Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and how (...) the rose is is not an entity over and above the rose. It is against this view that I shall argue in this paper. I shall argue that a significant class of true propositions, including inessential predications like the proposition that the rose is red, are made true by entities. "No truthmaking without truthmakers" is my slogan. Although I have my view about what kinds of entities are truthmakers, I shall not argue for or presuppose that view here. All I shall argue for here is that if a proposition is made true by something, it is made true by some thing, but my argument will leave it open what kind of thing that thing is: it could be a fact or state of affairs, a trope, or any other sort of entity. (shrink)

1. The Bundle Theory I shall discuss is a theory about the nature of substances or concrete particulars, like apples, chairs, atoms, stars and people. The point of the Bundle Theory is to avoid undesirable entities like substrata that allegedly constitute particulars. The version of the Bundle Theory I shall discuss takes particulars to be entirely constituted by the universals they instantiate.' Thus particulars are said to be just bundles of universals. Together with the claim that it is necessary that (...) particulars have constituents, the fundamental claim of the Bundle Theory is: (BT) Necessarily, for every particular x and every entity y, y constitutes x if and only ify is a universal and x instantiates y. 2 The standard and supposedly devastating objection to the Bundle Theory is that it entails or is committed to a false version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (Armstrong 1978: 91, Loux 1998: 107), namely: (Pll) Necessarily, for all particulars x and y and every universal z, if z is instantiated by x if and only if z is instantiated byy, then x is numerically identical with y. The most famous counterexample to the Identity of Indiscernibles is that put forward by Max Black, consisting of a world where there are only two iron spheres two miles apart from each other, having the same diameter, temperature, colour, shape, size, etc (Black 1952: 156). Let us from now on think of the properties of the spheres in this world as universals. The possibility of this world, which I shall hereafter refer to as 'Black's world', makes (Pll) false.' And according to common philosophical opinion this means that the Bundle Theory is false.. (shrink)

Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his argument for substance dualism from (...) an important objection. (shrink)

El artículo analiza el papel del resentimiento en la Teoría de los sentimientos morales de Adam Smith y su conexión con el proceso de la simpatía mutua por medio del cual el “espectador imparcial” asume plenamente el resentimiento de la víctima, al considerar que su pasión se rige por los principios de la propiedad y la justicia. Se sostiene que el resentimiento no solo cumple un rol central en la teoría del castigo de Adam Smith, en la medida en que (...) permite retribuir, disuadir y rehabilitar al victimario sino que, además, aporta a la discusión contemporánea sobre el perdón y la reconciliación, pues convoca la posibilidad de superar el resentimiento y restablecer las relaciones sociales entre el agresor y la víctima. (shrink)

This bulletin contains a summary of the main topics of discussion in truthmaker theory, namely: the definition of truthmakers, problems with Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Truthmaker Maximalism, the ontological burden of truthmakers and the recalcitrant topic of truthmakers for negative truths.

According to one of Leibniz's theories of contingency a proposition is contingent if and only if it cannot be proved in a finite number of steps. It has been argued that this faces the Problem of Lucky Proof , namely that we could begin by analysing the concept ‘Peter’ by saying that ‘Peter is a denier of Christ and …’, thereby having proved the proposition ‘Peter denies Christ’ in a finite number of steps. It also faces a more general but (...) related problem that we dub the Problem of Guaranteed Proof . We argue that Leibniz has an answer to these problems since for him one has not proved that ‘Peter denies Christ’ unless one has also proved that ‘Peter’ is a consistent concept, an impossible task since it requires the full decomposition of the infinite concept ‘Peter’. We defend this view from objections found in the literature and maintain that for Leibniz all truths about created individual beings are contingent. (shrink)

Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.

In this chapter I shall reply to a pair of articles in which the main contention of my “Why truthmakers” – namely, that an important class of synthetic true propositions have entities as truth-makers – is rejected. In §§1–5 I reply to Jennifer Hornsby’s “Truth without Truthmaking Entities” (2005) and in §§6–7 I reply to Julian Dodd’s “Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles” (2007).

