Assuming degrees of otherness proportional to the degrees of development of other beings as sentient in relation to rights and as rational in relation to duties, as well as considering the possibility of degrees of legal status, it seems that we could support an ecology that values environmental control so that all species could coexist. So defiantly the development of technology and the survival of other species could be compatible. The environment (including plants, fungi, brute beings) should always be thought (...) of taking into account humanism and secularism – without resorting to theological arguments – and the partial otherness that we can identify in animals. (shrink)

Aujourd’hui délaissées, parfois devenues gênantes, les collections médicales furent pourtant à l’avant-garde du renouveau de la médecine au début du XIXe siècle, avant que celle-ci ne devienne la médecine telle que nous la connaissons aujourd’hui. Selon une vision courante de l’histoire de la médecine, les collections médicales auraient perdu de leur utilité lorsque la médecine a accédé au statut de science expérimentale, les musées d’anatomie faisant alors place aux laboratoires. Les collections d’anatomie-pathologie comme le musée Dupuytren ne seraient que le (...) reliquat de cette histoire, le témoignage d’un échec méthodologique à opposer aux succès de la physiologie expérimentale. Cette narration de l’histoire de la médecine est-elle cependant correcte ? Dans quels buts épistémologiques les médecins ont-ils créé ces collections ? Quelles connaissances cherchaient-ils à obtenir par ce biais ? Plus généralement, pourquoi collecter en médecine – et en science – et pourquoi collectionner ? Pour répondre à ces questions, je m’intéressai principalement dans cette contribution aux pratiques de collecte et de collection chez les médecins de la Société Anatomique de Paris au XIXe siècle et au rôle joué par ces pratiques dans la construction de la collection Dupuytren. (shrink)

This paper describes the scientific practices of the anatomists from the Société Anatomique de Paris (1803–1873) who were collecting anatomical and pathological specimens in Nineteenth-Century Paris and which led to the building of the anatomy and pathology Musée Dupuytren (1835–2016). The framework introduced by Robert Kohler to describe collecting sciences (2007) is useful as a tool to identify the set of diverse practices within pathological anatomy in nineteenth-century Paris. However, I will argue that anatomy and pathology collecting had specific features (...) compared to most collecting sciences. Two main collecting practices could be distinguished: first, “finding” anatomical specimens and second, keeping these specimens. The first kind of practices were at least rhetorically and explicitly motivated by Auguste Comte’s positive philosophy. But “finding” an anatomy or pathology specimen could not be completely compared to finding an object or making a simple observation, as dissecting as well as some experimental practices were also involved. Heterogeneous practices thus coexisted within collecting in anatomy and pathology. Epistemological as well as pragmatic tensions arose. On top of Kohler’s framework, I introduce Sabina Leonelli’s concept of “data journey” to offer a narrative of the diversity of collecting practices involved in the Société Anatomique de Paris and the Musée Dupuytren. I use the concept to analyse how this diversity of practices impacted knowledge production. (shrink)

This is the second edition of the book with the same title, criticizing Cultural Anthropology approaches employed by Cultural Anthropologists to understand Indonesian adats and suggesting a new approach, i.e. perennialist approach to understand the adats well.

This is the second edition of the book with the same title, covering theories of philosophical traditions of the world, including African philosophy, Asian philosophy, Indonesian philosophy, American philosophy, Continental philosophy, Analytical philosophy from diverse branches of philosophy.

This is the second printing of the same book with the same title published in 2005, explaining chronologically Indonesian philosophers and Indonesian philosophical thoughts developed in Indonesia from 3500 BCE through 1998 CE.

