The purpose of this article is to discuss Safavid period Islamic philosopher Sadraddin Shirazi’s philosophical methodology and the sources of the school founded by him. The article relies on research conducted on Shirazi philosophy. It shows that Shirazi through synthesizing the methods of the earlier schools that existed in Islam to acquire knowledge devised a new mechanism for acquiring knowledge. Before coming to Shirazi, intellectual movements formed during Islam’s classical period, such as peripateticism, illuminationism, theology and Gnosticism, (...) were of different views regarding the best way to reach the truth. For example, for peripatetics reason, for theologians revelation, for gnostics/mystics intuition or personal experience were important, but ishraqi school was somewhere between peripatetic and Gnostic schools. Sadraddin Shirazi, though, considered all these agents necessary, for they complement each other, and said they should be utilized altogether to obtain ultimate reality. Similarly, considering his philosophical sources, we see that he is influenced almost by all philosophical schools as well as religious sources. However, Ibn Sina and Ibn Arabi’s influence on him was more profound compared to other philosophers. (shrink)

One of the challenges faced by philosophers throughout history of philosophical thoughts, has always been and is to find an adequate answer to the question of quiddity and existence of time and space. Thus, the present study aims to elaborate on the question of space and time in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy and its relationship with outcomes of modern physics. The study also intends to conduct an analytical comparison between these two views and clarify newer aspects of this (...) complicated and vague question. According to principles of his thought system in his ontology and particularly his theory of substantial motion, Mulla Sadra’s view toward time has a closer concordance with findings of modern physicists like Albert Einstein. One of the most noticeable achievements of the present paper, considering ontological view of Mulla Sadra toward time, is to reach a comprehensive and vast view of the question of space and time covering space-time approach of theory of relativity and having the common issue of time in mind, develops an image of unity and connectivity of the world of nature with the four dimensions. The present study uses a documentary analysis research and uses library resources. The prominent works of Mulla Sadra and Einstein’ works on the Theory of Relativity were the main sources for this study. It is hoped that this view not only reveals further philosophical aspects of the issue of time but also help uncover newer approaches for physicists. (shrink)

Sadr al-Din Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. Yahya Qawami Shirazi (ca. 1571–1636), known as Mulla Sadra, is one of the three important philosophers (with Avicenna, and Suhrawardi) in Islamic philosophy, after the period of the first prominent Islamic philosophers i.e., Averroes and al-Farabi.

The nature of the soul and its relationship with the body have always been a matter of concern for philosophers throughout the history of philosophy. Today, this and other related issues are discussed within the philosophy of mind under the name of mind-body problem. The issue of the mind-body problem, or the soul and its relation to the body, has received special attention in Islamic philosophy. One of the Muslim philosophers who extensively wrote on this issue was (...) Sadraddin Shirazi, widely known as Mulla Sadra. This paper examines Sadraddin Shirazi’s approach to the mind-body problem. It is known that historically, most philosophers regarded human beings as a composition of a material body and an immaterial soul. Although this dualistic approach to human beings has a long history, it became more popular due to French philosopher René Descartes’ endeavors. Generally, Muslim philosophers were also dualists, like Descartes. However, Sadraddin Shirazi, who was Descartes’ contemporary, rejects earlier philosophers’ theories on human nature. He claims that a human being, when it comes into existence, is material, while this material being gradually evolves into an immaterial being. The soul’s journey from material being to immaterial one becomes possible thanks to substantial motion. Shirazi’s famous theory on this issue is known as the soul’s corporeal origination and spiritual subsistence. Though this paper acknowledges Shirazi’s theory’s originality and coherence, it remains skeptical about the issue that whether his theory corresponds to dualism or monism. Now, after discussing Sadraddin Shirazi’s view on the issue, I can make the case that his corporeal origin soul theory is quite a revolutionary idea. In terms of the mind-body problem, even at the beginning, it solves the issue. Shirazi considers the soul bodily at its early stage. If the soul is not spiritual, then there is a material body and a material soul, and they can interact and unify. Therefore, there is no mind-body problem. However, then spirituality emerges, as do the mind-body problem. (shrink)

Personal identity is one of the important and complex issues in the field of the philosophy of the soul. It is also related to the philosophy of ethics and metaphysics in different respects and has given rise to some problems in these two areas. The justification of ethical responsibility and man's eternity in the posthumous state have attracted psychologist-philosophers' attention to the significance and necessity of explaining personal identity. This paper examines the issue from the view point of (...) Mulla Sadra. Here, the writer initially refers to some of the most important contemporary theories about personal identity which can generally be divided into two reductionist and non-reductionist branches. Reductionists intend to reduce the human identity to elements such as memory, biological specifications, or continuous psychological states, while non-reductionists are against this. Mulla Sadra's theory in this regard is not in conformity with any of the above theories; however, it is more consistent with the non-reductionist approach from certain aspects. Though relying on the fundamental ontological and psychological principles of his own philosophy, Mulla Sadra tries to present a picture of human identity that, while depending on human nature, reveals personal identity, too. This is an identity in whose process of formation the three elements of habits, intentions, and acts play major roles. The extent of the consistency of these three elements with rationality is the reason behind having people with different identities. It should also be added that no human being enjoys a single and fixed identity; rather, identity is a continuous reality that, while being one, is a plural truth. (shrink)

I seek to explicate the ways in which the soul is deemed immaterial in two main strands of Islamic philosophy, and then consider some arguments for the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I first overview Avicenna’s theory of the spiritual incipience (al-ḥudūth al-rūḥānī) of the soul and his version of substance dualism. I will then discuss Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of the physical incipience (al-ḥudūth al-jismānī) of the soul and how the soul emerges and develops towards immateriality on (...) his account. I then overview and discuss five of the most important arguments presented by these two great Muslim philosophers in favor of the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I will also point out some of the main contemporary physicalistic views of the nature of mind and mental states. I will then argue that arguments for the immateriality of the soul – dealt with here – do not indeed target or challenge any significant versions of contemporary physicalism. Moreover, these arguments involve conflations of epistemological or ontological issues. (shrink)

Abstract -/- This paper explores the philosophical concept of death from the perspectives of Mulla Sadra, a prominent philosopher of Islamic thought, and Søren Kierkegaard, a foundational figure in existential philosophy. Both thinkers offer distinct, yet profound insights into the meaning of death, which are deeply connected to their broader metaphysical, theological, and existential frameworks. Mulla Sadra’s view of death as a transformative transition towards divine perfection contrasts sharply with Kierkegaard’s existential perspective, wherein death represents a (...) confrontation with human finitude and the possibility of spiritual rebirth through faith. This comparative study delves into the relationship between death and nihilism in the modern world, offering critical reflections on how these two thinkers address modern existential concerns such as meaninglessness and despair. By examining the historical, philosophical, and theological implications of their views, this paper argues that both Sadra and Kierkegaard offer valuable contributions to contemporary efforts to transcend nihilism and find existential meaning in the face of death. (shrink)

The seventeenth century Muslim philosopher Muhammad Sadr al-Din Shirazi, known as Mulla Sadra, introduced the idea of substantial motion in Islamic philosophy. This view is characterized by a continuity criterion for diachronic identity, a four-dimensional view of individual substances, the notion that possibilities change, and the continual creation of all creatures. Modern philosophical logic provides means to model a variety of claims about individuals, substances, modality and time. In this paper, the semantics of formal systems discussed by (...) Carnap, Bressan and Gupta are reviewed with regard to the issue of substance and identity. Next a model introduced by Storrs McCall is described that is able to build upon and yet resolve some of the issues about substance and identity as characterized by Bressan and others. McCall’s model is also shown to be able to provide an illustration of Mulla Sadra’s doctrine of substantial motion. (shrink)