The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also arguesthat truthmaking is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive.

Dialogamos con Cintia Rodríguez Garat, quien obtuvo el Primer Premio Bioética 2023 de la Fundación Jaime Roca por su trabajo “Resiliencia y salud pública de las mujeres mapuce ante el cambio climático. Un análisis desde una perspectiva intercultural, participativa y de derechos humanos”.

This paper is a response to replies by Dan López de Sa and Mark Jago to my ‘Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjuction Thesis’. In that paper, my main aim was to argue against the Entailment Principle by arguing against the Conjunction Thesis, which is entailed by the Entailment Principle. In the course of so doing, although not essential for my project in that paper, I defended the Disjunction Thesis. López de Sa has objected both to my defence of the Disjunction (...) Thesis and my case against the Conjunction Thesis. I shall show that his objections are unfounded and based on serious misunderstandings of my position, what the relevant debate is, and some fundamental notions of Truthmaker Theory. Jago argues that accepting the Disjunction Thesis and rejecting the Conjunction Thesis is hard to maintain. But I show that Jago has not shown that accepting the Disjunction Thesis while rejecting the Conjunction Thesis is impossible or even hard to maintain. Jago believes that, to accept the Disjunction Thesis while rejecting the Conjunction Thesis, one needs to reject his axiom (T3), which says that all the truthmakers for <P&P> are truthmakers for <P>. I argue that there are reasons to reject such a principle, and the version of it that says that what makes <P&P> true makes <P> true. (shrink)

Proceeding of the first public presentation of the work of the mexican logical group "Deduktor" under the direction of the mexican professor Hugo Padilla Chacón. This work was in fact the first whole and stand alone arithmetization of logics.

Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of resemblance without (...) falling into a vicious infinite regress, and (b) even if resemblance nominalism had to admit a universal of resemblance, this would not make it pointless to avoid postulating other universals. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Aufsatz stellt das Erbe der Kantischen Theorie der Konstitutions- und Regulationsleistung der Erfahrung – die Analytik der Grundsätze – dar, das unserer Auffassung nach zur Begründung der rein spekulativen Philosophie Hegels führt. In diesem Zusammenhang werden einerseits die transzendental-konstitutiven Grundsätze – Axiome der Anschauung und Antizipationen der Wahrnehmung – und andererseits die transzendental-regulativen Grundsätze – Analogien der Erfahrung und Postulate des empirischen Denkens überhaupt – als grundlegendes Material der Exegese benutzt. Als Resultat der Deutung erscheint das Problem des (...) Doppel-Verhältnisses zwischen Erfahrung und Verstandesgrundsätzen. Ein solches Verhältnis entfaltet sich nicht nur als die erfahrungsmäßige Verwirklichung der Grundsätze, sondern auch als die grundsätzliche Ermöglichung der Erfahrung. Der notwendige Charakter der Wahrheit in transzendentaler Hinsicht begründet sich dabei durch die allgemeine Beziehung der transzendentalen Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes zur Gesamtheit der Erfahrung. Es wird die These vertreten, dass die Auffassung der Natur – d.h. die das Dasein der Erscheinungen in der Zeit ermöglichende Einheit – das Hauptvermächtnis Kants für den Deutschen Idealismus im Allgemeinen und für Hegels Philosophie im Besonderen darstellt. (shrink)

The complete arithmetization of the bivalued propositional logic is here presented and extended with original functions not hitherto included in other interpretations of propositional logic, as the algebraic logic or sets theory. An historical review of the former attempts of arithmetical representation of the propositional logic is presented.

Algorithmical procedure within a logical system to generate DNA chains through a formal rule up to the generation of a STOP codon's signal. Work developped under the direction of the Mexican Professor Hugo Padilla Chacón.