While the process of influence between various cultural and historical traditions in philosophy has been taking place for thousands of years, this inter-cultural interaction is occurring at a more accelerated pace in the information age. While philosophers throughout history have used visual representations to understand philosophical influence and historical origins and the distribution of philosophical ideas and sub-disciplines, this paper stresses the importance of philosophical visualizations to represent the global interactivity of philosophy. It provides various visualizations to represent global philosophical (...) interaction, the penetration of Western philosophical ideas into non-Western philosophical traditions, and the appropriation of non-Western traditions by Western philosophers. Such visualizations are important in the contemporary age to promote regional philosophies, to understand philosophical influence and to understand the promotion of a kind of pluralism which remains engaged with the global world. (shrink)

Kant's aim in the transcendental deduction is to show that the categories, i.e., a specific set of categories, are a necessary condition for all possible experience. Some philosophers have extended this idea in the following way: Kant solely identified a set of a priori concepts, which are a necessary condition for all possible epistemic claims within a framework of Newtonian physics; however, there exist other sets of epistemic claims, which can solely be justified by means of alternative sets of a (...) priori concepts. In this paper I will address the following questions: (1) What claims are precisely involved in this alleged extension of Kant's results of the transcendental deduction? (2) Is it merely an historical accident that Kant could only identify one set of categories, or, are there, apart from Kant's explicit commitment to one particular set of categories, any other claims within the Transcendental Analytic, which are incompatible with this extension of Kant's view? (shrink)

The paper surveys the currently available axiomatizations of common belief (CB) and common knowledge (CK) by means of modal propositional logics. (Throughout, knowledge- whether individual or common- is defined as true belief.) Section 1 introduces the formal method of axiomatization followed by epistemic logicians, especially the syntax-semantics distinction, and the notion of a soundness and completeness theorem. Section 2 explains the syntactical concepts, while briefly discussing their motivations. Two standard semantic constructions, Kripke structures and neighbourhood structures, are introduced in Sections (...) 3 and 4, respectively. It is recalled that Aumann's partitional model of CK is a particular case of a definition in terms of Kripke structures. The paper also restates the well-known fact that Kripke structures can be regarded as particular cases of neighbourhood structures. Section 3 reviews the soundness and completeness theorems proved w.r.t. the former structures by Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi, as well as related results by Lismont. Section 4 reviews the corresponding theorems derived w.r.t. the latter structures by Lismont and Mongin. A general conclusion of the paper is that the axiomatization of CB does not require as strong systems of individual belief as was originally thought- only monotonicity has thusfar proved indispensable. Section 5 explains another consequence of general relevance: despite the "infinitary" nature of CB, the axiom systems of this paper admit of effective decision procedures, i.e., they are decidable in the logician's sense. (shrink)

The Indonesian concept of budaya and its derivatives such as budi, budidaya, kebudayaan, budiman, budi pekerti, as well as budayawan were sacred concepts long ago. However, with the emergence of Cultural Anthropology by Indonesian anthropologists from the 1960s onwards, the concept of budaya became desacralized. Its desacralization started when budaya was construed as culture by Indonesian cultural anthropologists, and Ilmu-Ilmu Budaya was interpeted as the Humanities. This paper explores the sacred concept of budaya prior to the emergence of the Cultural (...) Anthropology, then investigates the desacralization of the concept of budaya through the history of Indonesian Cultural Anthropology and finally attempts to offer a re-sacralization of the concept of budaya by revitalizing the concept through the Indonesian Hindu and Islamic metaphysical heritage. The re-sacralization of the Indonesian concept of budaya will provide a pathway to the emergence of a Budaya Anthropology which can correct some of the problems of the profanized Cultural Anthropology. (shrink)

In their recently published book Nudge (2008) Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein (T&S) defend a position labelled as ‘libertarian paternalism’. Their thinking appeals to both the right and the left of the political spectrum, as evidenced by the bedfellows they keep on either side of the Atlantic. In the US, they have advised Barack Obama, while, in the UK, they were welcomed with open arms by the David Cameron's camp (Chakrabortty 2008). I will consider the following questions. What (...) is Nudge? How is it different from social advertisement? Does Nudge induce genuine preference change? Does Nudge build moral character? Is there a moral difference between the use of Nudge as opposed to subliminal images to reach policy objectives? And what are the moral constraints on Nudge? (shrink)

