyên AI, cũng như là vai trò, lợi thế, và cơ hội của việc vận dụng AI cho mục đích đảm bảo an ninh thông tin. (shrink)

Các quỹ bác ái đang đóng vai trò ngày càng quan trọng trong việc tài trợ cho các hoạt động môi trường. Trước sự xuất hiện của các nhà tài trợ mới và cam kết tài trợ ngày càng tăng của họ cho việc bảo tồn, chống biến đổi khí hậu và các vấn đề môi trường khác, việc tìm hiểu các quỹ bác ái có thể định hình và có tác động như thế nào đối với các chương trình (...) nghị sự bảo vệ môi trường là điều cấp thiết. (shrink)

Trong những năm gần đây, tính cấp thiết và tầm quan trọng của việc giải quyết vấn đề biến đổi khí hậu ngày càng gia tăng, từ một vấn đề thuần túy về môi trường, nó đã trở thành một thách thức chính trị - xã hội phức tạp. Thậm chí, một số nhà nghiên cứu cho rằng tác động của biến đổi khí hậu toàn cầu đối với an ninh quốc tế có thể mang tính lịch sử, thách thức (...) hơn những mối đe dọa toàn cầu trước đây như phổ biến vũ khí hạt nhân, Đại suy thoái và khủng bố. (shrink)

Sự phát triển nhanh chóng của các nền tảng thương mại điện tử đã làm thay đổi hành vi mua sắm của người tiêu dùng, đặc biệt thông qua tính năng phát trực tiếp (livestream). Nghiên cứu này xác định và đo lường các yếu tố ảnh hưởng đến hành vi mua sắm ngẫu hứng của sinh viên đại học thông qua phiên livestream trên các nền tảng thương mại điện tử tại TP. Hồ Chí Minh. Khảo sát được thực (...) hiện với 192 sinh viên và dữ liệu được phân tích bằng phần mềm SPSS 22.0. Kết quả chỉ ra 5 yếu tố chính ảnh hưởng đáng kể đến quyết định mua sắm ngẫu hứng, bao gồm: Trực quan, Tương tác, Chiêu thị, Cảm xúc và Thuận tiện. Kết quả nghiên cứu này cung cấp những hiểu biết quan trọng cho các nhà tiếp thị và doanh nghiệp nhằm tăng cường sự tương tác và doanh số bán hàng thông qua livestream trên các nền tảng thương mại điện tử. (shrink)

TCCS - Việt Nam đang đứng trước ngưỡng cửa thập niên thứ hai, thế kỷ XXI. Tuy vậy, mốc thời gian không quan trọng bằng những đổi thay chóng mặt của quá trình quốc tế hóa đời sống kinh tế, và những biến đổi sâu sắc nó sẽ mang lại. Quá trình ấy, ngay bây giờ, lại được phóng đại qua lăng kính của những biến động toàn cầu do khủng hoảng kinh tế - tài chính 2007 - 2009, điều (...) có thể dẫn tới những biến đổi lớn về cấu trúc kinh tế nhân loại, cũng như diễn tiến địa - chính trị khắp nơi trên thế giới. (shrink)

In domains as disparate as playing Go and predicting the structure of proteins, artificial intelligence (AI) technologies have begun to perform at levels beyond which any humans can achieve. Does this fact represent something lamentable? Does superhuman AI performance somehow undermine the value of human achievements in these areas? Go grandmaster Lee Sedol suggested as much when he announced his retirement from professional Go, blaming the advances of Go-playing programs like AlphaGo for sapping his will to play the game at (...) a high level. In this paper, I attempt to make sense of Sedol’s lament. I consider a number of ways that the existence of superhuman-performing AI technologies could undermine the value of human achievements. I argue there is very little in the nature of the technology itself that warrants such despair. (Compare: does the existence of a fighter jet undermine the value of being the fastest human sprinter?) But I also argue there are several more localized domains where these technologies threaten to displace human beings from being able to achieve valuable things at all. This is a particular worry for those in unequal societies, I argue, given the difficulty of many achievements and the corresponding amount of resources needed to achieve great things. (shrink)

