Il lavoro esamina criticamente i presupposti di cinque differenti approcci alla Scienza Cognitiva, (simbolico, connessionista, dinamico, della cognizione incarnata e della vita artificiale) e sostiene che tutti e cinque condividono tacitamente un’ipotesi metodologica molto generale. Tale ipotesi, che propongo di chiamare simulazionismo , postula che i fenomeni cognitivi di un qualunque sistema reale possono essere adeguatamente spiegati sulla base di opportuni modelli di simulazione del sistema stesso. Tuttavia, a causa della loro costituzione, i modelli di simulazione hanno forti limitazioni, sia (...) al livello descrittivo che esplicativo. Il limite descrittivo sta nel fatto che la corrispondenza fra i risultati di una simulazione e i dati relativi al fenomeno reale non è diretta e intrinseca ma, al più, indiretta e estrinseca. Il limite esplicativo consiste nel fatto che le spiegazioni supportate dal modello non sono mai compiute e realistiche ma, piuttosto, solo in linea di principio e romanzesche. Queste difficoltà potrebbero essere superate ricorrendo ai modelli Galileiani , costituiti da sistemi dinamici in cui ciascuna componente ha un’interpretazione precisa e definita, in quanto essa corrisponde ad una proprietà misurabile (grandezza) del fenomeno reale che il modello descrive. (shrink)

The standard view of classical cognitive science stated that cognition consists in the manipulation of language-like structures according to formal rules. Since cognition is ‘linguistic’ in itself, according to this view language is just a complex communication system and does not influence cognitive processes in any substantial way. This view has been criticized from several perspectives and a new framework (Embodied Cognition) has emerged that considers cognitive processes as non-symbolic and heavily dependent on the dynamical interactions between the cognitive system (...) and its environment. But notwithstanding the successes of the embodied cognitive science in explaining low-level cognitive behaviors, it is still not clear whether and how it can scale up for explaining high-level cognition. In this paper we argue that this can be done by considering the role of language as a cognitive tool: i.e. how language transforms basic cognitive functions in the high-level functions that are characteristic of human cognition. In order to do that, we review some computational models that substantiate this view with respect to categorization and memory. Since these models are based on a very rudimentary form of non-syntactic ‘language’ we argue that the use of language as a cognitive tool might have been an early discovery in hominid evolution, and might have played a substantial role in the evolution of language itself. (shrink)

Some philosophers search for the mark of the cognitive: a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions identifying all instances of cognition. They claim that the mark of the cognitive is needed to steer the development of cognitive science on the right path. Here, I argue that, at least at present, it cannot be provided. First (§2), I identify some of the factors motivating the search for a mark of the cognitive, each yielding a desideratum the mark is supposed (...) to satisfy (§2.1). I then (§2.2) highlight a number of tensions in the literature on the mark of the cognitive, suggesting they’re best resolved by distinguishing two distinct programs. The first program (§3) is that of identifying a mark of the cognitive capturing our everyday notion of cognition. I argue that such a program is bound to fail for a number of reasons: it is not clear whether such an everyday notion exists; and even if it existed, it would not be able to spell out individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for cognition; and even if it were able to spell them out, these conditions won’t satisfy the desiderata a mark of the cognitive should satisfy. The second program is that of identifying a mark of the cognitive spelling out a genuine scientific kind. But the current state of fragmentation of cognitive science, and the fact that it is splintered in a myriad of different research traditions, prevent us from identifying such a kind. And we have no reason to think that these various research traditions will converge, allowing us to identify a single mark. Or so, at least, I will argue in (§4). I then conclude the paper (§5) deflecting an intuitive objection, and exploring some of the consequences of the thesis I have defended. (shrink)

Structural representations are increasingly popular in philosophy of cognitive science. A key virtue they seemingly boast is that of meeting Ramsey's job description challenge. For this reason, structural representations appear tailored to play a clear representational role within cognitive architectures. Here, however, I claim that structural representations do not meet the job description challenge. This is because even our most demanding account of their functional profile is satisfied by at least some receptors, which paradigmatically fail the job description challenge. Hence, (...) the functional profile typically associated with structural representations does not identify representational posits. After a brief introduction, I present, in the second section of the paper, the job description challenge. I clarify why receptors fail to meet it and highlight why, as a result, they should not be considered representations. In the third section I introduce what I take to be the most demanding account of structural representations at our disposal, namely Gładziejewski's account. Provided the necessary background, I turn from exposition to criticism. In the first half of the fourth section, I equate the functional profile of structural representations and receptors. To do so, I show that some receptors boast, as a matter of fact, all the functional features associated with structural representations. Since receptors function merely as causal mediators, I conclude structural representations are mere causal mediators too. In the second half of the fourth section I make this conclusion intuitive with a toy example. I then conclude the paper, anticipating some objections my argument invites. (shrink)