In the pre-Independence era, our republic founders held the Cold War mindset strongly. Consequently, the Indonesian republic proclaimed in 1945 was based on a Cold War mindset; our state philosophy (Pancasila) and the Constitution (UUD '45) were understood and construed on the Cold War discourse basis; and binary oppositions of capitalism-socialism and liberalism-communism since then have been created. Up to the 2020s, the Cold War mindset has still been held by public intellectuals and the binary oppositions have still been rampant (...) in intellectual discourses. If the mindset were still held for three decades to come, it would cause a setback to the development of Indonesian philosophy history. This article is a call to stop and an invitation to escape from the retrogressive mindset. As a call, the article exposes first the evil root of the Cold War mindset as well as the philosophical critique towards it. Then, as an invitation, it suggests three realistic alternative mindsets to replace the Cold War mindset, i.e. post- Cold War capitalistic mindset, deconstructive mindset, and utopian mindset, which are called herein as three growth scenarios. It is believed that, if the three generating scenarios are followed, they will move Indonesian philosophy history forward, and its ongoing development will not hinder or retard. (shrink)

World philosophies are gradually gaining in recognition. Today, philosophers in Southeast Asia can freely construct their regional philosophies without philosophical tyranny of the West. However, this situation has not come so easily. Many Asian and African philosophies have experienced a struggle for acceptance. And even this recognition is limited by selectivity and philosophical fashion centered in Western academia and perpetuated by Western educated eastern intellectuals. This paper attempts to show how regional philosophy in general and Southeast Asian philosophy in particular (...) can be constructed and accepted. These regional self-constructed philosophies can serve to correct the legacy of the racism and bigotry of the tradition. And the paper also promotes the idea of establishing a philosophical umbrella called ‘Southeast Asian philosophy’ under which regional philosophies can develop and thrive. (shrink)

Not only does tradition of abstract thought called ‘philosophy’ exist in Indonesia, but it also has taken deep root. Through linguistic-morphological and historical studies, traces of possible existence of the philosophical tradition in Indonesia could be found out. Nevertheless, many still doubt its existence, since popular mass media have not yet popularized the designation of the thought tradition taking place in Indonesia. What is more, today’s philosophers have not yet formulated its accurate definition. Consequently, young generation of Indonesia has not (...) consciously recognized, let alone appreciated the indigenous philosophical legacy. Luckily, much effort has been done recently. For instance, the effort that the writer of this article has done, by defining an accurate definition for the tradition and writing some articles on Indonesian philosophy for online encyclopedia ‘Wikipedia’. (shrink)

This study outlines a new proposal on the creation of Islamic Anthropology on the basis of "perennialist epistemology", to use Aslan's term (2005:55). A previous proposal of this kind had been put forward by Akbar S. Ahmed in his Toward Islamic Anthropology: Definition, Dogma and Directions (1986). While Ahmed's proposed Islamic Anthropology aims at assessing and arguing with Western anthropologists over their misconceptions about Islamic societies they observe, then preparing and replying to their study in a scholarly manner by "creating (...) their own alternative scholarship" (1986:55), this author's recommended Islamic Anthropology aims at finding philosophia perennis or sophia perennis or religio perennis or "essential commonality" (Beinorius 2005:237) or "transcendent unity" (Aymard & Laude 2004:38) between Islamic, other religious and ethnic cultural manifestations, or rather, in Indonesian context, between Islamic, other religious and adat cultural manifestations. The building of Islamic Anthropology of perennialist bend in Indonesia is imperative since in the aftermath of national economic crisis and dethronement of Pres. Soeharto, Anthropology academia in Indonesia relishes the freedom of no longer having to serve the regime socio-political agenda. Post-Soeharto era of decentralization, liberalization, emancipation, and democratization provides favourable opportunity for Anthropology to set its own purely academic goals (Ramstedt 2005 :215). This new situation also enables anthropologists from diverse epistemological traditions to contribute directly to establishment of new kinds of Anthropology based on their specific epistemologies. To clarify what is meant by his perennialism-based Islamic Anthropology, the author herein elaborates the perennialist epistemology on which he bases his suggested Islamic Anthropology, explains the perennialist ontology on which the epistemology is based, delineates how to build an Islamic Anthropology based on the perennialist epistemology, and lastly exemplifies application of the perennialist method in Islamic Anthropology he proposes. (shrink)

