In this paper I address some aspects of the discussion of Aristotle against materialism. I take as a starting point the inaugural sentence of Phys. 2.4, where Aristotle refers to the endoxon that there are things which are (einai), and things which become or are generated (gignesthai) by chance. In the first place, I show that Aristotle would have ascribed to the materialists (especially Empedocles) the opinion that things like animals and plants can be (and not only become) by chance. (...) I shall argue that, in fact, this thesis implies that it is not only the compound that is generated, but also the form or eidos of the living being. To this extent, I propose that there are strong reasons for Aristotle to reject that living beings may be by chance, and to circumscribe chance to that which becomes or is generated. In other words: chance can occur within processes of generation but has nothing to do with the causes and principles of those processes. Thus, this repositioning of chance within the sole field of what becomes is closely connected to the causal priority of the eidos in the processes of generation. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic – or noetic or metacognitive – feelings (E-feelings). Since philoso- phers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions (...) to the focus section (two articles devoted to E-feelings and two devoted to E-emotions) with respect to both the existing literature and each other (section 3). We conclude by brie y describing some promising avenues for further philosophical research on E-feelings and E-emotions (section 4). (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to articulate a specific desideratum for any theory of Latinidad, namely, that there is no adequate conception of Latinx without an attendant conception of Afro-Latinx. In order to be reflective of those whom it purports to describe in the U.S. and elsewhere in the hemisphere, the term Latinx must be plastic enough to encompass the many internal differences, and even antagonisms, between its different constituent parts. Within it, we argue here in particular, it must (...) include its Afro-descended history, which includes not just African-descended people but also a denial of the influences of African-descended culture writ large. Our central claim here, then, is that a certain African-descendedness is constitutive of Latinidad in multiple registers, including history, cultural practices, and social identificatory processes despite Latinidad’s pernicious exclusionary history. (shrink)

What is a philosophy class like? What roles do teachers and students play? Questions like these have been answered time and again by philosophers using images and metaphors. As philosophers continue to develop pedagogical approaches in a more conscious way, it is worth evaluating traditional metaphors used to understand and structure philosophy classes. In this article, we examine two common metaphors—the sage on the stage, and philosophy as combat—and show why they fail pedagogically. Then we propose five metaphors—teaching philosophy as (...) world-traveling, wondering, conducting an orchestra, storytelling, and coaching—that can better respond to the needs of increasingly diverse student bodies. Further, these metaphors find their ground in long-standing beliefs about what philosophy is, how it is done, and what it can do for those willing to engage in it. While no single one of them is comprehensive, we think that these models can help us enliven our own thinking about our teaching and the roles we and our students play in our classrooms. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta y defiende una concepción expresiva del mundo perceptual que depende de la intersubjetividad. En un primer momento se muestra el desarrollo del concepto de expresión en Husserl y en Merleau-Ponty. El punto central de este desarrollo es que, en contraste con la concepción tradicional del concepto de expresión que es lingüística y consiste en el manifestarse exteriormente de algo interno, se propone ahora una idea de expresión que ya no separa radicalmente lo expresado de la expresión, no (...) se concibe como traducción, y se aplica a la relación entre subjetividad y corporalidad. Para ajustar la aplicación de la expresión a la percepción, se argumenta que las apariencias perceptuales requieren de una cualificación en términos de la posición o perspectiva del sujeto que percibe. Esta “posición” o perspectiva no es únicamente espacio-temporal, sino que también es pragmática. Finalmente, se introduce la intersubjetividad, entendida pragmáticamente, a través de la idea de que hay maneras de explorar el mundo con los sentidos que son constituidas socialmente por los diferentes grupos sociales de los que hacemos parte. Se argumenta que esta concepción pragmatista, diferente a la ruta predominante en fenomenología basada en el significado como un asunto de conciencia de la experiencia, también es defendible en el terreno fenomenológico, particularmente a través de la noción husserliana de toma de posición (Stellungnahme) y la idea merleau-pontiana de las maneras de interrogar el mundo perceptualmente. -/- This article presents and defends an expressive and intersubjectively dependent conception of the perceptual world. The first section deals with the phenomenological development of the concept of expression in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. In this development, and in contrast with the traditional conception of expression –a linguistic conception based on the external manifesting of something inner–, a new conception appears: one that doesn’t keep a hard separation between the expression and what is expressed, is not modeled after translation, and can be applied to the relationship between subjectivity and corporeality. To further precise the way expression and perception fit together, I argue that perceptual appearances require being qualified in terms of the position or perspective of the perceiving subject. This “position” or perspective is not only spatiotemporal but also pragmatic. Lastly, a pragmatically understood intersubjectivity is brought into play. I look at the fact that there are different ways of exploring the world with our senses that are socially constituted. This constitution takes places in and through the different social groups to which we belong. I argue that this pragmatist conception, while different from the dominant phenomenological understanding that takes meaning to be about the consciousness of experiences, is also defensible on phenomenological grounds. This alternative understanding finds support in Husserl’s idea of position-taking (Stellungnahme) and Merleau-Ponty’s claim that there exist different ways of interrogating the world perceptually. (shrink)