Endocrinologists apply the idea of feedback loops to explain how hormones regulate certain bodily functions such as glucose metabolism. In particular, feedback loops focus on the maintenance of the plasma concentrations of glucose within a narrow range. Here, we put forward a different, organicist perspective on the endocrine regulation of glycaemia, by relying on the pivotal concept of closure of constraints. From this perspective, biological systems are understood as organized ones, which means that they are constituted of a set of (...) mutually dependent functional structures acting as constraints, whose maintenance depends on their reciprocal interactions. Closure refers specifically to the mutual dependence among functional constraints in an organism. We show that, when compared to feedback loops, organizational closure can generate much richer descriptions of the processes and constraints at play in the metabolism and regulation of glycaemia, by making explicit the different hierarchical orders involved. We expect that the proposed theoretical framework will open the way to the construction of original mathematical models, which would provide a better understanding of endocrine regulation from an organicist perspective. (shrink)

Proceeding on the Automatic Deduction System developped at the Philosophy Faculty of the UNAM at Mexico City. (Deduktor Mexican Group of Logics work under the direction of the professor Hugo Padilla Chacón). Conference presented at the mexican City of Guadalajara at the Universidad de Guadalajara, Jalisco, by invitation of the latinoamerican association of philosophy SOPHIA. Early stage of the deductional systems at 2-valued logic. This work embodies the implementation of the first whole and standalone arithmetization of bivalent Logic, the theoretical (...) framework of Hugo Padilla Chacón published in 1984. (shrink)

Proceeding of the work in trivalent logic developped under the direction of the professor Hugo Padilla Chacón at the 90's at the National Autonome University of México. Program in RLisp.

In my book *Resemblance Nominalism* I argued that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In his "Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts" Alexander Bird objects to my claim that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In this paper I respond to Bird´s objections.

The subtraction argument, originally put forward by Thomas Baldwin (1996), is intended to establish Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. Some modified versions of the argument have been proposed in order to avoid some difficulties faced by the original argument. In this paper I shall concentrate on two of those versions, the so-called subtraction argument* (presented and defended in Rodriguez-Pereyra 1997, 2000, 2002), and Efird and Stoneham’s recent version of the argument (Efird and (...) Stoneham 2005). I shall defend the subtraction argument* from Alexander Paseau’s (2006) objection that because a crucial premise of the subtraction argument* may have no plausibility independent from Metaphysical Nihilism, the subtraction argument* is not suasive. Although Paseau focuses on the subtraction argument*, I shall point out that Efird and Stoneham could reply to Paseau’s objection in the same way. Thus there are (at least) two suasive versions of the subtraction argument that establish Metaphysical Nihilism. But are those two arguments equally good? I shall argue that the subtraction argument* is preferable to Efird and Stoneham’s argument. (shrink)

Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a recently (...) advocated strategy to stop Russell's regress by using paradigms does not succeed. (shrink)

¿Cómo es posible encontrar una constante en una obra que tiene en la ruptura su principal argumento? Una primera línea se puede percibir en el trabajo de Žižek sobre una política del goce cuya trayectoria circula desde el deseo a la pulsión. Desde una investigación muy orientada en el problema del sujeto, en el carácter sintomático del mismo, Žižek se ha desplazado hacia un análisis de la relación entre el objeto a y la pulsión en el marco del capitalismo actual. (...) En conexión con esta problemática se encuentra una segunda línea que tiene como punto central el trabajo crítico sobre las relaciones entre economía y política; frente al desafío que supone hoy en día la circulación espontánea del capital y el abandono del ámbito económico por parte de la teoría política. Por un lado nos encontramos con los dos sentidos del término escatología, el económico y el teológico-político, que convergen en la noción de exceso, sea de la pulsión o sea del objeto a. Al mismo tiempo, Žižek considera que no es posible traducir la atención sobre el exceso capitalista y su propia revolución inmanente en términos de dominación política.Ambas secuencias se encuentran, en definitiva, íntimamente vinculadas en la crítica de la economía política del discurso que Žižek lleva a cabo. La introducción del término paralaje puede servir como alternativa para entender la oscilación permanente que se produce en su obra entre síntoma y escatología. Una opción para leer a Žižek en función de sus incesantes desplazamientos, comenzando por el más fundamental: la paralaje entre lectura y escritura. (shrink)