Thức ăn đóng vai trò cực kỳ quan trọng trong cuộc sống. Nó không chỉ cung cấp năng lượng và chất dinh dưỡng cho sự sống và phát triển của con người, mà đôi khi nó còn là hình thức để con người đạt thỏa mãn các nhu cầu văn hóa và xã hội. Việc dân số toàn cầu đang gia tăng nhanh chóng qua từng năm, thức ăn lại ngày càng trở nên quan trọng để đảm bảo an ninh (...) lương thực. Tuy nhiên, các hoạt động nông nghiệp và sử dụng đất đai cho sản xuất thực phẩm là một trong những nguồn phát thải nhà kính chính, góp phần làm biến đổi khí hậu. (shrink)

The victories of the Go-playing artificial intelligence “AlphaGo” against professional player Lee Sedol in 2016 had a profound impact on public and academic perceptions of AI. This event shocked observers, as the ability of a machine to defeat a world champion human in a highly complex game seemed to indicate that a machine had achieved human-like—or more than human—intelligence. But why was AlphaGo so readily anthropomorphized by academic and non-academic audiences alike? Drawing from existing analyses of reactions to and arguments (...) concerning AlphaGo and AI generally, this paper argues that “generative” cognitive science—a school of thought exemplified by the linguistic work of Noam Chomsky—offers two novel contributions to this subject. First, generativism sheds light on an irrational double standard in the study of the human mind in contrast to the study of non-cognitive systems—“methodological dualism”—which, I argue, has been transferred to evaluations of AlphaGo and other AI. Second, by exposing this irrational double standard in perceptions of AI, I employ generativism’s more well-known arguments concerning the nature of human intelligence and its scientific study to the evaluation of AI, exposing deficient interpretations widely used in the case of AlphaGo and AI generally. (shrink)

Thức ăn đóng vai trò cực kỳ quan trọng trong cuộc sống. Nó không chỉ cung cấp năng lượng và chất dinh dưỡng cho sự sống và phát triển của con người, mà đôi khi nó còn là hình thức để con người đạt thỏa mãn các nhu cầu văn hóa và xã hội [1]. Việc dân số toàn cầu đang gia tăng nhanh chóng qua từng năm, thức ăn lại ngày càng trở nên quan trọng để đảm bảo an (...) ninh lương thực. Tuy nhiên, các hoạt động nông nghiệp và sử dụng đất đai cho sản xuất thực phẩm là một trong những nguồn phát thải nhà kính chính, góp phần làm biến đổi khí hậu. (shrink)

Dear Colleagues, -/- Recently, for an article submitted to the European Journal of Therapeutics, it was reported that the paper may have been written with artificial intelligence support at a rate of more than 50% in the preliminary examination made with Turnitin. However, the authors did not mention this in the article’s material method or explanations section. Fortunately, the article’s out-of-date content and fundamental errors in its methodology allowed us no difficulty making the desk rejection decision. -/- On the other (...) hand, similar situations that we may encounter later caused us to discuss how we would decide when the artificial intelligence support of the articles was written. The general opinion that we have adopted and currently available in the literature is that if artificial intelligence is used while writing an article, how artificial intelligence is used in the methodology should be written in detail. -/- Moreover, we encountered a much more exciting situation during our evaluation. In a few academic studies, we have seen that artificial intelligence is added as a co-author. On July 06, 2023, in the Web of Science, using the advanced search, we found four articles with the author name ChatGPT [1]. We have determined that ChatGPT is the author in one of these articles [2] and the Group Author in three [3-5]. -/- Lee [6] stated that although artificial intelligence tools are much more advanced than search engines, they cannot be an author regarding research ethics because they cannot take responsibility for what they write. Similarly, Goto and Katanoda [7] stated that it is the author’s responsibility to confirm that the texts written by ChatGPT are correct. However, Pourhoseingholi et al. [8] reported that keeping up with technology is inevitable. Additionally, they said that“this action will be more fruitful and practical in extended dimensions when international institutes like ICMJE or COPE come up with the appropriate adjustments and establish robust criteria to scheme the AI authorship”. -/- Most probably, the use of artificial intelligence applications in scientific articles and whether it can be a co-author in these papers will be discussed soon. -/- We encourage interested authors to submit their ideas to our journal as a letter to the editor. -/- Yours sincerely,. (shrink)