Many philosophers consider that memory is just a passive information retention and retrieval capacity. Some information and experiences are encoded, stored, and subsequently retrieved in a passive way, without any control or intervention on the subject’s part. In this paper, we will defend an active account of memory according to which remembering is a mental action and not merely a passive mental event. According to the reconstructive account, memory is an imaginative reconstruction of past experience. A key feature of the (...) reconstructive account is that given the imperfect character of memory outputs, some kind of control is needed. Metacognition is the control of mental processes and dispositions. Drawing from recent work on the normativity of automaticity and automatic control, we distinguish two kinds of metacognitive control: top-down, reflective control, on the one hand, and automatic, intuitive, feeling-based control on the other. Thus, we propose that whenever the mental process of remembering is controlled by means of intuitive or feeling-based metacognitive processes, it is an action. (shrink)

Proponents of enactivism should be interested in exploring what notion of action best captures the type of action-perception link that the view proposes, such that it covers all the aspects in which our doings constitute and are constituted by our perceiving. This article proposes and defends the thesis that the notion of sensorimotor dependencies is insufficient to account for the reality of human perception, and that the central enactive notion should be that of perceptual practices. Sensorimotor enactivism is insufficient because (...) it has no traction on socially dependent perceptions, which are essential to the role and significance of perception in our lives. Since the social dimension is a central desideratum in a theory of human perception, enactivism needs a notion that accounts for such an aspect. This article sketches the main features of the Wittgenstein-inspired notion of perceptual practices as the central notion to understand perception. Perception, I claim, is properly understood as woven into a type of social practices that includes food, dance, dress, music, etc. More specifically, perceptual practices are the enactment of culturally structured, normatively rich techniques of commerce of meaningful multi- and inter-modal perceptible material. I argue that perceptual practices explain three central features of socially dependent perception: attentional focus, aspects’ saliency, and modal-specific harmony-like relations. (shrink)

Mind-wandering seems to be paradigmatically unintentional. However, experimental findings have yielded the paradoxical result that mind-wandering can also be intentional. In this paper, we first present the paradox of intentional mind-wandering and then explain intentional mind-wandering as the intentional omission to control one’s own thoughts. Finally, we present the surrealist method for artistic production to illustrate how intentional omission of control over thoughts can be deployed towards creative endeavors.

Ouraiminthischapteristodelineatetheformofsharedagencythatwe take to be manifested in collective memory. We argue for two theses. First, we argue that, given a relatively weak conception of episodicity, certain small-scale groups display a form of emergent (i.e., genuinely collective) episodic memory, while large-scale groups, in contrast, do not display emergent episodic memory. Second, we argue that this form of emergent memory presupposes (high-level and possibly low-level) metamemorial capacities, capacities that are, however, not themselves emergent group-level features but rather strictly individual-level features. The form of (...) shared agency that we delineate is thus revealed as being minimal in three senses. First, the relevant groups are themselves minimal in terms of their size. Second, the form of memory in question is minimally episodic. And finally, the cognitive capac- ities attributed to the relevant groups are minimal, in the sense that they need not themselves be capable of metacognition. (shrink)

This introduction to this collection of essays presents diverse perspectives on social identities, inviting readers to reconsider established notions and explore new approaches to understanding these complex social phenomena. The contributions challenge traditional philosophical boundaries, intersecting ontological, epistemological, ethical, and political considerations. // The authors situate different views on the ontology of social identities within some extant options. Thus, they contrast their "social identity affordance view" with two alternative approaches: the Cambridge Social Ontology group's positioning theory and Weichold & Thonhauser's (...) broad conception of social identities. Their view understands social identities as realities that structure social life and shape individuals' self-conceptions, emphasizing the importance of historical contingency and social context. // The introduction then proceeds to review the contributions to the volume. The volume comprises three sections: "Experiences of Social Identities," exploring how specific identities are understood and experienced; "Horizons of Social Identities," examining how identities develop and change over time; and "Some Frameworks of Social Identities," presenting alternative frameworks for conceptualizing social identities. (shrink)