Across two studies, one of which was pre-registered, we find that a simple questionnaire that measures intellectual virtue and vice predicts how many fake news articles and conspiracy theories participants accept. This effect holds even when controlling for multiple demographic predictors, including age, household income, sex, education, ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, and news consumption. These results indicate that self-report is an adequate way to measure intellectual virtue and vice, which suggests that they are not fully immune to introspective awareness or (...) “stealthy” in the sense that Cassam (2015) argues. This is an important methodological result and may pave the way for future research on intellectual virtue and vice. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present the copy principle from execution of the principle of separability for the purpose of elucidating the discussions conducted by Hume in understanding the composition of space and its implications for the sciences that operate with spatial constructions. The particular epistemic gain here is to do this within a model of empiricism. Given that there are several irregularities in the manner of analyzing a complex and extracting simple elements from it, as will be (...) demonstrated here, we seek to show that separating a complex considering its simple qualities and decomposing a complex to determine its simple quantities is completely different. Thus, we seek to show how Hume needed to recreate his own cognitive model, strongly based on noting our perceptions, to be able to use it to conceive the composition of space and the operations of geometry that must make reference to it. (shrink)

Over three decades, Axel Honneth has developed one of the most fully-structured recognition paradigms in the field of social philosophy. Although it has undergone considerable theoretical changes, this paradigm retains a strong unity. I will analyze it in light of the Frankfurt school critical social theory research program. By so doing, I aim, first, to outline a defense of Honneth’s theory against growing criticisms, which tend to see depletion of its critical insights in his most recent works. Secondly, I aim (...) to highlight that most of the weaknesses pointed out by his critics derive from the methodology with which Honneth frames the concept of recognition, and which he explicitly related to the Frankfurt school critical social theory. Thirdly, I argue that, insofar as we are at present witnessing a transformation in the nature of current struggles for recognition, it is precisely one of the premises of this methodology that runs the risk of being undermined (i.e. the classical relation between theory and “praxis”). (shrink)

Recently, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein have argued that the extended consciousness thesis, namely the claim that the material vehicles of consciousness extend beyond our heads, is entirely compatible with, and actually mandated by, a correct interpretation of the predictive processing framework. To do so, they rely on a potent argument in favor of the extended consciousness thesis, namely the Dynamical Entanglement and Unique Temporal Signature (DEUTS) argument. Here, we will critically examine Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s endeavor, arguing for the following three claims. (...) First, we will claim that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s emphasis on culture and cultural practices does not help them substantiate the extended consciousness thesis. Secondly, we will argue that the way in which Kirchhoff and Kiverstein formalize the boundaries of a subject’s conscious mind is inadequate, as it yields conclusions running counter some of their assumptions. Lastly, we will argue that the DEUTS argument does not establish the extended consciousness thesis, as it licenses a phenomenal bloat objection which is exactly analogous to the “cognitive bloat” objection to the extended mind thesis. We will thus conclude that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s proposed marriage between the extended consciousness thesis and predictive processing fails, and that, contrary to a popular opinion, DEUTS is not a strong argument in favor of the extended consciousness thesis. (shrink)

The received view about emergence and reduction is that they are incompatible categories. I argue in this paper that, contrary to the received view, emergence and reduction can hold together. To support this thesis, I focus attention on dynamical systems and, on the basis of a general representation theorem, I argue that, as far as these systems are concerned, the emulation relationship is sufficient for reduction (intuitively, a dynamical system DS1 emulates a second dynamical system DS2 when DS1 exactly reproduces (...) the whole dynamics of DS2). This representational view of reduction, contrary to the standard deductivist one, is compatible with the existence of structural properties of the reduced system that are not also properties of the reducing one. Therefore, under this view, by no means are reduction and emergence incompatible categories but, rather, complementary ones. (shrink)

Why are mistaken beliefs about Covid-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other demographic variables explain only a part of individual differences in the susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more susceptible (...) to believing Covid-19 misinformation. We carried out an observational study (US sample, n = 998) in which we measured the level of epistemic vice of participants using a novel Epistemic Vice Scale. We also asked participants questions eliciting the extent to which they subscribe to myths and misinformation about Covid-19. We find overwhelming evidence to the effect that epistemic vice is associated with susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. In fact, the association turns out to be stronger than with political identity, educational attainment, scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test, personality, dogmatism, and need for closure. We conclude that this offers evidence in favor of the empirical presuppositions of vice epistemology. (shrink)