What should we do about “tainted” public commemorations? Recent events have highlighted the urgency of reaching a consensus on this question. However, existing discussions appear to be dominated by two naïve opposing views – to remove or preserve them. My aims in this essay are two-fold. First, I argue that the two views are not naïve, but undergirded by concerns with securing self-respect and with the character of our engagement with the past. Second, I offer a qualified defence of vandalising (...) tainted commemorations. The defence comprises two parts. I consider two prominent suggestions – to install counter-commemorations and to add contextualising plaques – and argue that they are typically beset with difficulties. I then argue that in some circumstances, constrained vandalism is a response to tainted commemorations which effectively adjudicates the demands of the two opposing views. (shrink)

One recurring criticism of the best interests standard concerns its vagueness, and thus the inadequate guidance it offers to care providers. The lack of an agreed definition of ‘best interests’, together with the fact that several suggested considerations adopted in legislation or professional guidelines for doctors do not obviously apply across different groups of persons, result in decisions being made in murky waters. In response, bioethicists have attempted to specify the best interests standard, to reduce the indeterminacy surrounding medical decisions. (...) In this paper, we discuss the bioethicists’ response in relation to the state's possible role in clarifying the best interests standard. We identify and characterise two clarificatory strategies employed by bioethicists —elaborative and enumerative—and argue that the state should adopt the latter. Beyond the practical difficulties of the former strategy, a state adoption of it would inevitably be prejudicial in a pluralistic society. Given the gravity of best interests decisions, and the delicate task of respecting citizens with different understandings of best interests, only the enumerative strategy is viable. We argue that this does not commit the state to silence in providing guidance to and supporting healthcare providers, nor does it facilitate the abuse of the vulnerable. Finally, we address two methodological worries about adopting this approach at the state level. The adoption of the enumerative strategy is not defeatist in attitude, nor does it eventually collapse into (a form of) the elaborative strategy. (shrink)

One of the central claims of the neurodiversity movement is that society should accommodate the needs of autistics, rather than try to treat autism. People have variously tried to reject this accommodation thesis as applicable to all autistics. One instance is Pier Jaarsma and Stellan Welin, who argue that the thesis should apply to some but not all autistics. They do so via separating autistics into high- and low-functioning, on the basis of IQ and social effectiveness or functionings. I reject (...) their grounds for separating autistics. IQ is an irrelevant basis for separating autistics. Charitably rendering it as referring to more general capacities still leaves us mistaken about the roles they play in supporting the accommodation thesis. The appeal to social effectiveness or functionings relies on standards that are inapplicable to autistics, and which risks being deaf to the point of their claims. I then consider if their remaining argument concerning autistic culture may succeed independently of the line they draw. I argue that construing autistics' claims as beginning from culture mistakes their status, and may even detract from their aims. Via my discussion of Jaarsma and Welin, I hope to point to why the more general strategy of separating autistics, in response to the accommodation thesis, does not fully succeed. Finally, I sketch some directions for future discussions, arguing that we should instead shift our attention to consider another set of questions concerning the costs and extent of change required to accommodate all autistics. (shrink)

Commemorative artefacts purportedly speak – they communicate messages to their audience, even if no words are uttered. Sometimes, such artefacts purportedly communicate demeaning or pejorative messages about some members of society. The characteristics of such speech are, however, under-examined. I present an account of the paradigmatic characteristics of the speech of commemorative artefacts (or, “commemorative artefactual speech”), as a distinct form of political speech. According to my account, commemorative artefactual speech paradigmatically involves the use of an artefact by an authorised (...) member of a group to declare the importance of remembering a subject, in virtue of some feature of the subject. Then, I outline a variety of ways that commemorative artefactual speech can go awry. Such speech can be unauthorised, involve unfair exclusion or incorrect identification, be aesthetically inadequate, invoke clandestine explanations, and be directed at inappropriate subjects. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my account for resisting problematic commemorative artefactual speech. (shrink)

This paper argues that phenomenal consciousness is what makes an entity a welfare subject. I develop a variety of motivations for this view, and then defend it from objections concerning death, non-conscious entities that have interests (such as plants), and conscious entities that necessarily have welfare level zero. I also explain how my theory of welfare subjects relates to experientialist and anti-experientialist theories of welfare goods.