Applied behavior analysis (ABA) has featured an increasing concern for understanding and considering the cultural diversity of the populations behavior analysts serve in recent years. As an expression of that concern, the new BACB’s Ethics Code for Behavior Analysts is more explicit and comprehensive in its inclusion of ethical obligations concerning cultural diversity. The purpose of this paper is to offer a discussion on the limitations of both our capacity and willingness to know and overcome our ignorance about our own (...) and other cultures. We examine different ways in which our ignorance of other cultures plays out even in willful compliance with the BACB ethics code. We suggest part of the problem is that the BACB ethics code seems to operate under the assumption that practitioners are always aware or can be aware of what they do not know and their biases. In contrast, we offer a reflection on a more complex picture of our understanding of ourselves and other cultures where we cannot assume people are aware of what they ignore and of their biases. Ethically, we find that in some cases these blindspots are accounted for by the BACB ethics code and should be foreseen and addressed by the behavior analyst (BA). But in other cases, when a person is not aware of what they ignore, understanding the connection between cultural diversity ignorance and professional behavior requires a different approach. Our analysis suggests an attitude of being thoughtfully diligent and humble while learning about cultural diversity issues and examining the areas where we might be ignorant and not aware of our ignorance. We argue that BAs’ obligations to respect the dignity of clients and their families and to provide effective treatment call for this attitude of diligence and humility that goes beyond mere compliance. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between epistemic feel- ings, mental action, and self-ascription. Acting mentally and/or thinking about one’s mental states are two possible outcomes of epistemic or metacognitive feelings. Our men- tal actions are often guided by our E-feelings, such as when we check what we just saw based on a feeling of visual uncertainty; but thought about our own perceptual states and capacities can also be triggered by the same E-feelings. The first (...) section of the pa- per presents Dokic’s argument for the insufficiency of the “ascent routine” to account for non-transparent cases of self-ascription, as well as his account of E-feelings. The second section then presents a two-level model of metacognition that builds on Dokic’s account and my own view of the issue. The two-level model links E-feelings to a min- dreading capacity in order to account for non-transparent self-ascriptions. Finally, the third section develops a deeper characterization of the relation among E-feelings, mental action, and self-ascription of mental states based on epistemic rules. In the context of self-knowledge, these remarks suggest the existence of means of forming self-ascriptions other than the ascent routine. (shrink)

El artículo es un comentario crítico a“Realismo, esencialismo yextensionalismo”, del profesor IgnacioÁvila. En particular, se contestan lascríticas que el profesor Ávila hace a lametafísica esencialista, argumentando,principalmente, que esta metafísica escompatible con el fenómeno de larelatividad conceptual.This paper is a critical commentary to“Realism, Essentialism and Extensionalism”, by professor Ignacio Ávila. In particular, professor Ávila’s criticisms to an essentialist metaphysics are answered,arguing, mainly, that this metaphysicsis compatible with the phenom-enon of conceptual relativity.

I argue that Husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, is adequate to understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. I claim that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among others, and that the notion of second nature must respond to precisely this fundamental active character of subjectivity. The appropriate concept should satisfy two additional desiderata. First, it should be able to develop alongside the biological, psychological, and social individual development. Second, (...) it should be able to underlie the vast diversity of human beings within and across communities. As possible candidates, I contrast position-taking with two types of habit-like concepts: instinct and habitus, on the one hand, and customary habits, on the other. I argue that position-taking represents the active aspect of the subject while the habit-like concepts are passive. A subject’s position-takings and ensuing comportments are tied together by motivations, which evince a certain consistency, and for this reason are expression of the subject’s identity. I conclude by nuancing the relation between Stellungnahme and passivity. Passivity is deemed necessary to action but subservient to it; position-taking is thought to be prior to passivity. (shrink)

The debate about the definition of Latinidad as a social identity has fluctuated between accounts that put it closer to ethnicity or closer to race. We present and defend the claim that the multiplicity of features and experiences of Latinxs in the United States is best accounted for by placing Latinidad in a different theoretical space. We draw from the ecological psychology and enactive literature on affordances to argue that Latinidad can be better understood as a social identity affordance: a (...) multifaceted landscape of possibilities for interaction, to do and to be done unto. We then focus on four areas that are part of the objective factors that have come to constitute Latinidad and which provide reasons to shy away from both race and ethnicity: the facts of mestizaje and hybridization, a vexed relation to the land, the political horizons and histories of this population, and the multiplicity of sensory-based cultural practices of Latinxs. It is precisely the many and deep variations across Latinxs that make social affordances an apt way to conceptualize a social identity whose reality is asserted pragmatically in many aspects of social life in the U.S. (shrink)

In his comment, McGann argues that in my “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social,” I have overlooked a group of enactivist theories that can be grouped under the participatory sense-making label. In this reply, I explain that the omission is due to the fact that such theories are not accounts of perception. It is argued that, unlike participatory sense-making, the approach of the “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices” article does not focus on the perceptual aspects of (...) things social, but on the social aspects that are constitutive of perception in general. I conclude by underscoring the central argument of the original article: that the adequate notion to make enactivism about perception social is that of “perceptual practices,” a social practices-based notion of perception. (shrink)

In this review, we present some ethical imperatives observed in this pandemic from a data ethics perspective. Our exposition connects recurrent ethical problems in the discipline, such as, privacy, surveillance, transparency, accountability, and trust, to broader societal concerns about equality, discrimination, and justice. We acknowledge data ethics role as significant to develop technological, inclusive, and pluralist societies. - - - Resumen: En esta revisión, exponemos algunos de los imperativos éticos observados desde la ética de datos en esta pandemia. Nuestra exposición (...) busca conectar problemas éticos típicos dentro de esta disciplina, a saber, privacidad, vigilancia, transparencia, responsabilidad y confianza, con preocupaciones a nivel social relacionadas con la igualdad, discrimi nación y justicia. Consideramos que la ética de datos tiene un rol significativo para desarrollar sociedades tecnificadas, inclusivas y pluralistas. (shrink)