Este texto pretende mostrar que, do ponto de vista das ciências empíricas, o projeto de demolição do ceticismo, conduzido por Descartes, perdura até a VI Meditação e nela não pode ser concluído. Se isto assim ocorre, é porque há dois modelos de superação do ceticismo em Descartes. O primeiro modelo diz respeito à superação da dúvida metafísica. Esse modelo alcança algum êxito já na II Meditação, na qual, por analogia com o procedimento matemático, a descoberta de uma evidência irrecusável conduz (...) à primeira certeza, e esta se torna o ponto de partida para a obtenção de outras. O segundo modelo diz respeito à superação da dúvida sobre os conteúdos do mundo sensível. Embora pareça que a solução do segundo modelo decorra diretamente do êxito obtido no domínio do primeiro, isto não se dá, porque, conquanto Descartes construa os fundamentos matemáticos de uma teoria do extenso, nela não consegue resolver os problemas da Física entendida como uma teoria dos objetos empíricos. (shrink)

A distinção entre conhecimento filosófico e conhecimento matemático constitui um dos temas centrais da construção do pensamento kantiano durante a década de 1760. Conquanto operasse com a distinção entre Filosofia e Matemática, Wolff não pressupunha uma radical oposição entre o modo de operação dessas duas ciências. Essa oposição radical surge pela distinção entre conceitos arbitrários e conceitos dados, que Kant propõe já em 1764, no texto Investigação sobre a evidência dos princípios da teologia natural e da moral. Tomando essa distinção (...) como ponto de partida, este texto pretende executar os seguintes passos: expor a incompatibilidade entre procedimento filosófico e procedimento matemático, que surge do modo de definir cada uma dessas ciências; examinar a transposição de tarefas que Kant projeta sobre a Filosofia e a Matemática, a partir do modo como cada uma pode operar com o conceito de espaço; e fazer uma apresentação inicial dos elementos da estética, particularmente do espaço, como fonte de possibilidade de toda a síntese teórica. Esse último passo do texto será realizado a partir de uma análise dos elementos da estética contidos na Dissertação de 1770. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Schopenhauer’s On the Will in Nature (1836), a book which is generally underestimated by scholars interested in Schopenhauer’sphilosophy. This essay analyses its genesis in Schopenhauer’s manuscripts, examines its role in Schopenhauer’s thought and its relationship with The World asWill and Representation, and locates its content and meaning with reference to the philosophical and scientific context. Aim of the article is a better understanding of Schopenhauer’s treatise, and such a scope is pursued by accurate insight of its (...) central theme: the notion of Bestätigung, that is the scientific corroboration of the philosophical knowledge. (shrink)

AI-based technologies are increasingly pervasive in a number of contexts. Our affective and emotional life makes no exception. In this article, we analyze one way in which AI-based technologies can affect them. In particular, our investigation will focus on affective artificial agents, namely AI-powered software or robotic agents designed to interact with us in affectively salient ways. We build upon the existing literature on affective artifacts with the aim of providing an original analysis of affective artificial agents and their distinctive (...) features. We argue that, unlike comparatively low-tech affective artifacts, affective artificial agents display a specific form of agency, which prevents them from being perceived by their users as extensions of their selves. In addition to this, we claim that their functioning crucially depends on the simulation of human-like emotion-driven behavior and requires a distinctive form of transparency—we call it emotional transparency—that might give rise to ethical and normative tensions. (shrink)

In this paper we assess two sides of the debate concerning biomedical enhancement. First, the idea that biomedical enhancement should be prohibited on the grounds that it degrades human nature; second, that biomedical enhancement can in principle remove the source of moral evil. In so doing, we will propose a different notion of human nature, what we shall call the agato-teleological idea of human nature, and its implications for a philosophical understanding of the human body. Also, we will point out (...) why it seems unreasonable to think that bodily enhancement is sufficient to guarantee moral progress. Finally, we will propose the idea that our technological societies are in need of a new moral virtue, what we shall call the virtue of non-conservative bodily integrity. (shrink)

Introduzione alla raccolta di saggi di Rahel Jaeggi "Forme di vita e capitalismo", curata e tradotta da Marco Solinas. L'introduzione presenta una breve panoramica del pensiero dell'autrice e si sofferma sul suo progetto incentrato sulla critica immanente del capitalismo come forma di vita.