I develop and defend a sense-datum theory of perception. My theory follows the spirit of classic sense-datum theories: I argue that what it is to have a perceptual experience is to be acquainted with some sense-data, where sense-data are private particulars that have all the properties they appear to have, that are common to both perception and hallucination, that constitute the phenomenal characters of perceptual experiences, and that are analogous to pictures inside one’s head. But my theory also diverges from (...) conventional sense-datum theories in some key respects: on my view, (1) sense-data are first-person presentations of neural states, (2) the sensational qualities of sense-data differ in kind from the sensible qualities of external objects, and (3) sense-data are the vehicles in virtue of which we perceive, rather than the objects that we perceive. I argue that this package of claims is appropriately labeled ‘sense-datum theory’, and that the resultant view ought to be a live contender in contemporary philosophy of perception. (shrink)

What is it for something to be a disability? Elizabeth Barnes, focusing on physical disabilities, argues that disability is a social category. It depends on the rules undergirding the judgements of the disability rights movement. Barnes’ account may strike many as implausible. I articulate the unease, in the form of three worries about Barnes’ account. It does not fully explain why the disability rights movement is constituted in such a way that it only picks out paradigmatic disability traits, nor why (...) only the traits identified by the movement as constituting experiences of social and political constraint count as disability. It also leaves out the contribution of people other than disability activists, to the definition of disability. I develop Barnes’ account. On my account, a person is disabled if she is in some state which is constitutive of some constraint on her legitimate interests. This state must be the subject of legitimate medical interest and be picked out by the disability rights movement as among the traits for which they are seeking to promote progress and change. My account addresses the worries about Barnes’ account. It is also able to include all disabilities, rather than only physical ones. (shrink)

In analysing the problems with commemorative artefacts, philosophers have tended to focus on objectionable monuments that honour inappropriate subjects. The problems with such monuments, however, do not exhaust problems with a society’s public commemorative landscape – the totality of public commemorative artefacts in general, and the institutions involved in their creation and maintenance. I argue that a public commemorative landscape can implicate authoritative ideas, including stereotypes about people in virtue of their group membership. This contributes to what I term hermeneutical (...) constriction – a situation in which people are given reason to rely on an authoritative subset of the totality of hermeneutical resources that they actually have access to. Critiquing and resisting these problems with a public commemorative landscape that contributes to hermeneutical constriction is fraught with difficulties. Attempts to do so render activists vulnerable to a range of serious criticisms. (shrink)

I attempt to adjudicate the disagreement between those who seek to reconceptualize disability as mere difference and their opponents. I do so by reviewing a central conviction motivating the resistance, concerning the relationship between disability and well-being. I argue that the conviction depends on further considerations about the costs and extent of change involved in accommodating individuals with a particular disability trait. I conclude by considering three pay-offs of this clarification.

A famous mathematical theorem says that the sum of an infinite series of numbers can depend on the order in which those numbers occur. Suppose we interpret the numbers in such a series as representing instances of some physical quantity, such as the weights of a collection of items. The mathematics seems to lead to the result that the weight of a collection of items can depend on the order in which those items are weighed. But that is very hard (...) to believe. A puzzle then arises: How do we interpret the metaphysical significance of this mathematical theorem? I first argue that prior solutions to the puzzle lead to implausible consequences. Then I develop my own solution, where the basic idea is that the weight of a collection of items is equal to the limit of the weights of its finite subcollections contained within ever-expanding regions of space. I show how my solution is intuitively plausible and philosophically motivated, how it reveals an underexplored line of metaphysical inquiry about quantities and locations, and how it elucidates some classic puzzles concerning supertasks. (shrink)

Effective altruism is purportedly ecumenical towards different moral views, charitable causes, and evidentiary methods. I argue that effective altruists’ criticisms of purportedly less effective charities are inconsistent with their commitment to ecumenicity. Individuals may justifiably support charities other than those recommended by effective altruism. If effective altruists take their commitment to ecumenicity seriously, they will have to revise their criticisms of many of these charities.