What would happen if one morning you wake up clumsy, as if your sense of touch were unreliable, arbitrarily on and off? And what would this clumsiness look like if we could transfer it to the moral sense? The article expounds an interesting analogy between the sense of touch, loosely construed, and the moral sense: just as a sort of consistency is necessary for the sense of touch to do its job, so it is for the moral sense to play (...) its part. Touch enables us to navigate the everyday world of coffee pots and staircases; our moral sensibility comes into play when we act or when we judge our actions and those of others, and plays a directive role in what we feel, how we feel it, and how we react to it. Taking the analogy further, I will suggest that inconsistency causes, in both cases, a certain clumsiness, and that clumsiness is linked to arbitrariness – like the person that helps others in dire need, but only does so on some rainy days. (shrink)

Collaborative remembering, in which two or more individuals cooperate to remember together, is an ordinary occurrence. Ordinary though it may be, it challenges traditional understandings of remembering as a cognitive process unfolding within a single subject, as well as traditional understandings of memory knowledge as a justified memory belief held within the mind of a single subject. Collaborative memory has come to be a major area of research in psychology, but it has so far not been investigated in epistemology. In (...) this chapter, we attempt an initial exploration of the epistemological implications of collaborative memory research, taking as our starting point the “extended knowledge” debate which has resulted from the recent encounter between extracranialist theories of cognition and externalist theories of knowledge (Carter et al., 2014; Carter et al., forthcoming). Various forms of socially and technologically augmented memory have played important roles in the extended knowledge debate, but the debate has so far not taken collaborative memory, in particular, into account. We will argue that collaborative memory supports a novel externalist theory of knowledge: distributed reliabilism. Distributed reliabilism departs in two important respects from both traditional reliabilism (Goldman, 2012) and updated theories such as extended (Goldberg, 2010) and social reliabilism (Goldman, 2014). First, it acknowledges that belief-forming processes may extend extracranially to include processing performed both by other subjects and by technological artifacts. Second, it acknowledges that distributed sociotechnical systems themselves may be knowing subjects. Overall, then, the main aim of the chapter is to draw out the philosophical implications of psychological research on collaborative memory. But our argument will also suggest that it may be useful to broaden the standard conception of collaborative memory to include not only the sorts of direct interactions among subjects that have been the focus of psychological research so far but also a range of more indirect, technology-supported and -mediated interactions, and it thus has implications for psychology as well. (shrink)

Recently, a strong hylomorphic reading of Aristotelian emotions has been put forward, one that allegedly eliminates the problem of causal interaction between soul and body. Taking the presentation of emotions in de An. I 1 as a starting point and basic thread, but relying also on the discussion of Rh. II, I will argue that this reading only takes into account two of the four causes of emotions, and that, if all four of them are included into the picture, then (...) a causal interaction of mind and body remains within Aristotelian emotions, independent of how strongly their hylomorphism is understood. Beyond the discussion with this recent reading, the analysis proposed of the fourfold causal structure of emotions is also intended as a hermeneutical starting point for a comprehensive analysis of particular emotions in Aristotle. Through the different causes Aristotle seems to account for many aspects of the complex phenomenon of emotion, including its physiological causes, its mental causes, and its intentional object. (shrink)

This paper deals with Aristotle’s concept of chance, such as it is presented in Physics II 4-6. The central section of the article concentrates on an analysis of Aristotle’s definition of chance and its essential peculiarities: the fact of being an incidental (efficient) cause and the fact of existing in the domain of what is for the sake of an end. According to Rossi, both characteristics would correspond to a causal aspect (in an incidental sense) and to a non causal (...) aspect (or just apparently causal) of chance. Finally, the author also tries to show the structural connection between the aforementioned aspects, taking as a key point the thesis of coincidence among the formal, final, and efficient causes. (shrink)

This paper deals with Plato’s theoretical views on rhetoric, its value, its conditions, and its genuine ethical-political function. My goal is to show that, even from the theoretical and/or metarhetorical point of view (Gorgias and Phaedrus), Plato would admit the practice of arguing from probabilities (eikós) and opinions, and would accept as a legitimate part of rhetoric –in order to persuade the mob– devices such as appeals to emotion. As it is well known, concrete uses of these devices can be (...) found in the dialogues. I will refer, in this vein, to some passages of Plato’s political writings, esp. Republic and Laws, and to the role of some myths in the dialogues. Nonetheless, I sustain the necessity (and the possibility) of harmonizing this view, with Plato’s strong claim that knowledge of (and commitment to) an objective truth is essential to the true rhétor. (shrink)

The text of Physics 2.8 has been recently interpreted so as to restore the reading that Aristotle holds an external, and even an anthropocentric, natural teleology. This reading has been defended by D. Furley, and especially by D. Sedley. In this paper I present several arguments against this interpretation of the text. Thus, I will argue that Aristotle does not claim, in this chapter, that it rains for the sake of the growing of the crop, against an opinion which is (...) currently somewhat extended among interpreters. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é demonstrar como a ética proferida por Epicteto se relaciona com uma postura filosófica, mais precisamente com uma atitude filosófica. Essa atitude não é especificamente uma exigência prévia para pensar a ética filosoficamente, pois não se trata de tê-la para então começar a filosofar, mas trata-se da manifestação de autenticidade daquele que se diz filósofo, porque evidencia a real assimilação das opiniões e teorias que defende. Para Epicteto, o progresso do filósofo necessariamente está unido ao progresso (...) no campo ético, sendo impossível desvinculá-los. Por entender a filosofia como um modo de vida, ele adverte para que a teoria seja sempre colocada em prática, estabelecendo assim o conhecido caráter ascético de seus ensinamentos. (shrink)