Racism in the USA not only takes place in law, economics, politics, mass media and new media, education, literature, and popular culture but also occurs in philosophy. An abundance of Latino philosophers, African-American philosophers, and Native American philosophers are excluded from the American philosophy canon. To discover whether racism happens in the field of American philosophy, the writer surveys 15 American philosophy books written between the 1940s and the 2020s by various American writers, the whites and the non-whites. The writer (...) carries out an ‗index-study‘: scanning philosopher names in the index of each book, identifying and scrutinizing the names, listing and categorizing them into race categories, counting them, comparing the number of non-white philosophers and white philosophers mentioned in each book, putting them in a table, and interpreting why there is a disparity between the number of non-white and white philosophers included in the books. The survey result shows that racism happens in American philosophy; the writers of the 15 American philosophy books exclude an abundance of non-white philosophers. There is a critical need to write a new, post-national American philosophy book that does justice to non-white philosophers in the near future so that racism diminishes. (shrink)

Dalam tulisan Mempopulerkan Filsafat Indonesia ke Dunia (Majalah Ilmiah Bina Widya Vol.16, No.2, Agustus 2005), penulis telah menggunakan dua pendekatan untuk menjawab soal ‘adakah tradisi filsafat di Indonesia?’, yang salah satunya ialah pendekatan morfologi linguistik. Sebagai suatu cabang ilmu linguistik yang mempelajari kata-kata (words) dan bagian-bagiannya (word parts) seperti morfem (morpheme) dan leksem (lexeme), kategori semantik dan kategori gramatikal yang dimiliki keduanya, aturan ucap dan perubahan ucap dalam kombinasi keduanya, serta hubungan antar-kata dalam kalimat, morfologi linguistik amat berguna dalam kaitannya (...) dengan studi Filsafat Indonesia, utamanya untuk menggali khazanah kata-kata di Indonesia yang berhubungan dengan tradisi pemikiran abstrak Filsafat, yang dengannya akan ditemukan data￾data linguistik yang cukup valid, yang memungkinkan kita berasumsi dengan asumsi ilmiah yang memadai akan adanya tradisi kefilsafatan di Indonesia. (shrink)

Saat Indonesia menghadapi krisis multi-dimensi sejak era akhir rezim Soeharto, banyak pakar, cendekiawan, serta kalangan intelektual dari dalam maupun luar negeri yang mencoba menemukan solusi dan jalan keluarnya. Setiap pakar menemukan obat mujarab 'krisis' itu berdasarkan kompetensi dan ekspertisi masing-masing. Pakar agama mengajukan 'pertobatan nasional' sebagai solusi, sementara pakar sosio-politik mengajukan 'reformasi', 'revolusi', atau 'transformasi'. Semuanya melandasi alternatif pilihannya dengan argumentasi masing-masing pula. Kali ini penulis ingin mengajukan suatu alternatif jalan-keluar, yang dengannya diharapkan Indonesia mampu keluar dari krisis multi-dimensi itu. (...) Solusi yang ditawarkan penulis berasal dari khazanah klasik tanah-airnya sendiri. Solusi krisis di negeri ini, hemat penulis, harus digali dari warisan aslinya sendiri, yang disebutnya sebagai 'kosmologi adat' atau 'sistem kosmik adat'. (shrink)