This paper proposes a metaphysical framework for distinguishing between human and machine intelligence. It posits two identical deterministic worlds -- one comprising a human agent and the other a machine agent. These agents exhibit different information processing mechanisms despite their apparent sameness in a causal sense. Providing a conceptual modeling of their difference, this paper resolves what it calls “the vantage point problem” – namely, how to justify an omniscient perspective through which a determinist asserts determinism from within the supposedly (...) deterministic universe. (shrink)

John Rawls’s use of the “fully cooperating assumption” has been criticized for hindering attempts to address the needs of disabled individuals, or non-cooperators. In response, philosophers sympathetic to Rawls’s project have extended his theory. I assess one such extension by Cynthia Stark, that proposes dropping Rawls’s assumption in the constitutional stage (of his four-stage sequence), and address the needs of non-cooperators via the social minimum. I defend Stark’s proposal against criticisms by Sophia Wong, Christie Hartley, and Elizabeth Edenberg and Marilyn (...) Friedman. Nevertheless, I argue that Stark’s proposal is crucially incomplete. Her formulation of the social minimum lacks accompanying criteria with which the adequacy of the provisions for non-cooperators may be assessed. Despite initial appearances, Stark’s proposal does not fully address the needs of non-cooperators. I conclude by considering two payoffs of identifying this lack of criteria. (shrink)

According to a prominent argument, citizens in unjust societies have a duty to resist injustice. The moral and political principles that ground the duty to obey the law in just or nearly just conditions, also ground the duty to resist in unjust conditions. This argument is often applied to a variety of unjust conditions. In this essay, I critically examine this argument, focusing on conditions involving institutionally entrenched and socially normalised injustice. In such conditions, the issue of citizens’ duties to (...) resist is complicated. I conclude by considering how my discussions may clarify a contemporary problem about engaging in resistance to aid potential migrants who have been turned away by states in accordance with widely accepted rules. (shrink)

This paper examines the idea of "objective phenomenology," or a way of understanding the phenomenal character of conscious experiences that doesn’t require one to have had the kinds of experiences under consideration. My central thesis is that structural facts about experience—facts that characterize purely how conscious experiences are structured—are objective phenomenal facts. I begin by precisifying the idea of objective phenomenology and diagnosing what makes any given phenomenal fact subjective. Then I defend the view that structural facts about experience are (...) objective. I also argue that structural facts about experience, despite being objective, nevertheless still give rise to an explanatory gap. (shrink)

In the science of consciousness, it’s oftentimes assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But in recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. This paper (1) argues that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, (2) examines the semantics of ‘more conscious than’ expressions, (3) develops an analysis of what it is for a degreed property to count as degrees of consciousness, (...) and (4) applies the analysis to various theories of consciousness. I argue that whether consciousness comes in degrees ultimately depends on which theory of consciousness turns out to be correct. But I also argue that most theories of consciousness entail that consciousness comes in degrees. (shrink)

This paper develops a theory of analog representation. We first argue that the mark of the analog is to be found in the nature of a representational system’s interpretation function, rather than in its vehicles or contents alone. We then develop the rulebound structure theory of analog representation, according to which analog systems are those that use interpretive rules to map syntactic structural features onto semantic structural features. The theory involves three degree-theoretic measures that capture three independent ways in which (...) a system can be more or less analog. We explain how our theory improves upon prior accounts of analog representation, provides plausible diagnoses for novel challenge cases, extends to hybrid systems that are partially analog and partially symbolic, and accounts for some of the advantages and disadvantages of representing analogically versus symbolically. (shrink)

I sketch here an intuitive picture of repeatable artworks as created types, which are individuated in part by historical paths (re)production. Although attractive, this view has been rejected by a number of authors on the basis of general claims about abstract objects. On consideration, however, these general claims are overgeneralizations, which whilst true of some abstracta, are not true of all abstract objects, and in particular, are not true of created types. The intuitive picture of repeatable artworks as created types (...) is, then, left in place. (shrink)

Are a material object, such as a statue, and its constituting matter, the clay, parts of one another? One wouldn't have thought so, and yet a number of philosophers have argued that they are. I review the arguments for this surprising claim showing how they all fail. I then consider two arguments against the view concluding that there are both pre-theoretical and theoretical considerations for denying that the statue and the clay are mutual parts.