Critical examination of Alchourrón and Bulygin’s set-theoretic definition of normative system shows that deductive closure is not an inevitable property. Following von Wright’s conjecture that axioms of standard deontic logic describe perfection-properties of a norm-set, a translation algorithm from the modal to the set-theoretic language is introduced. The translations reveal that the plausibility of metanormative principles rests on different grounds. Using a methodological approach that distinguishes the actor roles in a norm governed interaction, it has been shown that metanormative principles (...) are directed second-order obligations and, in particular, that the requirement related to deductive closure is directed to the norm-applier role rather than to the norm-giver role. The approach has been applied to the case of pure derogation yielding a new result, namely, that an independence property is a perfection-property of a norm-set in view of possible derogation. This paper in a polemical way touches upon several points raised by Kristan in his recent paper. (shrink)

Socrates’ burial is dismissed as philosophically irrelevant in Phaedo 115c-e although it had previously been discussed by Plato’s older contemporaries. In Antisthenes’ Kyrsas dialogue describes a visit to Socrates’ tomb by a lover of Socrates who receives protreptic advice in a dream sequence while sleeping over Socrates’ grave. The dialogue is a metaphysical explanation of how Socrates’ spiritual message was continued after death. Plato underplays this metaphorical imagery by lampooning Antisthenes philosophy and his work (Phd. 81b-82e) and subsequently precludes him (...) from an active role in the Phaedo. A similar case is the exclusion of Euclides of Megara. Fragments of a lost Socratic dialogue depict Apollodorus citing an unnamed Megarian in order to justify care for the remains of the dead. Similar mistaken notions explain Kyrsas’ belief when he lusts after Socrates even though he was dead. In spite of these disputes, the philosophers (Euclides, Antisthenes and Plato) each attempted to present Socrates’ moral influence as a force that continued after his death and burial. (shrink)

Neste texto será analisada a crítica de Cícero à retórica dos estoicos. Primeiramente é feita uma exposição da retórica estoica de acordo com os testemunhos que nos chegaram. Em seguida, são mencionadas as críticas de Cícero aos estoicos. Após isso, é argumentado que as críticas ciceronianas ocorrem em função de sua retórica ter um objetivo diferente da retórica estoica. Em vista disso, torna-se relevante perceber que os estoicos tinham motivos para se oporem à crítica de Cícero.

O presente artigo trata do pensamento de Epicteto pelo viés do exercício (áskēsis), ou seja, por meio de práticas que conduzem ao aperfeiçoamento de quem elege para si o ofício de filósofo. Para tal, inicialmente esclarecemos o que significam os exercícios na filosofia antiga, tendo como subsídio as teses de Pierre Hadot. Logo depois, exploramos seis exercícios que consideramos centrais para o filósofo de Nicópolis, contextualizando com os ensinamentos que estão envolvidos e descrevendo as principais características de seu método. Por (...) fim, defendemos que a importância deste artigo está em esclarecer a áskēsis em Epicteto de maneira a evitar possíveis anacronismos. -/- This article deals with Epictetus' thought through the exercise bias (áskēsis), that is, through the perfectioning practices of those who choose the office of philosophy. In order to do so, we first clarified what exercises in ancient philosophy mean, based on the theses of Pierre Hadot. Continuing, we explore six exercises considered central to the philosopher of Nicopolis, contextualizing with the teachings involved and describing the main characteristics of his method. Finally, we argue that the importance of this article lies in clarifying the áskēsis in Epictetus in order to avoid possible anachronisms. (shrink)

In this paper, I will be primarily concerned with moral issues regarding future people and the environment. When it comes to the future, we have deontological and epistemic limitations. The closer to the present, the higher the certainty and the knowledge we have about facts. Thus, when we intend to find moral clarity regarding a future scenario, we deal with an inverse relation between certainty and time. The main problem is that most ways of dealing with moral issues about future (...) scenarios do not address this relation, and rather focus on things that seem to simplify and clarify the uncertainties of the future. In response to this, I propose a different approach, one that operates neutrally and timelessly dealing with the uncertainties of the future while providing moral groundings that can help to clarify the future’s state of moral vagueness. (shrink)

The book is addressed to those who want to open a business in Romania, to become entrepreneurs or managers and to accumulate necessary accounting information on starting and managing a business. Accounting is the "ace up the sleeve" of any manager because, with the information provided, one can know the past, present and predict the future of a company. This paper presents the theoretical elements of the concepts used in accounting necessary for any manager. The book is intended for those (...) interested in this field whose training can be completed with the ABC of accounting. (shrink)