Grice in pragmatics and Levelt in psycholinguistics have proposed models of human communication where the starting point of communicative action is an individual intention. This assumption, though, has to face serious objections with regard to the alleged existence of explicit representations of the communicative goals to be pursued. Here evidence is surveyed which shows that in fact speaking may ordinarily be a quite automatic activity prompted by contextual cues and driven by behavioural schemata abstracted away from social regularities. On the (...) one hand, this means that there could exist no intentions in the sense of explicit representations of communicative goals, following from deliberate reasoning and triggering the communicative action. On the other hand, however, there are reasons to allow for a weaker notion of intention than this, according to which communication is an intentional affair, after all. Communicative action is said to be intentional in this weaker sense to the extent that it is subject to a double mechanism of control, with respect both to present-directed and future-directed intentions. (shrink)

Este texto pretende discutir, do ponto de vista kantiano, o que pode ser ensinado e o que pode ser aprendido em Filosofia. Seu objetivo é construir os argumentos hipotéticos de Kant em face do método estruturalista de leitura de textos filosóficos. Para circunscrever este tema, aparentemente muito amplo, tomaremos como fio condutor um célebre texto de aula de I. Kant, publicado por G. B. Jäsche sob o título Manual dos Cursos de Lógica Geral. Kant ministrou este curso por mais de (...) quarenta anos, até o término de suas atividades docentes em 1797, e nele apresenta considerações bastante fecundas e atuais sobre o ensino da História da Filosofia e sobre a formação do filósofo. A partir da distinção entre conhecimento histórico e conhecimento racional, e da distinção entre o conceito de filosofia na escola e o conceito de filosofia no mundo (AK 9:24), procuraremos apresentar as contribuições kantianas que podem ainda ser consideradas pertinentes para se discutir o modo de ensinar Filosofia e a formação do filósofo. (shrink)

The essay aims to offer a critical theory of psychosocial processes of regressive and depressive type. The Author starts by discussing the determining influence attributed to social suffering in the framework of the moral grammar of social struggle outlined by Axel Honneth, then he offers an analysis of the regressive reactions activate by disrespect experiences. The Author discusses some important points of Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of history, in particularly Benjamin’s critique of traditional concept of progress, and the determining role attributed (...) to suffering; points that are translated and moved in the framework of the analysis of regressive processes. Lastly, the Author shows how a critical theory that aims to reactivate the emancipatory potential immanent in the social suffering today frustrated may find an incisive and productive approach in a critical analysis of regressions. -/- Il saggio mira ad offrire una teoria critica dei processi psicosociali di taglio regressivo e depressivo. L’autore muove dalla centralità attribuita alla sofferenza sociale nel quadro della grammatica morale delle lotte sociali delineato da Axel Honneth, concentrandosi poi sulle reazioni di carattere regressivo indotte dalle esperienze di spregio. Segue la ripresa di alcuni punti fondamentali della filosofia della storia di Walter Benjamin, in particolare della sua critica alla concezione tradizionale di progresso, e la sua peculiare valorizzazione della sofferenza; spunti tradotti e traslati nell’ambito dell’analisi dei processi regressivi. Infine, l’autore mostra come una teoria critica che voglia riattivare i potenziali emancipatori immanenti alla sofferenza sociale oggi frustrati possa trovare un approccio incisivo e fecondo in una analisi critica delle regressioni. (shrink)

I begin by briefly reconstructing Honneth’s concept of reification. His paradigm gives the reification of the non-human environment a marginal position in comparison to the reification of human beings, thereby detracting from its explanatory and critical potential. In order to avoid this outcome, I subsequently present a paradigm of subject identity formation in which not only affectively-based intersubjective interactions but also affectively-based interactions with the non-human environment are, in both a “genetic” and a “conceptual” sense, essential to establish an objective (...) and meaningful relationship with external reality. On the basis of this paradigm a closer connection can be identified between the reification of human beings and the reification of the non-human environment—a connection in which the reification of the latter may reinforce human reification. (shrink)

As neuroscience progresses, we will not only gain a better understanding of how our brains work, but also a better understanding of how to modify them, and as a result, our mental states. An important question we are faced with is whether the state could be justified in implementing such methods on criminal offenders, without their consent, for the purposes of rehabilitation and reduction of recidivism; a practice that is already legal in some jurisdictions. By focusing on a prominent type (...) of view of free action, which I call bypassing views, this paper evaluates how such interventions may negatively impact the freedom of their subjects. The paper concludes that there will be a tension between the goals of rehabilitation and reduction of recidivism, on the one hand, and the negative impact such interventions may have on free action, on the other. Other things equal, the better that a particular intervention is at achieving the former, the more likely it is to result in the latter. (shrink)