In this issue of the Report, James L. Bernat proposes an innovative and sophisticated distinction to justify the introduction of permanent cessation as a valid substitute standard for irreversible cessation in death determination. He differentiates two approaches to conceptualizing and determining death: the biological concept and the prevailing medical practice standard. While irreversibility is required by the biological concept, the weaker criterion of permanence, he claims, has always sufficed in the accepted standard medical practice to declare death. Bernat argues that (...) the medical practice standard may be acceptable on the ground that proving circulatory or brain permanence is sufficient to assure complete accuracy for death diagnosis. -/- The topic requires public deliberation: processes to survey people's opinions and mechanisms to channel their opinions into policy-making. What is at stake is the nature of our society. Do we want an expertocracy, in which an enlightened few design policies for the greater good of the majority and exploit the lack of public knowledge to achieve compliance? (shrink)

Causation was an important topic of philosophical reflection during the Seventeenth Century. This reflection centred around certain particular problems about causation, one of which was the problem of causation between mind and body. The doctrine of the pre-established harmony is Leibniz's response to the problem of causation between mind and body. In this chapter I shall (a) explain the problem of mind-body causation; (b) explain Leibniz's pre-established harmony; and (c) assess his case for it.

Mellor´s theory of causation has two components, one according to which causes raise their effects´ chances, and one according to which causation links facts. I argue that these two components are not independent from each other and, in particular, that Mellor´s thesis that causation links facts requires his thesis that causes raise their effects´ chances, since without the latter thesis Mellor cannot stop the slingshot argument, an argument that is a threat to any theory postulating facts as the relata of (...) causation. (shrink)

Leibniz’s short letter to the mathematician and physicist Ludovico Casati of 1689 is a short but interesting text on the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, to which it is entirely dedicated. Since there is no watermark in the paper of the letter, the letter is difficult to date, but it is likely that it was written during Leibniz’s stay in Rome, sometime between April and November of 1689 (A 2 2 287–8). When addressing the letter, Leibniz wrote ‘Casani’, but this (...) seems to be a mistake and the real addressee is thought to be Ludovico Casati, nephew of Paolo Casati, the Jesuit mathematician. The letter, reproduced in the Berlin’s Academy edition of Leibniz’s works, was first published by Gerhardt in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie in 1892 (Gerhardt 1892: 53–54). It also appears in Robinet’s Iter Italicum (Robinet 1988: 134–35). But neither Gerhardt nor Robinet provide a philosophical discussion of the letter, and I am not aware of any other philosophical discussion of it. Furthermore, as far as I know, the letter has never been translated into any language. Thus I shall here provide a transcription (from A 2 2 288–89) and a translation of the letter into English, and a philosophical discussion of its treatment of the Identity of Indiscernibles. (shrink)

Aunque la problemática de los daños ambientales ha atraído el interés sustancial de profesionales y académicos de diversas disciplinas, los motivos que impulsan esas prácticas han recibido poca atención en la literatura jurídica colombiana. Especialmente desde la perspectiva de la responsabilidad. Este capítulo presenta unas reflexiones preliminares de la responsabilidad por daños ambientales, para introducir el estudio de diversos temas, hacia una construcción doctrinal enmarcada no sólo en el deber de evitar el progresivo deterioro ambiental causado por el hombre, sino (...) para salvaguardar las especies vivas que habitan y habitarán este planeta, así como el legado que le quedará a las generaciones venideras. (shrink)

In this paper I present what I call the 'Metaphysical Problem of Truth', which consists in explaining in virtue of what all true sentences are true, and argue that a version of the Correspondence Theory of Truth is the most plausible solution to this problem.