Em função da pandemia de Covid-19, o ano de 2020 marcou a vida de todos. Em escala global, exigiu-se da população restringir as interações físicas o que fosse possível. Ainda assim, as interações sociais permaneceram, tanto as remotas, proporcionadas pela tecnologia da internet e das comunicações, quanto as presenciais, incluindo nestas as indispensáveis ou não. Portanto, mesmo que se entenda que a pandemia tenha ocasionado restrições sociais, em muitas ocasiões talvez seja melhor dizer que ela ocasionou restrições físicas à sociabilidade. (...) Neste sentido, vale tentarmos atualizar o termo kathēkonta da ética estoica em função dessa interação social que se afigurou nesse momento. Enquanto seres de comunidade, “pois nossa raça toda é disposta para a comunidade 3”, como afirma Hiércoles, quais atos adequados que mantém e fomentam a interação ética tanto individual quanto social? Kathēkonta enquanto atos adequados será visto na perspectiva de Hiérocles situada em seu tratado Sobre Atos Adequados, onde ele sustenta tais atos enquanto interações sociais éticas. E uma vez definido esse termo da ética estoica na perspectiva de Hiérocles, como perceber esses atos nesta situação pandêmica em que as interações sociais físicas enfraqueceram? Nessa nova configuração social, teriam os atos adequados algum papel relevante no desenvolvimento ético do indivíduo e da sociedade? Esses atos não teriam espaços de efetivação em tal circunstância? (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende mostrar como o filósofo e ensaísta de sobrenome árabe, origem judia e religião católica Fabrice Hadjadj se utiliza de dois autores italianos, a saber, Dante Alighieri e Lorenzo da Ponte, para aprofundar as suas reflexões sobre a noção de Paraíso. No primeiro caso, Hadjadj elabora um encontro entre Dante e Nietzsche, articulando uma compreensão de Paraíso que, na perspectiva hadjadjiana, ultrapassaria as críticas de Friedrich Nietzsche. No segundo, o autor explora o conceito de “redenção”, presente na (...) ópera “Don Giovanni”. Após a exposição da interpretação do filósofo em cada caso, constatamos que a leitura de Dante promove, para Hadjadj, um deslocamento do paraíso do exterior para o interior e que Don Giovanni explicita, segundo Hadjadj, a dinâmica redentora do Paraíso, à medida em que o convite à máxima felicidade não é fruto de uma conquista pessoal ou do cumprimento de um preceito moral, mas um dom que vem do Alto. Finalmente, constatamos o caráter transdisciplinar da leitura que Hadjadj faz de Da Ponte e Dante, considerando-os como autores cujas obras exprimem realidades profundas que precisam ser desveladas e que podem envolver e auxiliar àqueles que leem o texto contemporaneamente. (shrink)

Anger is often an appropriate reaction to harms and injustices, but is it a politically beneficial one? Martha Nussbaum (Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1), 41–56, 2015, Anger and Forgiveness. Oxford University Press, 2016) has argued that, although anger is useful in initially recruiting agents for action, anger is typically counterproductive to securing the political aims of those harmed. After the initial shockwave of outrage, Nussbaum argues that to be effective at enacting positive social change, groups and individuals (...) alike, must move quickly out of the state of anger. Feminist theorists (Frye, The Politics of Reality. Crossing Press, 1983; Lorde, 1997; Narayan, Hypatia 3 (2): 31–48, 1988) on the other hand have for long highlighted the efficacy of anger, as well as its moral and epistemic value, in fighting against the oppressive status quo. It might be thought therefore that for political action to be effective, a continued state of anger is preferable. Protestors must after all create and sustain a sense of moral obligation and justice. A main way of doing so is to promote successive moral shocks that trigger outrage (Jasper, Emotion Review 6 (3): 208–213, 2014). I present a novel, empirically informed defense of anger’s efficacy in political action. Nussbaum holds a traditional view on the nature of anger, inherited from Aristotle and the Stoics, which holds that anger constitutively involves a desire for retribution. The view that anger is counterproductive falls out of this and is dominant in academic work as well as in our personal and political lives. Based on work in social psychology, I argue that we need to reconsider this. In doing so, I highlight anger’s aim for recognition, rather than retribution, as key. Furthermore, I uncover conditions for anger’s political efficacy, as well as reasons for why the traditional view of anger has been so pervasive. (shrink)

O hábito para os estoicos deve ser entendido de modo diferente da maneira descrita por Platão ou Aristóteles. Dado que, para estes, a formação do caráter é considerada a partir de uma psicologia que aborda a alma por meio de partes distintas, tal interpretação os levou a descrever o hábito como um elemento fundamental para a educação da parte irracional da alma, enquanto a parte racional é educada por meio da razão. Para os estoicos, no entanto, o hábito se faz (...) importante para a alma como um todo, sem distinção entre racional e irracional. Seguindo essa perspectiva, Epicteto não trata da habituação de qualquer elemento irracional. Quando o filósofo fala em “habituar-se” a determinadas ações, ele não se refere a uma atividade de repetição que condiciona aspectos distintamente irracionais, mas, ao contrário, refere-se a uma atividade autonomamente filosófica, que envolve a razão, com atenção especial ao cuidado com as representações. (shrink)