Filsafat bukanlah seperti yang selama ini dipahami dan dimengerti. Ia bukanlah satu disiplin berpikir, apalagi asketisme bernalar, yang kedap-politis. Nyatanya, filsafat lahir dari silang-sengkarut politis antar-filsafat dalam momen dan ruang historis yang terus berubah. Filsafat sang pemenang (philosophy of the dominator) akan mengangkangi dan menjajah filsafat sang kalah (philosophy of the dominated). Kajian politis atas filsafat-filsafat dunia masih terbilang jarang, untuk tidak mengatakan belum pernah ada. Termasuk kajian yang jarang tersebut adalah kajian yang ditulis Enrique Dussel (lahir 1934). Dalam buku (...) The Philosophy of Liberation (2003), Dussel memperkenalkan kajian Politik Filsafat-kajian tentang tangan-tangan penjajah yang bermain di dalam proses produksi suatu tradisi filosofis. Fokus utama kajiannya memang Filsafat Barat Modern (the Modern Western Philosophy); meskipun demikian, pendekatan yang digunakan dalam bukunya itu ternyata dapat pula diterapkan pada gejala dan fenomena filosofis di negeri-negeri lain, hatta fenomena filosofis yang terjadi di negeri kita sendiri. Makalah ini bermaksud menyingkap penjajahan politis yang dilakukan Filsafat Barat Modern (the Modern Philosophy) terhadap tradisi filsafat sejagad, penjajahan politis yang dijalankan Filsafat Barat Modern terhadap Filsafat Asia Tenggara (the Southeast Asian Philosophy), serta penjajahan politis yang dijalankan Negara terhadap tradisi Filsafat Indonesia, berpijak pada kajian Philosophy of Liberation yang ditulis oleh Enrique Dussel tersebut. (shrink)

In this introduction, we give a brief overview of the main concepts of modularity that have been offered in recent literature. After this, we turn to a summary of the papers collected in this volume. Our primary aim is to explain how the modularity of emotion question relates to traditional debates in emotion theory.

Contrary to what many interpretations claim, according to Bayle faith does not completely eliminate reason. It intervenes to reveal factual truths that can only be known through revelation (for example, that God allowed Adam and Eve to sin). To these factual truths can be applied a rational principle (an axiomatic and evident one, according to Bayle, which he calls a "common notion"), namely, that "what God does is well done." God allowed sin, so we must think it was justified, even (...) if we don't understand why. This approach is what I call, cum grano salis, Pierre Bayle's theodicy. (shrink)

Philosophers have not been very preoccupied by the link between emotions and attention. The few that did (de Sousa, 1987) never really specified the relation between the two phenomena. Using empirical data from the study of the emotion of fear, we provide a description (and an explanation) of the links between emotion and attention. We also discuss the nature (empirical or conceptual) of these links.

According to recent approaches in the philosophy of medicine, biomedicine should be replaced or complemented by a humanistic medical model. Two humanistic approaches, narrative medicine and the phenomenology of medicine, have grown particularly popular in recent decades. This paper first suggests that these humanistic criticisms of biomedicine are insufficient. A central problem is that both approaches seem to offer a straw man definition of biomedicine. It then argues that the subsequent definition of humanism found in these approaches is problematically reduced (...) to a compassionate or psychological understanding. My main claims are that humanism cannot be sought in the patient–physician relationship alone and that a broad definition of medicine should help to revisit humanism. With this end in view, I defend what I call an outcomes-oriented approach to humanistic medicine, where humanism is set upon the capacity for a health system to produce good health outcomes. (shrink)

How much can we shape the emotions we experience? Or to put it another way, how plastic are our emotions? It is clear that the exercise of identifying the degree of plasticity of emotion is futile without a prior specification of what can be plastic, so we first propose an analysis of the components of emotions. We will then turn to empirical data that might be used to assess the degree of plasticity of emotions.

I investigate whether any plausible moral arguments can be made for ‘grandfathering’ emission rights (that is, for setting emission targets for developed countries in line with their present or past emission levels) on the basis of a Lockean theory of property rights.

The Distribution View provides a model that integrates four distributional concerns in the evaluation of risky prospects. Starting from these concerns, we can generate an ordering over a set of risky prospects, or, starting from an ordering, we can extract a characterization of the underlying distributional concerns. Separability of States and/or Persons for multiple-person risky prospects, for single-person risky prospects and for multiple-person certain prospects are discussed within the model. The Distribution View sheds light on public health policies and provides (...) a framework for the discussion of Parfit's Priority View for risky prospects. (shrink)

Utilitarianism, it has been said, is not sensitive to the distribution of welfare. In making risky decisions for others there are multiple sensitivities at work. I present examples of risky decision-making involving drug allocations, charitable giving, breast-cancer screening and C-sections. In each of these examples there is a different sensitivity at work that pulls away from the utilitarian prescription. Instances of saving fewer people at a greater risk to many is more complex because there are two distributional sensitivities at work (...) that pull in opposite directions from the utilitarian calculus. I discuss objections to these sensitivities and conclude with some reflections on the value of formal modelling in thinking about societal risk. (shrink)

We construct a probabilistic coherence measure for information sets which determines a partial coherence ordering. This measure is applied in constructing a criterion for expanding our beliefs in the face of new information. A number of idealizations are being made which can be relaxed by an appeal to Bayesian Networks.