The distinction between nature and artifice has been definitive for Western conceptions of the role of humans within their natural environment. But the human must already be separated from nature in order to distinguish between nature and artifice. This separation, in turn, facilitates a classification of knowledge in general, typically cast in terms of a hierarchy of sciences that ascends from the natural sciences to the social (or human) sciences. However, this hierarchy considers nature as a substantial foundation upon which (...) artifice operates and to which it responds. Here I examine three inter-related concepts that, by focusing on events rather than substances, operate beyond the nature–artifice distinction and thereby resist the hierarchical classification of the sciences: Foucault’s concept of technology, the concept of milieu as it crosses over historically from physics to biology and anthropology, and Deleuze and Guattari’s reconfiguration of the concept of milieu in terms of their concept of machine. (shrink)

The essay aims to offer a critical theory of psychosocial processes of regressive and depressive type. The Author starts by discussing the determining influence attributed to social suffering in the framework of the moral grammar of social struggle outlined by Axel Honneth, then he offers an analysis of the regressive reactions activate by disrespect experiences. The Author discusses some important points of Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of history, in particularly Benjamin’s critique of traditional concept of progress, and the determining role attributed (...) to suffering; points that are translated and moved in the framework of the analysis of regressive processes. Lastly, the Author shows how a critical theory that aims to reactivate the emancipatory potential immanent in the social suffering today frustrated may find an incisive and productive approach in a critical analysis of regressions. -/- Il saggio mira ad offrire una teoria critica dei processi psicosociali di taglio regressivo e depressivo. L’autore muove dalla centralità attribuita alla sofferenza sociale nel quadro della grammatica morale delle lotte sociali delineato da Axel Honneth, concentrandosi poi sulle reazioni di carattere regressivo indotte dalle esperienze di spregio. Segue la ripresa di alcuni punti fondamentali della filosofia della storia di Walter Benjamin, in particolare della sua critica alla concezione tradizionale di progresso, e la sua peculiare valorizzazione della sofferenza; spunti tradotti e traslati nell’ambito dell’analisi dei processi regressivi. Infine, l’autore mostra come una teoria critica che voglia riattivare i potenziali emancipatori immanenti alla sofferenza sociale oggi frustrati possa trovare un approccio incisivo e fecondo in una analisi critica delle regressioni. (shrink)

I discuss Clark’s predictive processing/extended mind hybrid, diagnosing a problem: Clark’s hybrid suggests that, when we use them, we pay attention to mind-extending external resources. This clashes with a commonly accepted necessary condition of cognitive extension; namely, that mind-extending resources must be phenomenally transparent when used. I then propose a solution to this problem claiming that the phenomenal transparency condition should be rejected. To do so, I put forth a parity argument to the effect that phenomenal transparency cannot be a (...) necessary condition on cognitive extension: roughly, since internal cognitive resources can fail to be transparent when used, by parity, external resources can fail to be phenomenally transparent too. Further, I argue that phenomenal transparency is not even a reliable indicator of cognitive extension; hence its absence should not be considered a problem for Clark’s extended mind-predictive processing hybrid. Lastly, I consider and allay a number of worries my proposal might raise, and conclude the paper. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis claims that a subject’s mind sometimes encompasses the environmental props the subject interacts with while solving cognitive tasks. Recently, the debate over the extended mind has been focused on Markov Blankets: the statistical boundaries separating biological systems from the environment. Here, I argue such a focus is mistaken, because Markov Blankets neither adjudicate, nor help us adjudicate, whether the extended mind thesis is true. To do so, I briefly introduce Markov Blankets and the free energy principle (...) in Section 2. I then turn from exposition to criticism. In Section 3, I argue that using Markov Blankets to determine whether the mind extends will provide us with an answer based on circular reasoning. In Section 4, I consider whether Markov Blankets help us track the boundaries of the mind, answering in the negative. This is because resorting to Markov Blankets to track the boundaries of the mind yields extensionally inadequate conclusions which violate the parity principle. In Section 5, I further argue that Markov Blankets led us to sidestep the debate over the extended mind, as they make internalism about the mind vacuously true. A brief concluding paragraph follows. (shrink)

Recently, following the social and subjective consequences of the neoliberal wave, there seems to be a renewed interest in work as occupying a central place in social and subjective life. For the first time in decades, both sociologists and critical theorists once more again regard work as a major constituent of the subject’s identity and thus as an appropriate object of analysis for those engaged in critique of the social pathologies. The aim of this article is to present a succinct (...) analysis of Axel Honneth’s thoughts on the concept of work and to propose an approach granting it a more substantial role in social theory. To this end, this article will embark upon a reappraisal of the importance of the material and psychological dimensions of the subject’s interactions in the world of work. It aims to demonstrate that the normative demands associated with these dimensions are, like the normative demands of recognition, immanent and universal. In other words, it will argue that the normative ideals related to individuals’ bodily and psychic life (in the workplace and beyond) are not necessarily utopian in the negative sense (abstract and unrealistic). If this is indeed the case, theorists could take these normative demands for emancipation as a guide to analyzing the sociological, political and moral implications of the transition from the ‘Fordist’ to the ‘post-Fordist’ organization of labor. (shrink)