Transcendental philosophy was not born like Athena out of Zeus’s head, mature and in full armour from the very beginning. That is why in both prefaces to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781 and 1787) Kant introduces the concept of transcendental philosophy as an “idea.” The idea understood architectonically develops slowly and only gradually acquires a definite form. As witnessed by the works of Kant himself and of his predecessors and followers, the idea of transcendental (...) philosophy has undergone a series of changes and adjustments compared to the initial plan. In this context, my goal is not simply exegesis and historical investigation of transcendental philosophy, but also to look at it from a systematic and methodological perspective. I examine the concept of transcendental philosophy from the viewpoint of programmatic metaphilosophy. The first part discusses programmatics as a distinct subsection of metaphilosophy. I argue that Kant’s architectonic methodology and the methodology of Lakatos can be used to understand the inception, development and degradation of philosophical systems. In the second part I look at the project of transcendental philosophy and the stages of its development from the standpoint of architectonics. The third part shows that Lakatos’s methodology can provide a detailed insight into the elements of transcendental philosophy, a clear idea of its logic and identify the component parts that can be improved and developed. In spite of the different levels of detailing and epistemological prerequisites, the methodologies of Kant and Lakatos can be combined to achieve a metaphilosophically informed and progressive understanding of philosophical projects. (shrink)

Mulla Sadra's view of the perception of the other is the product of a profound study and serious criticism of the ideas of Peripatetics and Illuminationists, particularly those of Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi. In fact, an accurate perception of his view requires great attention to these criticisms. The importance of Mulla Sadra's criticisms lies in the fact that they are not limited only to the outward and external layers of a philosophy but continue until penetrating its inward (...) and internal layers and main principles and, in case they are defective, lead to developing new fundamental principles.According to Suhrawardi, the perception of the other is a relation. Mulla Sadra rejects this idea because of its being based on some principles which are completely unacceptable to him. Some of them include the principiality of quiddity, its gradation, and the negation of the union of the knower and the known. Mulla Sadra demonstrates the opposite of these principles and, unlike Suhrawardi, based his interpretation of the perception of the other on believing in the principiality of existence, its gradation, and the union of the knower and the known. Accordingly, he views the perception of thing not as a relation but as the presence of its form before the perceiver. Here, the form has no identity in separation from the perceiver so that we could say there is a non-relational perception between the perceiver and the perceived.The writer believes that Mulla Sadra's arguments on rejecting the argument of relation lack sufficient firmness, and a final judgment of the truth of either of these theories on perception depends on the truth of their basic principles. The acceptance of Mulla Sadra's theory depends on the strength of his arguments on denying the plurality of existents. This is because without this denial one cannot reject the ideas of relation and demonstrate the idea of the union of the knower and the known. (shrink)

This paper compares epistemic virtue from the viewpoints of Zagzebski and Mulla Sadra, aiming to determine the extent to which their viewpoints on epistemic virtue are similar. Zagzebski, the contemporary philosopher, considers epistemic virtue as the basis on which knowledge is interpreted. She sees epistemic virtue as a requirement for achieving knowledge. Mulla Sadra, the founder of Transcendent Philosophy, considers knowledge as an outcome of intellectual virtues without which there would be no knowledge. The role these two (...) philosophers ascribe to moral and intellectual virtues and vices in forming the identity makes it possible to compare their interpretation of epistemic virtues. As a virtue responsibilist, Zagzebski sees epistemic virtue as a character trait and explains its nature by its different components. Sadra as well, sees epistemic virtue as a character trait. Evidence shows that Sadra’s definition of intellectual virtues is similar to that given by Zagzebski in many respects. Examining Zagzebski’s viewpoint on epistemic virtue, this paper will discuss Sadra’s viewpoint on epistemic virtue as well as its contribution to knowledge. In conclusion the similarities of the two viewpoints will be delineated. (shrink)

The article presents edmund Husserl’s idea of transcendental phenomenology in the perspec‐ tive of the project of science. this aspect of Husserl’s writings was pointed out by, for example, rudolf Bernet, man ed Brelage, Iso Kern, eduard marbach, eugen Fink, Ludwig Landgrebe, and roman Ingarden. the main aim, realised in the article is to prove the main hypothesis claiming that transcendental phenomenology is closely connected with Husserl’s conception of philosophy, the idea of philosophy as a science (...) (eidetic and transcendental). the project of transcendental science and knowledge is also connected with Husserl’s conception of transcen‐ dental reduction taken as a mode of revealing those constitutive achievements of consciousness which were covered in the natural attitude. In the paper, I focus on presenting the most im‐ portant points (epistemological, methodological, and transcendental) connected with Husserl’s evolution of phenomenology in the perspective of the project of science. (shrink)

The purpose of the present project is to study the Upaniṣads and Mullā Sadrā as expounders of mystical philosophy dealing with the question of the nature of Ultimate Reality and its concomitant issues. To be more specific, this study is an examination focused on the metaphysical theories propounded by them. The mystical and philosophical systems constructed by Upaniṣads and Mullā Sadrā are often viewed as being representative of absolutism found within their respective traditions. The striking differences generally perceived (...) between aspects of Hinduism and Islām have, however, somewhat prevented scholars to develop interest in the comparison of philosophies rooted in these two philosophical traditions. This study will be exploring the systems of these influential traditions to ascertain if this approach is true. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Mullā Ṣadrā’s (c 1571-1640) commentary on Uṣūl al- Kāfī is one of the more famous commentaries on this significant Shi‘i hadith collection. For his philosophical and Sui background, Ṣadrā’s approach to the hadith is slightly different and in some ways contrary to the earlier commentators such as`Allāma Majlisī in Shi'a and Ibn Taymīyya in Sunni Islam. This paper aims to shed light on the way, Ṣadrā interprets al-Kāfī and particularly to determine his understanding of the ʿaql (intellect) at (...) the cosmic (as first created being) and human levels as presented in the Kitāb al-ʿAql wa al-Jahl (The Book of Intellect and Ignorance). Ṣadrā, already well-versed in the philosophical discourses on ontology and cosmology find al-Kāfī as a fertile ground to develop and extend his vision of cosmos and existence. This paper, furthermore, investigates and reviews some later and contemporary scholars’ critiques of Ṣadrā’s view on hadith and intellect. (shrink)

This paper aims to discuss the philosophical roles of common sense in Thomas Reid’s thought. I argue that there is not only one way of appealing to common sense in attempt of discovering truth and allowing knowledge. According to my understanding, Reid makes at least three distinct uses of common sense: (1) the foundational use, in which common sense is taken as the foundation upon which knowledge must be built; (2) the methodological use, in which common sense arises as (...) a source of methodo-logical presuppositions of philosophical investigations; (3) the instrumental use, in which common sense, in the light of the emotion of ridicule, is used as an instrument to refute philosophical principles and conclusions. (shrink)