Belgium has recently extended its euthanasia legislation to minors, making it the first legislation in the world that does not specify any age limit. I consider two strands in the opposition to this legislation. First, I identify five arguments in the public debate to the effect that euthanasia for minors is somehow worse than euthanasia for adults—viz. arguments from weightiness, capability of discernment, pressure, sensitivity and sufficient palliative care—and show that these arguments are wanting. Second, there is another position in (...) the public debate that wishes to keep the current age restriction on the books and have ethics boards exercise discretion in euthanasia decisions for minors. I interpret this position on the background of Velleman’s “Against the Right to Die” and show that, although costs remain substantial, it actually can provide some qualified support against extending euthanasia legislation to minors. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of somatic evolution by natural selection to our understanding of cancer development. I do so in two steps. In the first part of the paper, I ask to what extent cancer cells meet the formal requirements for evolution by natural selection, relying on Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) framework of Darwinian populations. I argue that although they meet the minimal requirements for natural selection, cancer cells are not paradigmatic Darwinian populations. In the second (...) part of the paper, I examine the most important examples of adaptation in cancer cells. I argue that they are not significant accumulations of evolutionary changes, and that as a consequence natural selection plays a lesser role in their explanation. Their explanation, I argue, is best sought in the previously existing wiring of the healthy cells. (shrink)

Choice often proceeds in two stages: We construct a shortlist on the basis of limited and uncertain information about the options and then reduce this uncertainty by examining the shortlist in greater detail. The goal is to do well when making a final choice from the option set. I argue that we cannot realise this goal by constructing a ranking over the options at shortlisting stage which determines of each option whether it is more or less worthy of being included (...) in a shortlist. This is relevant to the 2010 UK Equality Act. The Act requires that shortlists be constructed on grounds of candidate rankings and affirmative action is only permissible for equally qualified candidates. This is misguided: Shortlisting candidates with lower expected qualifications but higher variance may raise the chance of finding an exceptionally strong candidate. If it does, then shortlisting such candidates would make eminent business sense and there is nothing unfair about it. This observation opens up room for including more underrepresented candidates with protected characteristics, as they are more likely to display greater variance in the selector’s credence functions at shortlisting stage. (shrink)

In some quarters within philosophy of medicine, more particularly in the phenomenological approaches, naturalism is looked upon with suspicion. This paper argues, first, that it is necessary to distinguish between two expressions of this attitude towards naturalism: phenomenological approaches to illness disagree with naturalism regarding various theoretical claims and they disapprove of naturalism on an ethical level. Second, this paper argues that both the disagreement with and the disapproval of naturalism are to a large extent confused. It then offers some (...) proposals to set up an agenda for future collaboration. (shrink)

Considerations of objective-value freedom and status freedom do impose constraints on policies that restrict access to cigarettes. As to the objective-value freedom, something of value is lost when anti-alcohol policies lead to pub closures interfering with valued life styles, and a similar, though weaker, argument can be made for cigarettes. As to status freedom, non-arbitrariness requires consultation with vulnerable populations to learn what might aid them with smoking cessation.

Risky prospects represent policies that impose different types of risks on multiple people. I present an example from food safety. A utilitarian following Harsanyi's Aggregation Theorem ranks such prospects according to their mean expected utility or the expectation of the social utility. Such a ranking is not sensitive to any of four types of distributional concerns. I develop a model that lets the policy analyst rank prospects relative to the distributional concerns that she considers fitting in the context at hand. (...) I name this model ‘the Distribution View’ posing an alternative to Parfit's Priority View for risky prospects. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Going Beyond Nature in Order to Explain it Technē, epistēmē and alēthēs doxa Mathematics, pure and applied Observation and Experimental Verification Bibliography.