In der Kritik der Urteilskraft vertritt Kant noch die analogische Beziehung zwischen Schönheit und Sittlichkeit (KU, AA 05: 351–354). Aber wir befinden uns hier in einem ganz anderen Zusammenhang. Und dies nicht nur, weil die Erörterung dieser analogischen Beziehung eine Lösung für das Problem der Verknüpfung zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft beansprucht. Die Reflexionen in den Vorlesungen über Anthropologie über die pragmatische Dimension des Geschmacks setzten die Möglichkeit dieser Verknüpfung bereits voraus, bevor Kant eine kritische Begründung derselben erreichte. Wir dürfen (...) aber diese Reflexionen nicht als das Ergebnis unreifer Versuche zur Lösung dieses kritischen Problems der Rationalitätstheorie Kants deuten. Während der Paragraph 59 der Kritik der Urteilskraft Teil der spekulativen Philosophie ist, wird die Kritik des Geschmacks in den Vorlesungen über Anthropologie vielmehr insofern sinnvoll, da sie zu einem pragmatischen, populären und aufgeklärten Bildungsprogramm der Anthropologie Kants gehört. (shrink)

Constructivism is frequently met with objections, criticism and often equated with nihilism or relativism. Sometimes even blamed for what some would randomly picture as unwanted side effects of radicalism or of a progressivist era: such misconceptions are not only due to an imprecise grasp of the premises shared by the constructivist family of systems. The structure of media, political systems, and economic models, still up today impel societal understandings of knowledge on neo-positivistic grounds. The first part of this essay outlines (...) such pressures while sketching how language and worldviews play critical roles in our knowledge construction. Focusing on recent mediatic events, this work advances displaying some essential limits regarding the construction of human knowledge. Though unavoidable, some of the distinguishing aspects regarding the nature of our narratives are then critically reviewed. Later, it is shown how a special kind of self-denial that certain sub-stories implicitly hold about their own narrative nature leaves us with clashing worldviews that eventually collide onto crisis. Finally, it’ll be argued that it’s precisely in this scenario where a constructivist depiction of social discourses may move us away from any adolescent intent of elucidating absolutes within mere heuristics, to the pragmatic need of arriving on satisfactory agreements between parties (DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2022). (shrink)

Leibniz was a philosopher of principles: the principles of Contradiction, of Sufficient Reason, of Identity of Indiscernibles, of Plenitude, of the Best, and of Continuity are among the most famous Leibnizian principles. In this article I shall focus on the first three principles; I shall discuss various formulations of the principles (sect. 1), what it means for these theses to have the status of principles or axioms in Leibniz’s philosophy (sect. 2), the fundamental character of the Principles of Contradiction and (...) Sufficient Reason (sect. 3), some attempts to demonstrate the Principles of Contradiction and Sufficient Reason (sect. 4), and one attempt to demonstrate the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (sect. 5). The main results of the chapter are summarized in a short conclusion (sect. 6). (shrink)

The Razor says: do not multiply entities without necessity! The Laser says: do not multiply fundamental entities without necessity! Behind the Laser lies a deep insight. This is a distinction between the costs and the commitments of a theory. According to the Razor, every commitment is a cost. Not so according to the Laser. According to the Laser, derivative entities are an ontological free lunch: that is, they are a commitment without a cost. Jonathan Schaffer (2015) has argued that the (...) Laser should replace the Razor. In Sections 2-4 we shall discuss and argue against Schaffer’s arguments for replacing the Razor with the Laser. Schaffer considers several objections to his views, and in Sections 5-7 we shall argue that Schaffer does not deal successfully with two of them. In Section 8 we shall present a probabilistic argument for the Laser. However, the argument has a limitation and does not support the replacement of the Razor with the Laser. Indeed, it supports only the claim that, given certain assumptions, the multiplication of explanatorily relevant derivative entities does not matter; but, as we argue in the same section, there is an argument that multiplying explanatorily superfluous derivative entities does makes a theory less rationally acceptable. Our conclusion is that the Laser cannot replace the Razor and that derivative entities are not an ontological free lunch. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Ancient Greek Sceptics implicitly presupposed a Parmenidean ontology.