Kant describes logic as “the science that exhaustively presents and strictly proves nothing but the formal rules of all thinking”. (Bviii-ix) But what is the source of our cognition of such rules (“logical cognition” for short)? He makes no concerted effort to address this question. It will nonetheless become clear that the question is a philosophically significant one for him, to which he can see three possible answers: those representations are innate, derived from experience, or originally acquired a priori. Although (...) he gives no explicit argument for the third answer, he seems committed to it—especially given his views on the source of pure concepts of the understanding and on the nature of logic. It takes careful preparatory work to gather all the essential materials for motivating and reconstructing Kant’s “original acquisition” account of logical cognition. I shall proceed in two sections. In section 1, I analyze Kant’s argument that pure concepts of the understanding (or intellectual concepts)—as one kind of pure cognition—must be acquired originally and a priori. My analysis partly concerns his varied attitudes toward Crusius’s and Leibniz’s versions of the nativist account of such concepts. I give special attention to how Kant characterizes the nativist account and his own “original acquisition” account in terms of “preformation” and “epigenesis”. My goal is, firstly, to tease out the sense in which Kant grants that there must be an innate ground (or preformation) for the derivation of pure concepts and, secondly, to introduce—and pave the way for answering—the question about the source of logical cognition. In section 2, in light of Kant’s reference to Locke and Leibniz as the greatest reformers of philosophy (including logic) in their times (Log, AA 9: 32), I examine the Lockean and Leibnizian approaches to logic, respectively. Both approaches are “physiological” by Kant’s standard and are directly opposed to his own strictly critical method. I explain how this methodological move shapes Kant’s view that representations of logical rules must be originally acquired a priori. This acquisition involves a kind of radical epigenesis of pure reason: unlike the acquisition of pure concepts, it presupposes no further innate ground (or preformation). This view will have important consequences for issues such as the ground of the normativity of logical rules and the boundaries of their rightful use. (shrink)

This book presents a new account of Thales based on the idea that Acheloios, a deity equated with water in the ancient Greek world and found in Miletos during Thales’ life, was the most important cultic deity influencing the thinker, profoundly shaping his philosophical worldview. In doing so, it also weighs in on the metaphysical and epistemological dichotomy that seemingly underlies all academia—the antithesis of the methodological postulate of Marxian dialectical materialism vis-à-vis the Platonic idea of fundamentally real (...) class='Hi'>transcendental forms. Unbeknownst to many scholars, there are various Neo-Marxian thinkers that position the origin of coinage as the pivotal technological development giving rise to impersonal “metaphysical cosmology,” suggesting that the value of money was more-or-less projected back onto the cosmos in the form of “ideal substances.” While the arguments are incredibly sophisticated and persuasive, their conclusions (either stated or implied) are rather difficult to swallow: the self is merely an illusion, abstract ideas of an ultimate source of value, like God or the Good, are totally delusional (as is the soul, and presumably any notion of inherent human dignity), and essentially everything is reducible to mankind’s enslavement to commodities and the notion of our own objectified labor, which is the true source of all value according to Marx. Not only is this an alarming belief that many scholars (consciously or unconsciously) have adopted, since essentially any action could be “justified,” it is also demonstrably false, since it rests on a misunderstanding of Thales and misconception of philosophy as such. -/- My work rectifies that misunderstanding. In an important sense, it is an attempt at redefining philosophy as a “love of wisdom,” which I argue was accurate even in the Presocratic setting, and it uses the influence of Acheloios on Thales to do so. Throughout its pages I explore the etymology and historical uses of the word ὔδωρ, examine the archaeological context of 7th to 6th century Miletos, consider various aquatic myths Thales encountered, and highlight a hitherto overlooked tradition stemming from Thales and influencing such thinkers as Pythagoras, Empedokles, and Hippo, which culminates in a completely new reading of Plato’s Phaedrus, a dialogue in which Plato responds to the exact type of thinking employed by the Neo-Marxians. It is there that we find Socrates and Phaedrus surrounded by the iconography of Acheloios and the nymphs, all while they lie reclined like river gods (the sinews of Acheloios) on the banks of the Ilisos. And it is in that dialogue that Plato defines philosophy as a love of wisdom—the beholding of a multiplicity of hermeneutical frameworks—and alludes to the fact that it began with the sacrifice of Acheloios, the initial philosophical maneuver which he attributes to Thales. The book ends with a threefold rejoinder to the Neo-Marxian school, corresponding to the λόγος, μῦθος, and ἔργον of Acheloios. It turns out that, (1) the λόγος of Acheloios contained the ideal preconditions conducive to an abstraction to a more refined philosophical worldview in which divine water operated as the One among the Many; (2) the μῦθος of Acheloios actually encouraged the application of the notion of sacrifice to Acheloios himself (thus revealing his essence as divine water); and, (3), the ἔργον of Acheloios, in which he kneels in assent to sacrifice, is found on a coin that was probably designed by Thales. In the final analysis, I suggest that the tradition of Acheloios is reflective of a greater philosophical truth, and that by following Thales’ lead, we transcend the Marxian hermeneutic of doubt and reorient ourselves toward the οὐσια ὄντως οὖσα. (shrink)

This chapter presents a task-based lesson sequence based on Judith Butler's Gender Trouble. Gender Trouble is a great piece of philosophical literature. However, as philosophical literature is a genre rarely found in EFL teaching, this chapter first demonstrates in detail the merits of this genre for the teaching ofEnglish for Academic Purposes. After a brief analysis of the source text, which deconstructs the entire sex-gender link and presents both sex and gender as free-floating, this chapter presents task-based methodology (...) and how it is utilized in a lesson aimed at building gender awareness and acceptance. In the target task students are asked to take the role of an ethics teacher at an Irish high school, in which the discussion arose whether the school should introduce unisex toilets and changing rooms in order to not discriminate against transsexual students. Tue study of Butler's philosophy will provide students with both the knowledge and language to accomplish this task. Open follow-up discussions often lead to powerful ethical insights in the context of gender, homo- and transsexuality. (shrink)

Sad al-Din Dashtaki, and following him, Mulla Sadra Shirazi maintains that all real compositions are unified. After a short review of Dashtaki’s thesis, we concentrate on Mulla Sadra’s version. Mulla Sadra believes that Dashtaki’s version is not coherent and he declines the existence of real parts. We will argue that Mulla Sadra’s objections do not work and furthermore, all things said and done there is no difference between these two versions of the thesis of unified composition. (...) If there is any difference, it is about their theory of existence, not about their theory of composition. Sad al-Din Dashtaki, and following him, Mulla Sadra Shirazi maintains that all real compositions are unified. After a short review of Dashtaki’s thesis, we concentrate on Mulla Sadra’s version. Mulla Sadra believes that Dashtaki’s version is not coherent and he declines the existence of real parts. We will argue that Mulla Sadra’s objections do not work and furthermore, all things said and done there is no difference between these two versions of the thesis of unified composition. If there is any difference, it is about their theory of existence, not about their theory of composition. (shrink)

In their paper titled “Gender and philosophical intuition,” Buckwalter and Stich argue that the intuitions of women and men differ significantly on various types of philosophical questions. Furthermore, men's intuitions, so the authors claim, are more in line with traditionally accepted solutions of classical problems. This inherent bias, so the argument goes, is one of the factors that leads more men than women to pursue degrees and careers in philosophy. These findings have received a considerable amount of (...) attention and the paper is to appear in the second edition of Experimental Philosophy edited by Knobe and Nichols , which itself is an influential outlet. Given the exposure of these results, we attempted to replicate three of the classes of questions that Buckwalter and Stich review in their paper and for which they report significant differences. We failed to replicate the results using several different sources for data collection (one being identical to the original procedures.. (shrink)

This chapter aims to situate Hegel’s philosophical outlook by illuminating it against the backdrop of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental philosophy, some early skeptical critiques of that philosophy, Fichte’s philosophy of freedom, and finally the Spinozistic thinking of Schelling and of Hegel himself.