I argue in this paper that there are two considerations which govern the dynamics of a two-person bargaining game, viz. relative proportionate utility loss from conceding to one's opponent's proposal and relative non-proportionate utility loss from not conceding to one's opponent's proposal, if she were not to concede as well. The first consideration can adequately be captured by the information contained in vNM utilities. The second requires measures of utility which allow for an interpersonal comparison of utility differences. These considerations (...) respectively provide for a justification of the Nash solution and the Kalai egalitarian solution. However, none of these solutions taken by themselves can provide for a full story of bargaining, since, if within a context of bargaining one such consideration is overriding, the solution which does not match this consideration will yield unreasonable results. I systematically present arguments to the effect that each justification from self-interest for respectively the Nash and the Kalai egalitarian solution is vulnerable to this kind of objection. I suggest that the search for an integrative model may be a promising line of research. (shrink)

There are three slogans in the history of Socialism that are very close in wording, viz. the famous Cabet-Blanc-Marx slogan: "From each according to his ability; To each according to his needs"; the earlier Saint-Simon-Pecqueur slogan: "To each according to his ability; To each according to his works"; and the later slogan in Stalin’s Soviet Constitution: "From each according to his ability; To each according to his work." We will consider the following questions regarding these slogans: a) What are the (...) earliest occurrences of each of these slogans? b) Where does the inspiration for each half of each slogan come from? c) What do the Saint-Simonians mean by “To each according to his ability”? d) What do they mean by “To each according to his works”? e) What motivates the shift from “To each according to his ability” to “From each according to his ability”? f) How should we envisage the progression toward “To each according to his needs”? g) What is the distinction between from “To each according to his works” and “To each according to his work”? (shrink)

Dans cet article, je considère l’influence possible des recherches récentes sur les attitudes en psychologie sociale, principalement dans le paradigme des théories des processus duaux [dual process theories], sur notre compréhension de la responsabilité. La thèse que je soutiens est que certaines révisions à notre façon de comprendre la responsabilité et nos pratiques d’attribution de la responsabilité pourraient être justifiées par ces travaux. Avant de présenter les révisions que j’introduis, je décris les grandes lignes du paradigme que j’utiliserai, soit celui (...) des théories processus duaux tel qu’appliqué aux attitudes. Puis, m’inspirant de Vargas (2004, 2005), je présente les différentes formes que peuvent prendre le révisionnisme. Parce que ces révisions s’appliquent à des notions qui sont utilisées à la fois par le commun des mortels et par les philosophes (qui tentent soit de les reconstruire rationnellement, soit de les modifier), je présente ce que l’on présume que pense chacun des groupes sur la question. Finalement, je présente trois révisions, plutôt « locales », que ces travaux pourraient inspirer. (shrink)

In this commentary on Yashar Saghai's article "Salvaging the Concept of Nudge" (JME 2013) I discuss his distinction between a 'prod' (which is 'substantially controlling') and a 'nudge' (which is ‘substantially non-controlling’).

The novelty in Adam Burgess’ paper is that he assesses nudge policies in the context of the shift in the UK government’s approach to risk from the nannying policies of Labour to the nudge policies of the Conservatives. There is a wealth of ideas in this paper. I find it useful to disentangle some of these ideas focusing on the following two questions: 1. In what respects do Labour’s nannying policies and the Conservatives’ nudge policies differ? 2. What is problematic (...) about Labour’s nannying and the Conservatives’ nudge policies? Subsequently I will reflect on how a particular strand of research in the social sciences can be made relevant to designing a more responsible way of dealing with societal risk and show how this approach can evade some of Burgess’ concerns. (shrink)

I argue that by constructing an identity of Bohemian whim and spontaneity one can make what was previously an akratic action into a fully rational action, since in performing the action, one asserts one identity.

In the novel "Het Been" by the Flemish writer Willem Elsschot. In the novel, a businessman becomes obsessive over the fact that a victim of his unscrupulous business practices refuses to forgive him. This raises the following questions: Why does one find it upsetting when the victim of one's wrongdoing refuses to accept our apologies? Why does one find it upsetting when the victim is unwilling to grant us the forgiveness that we are asking for?