A view that emancipates free will by means of quantum indeterminism is frequently rejected based on arguments pointing out its incompatibility with what we know about quantum physics. However, if one carefully examines what classical physical causal determinism and quantum indeterminism are according to physics, it becomes clear what they really imply–and, especially, what they do not imply–for agent-causation theories. Here, we will make necessary conceptual clarifications on some aspects of physical determinism and indeterminism, review some of the major objections (...) against libertarian conjectures, and show that there is no conceptual incompatibility preventing us from taking a ‘quantum-libertarian’ approach to the problem of free will. In particular, we will illustrate the possible role of self-causation (causa sui) as a potential solution to otherwise apparently incompatible or even paradoxical statements concerning free will and quantum indeterminism. (shrink)

In this article, I address a controversial aspect of Rawls’s treatment of the question of justice between generations: how the parties in the original position could be motivated to select Rawls’s preferred principle of intergenerational savings, which he dubs the just savings principle. I focus on the explanation found in his later work, where he proposes that the correct savings principle is the principle that any generation would have wanted preceding generations to have followed. By expanding upon this explanation, I (...) respond to the objection that this explanation disregards the perspective of the first generation. I demonstrate that this objection ceases to be a concern when a proper account of the parties’ reasoning is developed. What is notable about the explanation I defend is that it relies on the parties adopting maximax – not maximin – as a rule for rational decision making. Having established this intermediary conclusion, I depart with Rawls and consider what savings principle the parties would choose if given more options. Ultimately, I argue that the parties would select a principle that Rawls would have undoubtedly rejected if presented to him at face value. This is because the principle of savings I argue would be selected requires continual economic growth over generations to increase upwards indefinitely – a conclusion Rawls is explicitly trying to avoid in his theory of justice. (shrink)

Many philosophers claim that the neurocomputational framework of predictive processing entails a globally inferentialist and representationalist view of cognition. Here, I contend that this is not correct. I argue that, given the theoretical commitments these philosophers endorse, no structure within predictive processing systems can be rightfully identified as a representational vehicle. To do so, I first examine some of the theoretical commitments these philosophers share, and show that these commitments provide a set of necessary conditions the satisfaction of which allows (...) us to identify representational vehicles. Having done so, I introduce a predictive processing system capable of active inference, in the form of a simple robotic “brain”. I examine it thoroughly, and show that, given the necessary conditions highlighted above, none of its components qualifies as a representational vehicle. I then consider and allay some worries my claim could raise. I consider whether the anti-representationalist verdict thus obtained could be generalized, and provide some reasons favoring a positive answer. I further consider whether my arguments here could be blocked by allowing the same representational vehicle to possess multiple contents, and whether my arguments entail some extreme form of revisionism, answering in the negative in both cases. A quick conclusion follows. (shrink)

[This is a pre-print; please cite the published version] This paper employs structural topic modeling (STM) to describe the academic philosophy landscape in Brazil. Based on a public national database, a corpus consisting of 12,515 abstracts of monographs defended in philosophy graduate programs between 1991 and 2021 was compiled. The final STM model identified 74 meaningful research topics, clustered into 7 thematic categories. This study discusses the prevalence of the most significant topics and categories, their trends across three decades, and (...) their (positive or negative) association with the supervisor's gender. Results show the first empirical evidence that Brazilian philosophical research exhibits a greater focus on philosophers than on specific themes or problems. Moreover, by visualizing the variations in topic prevalence over time, it was possible to track the rise or decline of the major interest categories and topics. Finally, results also show which topics are more influenced or less influenced by gender. (shrink)

Jesse Prinz (2006, 2007) claimed that emotions are necessary and sufficient for moral judgments. First of all, I clarify what this claim amounts to. The view that he labels emotionism will then be critically assessed. Prinz marshals empirical findings to defend a series of increasingly strong theses about how emotions are essential for moral judgments. I argue that the empirical support upon which his arguments are based is not only insufficient, but it even suggests otherwise, if properly interpreted. My criticism (...) is then extended to his sentimentalist theory, that accounts for how emotions are integrated into moral judgments. The central problem is that Prinz’s view fails to capture the rational aspect of moral evaluation. I make this failure explicit and defend that some version or other of neosentimentalism is a more promising route. (shrink)