This paper first explores in detail a regenerated theory in philosophy of mind, known among contemporary philosophers as ‘emergentism’. By distinguishing strong and weak versions of the theory, I explain two important explanatory challenges presented by physicalists against this theory. In the following, I provide a brief overview of Sadr al-Muta’allihin’s theory of the incipience and degrees of the soul, examining similarities and differences between this theory and strong emergentism. Then, underlining the main aspects of similarity between the two (...) theories, I consider the challenges presented by physicalists against emergentism as reconstructible against Sadra’s theory. Surveying some explanations by Sadraean philosophers of the soul-body relationship, I ultimately argue that Sadra’s theory is inadequate in face of the objections and doubts raised by contemporary physicalists. My assessment is that Sadra’s philosophy is in need of further development to meet those explanatory challenges. (shrink)

Mümkün varlıkları aracı kılmadan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatlama çabalarının bir sonucu olan sıddıkîn burhanı ilk defa Müslüman filozoflar tarafından dillendirildi. İbn Sînâ (ö. 428/1037) da Fârâbî’nin etkisiyle yeni bir burhan açıkladı ve buna sıddıkîn adını verdi. Molla Sadrâ (ö. 1050/1641) varlığın asaleti ilkesini mutasavvıflardan, teşkîk ilkesini de Sühreverdî’den iktibas ederek yeni bir sıddıkîn burhanı dillendirdi. Bu burhanın, varlığın asaleti, basîtliği/yalınlığı, teşkîkî ve ma’lûlün illete ihtiyacı olmak üzere bazı öncülleri vardır. O, bu öncülleri açıkladıktan sonra teselsüle ihtiyaç duymadan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatlar. Onun (...) burhanı diğer sıddıkîn burhanlarına nispetle bazı üstün özelliklere sahiptir. Öncelikle bu burhan varlığın asaleti ilkesi üzerine bina edildiğinden dayanağı varlık kavramı değil, varlığın nesnel hakikatidir. İkincisi bu burhan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un zâtını ispatlamakla birlikte Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un birliğini ve kemâlî sıfatlarını ispatlar. Üçüncüsü bu burhana göre mümkün varlıklar hiçbir aracı olmadan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’a bağımlı olduklarından burhanın açıklanmasında teselsül ve kısır döngüden yararlanma ihtiyacı yoktur. Molla Sadrâ’nın teselsül ve kısır döngüden de yararlanarak Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatladığı burhanlar da vardır. Molla Sadrâ bu burhanıyla hem Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ve hem de onun kemâlî sıfatlarını ispatladığını iddia eder. Bu çalışmada bu iddia incelecek ve ispat-ı vacip meselesinde Molla Sadrâ’nın ne gibi yenilikler getirdiği ele alınacaktır. ABSTRACT A result of the attempts to prove the existence of The Necessary Existence without the mediation of possible beings, proof of the truthful was first expressed by Muslim philosophers called it sıddıkin. Mullā Ṣadrā’s “proof” that he explains has certain premises such as the fundamental of existence, indivisibility of the existence, existential gradation, effect’s need for cause. After explanining these premises, Mullā Ṣadrā then proves the Necessary Existence without needing succession. Mullā Ṣadrā’s proof of the truthful has certain superior features tan the proofs of truthful expressed before him. First of all, as this proof is built upon the principle of the fundamental of existence, its foundation is the external truth of existence, not the concept of existence itself. Secondly, this proof proves the unity and perfection attributes of The Necessary Existence as well as proving the existence of the Necessary Existence. Thirdly, according to this proof, as all possible existences are dependent on The Necessary Existence without any mediation, there is no need to benefit from succession and vicious circle in explaining the proof. However, Mullā Ṣadrā proves the Necessary Existence by benefitting from succession and vicious circle in other proofs. Mullā Ṣadrā asserts that this proof demonstrates the presence of The Necessary Existence and its perfection attributions. This study examines this assertion and addresses what kind of innovations was brought by Mullā Ṣadrā in terms of proving The Necessary Existence. (shrink)

The main purpose of the article is to analyze the statements of philosophical Ukrainian Studies about the anthropological specifics of Ukrainian philosophical thought by means of historicalphilosophical cultural-predicative analysis. The research methodology was determined primarily by the concept of cultural attribution and translation in the dialogue of languages of historical cultures of the Poznań Methodological School (J. Topolski, W. Wrzosek, E. Domańska) and the culturological approach in historical-philosophical Ukrainian Studies (V. Horskyi, S. Rudenko). The statements of the (...) language of historical and philosophical Ukrainian studies are analyzed by means of historicalphilosophical cultural-predicative analysis. The latter is a specific humanities research strategy, which we propose as a means of studying the communicative specifics and syntactic correctness of the language of historical-philosophical theory. The study of communicative specifics takes place from the perspective of modernized versions of metaphysical, phenomenological, and dialectical logic. The first is understood as the logic of transcendental metaphysics, the second as the logic of immanent metaphysics, and the third as the logic of procedural metaphysics. Such an approach provides a qualitative and comprehensive understanding of the analyzed statements. The statements of the language of the historical-philosophical theory are generalized in its names, depending on the perspective of one of the three versions of the logic of philosophical reasoning. The offered historical-philosophical cultural-predicative analysis of communicative specifics and the syntactic correctness of the Ukrainian historical-philosophical theory statements opens new dimensions in research of the anthropological specifics of Ukrainian philosophy. (shrink)

Tschumi believes that the quality of architecture depends on the theoretical factor it contains. Such a view led to the creation of architecture that would achieve visibility and comprehensibility only after its interpretation. On his way to creating such an architecture he took on a purely philosophical reflection on the basic building block of architecture, which is space. In 1975, he wrote an essay entitled Questions of Space, in which he included several dozen questions about the nature of space. (...) The questions he formulated could be regarded as analogous to the situation in the philosophy of the time, in which the interest in questioning the most obvious forms of understanding the world and intellectual categories increased. The research on space is an area common to many fields of natural sciences, humanities and artistic creation, but it also deals with other problems, such as issues of experience. The concept of space-time continuum proposed by Hermann Minkowski drew attention to the identity of time and space with the events taking place. Probably regardless of the postulates of physicists commenting on Einstein’s discoveries, also in philosophy it increased the importance of the concept of the event which became dominant in Heidegger’s latest work Contributions of Philosophy. Of the event. Furthermore, Tschumi’s reflections on space entered into relation with the problem of experience, which aroused the interest of a group of French philosophers trying to assimilate Georges Bataille’s concept of “inner experience”. Both Tschumi and Derrida referred to Bataille because his views could be used not only to modify the concept of the subject, but also to change the understanding of what constitutes the area of architecture. The discussion on experience has led to the recognition that the subject is not sovereign, but actually a form of what is on their outside. Such insights make it possible to treat the area of the Parc de La Villette as existing mainly when it is organised by its users. The decisive features of the Park are its assumptions, according to which it is a variety of active void that leads to agreeing new social relations with it. The park does not force to participate in already existing moral or political communities, but tries to move into an unknown future in which the scope of free functioning of individuals will be increased. Doubts about the principles of functioning of the individual self and its discovery as a whole composed of non-coherent parts, as well as its dependence on its own depth full of disordered forces, influenced the understanding of architecture as a set of contradictions whose source is a fundamental void anticipating the empty phenomenal space. The use of this phenomenal void in architecture, as well as the rejection of the whole and unity, had a specific political purpose and drew its inspiration from political analyses. In the Parc de La Villette, metaphysics and politics were brought closer together because the philosophy of void was used to create new conditions for community action. It can be argued that the source of this philosophy was the perception of errors in existing societies dependent on the shortcomings of traditional metaphysics. Spacing (espacement) was one of the key terms in Derrida’s philosophy, which was also combined with the concepts of différance and chôra. The study of the nature of space, especially its transition from the level of pure possibility to the level of sensual phenomenon, also contributes to understanding how well designed space can have an impact on its audience. This explanation is based on Tschumi’s assumption that the space of the Parc de La Villette contradicts the integrating approaches and instead exposes contradictions, but it does so in a way that combines incompatible properties into a single piece of architecture. The specificity of such integration is similar to the invention of a musical phrase, which is an ideological message: moral and political. Such a thesis may raise doubts, however, if both the clearly adopted assumptions and those deduced from the work allow for their ↪Quart Nr 2(52)/2019 logically ordered presentation then to a limited extent it may be assumed that the work has achieved a connection between a specific philosophy of space and its practical application. Derrida combined the problem of spatiality with the problem of transcendental imagination in Kant’s philosophy, who in the first version of Critique of Pure Reason assumed that pure imagination precedes the appearance of time and space, even in their transcendental forms. The imagination in such a situation can be described as a factor activating time and space, which indicates what function is played by movement in this activity. This leads us to recognize that the ultra originary source of pure forms of sensual intuition is movement, which in early Greek philosophy was identified with void and its lack of resistance to phenomena occurring in it. Derrida’s philosophy in search of a certain super-transcendental source of time and space pointed to différance which, like void or the chôra, does not have material features or even any other form of being. Différance is the primary cause of the disruption of motionlessness and the introduction of activity into motionless time and space, thus its activity can be described as spacing (espacement). Derrida’s discoveries in this respect are not entirely original, because Hegel already pointed out when examining the present that it is primarily a differential relation (differente Beziehung), which, being seemingly neutral, influences the present with supernatural force and makes it unidentifiable with itself. Differente Beziehung must similarly influence the originary space, negating its initial character by multiplying its divisions and expanding its boundaries. Différance acts by revealing contradictions wherever there is apparent undifferentiation. Tschumi, composing the Parc de La Villette as a variety of void and a set of incompatible layers, followed the rules of différance or the chôra: he made void visible together with its saturation with contradictions. If space can be considered to be the result of the activity of difference, such activity has a certain regularity, which influences the behaviour of its observers. Differences or contradictions fall into a certain rhythm, which can be considered a manifestation of transcendent order. The problem is that what can be considered the source of such order, namely the logos or God, is partly disorder and error. According to descriptions contained in Timaeus, the world is a combination of forces that drive to order with forces of erroneous necessity that resounds in every order and forces it to return to disorder. Derrida denied the possibility of understanding différance as a theological value, even if it were a negative or apophatic theology, but no categorical denial could be perfect. The assumption that différance or the chôra are not endowed with any substance properties cannot deny their activity, and thus a certain force. Already since Democritus, philosophy has multiplied the names of such a force and the contradictory variety of its manifestations, never forgetting also the necessity for reason to withdraw from the possibility of giving its correct characteristics. Such a withdrawal may be interpreted as an expression of respect and, in certain situations, as a cult of the force that precedes reasonableness. The Parc de La Villette, which is an artistic divagation about the contradictions and forces behind them, can be considered as a place of their sublimation, and therefore as a variation of the temple of what differs from order and disorder. (shrink)