Selon l’une des thèses les plus répétées de la médecine narrative, la théorie littéraire, ou plus largement, la narration, permettrait aux membres du personnel médical d’appréhender les récits des patients et par là, de prendre en considération leurs expériences dans leur singularité absolue. Dans ma contribution, je soulignerai quelques limites de cette thèse. J’appuierai mon analyse sur un exemple de récit dominant de maladie, les récits portant sur le cancer du sein aux États-Unis au XXe siècle, à partir des analyses (...) féministes qui en ont été faites. Ainsi je montrerai d’une part qu’il est peu plausible que les récits des patients soient absolument singuliers et uniques, en un sens pertinent, et d’autre part que certains récits peuvent devenir dominants et marginaliser des récits qui voudraient s’en démarquer. (shrink)

Socrates’ eros model, St. Paul’s agape model, and Aristophanes’ shared-identity model have different takes on the constancy of love and on the loss of love. I illustrate how these models and themes find expression within literature, music, and film through the ages.

In decision-theory, the notion of regret enters into the minimax decision-rule and has a determinate usage in this context. However, there are many alternative ways of conceiving of regret. The chapter constructs the einmalist- nicht-keinmal ('once is not never') game, in which a single sampling radically changes the expected value of the game in a way that is quite counterintuitive, as the basis for studying regret after a loss following the choice of an uncertain action. Crucially, the very loss affects (...) the posterior expectation of the game and the posterior credence about the objective chances of a win. Our taxonomy of regret contains regret over the action chosen and regret over the outcome obtained as its main categories, and is mirrored by a taxonomy of joy after a win following the choice of an uncertain action, and is used to critique of Krähmer and Stone's analysis of risk aversion for uncertain actions. (shrink)

Some of the challenges in Sanders et al. (this issue) can be aptly illustrated by means of charity nudges, that is, nudges designed to increase charitable donations. These nudges raise many ethical questions. First, Oxfam’s triptychs with suggested donations are designed to increase giving. If successful, do our actions match ex ante or ex post preferences? Does this make a difference to the autonomy of the donor? Second, the Behavioural Insights Team conducted experiments using social networks to nudge people to (...) give more. Do these appeals steer clear of exploiting power relations? Do they respect boundaries of privacy? Third, in an online campaign by Kiva, donors are asked to contribute directly to personalized initiatives. In many cases, the initiative has already been funded and donor money is funnelled to a new cause. Is such a “pre-disbursal” arrangement truthful and true to purpose as a social business model? (shrink)

This paper demonstrates the innovative character of the approach to metaethics underlying John Dewey’s pragmatism. Dewey's theory of evaluation is contrasted with one of the most dominant contemporary metaethical theses: constructivism. I show that the insistence placed by metaethical constructivists on the actor’s practical point of view, on the rejection of the subjective preferences model, and on a specific form of ethical antirealism and naturalism echoes some of the most crucial claims made by Dewey. This argumentation leads to my main (...) hypothesis: an analysis of Dewey's conception of evaluation allows us to highlight the groundbreaking character of its metaethical approach—an approach that will be characterized as fairly constructivist. (shrink)

Many religions offer hope for a life that transcends death and believers find great comfort in this. Non-believers typically do not have such hopes. In the face of death, they may find consolation in feeling contented with the life they have lived. But do they have hopes? I will identify a range of distinctly secular hopes at the end of life. Nothing stops religious people from sharing these secular hopes, in addition to their hope for eternal life. I will distinguish (...) between hopes about one’s life, hopes about one’s death, hopes about attitudes of others, and hopes about the future. But before turning to these hopes, I will reflect on the following question: What is it that would keep a person from hoping for eternal life? (shrink)

Empathy is often described as a virtue which that could help in making medicine more humanistic. This paper argues that there are two limits to this thesis. First, it is unclear whether a lack of empathy can be attributed to the biomedical education. Second, empathy itself is not without issues, and another concept, compassion, can be put forward instead. Humanism based on compassion is more minimalist, but integrated with an approach focused on health systems, it makes humanism more tangible and (...) radical. -/- . (shrink)