Abstract. This paper argues that the “Argument from Moral Peer Disagreement” fails to make a case for widespread moral skepticism. The main reason for this is that the argument rests on a too strong assumption about the normative significance of peer disagreement (and higher-order evidence more generally). In order to demonstrate this, I distinguish two competing ways in which one might explain higher-order defeat. According to what I call the “Objective Defeat Explanation” it is the mere possession of higher-order evidence (...) that explains defeat. I argue that this type of explanation is problematic and that it at best collapses into another explanation I call the “Subjective Defeat Explanation”. According to this explanation, it is coming to believe that one’s belief fails to be rational that explains defeat. Then I go on to argue that the Subjective Defeat Explanation is able to provide a straightforward explanation of higher-order defeat but that it entails that peer disagreement (and higher-order evidence more generally) only contingently gives rise to defeat, and importantly, that the condition it is contingent upon is very often not satisfied when it comes to moral peer disagreement specifically. As a result, it appears that moral knowledge is seldom threatened by moral peer disagreement. (shrink)

O ficcionalismo, geralmente classificado como um tipo de nominalismo, apresenta como perspectiva precípua a tese de que os entes matemáticos são ficções. Para o ficcionalista, o discurso matemático é desprovido de conteúdo. Hartry Field, que é o principal defensor dessa concepção ontológica da matemática, contesta, em Science Without Numbers, a utilização de entes matemáticos na redação de teorias da física, alegando que a defesa mais plausível do realismo ontológico matemático é o argumento da indispensabilidade de Quine-Putnam. O ficcionalismo defendido por (...) Field nos permite, de acordo com Shapiro, classificá-lo no grupo filosofia-primeiro, ou seja, entre os filósofos que defendem que a filosofia deve ser responsável por legislar a respeito da prática matemática. Dessa forma, podemos considerar Field um revisionista epistemológico. Como se sabe, a dependência da ciência moderna em relação ao discurso matemático coloca a tese ficcionalista em xeque. Ainda assim, se partirmos dos pressupostos filosóficos da vertente formalista da filosofia da matemática, que concebe a matemática como constituída de um conjunto de regras sem significado que podem ser manipuladas de maneira puramente sintática, poderemos traçar importantes analogias entre matemática e ficção, tal como também entre metamatemática e metaficção. Para um formalista simpático à tese ficcionalista, o estatuto ontológico da matemática é semelhante ao das regras de um jogo de xadrez. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, I will offer some examples of the effectiveness of Adorno’s concept of mimesis for an analysis of extreme violence and for a defence of democratic institutions against possible regressions into authoritarian regimes. I will start by reading the concept of mimesis through the lens of the interlacement between the concepts of play and power. My aim is twofold: first, I wish to further the analysis of Adorno’s concept of mimesis by showing that it can be interpreted (...) as a form of play, which either empowers subjectivity or becomes a means of domination; second, I will use these speculations to highlight the relevance of Horkheimer and Adorno’s explanation of anti-Semitic violence when seen through the lens of the concept mimesis. Before concluding, I will briefly highlight Adorno’s ideas about what makes democracy vulnerable to potential regressions into extreme violence, and examine what can be done practically – from an Adornian perspective – to avoid regression: defending democratic institutions, and working towards a removal of those barriers that obstruct genuine mimetic experience and self-reflection. (shrink)

Cognitive Robotics can be defined as the study of cognitive phenomena by their modeling in physical artifacts such as robots. This is a very lively and fascinating field which has already given fundamental contributions to our understanding of natural cognition. Nonetheless, robotics has to date addressed mainly very basic, low­level cognitive phenomena like sensory­motor coordination, perception, and navigation, and it is not clear how the current approach might scale up to explain high­level human cognition. In this paper we argue that (...) a promising way to do that is to merge current ideas and methods of 'embodied cognition' with the Russian tradition of theoretical psychology which views language not only as a communication system but also as a cognitive tool, that is by developing a Vygotskyan Cognitive Robotics. We substantiate this idea by discussing several domains in which language can improve basic cognitive abilities and permit the development of high­level cognition: learning, categorization, abstraction, memory, voluntary control, and mental life. (shrink)

Esse texto procura explicitar a tese da compreensão atual que Simmel pressupõe como lócus de apreensão e interpretação dos processos humanos dotados de sentido. Para explicitá-la, confronta as posições de Dilthey e Simmel sobre o papel da vivência na fundamentação do conhecimento histórico. Ao contrário de Dilthey, no entanto, Simmel não pressupõe uma vivência que possa ser apreendida em outrem ou circunscrita a partir de um objeto, porque põe o fundamento da compreensão na atualidade daquele que compreende. Assim, opera com (...) possibilidades objetivas da construção de conexões de sentido por meio da projeção de processos psíquicos. Conquanto dificilmente seja lembrado no debate sobre a compreensão ou sobre a filosofia da história, Simmel possui uma posição própria e consistente acerca da fundamentação do conhecimento histórico, que pode ou abrir novos ângulos de pesquisa ou ser fecunda para se reexaminar perspectivas já consolidadas. (shrink)