The philosophy of nature operates as one complete and systematic aspect of Schelling’s philosophy in the years 1797-1801 and as complement to Schelling’s transcendental philosophy at this time. The philosophy of nature comes with its own, naturalistic epistemology, according to which human natural productivity provides the basis for human access to nature’s own productive laws. On the basis of one’s natural productivity, one can consciously formulate principles which match nature’s own lawful principles. One refines these (...) principles through a process of experimentation, which relies on the human being’s naturalness in productivity. By making natural activity central to knowledge, Schelling takes seriously the naturalness of humans, without denying the dramatic shift that occurs when consciousness and rationality factor into experience. This epistemology can thus be fruitfully put in conversation with current philosophical discussions of mind and nature, in that it offers a naturalized account of mind which does not suffer from the typical weaknesses of a contemporary Kantian or Hegelian account. The paper thus concludes with a discussion of John McDowell’s Mind and World, and shows how Schelling’s philosophy can resolve some tensions in that work. (shrink)

Divine intention is an important problem for both philosophy and Kalam. This problem has two aspects as the subject and action of the intention. The intention of the subject occurs for the motion or the action itself. The intention of the action is to reach the motion or the action itself. According to this, when a person travels to Mecca to visit Kaaba, the visit is the intention of the subject and the journey is the intention of the action. (...) In this context, does Allah have an intention? And what are the intentions of the actions aris-ing from him? In the Islamic philosophy, the first question is handled as "intention of the sub-ject/divine intention” and the second question as "the intention of the actions/divine inten-tion of the actions". In order to answer the first question, we must examine all types of inten-tions. Each subject takes action to benefit them, to benefit others and to act for the sake of the goodness and kindness. Allah would be dependent being if he acted to benefit him and to make up for a flaw for the first of these intentions. In the second intention type, if Allah acted for someone else, this sit-uation would be on the degree of cause for the subject and he would be passive. For the third intention type which is to act to reach for perfection, it would deem Allah as a dependent being. The above-mentioned intentions are flawed. On the contrary, Allah is perfect and does not need any of these intentions to create. Thus, he is not subject to any of these possible inten-tions. These intentions are only used by imperfect subjects. Of course, it does not mean that Allah does not have intentions. According to Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, intention of Allah is the love towards his essence which is free from any flaw. According to this, all beings are entailed to the divine essence and they exist due to the love of essence of Allah. Allah has a direct intention as well as an indirect one. As mentioned before, Allah is in love with his essence. Allah loves the works and actions of his essence as well, according to the principal that one, who loves the essence, loves the works and actions of that essence as well. In this context, the love of essence of the Allah is a direct intention, while the love of his es-sence's works and actions is an indirect intention. After the divine intention is explained, we must also explain the intention of the divine ac-tions. According to both Mulla Sadra and Avicenna, since possible beings are flawed, their intention is to reach to certain perfections which are compatible with themselves. Mulla Sadra states that Allah bestows motivation to possible beings to advance towards the perfection and he claims that these beings make use of that motivation to be perfect. Therefore, possible beings try to make up their flaws and reach to perfection. Since Allah is the absolute perfect being, the final intention of the possible beings is Allah. In other words, all beings that seek for perfection, take example of him. The other intentions act as a primary tool to reach the final intention. How can flawed beings by essence reach to perfections compatible with them? Avicenna and Mulla Sadra stated different opinions on the search of perfection of the flawed beings in the Islam philosophy. According to Avicenna, beings change with extinction and creation. This change happens by accident and the substance stays constant. In accordance with this approach, this change and development is only possible with accidental motion. It occurs with the replacement between forms. But the theory of the Avicenna has some flaws. Because forms are not the intentions of each other and first hyle is not strong enough to have an intention. Thus, no form is superior to the other. It is also not possible to have substance development because the substance and es-sence of the material are constant. It only goes through changes in appearance with the acci-dental motion. It is clear that the changes in the appearance and the shape are not standards for perfection. On the other hand, Mulla Sadra's development theory, which is based on the fundamentality of existence, existential gradation and substantial motion, suggests that the material world is moving towards the perfection. The motion in the substance of material beings is reason of substantial and accidental developments. All beings try to promote themselves to a higher position by reaching perfection in accordance with their intentions. Thus, the theory of Avicenna focuses on the accidental and formal changes in the search of perfection of the material beings, while Mulla Sadra’s theory explains accidental changes as well as the essential ones. Mulla Sadra does not limit the explanation of which Allah is the intention of possible beings to ontological dimension. According to him, Allah is an intention of possible beings as well. He points out the Hadith Qudsi "I was a hidden treasure, I desired to be recognized so I created the creature" and states that "This (Hadith Qudsi) indicates that he is the subject and the in-tention of the universe in an ontological manner as well as the intention of the universe in an epistemological manner." Thus, according to Mulla Sadra, possible beings have two inten-tions, to reach to and understand Allah. (shrink)