Los fenómenos urbanos son objeto de complejos modelos cuantitativos que persiguen explicar la emergencia de futuras tendencias. De similar manera, la intuición opera en algunos visionarios, cuya propiedad de percibir lo que esta por venir, los acerca a la realidad de un modo distinto. Este es el caso de Víctor Jara, cuya canción “Las Casitas del Barrio Alto” es objeto de estudio a través de un análisis crítico del discurso. En el trabajo se aprecia que Víctor Jara tiene la capacidad (...) de anticipar el futuro con esta canción, enunciando las características de lo que seria el porvenir urbano de Chile post dictatorial. (shrink)

The concern of this paper is a version of Resemblance Nominalism according to which resemblance classes, i.e. classes of resembling things, are determined by paradigms. I show that the theory is false, since paradigms do not generally determine resemblance classes. Although I concentrate upon the version of the theory which was delineated by H. H. Price, my results apply to any other theory constructing resemblance classes out of paradigms.

Emancipatory social movement solidarities are prefigurative associations. While pursuing broad-based social transformations, solidaristic agents attempt to model—in an incomplete and provisional way—the social relations they wish to bring into existence. Existing structures of domination, deep-set and overlapping as they are, pose an abiding challenge to the prefiguration of just relations, however. This article considers the challenge of prefiguration by developing a diachronic, goal-oriented, and epistemic account of solidarity. The author argues that solidarity is a collaborative process whereby agents prefigure relationships (...) of nondomination while working together to reach shared understandings about the political task at hand. The author examines two epistemologies that have not been traditionally connected to philosophical discussions of solidarity, philosophical hermeneutics and creolization, to elaborate the account. While both frameworks enable an understanding of solidarity as a properly transformative relation, creolization illuminates the possibilities and difficulties of collaborating under conditions of domination. (shrink)

The paper clarifies the sense of remark 202 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* with respect to its relation to the private language argument. It argues, against what some have maintained, that remark 202 is not meant to reject the possibility of a private language as this is defined in remark 243.

En los últimos tiempos el derecho ambiental ha ganado un puesto importante en el ámbito jurídico, hecho que refleja la preocupación que hoy se tiene por la relación del hombre con su entorno. Desde hace quince años, la Universidad Colegio Mayor de Nuestra señora del Rosario, por intermedio de su Facultad de Jurisprudencia y concretamente de la Especialización y la línea de investigación en Derecho Ambiental, ha propuesto a través de diversos proyectos avanzar en el conocimiento y análisis del ordenamiento (...) jurídico ambiental, aportando así al desarrollo, estructura y consolidación de esta rama jurídica. Bajo estos parámetros, el objetivo de esta publicación es hacer algunas reflexiones en torno a distintos temas que dentro del derecho público impactan o influyen al derecho ambiental y responder a los enormes desafíos que se presentan en la materia. Por tanto, el programa quiere contribuir desde la academia al diálogo crítico y propositivo que permita dar solución a los problemas encontrados en la aplicación del derecho ambiental. En el primer capítulo, Gloria Amparo Rodriguez describe los ordenamientos jurídicos constitucionales de Colombia, Ecuador y Bolivia a fin de analizar la forma en que cada uno de ellos consagra el derecho a un ambiente sano. A continuación, Martha Ovalle y Zelba Nidia Castro de Perez realizan un estudio de los principios de precaución y prevención, exponiendo su alcance, su fundamento desde el derecho internacional y cómo vienen siendo entendidos por nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, tanto jurisprudencial como legal. Luis Adolfo Diazgranados se ocupa de la responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos en materia ambiental, para lo cual realiza un análisis de los deberes consagrados en la normatividad vigente. Continuando con esta temática, el profesor Jorge Agudo Gonzalez, de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, explora la incidencia del ambiente y los recursos naturales en los procesos contractuales, a fin de mostrar cómo estas materias se han constituido en variable fundamental en el devenir de la formación, celebración y ejecución de los contratos, desde un punto de vista crítico, los aspectos importantes del proceso sancionatorio ambiental, evidenciando las falencias y vacios del a Ley 1333 de 2009. Jairo Cabrera plantea algunas reflexiones sobre la responsabilidad, valiéndose de la doctrina internacional, sobre la problemática de la reparación por daño ambiental. Por su parte, Leonardo Güiza Suárez explica el régimen general de la responsabilidad ambiental en el ordenamiento jurídico a partir del daño de los bosques naturales y su incidencia sobre los derechos humanos. Andres Gomez Rey, desde la teoría del acto administrativo, desarrolla el análisis crítico del régimen jurídico de las aguas superficiales en el derecho ambiental. Giovani J. Herrera Carrascal realiza una disertación sobre los recursos naturales y el ambiente como elementos del espacio público que a su vez constituye en un componente del medio ambiente urbano a partir de la jurisprudencia y de las competencias respectivas. Por último, Marybell Ochoa Miranda trate el tema de los residuos hospitalarios en Colombia, exponiendo su régimen jurídico, las competencias de las autoridades ambientales, los deberes que en estos asuntos tienen los ciudadanos, proponiendo lineamientos para avanzar en la consolidación de la gestión integral de residuos hospitalarios y similares. (shrink)