This chapter explains the rationale behind the book. It provides basic definitions of the concept of the sharing economy as well as the primary meanings related to the subject of the analysis undertaken in the subsequent chapters. This Introduction also includes a description of the main benefits of the analysis of the sharing economy from a European perspective. It highlights that the idea of the book emerged from the collaboration of most co-authors in the COST Action CA16121 ‘From Sharing to (...) Caring: Examining Socio-Technical Aspects of the Collaborative Economy.’ Finally, the outline of the book is presented, providing a description of the content of each chapter within this academic collection. (shrink)

A concepção de mundo estoica é fundamentada por uma rede causal de relações determinadas pela natureza. O destino faz parte dessas relações, problematizando a questão da liberdade num ambiente determinista. Levando em consideração esse legado teórico, Epicteto coloca a liberdade nas escolhas do indivíduo em relação a essas determinações, que ele atribui à providência divina.

My goal with this article is to present the elements involved in Cicero's criticism of Stoic rhetoric. First, I will present the rhetoric of the Stoics based on the testimonies we have left on these philosophers. Soon after, I will expose Cicero's criticisms of the Stoics. Next, I will argue that Cicero's criticisms arise because his proposal with rhetoric is different from the Stoics' proposal. Due to this difference, it is necessary to understand that the Stoics, on the other hand, (...) also had motives to defend their vision of rhetoric in face of Ciceronian criticism. Meu objetivo neste artigo é apresentar os elementos envolvidos na crítica de Cícero à retórica estoica. Inicialmente apresentarei a retórica dos estoicos baseado nos testemunhos que nos restaram sobre esses filósofos. Logo depois, exporei as críticas assinaladas por Cícero aos estoicos. Em seguida, argumentarei que as críticas de Cícero surgem em consequência de que sua proposta com a retórica é diferente da proposta estoica. Em função dessa diferença, é preciso compreender que os estoicos, em contrapartida, também tinham motivos para defender sua visão de retórica perante as críticas ciceronianas. (shrink)

Resumo: Neste artigo exploramos a concepção estoica de πάθος, suas causas e consequências. Inicialmente abordamos o modo como as paixões se encaixam na ética estoica, uma vez que elas se mostram como impedimentos para aquele que quer viver melhor. Logo depois, analisamos os debates realizados no seio da escola, os acréscimos e os aperfeiçoamentos teóricos. Por fim, mostramos a distinção entre πάθη, προπάθειαι e εὐπαθεῖαι, pois isso propicia uma melhor compreensão da dimensão emocional da psicologia da Stoa, servindo principalmente para (...) evitar interpretações precipitadas que podem ocorrer ao se ler um texto estoico. -/- Abstract: In this article the stoic conception of πάθος is explored, its causes and consequences. Initially, it is approached how passions fit Stoic ethics, since they appear as impediments to those who want to live better. Afterwards the debates within this school are analyzed, its additions and the theoretical improvements. Finally, the distinction between πάθη, προπάθειαι and εὐπαθεῖαι is presented, since this provides a better understanding of the emotional dimension of Stoa’s psychology, mainly to avoid precipitous interpretations that may occur when reading a Stoic text. (shrink)

From 1950 onwards, the study of creativity has not stopped. Today, AI has revitalised debates on the subject. That is especially controversial in the artworld, as the 21st century already features AI-generated artworks. Without discussing issues about AI agency, this article argues for AI’s creativity. For this, we first present a new functionalist understanding of Margaret Boden’s definition of creativity. This is followed by an analysis of empirical evidence on anthropocentric barriers in the perception of AI’s creative capabilities, which is (...) later criticised for considering insights from media theory. Finally, benefits derived from including AI as an artistic creative producer and supportive tool are discussed. It is then argued that AI can contribute to democratising the artworld. Therefore its creative role must be recognised. (shrink)

O objetivo do presente artigo é expor os motivos porque Frédéric Lordon assinala a necessidade de as ciências sociais precisarem de uma fundamentação filosófica spinozista. Para isso, inicialmente, explicitamos as carências que o filósofo encontra nos estudos sociais, e, logo depois, analisamos a forma como a filosofia de Spinoza se encaixa como base teórica de fundamentação. Demonstramos o modo como Lordon se apropria dos termos spinozistas para justificar seu insight, pois, dessa maneira, podemos esclarecer como elementos da ética de Spinoza (...) encontram lugar em seu estudo sociológico. Ao final, concluímos que a proposta, apesar de relevante, carece de uma abordagem satisfatória acerca da liberdade. (shrink)