Our paper examines Gloria Anzaldúa’s critical appropriation of Mexican philosophical sources, especially in the writing of Borderlands/La Frontera. We demonstrate how Anzaldúa developed a transnational Philosophy of Mexicanness, effectively contributing to what has been recently characterized as the “multi-generational project to pursue philosophy from and about Mexican circumstances” (Vargas). More specifically, we recover “La Mexicana en la Chicana” by paying careful attention to Anzaldúa’s Mexican sources, both those she explicitly cites and those we have discovered (...) while conducting archival research using the Gloria Evangelina Anzaldúa Papers from the Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas at Austin. The three sections of our paper: 1) define the terms Mexican and philosophy in conversation with Anzaldúa’s work, 2) examine the Mexican philosophical sources that Anzaldúa cites in Borderlands/La Frontera, and 3) present the other major Mexican philosophical influences on Anzaldúa that we have found in her archive. The eight Mexican philosophical sources we discuss here include: José Vasconcelos (1882-1959), Miguel León-Portilla (1926-2019), Juana Armanda Alegría (1938- ), Octavio Paz (1914-1998), Samuel Ramos (1897-1959), Rosario Castellanos (1925-1974), Sor Juana Inés de La Cruz (1648-1695), and Jorge Carrión (1913-2005). (shrink)

Political philosophy is having a methodological moment. Driven by long-standing frustrations at the fragmentation of our field, as well as recent urges to become more engaged with the ‘real’ world, there is now a boom in debates concerning the ‘true’ nature of our vocation. Yet how can this new work avoid simply recycling old rivalries under new labels? The key is to turn all this so-called methodological interest into a genuinely new programme of ‘methodology’, defined here as the careful (...) identification and evaluation of all the different methods of reasoning available to us as political philosophers. This programme would clarify, for the first time, all the many ways in which we might argue with one another, thus making us less likely to talk past each another, and more likely to work fruitfully together. (shrink)

Essay on Transcendental Philosophy presents the first English translation of Salomon Maimon's principal work, originally published in Berlin in 1790. In this book, Maimon seeks to further the revolution in philosophy wrought by Kant's Critique of Pure Reason by establishing a new foundation for transcendental philosophy in the idea of difference. Kant judged Maimon to be his most profound critic, and the Essay went on to have a decisive influence on the course of post-Kantian German (...) Idealism. A more recent admirer was Gilles Deleuze who drew on Maimon's Essay in constructing his own philosophy of difference. This long-overdue translation makes Maimon's brilliant analysis and criticism of Kant's philosophy accessible to an English readership for the first time. The text includes a comprehensive introduction, a glossary, translators' notes, a bibliography of writings on Maimon and an index. It also includes translations of correspondence between Maimon and Kant and a letter Maimon wrote to a Berlin journal clarifying the philosophical position of the essay, all of which bring the book's context alive for the modern reader. (shrink)

This article studies common aspects and differences between Heidegger, contemporary German philosopher, with Persian philosopher, Mulla Sadra 17th century equivalent to 11th Islamic century. The origin point for Mulla Sadra and Heidegger is "existence". However, Mulla Sadra believe in "existence unity" whereas Heidegger tries to understand the concept of "existence" by special being, i.e. human being. Both of them believe in supposing the concept of human without world is wrong, they believe in dichotomy of mind, being is (...) wrong, and there is a unity between objective and sane. Both reached from thing to being, but Heidegger by "Phenomenology", and Mulla Sadra by "metaphysics." Both believe in priority of existence before nature, or virtual validity of nature. Although Heidegger considers existence just for threshold, and Mulla Sadra believes origin of existence is the same and it includes for all beings versus of null. Briefly, for Heidegger same as Hegel, being as being has no value, whereas for Mulla Sadra this type of being is highest grade of existence. Heidegger returns into illumination, while his illumination is different from Mulla Sadra's illumination, his illumination is same as Buddhism "human for human" not from higher world for human. According to Heidegger, existence changes have cultural and historical meaning. Whereas according to Mulla Sadra the concept of existence is common, meaning and it is understood with illumination . (shrink)

After the discoveries of such scholars as J. H. Poincaré, E. N. Lorenz, I. Prigogine, etc. the term ‘chaos’ is used actively by representatives of various scientific fields; however, one important aspect remains uninvestigated: which attitude one should have toward chaotic phenomena. This is a philosophical question and my dissertation aims to find the answer in the history of philosophy, where chaos theme has had its investigators from ancient philosophy to the philosophical theories of the 21st (...) century. My dissertation is based on the idea that sciences and philosophy can achieve significant success in exploring chaos theme when their efforts are combined. This dissertation research is designed to help in the planning of conscious, rational actions towards chaotic phenomena, since it is aimed at exploration and systematic presentation, as well as comprehension of possible systems of such actions – philosophical strategies for interacting with chaos. -/- Results of the dissertation are the following. I reveal, reconstruct, and explain the content of six possible strategies for interacting with chaos that were worked out in history of philosophical thought: ordering, avoiding, transfiguring, preventing, controlling, and integrating. I argue that the first philosophical strategies for interacting with chaos were worked out in the 19th century by German philosophers K. W. F. Schlegel and F. W. Nietzsche on the basis of their rethinking the ideas which were expressed by different thinkers during classical antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the modern period. I show that ideas of strategic views towards chaos were also elaborated by such 20th-century thinkers as H. Rickert, N. Berdyaev, I. Prigogine, H. Haken, G. Deleuze, Q. Meillassoux, and others. I outline the main stages of the evolution of philosophical strategies for interacting with chaos as well as its regularities. The dissertation shows perspectives of further development of each one of the six strategies for interacting with chaos. -/- In contemporary scientific and philosophical research on chaos, my exploration contributes to the new approach to improving the understanding of aims of acts towards chaotic phenomena. I think that knowing a range of different strategic views of chaos help researchers of chaotic phenomena to choose the most appropriate and rational reactions. In the area of history of philosophy, my research contributes detailed data about development and conceptual transformations of the notion of ‘chaos’ through all periods of Western philosophy. -/- The dissertation consists of five chapters: 1) Literature Review, Methodology and Key Research Terms, 2) Ancient and Medieval Philosophical Ideas about Chaos, 3) Genesis of the First Strategies for Interacting with Chaos, 4) Strategies for Interacting with Chaos in the 20th and 21st Centuries, 5) Regularities and Prospects of the Development of Philosophical Strategies for Interacting with Chaos. In the first chapter I analyze more than five hundred books, articles, and other philosophical and scientific sources in which the chaos theme is raised. I also argue the necessity of applying methods such as analysis, the structural method, the hermeneutic method of interpretation, and the comparative method in my dissertation research. Moreover, in this chapter, I define key terms for my dissertation – ‘chaos’ and ‘philosophical strategies for interacting with chaos.’ -/- Then, in the next chapter, I analyze the appearance and development of Ancient and Medieval philosophical ideas about chaotic phenomena and order. Particularly, I explore thoughts of philosophers such as Anaxagoras, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine of Hippo, Bernard Silvestris, Ramon Llull, etc. In this chapter I also compare the first Western ideas about chaos with similar thoughts from Eastern philosophy, analyzing Indian and Chinese philosophical ideas about disorder. -/- In the third chapter I explore transformations in understanding the meaning of the term ‘chaos’ in philosophy from the 15th to the end of the 19th century. I analyze ideas about chaos and order from thinkers such as M. Ficino, Paracelsus, F. Bacon, P. Bayle, Voltaire, J. G. Herder, I. Kant, F. W. J. Schelling and other philosophers from the Renaissance, the Age of Enlightenment, and the German idealist period, showing that these thinkers’ new approaches to interpreting the notion of ‘chaos’ were the background for K. W. F. Schlegel’s and F. W. Nietzsche’s creations of the first strategies for interacting with chaos in the 19th century. I finish the chapter with detailed analysis of K. W. F. Schlegel’s strategy for transfiguring chaos and F. W. Nietzsche’s strategy for ordering chaos. -/- The development of philosophical strategies for interacting with chaos in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century is the topic of the fourth chapter. I research new ideas about ordering chaos (H. Rickert) and transfiguring chaos (N. Berdyaev). Also, I reveal thoughts about avoiding chaos (A. Camus), preventing chaos (J. Ortega y Gasset), integrating chaos (G. Deleuze, Q. Meillassoux). Moreover, I analyze a philosophical component of the strategy for chaos control (I. Prigogine, H. Haken). In the final fifth chapter of the dissertation I trace the major features of philosophical strategies for interacting with chaos and find out the main conditions and periods of their development. Then I outline the prospects for the development of the philosophical strategies for interacting with chaos and show the most productive ways of their progress. (shrink)