The “Lie-Flat movement” is a growing trend in China that promotes minimalism, leisure, and well-being as priorities over career-focused success. The article cautions the disillusioned young population of Hong Kong about the unmanageable expenses of living and the restricted upward social movement. Since 1980, the presence of inequality and limited intergenerational mobility has hindered upward mobility. Initial followers propagated the rejection of materialism through online platforms, emphasizing the importance of maintaining a healthy balance between work and personal life, and finding (...) satisfaction from within. It promotes prioritizing experiences over material possessions, thereby decreasing consumerism. Public housing and welfare programs facilitate the way of life, but increasing expenses instill uncertainty in the government among the middle-class. (shrink)

This paper defends contextualism against relativists" "faultless disagreement’ objection, while focusing on the debate about the semantics of predicates of personal taste. Relativists argue that there exists the phenomenon of faultless disagreement, and that relativism is the only framework where we can provide an explanation of this phenomenon. Against this argument, I first suggest three categories of disagreement which are not a faultless disagreement, and I argue that all apparent cases of faultless disagreement belong to one of these three categories. (...) In particular, I argue that the illusion of the existence of faultless disagreement arises when we have not specified the context of conversation in a sufficient way or when we have failed to notice that there is simply a conceptual disagreement. (shrink)

A response to a declaration in 'Le Monde', 'Luttons efficacement contre les théories du complot' by Gérald Bronner, Véronique Campion-Vincent, Sylvain Delouvée, Sebastian Dieguez, Karen Douglas, Nicolas Gauvrit, Anthony Lantian, and Pascal Wagner-Egger, published on June the 6th, 2016.

Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents automatically true? That is, is Conjunction Conditionalization: if (X & Y), then (X > Y) valid? Stalnaker and Lewis think so, but many others disagree. We note here that the extant arguments for Conjunction Conditionalization are unpersuasive, before presenting a family of more compelling arguments. These arguments rely on some standard theorems of the logic of counterfactuals as well as a plausible and popular semantic claim about certain semifactuals. Denying Conjunction Conditionalization, then, requires (...) rejecting other aspects of the standard logic of counterfactuals, or else our intuitive picture of semifactuals. (shrink)

Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in geometrical spaces, where distances between points inversely correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This paper argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more powerful and flexible. The core problem for the standard framework is that it cannot capture precision structure: for example, (...) consider the phenomenal contrast between seeing an object as crimson in foveal vision versus merely as red in peripheral vision. The solution I favor is to model mental qualities using regions, rather than points. I explain how this seemingly simple formal innovation not only provides a natural way of modeling precision, but also yields a variety of further theoretical fruits: it enables us to formulate novel hypotheses about the space and structures of mental qualities, formally differentiate two dimensions of phenomenal similarity, generate a quantitative model of the phenomenal sorites, and define a measure of discriminatory grain. A noteworthy consequence is that the structure of the mental qualities of conscious experiences is fundamentally different from the structure of the perceptible qualities of external objects. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs the function argument of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics 2.1. The argument seeks to define happiness through the method of division; shows that the highest good is better than all four of the goods of the soul, not only two, as commentators have thought; and unlike the Nicomachean argument, makes the highest good definitionally independent of the human function.