In the following paper I will examine the possibility for a rational foundation of morals, rational in the sense that to ground a moral statement on reason amounts to being able to convince an unmotivated agent to conform to a moral rule - that is to say, to “rationally motivate” him (as Habermas would have said) to act in ways for which he or she had no previous reason to act. We will scrutinize the “internalist’s” objection (in Williams’ definition) to (...) such a claim and confront it with a, however, obvious fact: our need to convince or, at least, to influence agents to act according to moral judgements that entail strong validity claims. Therefore we need to find a better ground for our moral norms than that provided by a narrow concept of practical reason, which ultimately offers the basis for the internalist’s intuitions. Classical philosophers believed that to have a “right” sense meant also to think accordingly, that there was no intelligence without a social or moral side and that a person who lacked moral sense was not, at the same time, very intelligent. This contradicts some deep Humean intuitions, and in any case requires a more complex concept of practical reason than the one we normally encounter in internalist moral philosophers. In the following pages, I would like to reflect on this kind of social reason, or intelligence, or moral rationality, in an attempt to couple, in a coherent vision of moral sense within the framework of practical reason, intuitions that appear in Kant and Adam Smith with empirical research about what the lack of moral sense could mean. (shrink)

Resumo: O presente artigo aborda a dimensão psicológica da filosofia de Epicteto. Para tal, exploramos inicialmente a distinção epictetiana entre as coisas que dependem de nós e as que não dependem, visto que é por meio dela que o filósofo separa o que é interno do que é externo. Ao fazer isso, ele foca a abordagem ética naquilo que é interno, pois afirma que é isso que depende de nós (ἐφ ̓ ἡμῖν). Dentre as ações que são ἐφ ̓ ἡμῖν, (...) o desejo parece possuir uma relevância específica, uma vez que condiciona os demais âmbitos de ação. Além disso, outro aspecto psicológico importante para a compreensão da filosofia epictetiana é a sua concepção de προαίρεσις, dada a identificação desta com o “eu”. (shrink)

Devido à racionalidade, portanto, o ser humano tem a capacidade de ampliar seus horizontes de modo a compreender a estrutura racional que o conecta com os demais seres humanos e com a dimensão espiritual do lógos. Sendo assim, de acordo com a filosofia estoica, certamente estarão fadadas ao erro quaisquer concepções políticas que não considerem essa dimensão cosmopolita que se projeta não só para toda a humanidade, mas também para uma conexão com o ordenamento natural.

This is the translation of the Quaestio I "De sacra doctrina, qualis sit, et ad quae se extendat"" of Thomas Aquinas' "Summa Theologiae".

La exposición y crítica de las doctrinas antiguas tiene un lugar importante en los escritos de Aristóteles. Sin embargo, ciertas dudas se han vuelto corrientes acerca de la confiabilidad de sus descripciones. Más aún, se ha sostenido que Aristóteles deforma la comprensión histórica a través de la introducción de conceptos y términos propios. En este libro se aborda el problema a través de un análisis de las críticas que Aristóteles dirige a la teoría platónica de las Ideas, que permite explicar (...) la constitución y desarrollo de importantes conceptos aristotélicos a partir de la confrontación dialéctica con las doctrinas de su maestro. En efecto, las dificultades genuinas que Aristóteles descubre en el platonismo constituyen el motor para gestar nuevos conceptos, que no son ajenos, sino que surgen como implicaciones del examen crítico. Así, la imposición de términos propios no debe interpretarse como distorsión, sino como el modo que Aristóteles adopta para exhibir su particular solución a los problemas que los filósofos anteriores dejaron sin solución. (shrink)

Definida como beleza lógica e forma do paradoxo, a ironia romântica de Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) assimila a antiga ironia socrática e a reinterpreta, inserindo-a como elemento central de sua teorização crítico-literária. O presente artigo analisa a ironia romântica, buscando situar sua alteração e abrangência no final do século XVIII, quando o conceito passa a significar metacrítica, reflexão filosófica, ruptura ficcional, distância estética e forma de exposição da arte literária. Defined as logical beauty and form of paradox, Friedrich Schlegel's (1772-1829) romantic (...) irony incorporates ancient Socratic irony and reinterprets it, inserting it as a nuclear element of his theorization on literary criticism. The current paper analyses the concept of romantic irony seeking to situate its alterations at the end of 18th century, when it changed its meaning for metacritics, philosophical reflexion, fictional rupture, aesthetical distance and form of art exposition. (shrink)

Frente a quienes sostienen una incompatibilidad entre historia de la filosofía y filosofía, en cuanto plantean una disyuntiva entre una práctica descriptiva y una argumentativa, en este trabajo nos proponemos mostrar, examinando la labor histórico-filosófica de Aris- tóteles, que esa disyuntiva no es excluyente. Para ello, en primer lugar, examinaremos algunos pasajes de su obra en los que ofrece indicaciones metodológicas que permiten comprender la doble función que cumplen las exposiciones críticas de los filósofos precedentes en la constitución misma de (...) su filosofía. En segundo lugar, ilustraremos el tipo de argumentación aristotélica a través del análisis de las críticas que dirige a las Ideas platónicas como causas. Contra Platón, Aristóteles establece que, para dar cuenta de la ingenerabilidad e incorruptibilidad de las formas, no es necesario caracterizarlas como entidades separadas de la materia y del movimiento. Basta asegurar la eternidad de la forma a través de su reproducción en otros individuos de la misma especie. Tal análisis nos permite concluir, finalmente, que filosofía o historia de la filosofía constitu- yen una falsa disyuntiva en Aristóteles, por lo que el examen dialéctico de las doctrinas precedentes es un método adecuado de indagación filosófica. (shrink)