The concept of Substantial motion (حركت جوهرى) is fundamentally flawed and severely muddled. Aristotle and Mulla Sadra’s conception of motion, substance (جوهر) and substantial form صورت نوعيه)) were all based on a severe misunderstanding of nature as later was established by the scientists and philosophers that came after them. Here, by recalling the established facts of modern science, particularly the universally accepted scientific fact that, properties of objects are reducible to the motion of their electrons and there’s no such (...) thing as ‘substantial form’ much less substance, the author puts an end to a 400-year-old glorious error called ‘substantial motion’. Naturally any attempt to reconcile the paradigms of modern physics with Aristotle/Sadra paradigms of form/matter and substance/accidents, and to try to draw parallel between the two and revive their philosophy would be an exercise in futility. (shrink)

The study examines the creative process using the logical and methodological analysis of Plato’s concepts. It presents the modern scientific research related directly or indirectly to his philosophical views (the structural analogy method, the theory of archetypes and fractals and many others). A number of modern studies and concepts, such as the theory of fractals, evolutionary epistemology, the concept of autopoiesis, and others, confirm Plato’s views on the structure of the world and creativity. For this reason, the authors define (...) creativity as the activity of a rational and social subject to produce a qualitatively new thing based on universal patterns of the fractal and archetype nature in accordance with the ideal. This activity needs in creativeness which is the state of love as a creative force arising from social interaction as a desire to create and expand space for life, connecting space inside the subject of creativity and outside it, creating a resonance between the creative self and other persons. (shrink)

What are some of the distinctive virtues of the confluence approach that sets it apart from other attempts to do philosophy across cultural boundaries? First, unlike comparing and contrasting, the confluence approach remains faithful to the dominant conception of philosophy as an intellectual enterprise centered on dialogue and argumentation, in which philosophers pursue unresolved problems by building on the achievements of their acknowledged forbears. Second, confluence philosophy implements a syncretic and creative approach to doing philosophy by (...) drawing on non-Western philosophical sources while using the tools and conceptual resources of analytic philosophy. Third and last, the confluence approach highlights possible tensions when the traditions of thought brought into dialogue are on a diverging path on certain matters. Contemporary philosophy, at least in the Anglophone world and its satellites, is an avowedly secular enterprise, deferring to the sciences for its account of what can be said to exist at the most fundamental level and for its understanding of the processes that realize cognition. Buddhism at its core is often understood as a soteriological project manly concerned with overcoming suffering, which sometimes is taken to entail an insight into the emptiness of all the constitutive elements of existence and/or experience. Confluence philosophy thus makes it possible to ask whether defending a theoretical framework which affirms this truth of emptiness means that one must engage in the very sort of activity, namely, rational self-assertion, that hinders enlightenment. (shrink)

Much discussion about experimental philosophy and philosophical methodology has been framed in terms of the reliability of intuitions, and even when it has not been about reliability per se, it has been focused on whether intuitions meet whatever conditions they need to meet to be trustworthy as evidence. But really that question cannot be answered independently from the questions, evidence for what theories arrived at by what sorts of inferences? I will contend here that not just philosophy's (...) sources of evidence, but also its inferential resources, are in great need of closer examination. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s perspectivism is a philosophical methodology for achieving various epistemic goods. Furthermore, perspectives as he conceives them relate primarily to agents’ motivational and evaluative sets. In order to shed light on this methodology, I approach it from two angles. First, I employ the digital humanities methodology pioneered recently in my recent and ongoing research to further elucidate the concept of perspectivism. Second, I explore some of the rhetorical tropes that Nietzsche uses to reorient his audience’s perspective. These include engaging (...) the audience’s emotions, apostrophic address to the reader, and what I’ve elsewhere called ‘Nietzschean summoning’. Each of these methods tugs at the affects and values of the audience, positioning them to notice, find salient, and be disposed to act in relation to certain (aspects of) things while ignoring, finding less salient, and being disposed to neglect (aspects of) other things. This suggests that, for Nietzsche, perspectivism may have less to do with cognition than the painterly metaphor of a visual perspective suggests. Instead, I’ll argue that for Nietzsche, perspectivism relates primarily to agents’ motivational and evaluative set. (shrink)

In the history of European philosophy and science, René Descartes is considered an author of a methodology of radical doubt, meditation, and the conception that explains the cause of human errors. But the course on internalization, knowledge of one's own Self, methodology of searching foundation of knowledge and conception of perfect reason have been formed already in the times of a Late Antiquity, particular by Augustine in his works “Soliloquies” and “Confession”, Boethius’s “The Consolation of Philosophy” and was (...) continued in the New age by Loyola’s “Spiritual exercises” and Teresa of Avila’s “The Interior Castle”. Therefore, Descartes could be rightfully considered rather the brilliant inheritor of this tradition than pioneer. To this chain of philosophers and theologians who were forerunners of Descartes’s theory of Radical doubt and especially problem of the source of human errors worth to add a new name – Hadewijch, the representative of medieval Dutch vernacular theology and her works “Visions” along with “Letters”. Precisely her point of view on cause of human errors, very close to the explanation have been given by Descartes in his IV Meditation. The aim of the research is to demonstrate common positions of Descartes’s and Hadewijch’s explanation of the nature of the errors. (shrink)

This article argues that Novalis's philosophy of magical idealism essentially consists of three central elements: a theory of the creative or productive imagination, a conception of love, and a doctrine of transcendental medicine. In this regard, it synthesizes two adjacent, but divergent contemporary philosophical sources - J. G. Fichte's idealism and Friedrich Schiller's classicism - into a new and original philosophy. It demonstrates that Novalis's views on both magic and idealism, not only prove to be (...) perfectly rational and comprehensible, but even more philosophically coherent and innovative than have been recognised up to now. (shrink)

In 1901 Russell had envisaged the new analytic philosophy as uniquely systematic, borrowing the methods of science and mathematics. A century later, have Russell’s hopes become reality? David Lewis is often celebrated as a great systematic metaphysician, his influence proof that we live in a heyday of systematic philosophy. But, we argue, this common belief is misguided: Lewis was not a systematic philosopher, and he didn’t want to be. Although some aspects of his philosophy are systematic, mainly (...) his pluriverse of possible worlds and its many applications, that systematicity was due to the influence of his teacher Quine, who really was an heir to Russell. Drawing upon Lewis’s posthumous papers and his correspondence as well as the published record, we show that Lewis’s non- Quinean influences, including G.E. Moore and D.M. Armstrong, led Lewis to an anti- systematic methodology which leaves each philosopher’s views and starting points to his or her own personal conscience. (shrink)