At a crucial juncture in Plato’s Sophist, when the interlocutors have reached their deepest confusion about being and not-being, the Eleatic Visitor proclaims that there is yet hope. Insofar as they clarify one, he maintains, they will equally clarify the other. But what justifies the Visitor’s seemingly oracular prediction? A new interpretation explains how the Visitor’s hope is in fact warranted by the peculiar aporia they find themselves in. The passage describes a broader pattern of ‘exploring both sides’ that lends (...) insight into Plato’s aporetic method. (shrink)

This note argues that research in analytical philosophy broadly conceived should be published exclusively in English. Reasons are given for this and the thesis is defended against thirteen objections.

Los intereses contrapuestos en relación con el manejo, uso, utilización y aprovechamiento de los recursos naturales de los territorios indígenas, generan conflictos ambientales en donde uno de los escenarios privilegiados de expresión de los mismos es el de la consulta previa: cuando se adelanta o por el contrario, cuando aunque sea obligatoria, no se impulsa o se hace de manera inadecuada, es decir, sin el cumplimiento de los requisitos mínimos establecidos.

Using semi-structured interviews and an analytic approach based on the grounded theory, this research took on constructing an understanding of the socio-emotional relevance, and the meaning that a group of elder participants of CIAM «Lucía Salas Romo» of Quilicura (Santiago, Chile) ascribe to social discourses regarding aging. Findings showed that, mobilizing the semantic dissonance between what society promotes and the effective opportunities it allows for the elderly, there are two crucial components of the social discourse: social injustice and fear of (...) dependency. In turn, these play a central role in elder affectivity and the reformulation of identity during this developmental stage for this group (DOI: 10.33264/rpa.202101). (shrink)

Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and how (...) the rose is is not an entity over and above the rose. It is against this view that I shall argue in this paper. I shall argue that a significant class of true propositions, including inessential predications like the proposition that the rose is red, are made true by entities. "No truthmaking without truthmakers" is my slogan. Although I have my view about what kinds of entities are truthmakers, I shall not argue for or presuppose that view here. All I shall argue for here is that if a proposition is made true by something, it is made true by some thing, but my argument will leave it open what kind of thing that thing is: it could be a fact or state of affairs, a trope, or any other sort of entity. (shrink)