Some philosophers think that life is worth living not merely because of the goods and the bads within it, but also because life itself is good. I explain how this idea can be formalized by associating each version of such of a view with a function from length of life to the value generated by life itself. Then I argue that every version of the view that life itself is good faces some version of the following dilemma: either (1) good (...) human lives are worse than very long lives wholly devoid of pleasure, desire-satisfaction, knowledge, or any other goods, or (2) very short lives containing nothing but suffering are worth living. Since neither result is plausible, we ought to reject the view that life itself is good. On the view I favor, any given life may be worth living because of the goods that it contains, but life itself is neutral. (shrink)

Recent studies of peacebuilding highlight the importance of attending to people’s local experiences of conflict and cooperation. This trend, however, raises the fundamental questions of how the local is and should be constituted and what the relationship is between institutions and individual actors of peace at the local level of politics. I turn to Hannah Arendt’s thoughts to address these issues. Arendt’s thinking provides a distinctive form of realism that calls for stable institutions but never depletes the spirit of resistance. (...) Peacebuilding guided by this insight seeks to enable parties in conflict to voice their competing opinions by acting agonistically in public and to help them align their disruptive yet creative voices with a desire to establish and sustain common institutions. Thus, Arendt’s thinking not only offers a way to increase sensitivity to local differences but also to provide direction to the politics of resistance. In the end, it offers a balanced insight into peacebuilding and local agency beyond the contemporary liberal and critical approaches to peace. (shrink)

I develop and defend "metaethical experientialism," the thesis that phenomenal facts explain certain kinds of value facts. I argue, for example, that anyone who knows what it’s like to feel extreme pain is in a position to know that that kind of experience is bad. I argue that metaethical experientialism yields genuine counterexamples to the principle that no ethical conclusion can be derived from purely descriptive premises. I also discuss the prospects for a pluralistic metaethics, whereby different metaethical theories hold (...) for different classes of ethical facts. (shrink)

The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent and true consequent is itself true. There have been many recent attempts to amend the standard semantics to avoid this result. I show that these proposals invalidate a number of further principles of the standard logic of counterfactuals. The case against the automatic truth of counterfactuals with true components does not extend to these further principles, however, so it is not clear that rejecting the latter should be (...) a consequence of rejecting the former. Instead I consider how one might defuse putative counterexamples to the truth of true-true counterfactuals. (shrink)

The Rohingyas, the longest-standing stateless refugees in Malaysia, are continuously denied access to formal education. The UN Refugee Agency and local non-government organizations run learning centers that offer non-formal education to Rohingya children. Existing literature highlights that, in the absence of formal openings, alternative educational programmes remain the main provider of refugee education in Malaysia. This study, using the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies' five-domain framework, examines the educational standards provided to Rohingya refugees in Malaysia. The findings suggest that (...) most learning centers lack financial, human, and infrastructural resources. Lack of opportunity for secondary schooling makes primary education less worth it. Moreover, prevailing cultural and religious norms make it challenging for Rohingya children (especially girls) to access educational opportunities outside the community. National examinations and academic accreditation for learning are inaccessible to refugees, including Rohingyas. This paper deliberates on some immediate and long-term measures that can potentially address these issues. However, all actors, including UNHCR and the Malaysian government, must collaborate towards formulating a sustainable solution to this critical problem. (shrink)

Is A & C sufficient for the truth of ‘if A were the case, C would be the case’? Jonathan Bennett thinks not, although the counterexample he gives is inconsistent with his own account of counterfactuals. In any case, I argue that anyone who accepts the case of Morgenbesser's coin, as Bennett does, should reject Bennett’s counterexample. Moreover, I show that the principle underlying his counterexample is unmotivated and indeed false. More generally, I argue that Morgenbesser’s coin commits us to (...) the sufficiency of A & C for the truth of the corresponding counterfactual. (shrink)

The normativity of so-called “coherence” or “structural” requirements of rationality has been hotly debated in recent years. However, relatively little has been said about the nature of structural rationality, or what makes a set of attitudes structurally irrational, if structural rationality is not ultimately a matter of responding correctly to reasons. This paper develops a novel account of incoherence (or structural irrationality), critically examining Alex Worsnip’s recent account. It first argues that Worsnip’s account both over-generates and under-generates incoherent patterns of (...) attitudes, and then proposes an alternative that both avoids these problems and captures a crucial insight behind Worsnip’s account. According to this account, a set of attitudes is incoherent just in case having all of the attitudes in that set is incompatible with reacting to a question in a way that one is, in virtue of having the attitudes, committed to. (shrink)