This volume offers a collective study of the work of P. F. Strawson (1919-2006) and an exploration of its relevance for current philosophical debates. It is the first book since Strawson's death to cover the full range of his philosophy, with chapters by world-leading experts about his lasting contributions to the philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, and philosophical methodology. It aims to achieve a balance between exegesis of Strawson, critical engagement, and consideration of (...) the reception and continuing value of his work. It explores the intellectual relations between Strawson and some of his predecessors and contemporaries and it will be an indispensable source for scholars and students of twentieth-century philosophy and its influence in the twenty-first. With contributions by Anne Bezuidenhout, Ian Rumfitt, Paul Snowdon, Quassim Cassam, Michelle Montague, Hans-Johann Glock, Anil Gomes, Lilian Alweiss, Giuseppina D'Oro, A.P. Martinich, Paul Russell, Lucy Allais, and Victoria McGeer. (shrink)

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was a system philosopher in the grand tradition of classical German idealism. Broadly an adherent of Kant’s transcendental idealism, he is now most noted for his belief that Kant’s thing in itself can best be described as ‘will’, something he argued in his 1819 work The World as Will and Representation (WWRI 124/H 2:119). Schopenhauer’s term ‘will’ does not refer primarily to human willing, that is, conscious striving towards a goal. Following Kant he argues that willing (...) remains conditioned by the forms of representation and therefore cannot be identified with the thing-in-itself. To reach the thing-in-itself, all forms of representation must be removed to arrive at a conception of will as striving without a goal. This conception is at the root of Schopenhauer’s pessimism: willing is experienced by conscious beings as suffering; and the world, including each of us, is in-itself endless willing without the possibility of satisfaction. Only two things hold out the prospect of any relief: the disinterested contemplation of works of art provides temporary respite from the striving will for the many; and a very few saintly beings may be able to still or quiet the will completely and achieve a state that Schopenhauer identifies as nirvana. These concerns—with suffering, meaning, asceticism and renunciation—are already problems in moral philosophy in a wide sense. But Schopenhauer also has a moral philosophy in the ‘narrower’ sense (WWRII 589/H 3:676; Cartwright 1999) that addresses questions such as freedom of the will, moral responsibility, the proper criterion for right action, moral motivation, and the virtues and vices. Indeed Schopenhauer makes a distinctive and quite contemporary contribution to virtue theory, advocating compassion (Mitleid) as the source of all human virtues. (shrink)

After Al-Tusi and his effective work- which is called Nasirian Ethics- Islamic Philosophical Ethics emerges a fixed perspective that tips the balance (scale) in favor of otherworldly Eudemonia and considers worldly Eudemonia as rental land which can be abandoned. Ibn Khaldun tries to present a communicative theory; but his work has limited under the main discourse of Islamic Ethics which is fixed in the space and effect of the mentioned balance. As a consequence, after Mulla Sadra and in (...) Esfahan school, the Nasirian though is developed. then the main challenge is that the social development is slowed diminished in favor of individual Eudemonia. But it seems that Tabatabai in his theory (Constructional Perceptions) shows or reconstructs an almost unanimous consensus which tries to find a compromise between temporal (worldly) and eschatological (otherworldly) Eudemonia. In this paper and according to its descriptive- analytic prospect- with memorizing a historical transformation- Tabatabai 's theory is supposed as an alternative for reconstituting of Islamic Philosophical Ethics, which is based on the popular goodness and civil development. (shrink)

It is generally acknowledged that Kant’s new “transcendental” philosophy produced a “Copernican revolution” in this discipline. Instead to philosophically explore the world, Kant investigated the possibility of cognizing the world through human reason. Unfortunately, it is not thus clear which exactly method helped Kant to produce it. The claim of the present paper is that Kant’s new approach in philosophy went together with a change of the style followed in this discipline. Instead of doing philosophical “meditations” (...) (like Descartes) or composing philosophical “essays” (like Locke and Hume), Kant introduced, what we call here, a diachronic encyclopedic approach of doing philosophy, which was brought about in the context of the highly influential in his years Encyclopédie of D’Alembert and Diderot. In contrast to the latter, however, Kant’s project prompted a logical unification of all substantial ideas introduced in philosophy so far. (shrink)

The late Middle Ages witnessed a recapitulation of medieval reflection on beauty. Jean Gerson is an important representative of these philosophical and theological contributions, although he has been largely neglected up to this time. A first dimension of his ideas on beauty is the incorporation of beauty (pulchrum) into the number of transcendentals, i.e., the concepts “convertible” with the notion of being (ens), that is, unity, truth, and goodness (unum, verum and bonum). This article revisits Monica Calma’s study on (...) Gerson’s theory of beauty and suggests new hypothetical sources that may have inspired this aspect of his thought. The second aspect emphasised here is Gerson’s classification of beauty, which entails some similarities to the one of Ulrich of Strasbourg, but also differs from it. Moreover, its incorporation of a division entirely devoted to artistic beauty is highly remarkable. (shrink)

How does the critical Kant view ontology? There is no shared scholarly answer to this question. Norbert Hinske sees in the Critique of Pure Reason a “farewell to ontology,” albeit one that took Kant long to bid (Hinske 2009). Karl Ameriks has found evidence in Kant’s metaphysics lectures from the critical period that he “was unwilling to break away fully from traditional ontology” (Ameriks 1992: 272). Gualtiero Lorini argues that a decisive break with the tradition of ontology is essential to (...) Kant’s critical reform of metaphysics, as is reflected in his shift from “ontology” to “transcendental philosophy,” two notions that Lorini takes to be related by mere “analogy” (Lorini 2015). I agree with Lorini that a thorough reform of ontology is a pivotal part of Kant’s critical plan for metaphysics and that ontology somehow “survives within the critical philosophy” (Lorini 2015: 76). To make this case, however, I deem it important to identify “ontology” and “transcendental philosophy” in the sense of extensional equivalence. While we can detect this identification in Kant’s writings, only from his metaphysics lectures can we get a full sense of its historical and philosophical significance. In this chapter I focus on how it represents a definitive turn from as well as notable continuity with traditional treatments of ontology, particularly the Wolffian one. (shrink)

Philosophy is an important relation with education as it gives theoretical ground for its development. Principles and values of life learnt through education and experience gives birth to philosophy. Philosophy lays the foundation of leading one’s life based on principles. Education is the source of learning and philosophy it’s applications in human life. While discussing about the real nature of philosophy in present time, we should have a single criteria as if it to be acceptable (...) to all reasonable people of the world. In defining Positive Philosophy it may be said, The Positive Philosophy is an attempt to achieve an intellectual detachment from all philosophical systems, and not to solve specific philosophical problems, but to become sensitively aware of what it is we do when we philosophize. It is an attitude as well as a methodology for both academician and common person. It make education process positive so that it can make something useful for societal growth and in working process it also make the person sensitive about the societal problems and make them ready to be a part of social change. I am not negating something, here “positive” word is not an antonym but it is an adjective. Where there are merely religious, metaphysical and passive ideologies in our education system, we are not able to have a good and creative education. Positive Philosophy is working on that issues which have some worth for human. It is a process to do something creative. We are using innovative method. An innovator could be rebellion because he breaks the established method, norms and redefines the layer of thought. Innovation not simply implies questioning, reshaping, restricting but also developing through transformation. A teacher can play an important role in promoting this discussion because a teacher has the capacity to influence students with their thoughts and personality and engages them to creative activities. Innovativeness needs to be included in the curriculum. Once one becomes habitual to this attitude he/she will be ready to do some positive or creative. In this paper it is an attempt being made to apply positive philosophy though innovative method in our present education system. -/- . (shrink)

I examine John McDowell's attitude towards naturalism in general, and evolutionary theory in particular, by distinguishing between "transcendental descriptions" and "empirical explanations". With this distinction in view we can understand why McDowell holds that there is both continuity and discontinuity between humans qua rational animals and other animals -- there is continuity with regards to empirical explanations and discontinuity with regards to transcendental descriptions. The result of this examination is a clearer assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of (...) McDowell's contribution to philosophical naturalism. (shrink)