In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz put forward his famous complete-concept definition of substance. Sometimes this definition is glossed as stating that a substance is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates, and it is thought that it follows directly from Leibniz’s theory of truth. Now, an adequate definition of substance should not apply to accidents. But, as I shall point out, if Leibniz’s theory of truth is correct then an accident is an entity (...) with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates. The aim of this paper is to clarify Leibniz’s notion of substance in the Discourse with a view to explaining how that definition successfully distinguishes between substances and accidents. (shrink)

La Inteligencia Artificial (IA) ha supuesto un gran avance para la humanidad en diversos campos; sin embargo, eso no implica que su actividad esté exenta de reflexión ética. La humanidad está enfrentado, y va a enfrentar en el futuro, numerosos desafíos que van a obligar a elaborar nuevas ideas para poder vivir a la altura de los tiempos. Entre esos desafíos encontramos el laboral y económico, el de mejoramiento humano, el militar y de seguridad y el político y jurídico, entre (...) otros. Así pues, una vez considerados los desafíos en el terreno de la IA, una referencia ética que puede servir para enfrentar dichos desafíos, puede ser el principio de responsabilidad de Hans Jonas. La lectura de este aporte ético puede facilitarnos unas primeras coordenadas para la orientación en medio de un horizonte de posibilidades nuevo para la humanidad y, adicionalmente, servir como punto de partida en el compromiso que deben asumir los diferentes saberes implicados en este novedoso campo. (shrink)

En este documento se despliega todas las distributividades y asociatividades posibles de construir en el formato tradicional de la lógica bivaluada, asimismo se presenta el valor que resulta de efectuar dichas operaciones de distributividad y asociatividad, sean o no tautológicas a través del operador de la equivalencia lógica. El valor resultante de realizar una operación de distributividad o asociatividad se expresa como el código binario de su columna veritativo-funcional, presentado en base decimal.

In this fragment of Opuscula Logica it is displayed an arithmetical treatment of the aristotelic syllogisms upon the previous interpretations of Christine Ladd-Franklin and Jean Piaget. For the first time, the whole deductive corpus for each syllogism is presented in the two innovative modalities first proposed by Hugo Padilla Chacón. A. The Projection method (all the possible expressions that can be deduced through the conditional from a logical expression) and B. The Retrojection method (all the possible valid antecedents or premises (...) conjunction for an expression proposed as a conclusion). The results are numerically expressed, with their equivalents in the propositional language of bivalent logic. (shrink)

Developments in the realm of formal sciences and math foundations during the twentieth century were marked by important methodological advances. Such new approaches partialy owe their appearance to the abandonment of the previous paradigm. To identify how this transition occured, in this essay we observe some aspects regarding the works of Gödel and Tarski, who, under a certain interpretations, restructure epistemological bases of math's formalisms. It'll be argued that the theoretical variabilities produced in abstract sciences upon weakening previous viewpoints forced (...) to abandon some of the components of hegemonic programs. (shrink)

Since 1968, the irreversible loss of functioning of the whole brain, called brain death, is assimilated to individual’s death. The almost universal acceptance of this neurological criterion of death had decisive consequences for the contemporary medicine, such as the withdrawal of mechanical ventilation in these patients and organ retrieval for transplantation. The new criterion was successfully accepted in part because the assimilation of brain death state to death was presented by medicine --and acritically assumed by most of societies-- as a (...) scientific and objective fact. Nevertheless, many people do not think that the patients suffering brain death are actually dead. We show here that those people are not necessarily wrong. It can be argued that, in fact, the justification of the neurological criterion is not scientific but moral. We outline the thesis that the problem surrounding the vital status of brain dead patients is due to a confusion between factual and normative questions. Furthermore, we claim that the donation of organs and the withdrawal of life-support could be ethically acceptable even if the patients suffering brain death are considered as alive. As an alternative to the dead donor rule, we propose a justification for organ donation of brain-dead patients based on the (moral) concepts of harm and consent : what truly justifies the procurement of organs on those patients is not that they are dead, but that they wish to donate their organs and that, since they have irreversibly lost their brain, they cannot be harmed. (shrink)