Michael Tye proposed a way of understanding the content of hallucinatory experiences. Somewhat independently, Mark Johnston provided us with elements to think about the content of hallucination. In this paper, their views are compared and evaluated. Both their theories present intricate combinations of conjunctivist and disjunctivist strategies to account for perceptual content. An alternative view, which develops a radically disjunctivist account, is considered and rejected. Finally, the paper raises some metaphysical difficulties that seem to threaten any conjunctivist theory and to (...) lead the debate to a dilemma: strong disjunctivists cannot explain the subjective indistinguishability between veridical and hallucinatory experiences, whereas conjunctivists cannot explain what veridical and hallucinatory experiences have in common. This dilemma is left here as an open challenge. (shrink)

What is, after all, the famous method of Descartes? The brief and vague passages devoted to this subject in Descartes’ corpus have always puzzled his readers. In this paper, I investigate not only the two essays in which it is directly addressed (the Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii, and the Discours de la Méthode), but also his scientific works and correspondence. I finally advocate an interpretation that makes the best sense of his overt comments as well as of his actual scientific (...) practice. Contrary to widely accepted views, I argue that there are no substantial discontinuities in his understanding of his own method, or between his theory and practice. I claim, by contrast, that Descartes advocated a minimal method: a method that says little, but that, nonetheless, marks a revolutionary rupture with the existing forms of explanation. (shrink)

In this contribution, I explore the possibility of characterizing the emergence of time in causal set theory (CST) in terms of the growing block universe (GBU) metaphysics. I show that although GBU seems to be the most intuitive time metaphysics for CST, it leaves us with a number of interpretation problems, independently of which dynamics we choose to favor for the theory —here I shall consider the Classical Sequential Growth and the Covariant model. Discrete general covariance of the CSG dynamics (...) does not allow us to individuate a single history of the universe (defined by a causal history of different causal sets), thereby making the claim that ‘the past exists’ at best problematic. In addition, because the evolution of the universe in CSG dynamics leads to an outward branching causal tree, it becomes impossible to determine a proper ‘line of becoming’, thereby blurring the presentists’ claim that only the present exists. Similarly, the covariant approach runs into the same, if not even more severe problems, since each configuration of the universe would amount to a set of possible causal sets, thereby making the individuation of a single configuration of the universe —and thus the physical interpretation of the theory— implausible. (shrink)

The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view. Part of the dispute, I claim here, is based on a lack of grasp of the notion of content. There is, however, a core of substantial disagreement. Once the substantial core is revealed, I aim to: (1) reject the arguments raised against the content view by Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2006); (2) criticize Brewer’s (2006, (...) 2007, 2008, 2011) attempts to defend the object view; (3) refine Pautz’ (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) arguments against the object view, which mainly resort to the fact that it cannot account for the grounding role of hallucinatory experiences; (4) and finally adjudicate in favor of the content view and against the overestimation of the naïve intuition. (shrink)

Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination embraces a cluster of different theories and approaches regarding the multi-faced phenomenon of imaginative experience. In this paper I consider one aspect that seems to be crucial to the understanding of a particular form of imagination that Husserl names pure phantasy. I argue that the phenomenon of Ego-splitting discloses the best way to elucidate the peculiarity of pure phantasy with respect to other forms of representative acts and to any simple form of act modification. First, I (...) unravel the phenomenological distinctions which, respectively, oppose phantasy to perception, on the one hand, and phantasy to other forms of the so-called “intuitive re-presentations”. Second, I introduce the difference between presentative and representative acts, arguing that this cannot help us to single out the defining feature of phantasy experiences. The third section draws again an important distinction between pure phantasy and neutrality modification, which allows me to finally determine an internal trait of phantasy experiences, which Husserl refers to as the “Ego-splitting”. In this way, I hope to contribute to a refined characterization of Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination. (shrink)

This study evaluates the relationship between mental health and academic motivation among third-year college TES grantees. Thus, correlational design was employed to determine if there is a significant relationship between mental health and academic motivation among 150 third-year TES grantees. Statistical findings reveal that the r coefficient of 0.52 indicates a moderate positive correlation between the variables. The p-value of 0.00, which is less than 0.05, leads to rejecting the null hypothesis. Hence, a significant relationship exists between mental health and (...) academic motivation of third-year college TES grantees. Implications were discussed in the study. (shrink)