En esta modernización y cambios permanentes, los museos necesitan aplicar calidad en su gestión incorporando criterios de control y evaluación para obtener los mejores resultados. El desarrollo del presente trabajo estará enfocado en el análisis de la gestión de calidad en las instituciones museísticas. Considerando que los modelos de calidad son un referente de la gestión, la investigación estará dirigida a la determinación de si es aplicable el modelo iberoamericano de gestión en los museos. Este modelo de excelencia en gestión (...) fue desarrollado a partir de la iniciativa de la Fundación Iberoamericana para la Gestión de la Calidad (Fundibeq) y reúne la opinión de países de América y Europa. Constituye una guía que posibilita a las organizaciones medir el grado de avance respecto a las variables que integran el modelo y, en ese marco, definir acciones que permitan cubrir la brecha entre el modelo y la realidad organizacional. La investigación se enfoca en analizar su aplicabilidad a los museos como unidades complejas, con misiones específicas, en proceso de importante transformación cualitativa y la medida que contribuye a enriquecer su gestión. Para ello se realizó en una primera instancia una revisión bibliográfica respecto de la concepción de museo, calidad y gestión organizacional. Posteriormente, se efectuó la investigación sobre la base de entrevistas a los directores de los museos seleccionados. Desde el punto de vista metodológico formal –para la elección de la muestra y siguiendo a Dillon – se usó un tipo de muestreo no probabilístico denominado muestra de criterio que consiste en la selección de determinados encuestados para que participen en el estudio. La selección busca satisfacer las necesidades concretas de la investigación para lo que se incluyeron en la muestra los principales museos montevideanos públicos y privados que representan 27% del total. El trabajo se divide en cuatro apartados. El primero muestra una revisión de la bibliografía al respecto de la gestión y su aplicabilidad en los museos y, en el segundo, se presentan distintos modelos de gestión de calidad haciendo hincapié en el modelo iberoamericano de gestión. En la tercera parte del trabajo se desarrolla la investigación empírica y en la cuarta se exponen las conclusiones de la investigación. (shrink)

Este libro, es el segundo de la serie La Cultura en el Uruguay: una mirada desde las Ciencias Económicas. Tal como señaló en el primer volumen, los estudiantes de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración de la Universidad de la República realizan como trabajo final de carrera, una investigación o ensayo monográfico en un área de su interés, tutorados por un docente universitario o un investigador de reconocida trayectoria. Un gran número de estos trabajos monográficos han hecho un (...) aporte valioso al conocimiento pero, lamentablemente, la poca difusión de éstos hace que el conocimiento adquirido termine olvidado en los fondos de la biblioteca de dicha Facultad, entre cientos de producciones monográficas. Al igual que en el volumen anterior, se pretende en éste, continuar mostrando los aportes que se han generado en el área tanto de Economía de la Cultura como de Gestión de Organizaciones Culturales, en una línea de investigación que me enorgullece coordinar, y en la que vuelco cotidianamente mis mayores esfuerzos. Cabe señalar, que el primer libro trató sobre diversos temas vinculados a la Cultura, atendiendo a una clasificación clásica en la disciplina que divide -o solía dividir- el objeto de estudio en Patrimonio, Artes Escénicas e Industria Cultural, y por ende, abarcó temáticas diversas. En esta segunda entrega, y ante la imposibilidad de recoger la totalidad de los trabajos monográficos producidos en el lapso comprendido entre la edición del primer y segundo volumen, se optó por efectuar una selección temática en vez de cronológica, por lo que se muestran en este libro solamente los trabajos que atañen a la Gestión y Economía de los Museos, y a un tema estrechamente vinculado, por la injerencia que tiene uno en el otro, que es el análisis económico del mercado de arte, en este caso, por medio de subastas. Todos los trabajos aquí presentados fueron tutorados por mí, aunque no en exclusividad. Primando la excelencia académica, y entendiendo que varios de los temas tratados tenían una especificidad considerable, recurrí, tal como es usual en el ámbito académico, -que valora la discusión entre pares y la consideración de opiniones de especialistas- a la ayuda de diversos colegas para que estas monografías pudieran concretarse con el mejor nivel académico posible. La primera investigación que se presenta fue realizada por las Contadoras Ana Macias y Ma. Fernanda Rimoldi, titulada Museos, una visión desde la Gestión de Calidad. Dicha investigación, tutorada conjuntamente con la especialista en calidad Cra Sara Gerpe, buscó determinar si es aplicable el Modelo Iberoamericano de Gestión de Calidad en Museos, para lo que se consideró una muestra de 14 museos montevideanos. Dicho trabajo propició un premio de un concurso organizado por el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, denominado Tu Tesis en Cultura, y por ende, no necesita más presentación. La Cultura en Uruguay: una mirada desde las Ciencias Económicas El segundo trabajo, titulado Sistema de Museos: Planificación Estratégica. Un diagnóstico previo, de las Cras Andrea de Armas, Cecilia Moreira y Valeria Palacios, trata sobre un caso de estudio de gran importancia para el atractivo turístico y patrimonial, como es el Sistema de Museos de Colonia de Sacramento, y realiza un diagnóstico enmarcado en la gestión estratégica de las organizaciones museísticas. Las conclusiones no son generalizables a otros museos que los que integran el Sistema de Museos de Colonia, sin embargo, la metodología empleada es fácilmente extrapolable a otros museos, tanto uruguayos como del exterior, que busquen comenzar el camino de la planificación estratégica. En tercer lugar, se expone la monografía de los Contadores Yamila Hernández, Sebastián Maidán y Ana Laura Mascheroni, que trata un tema crucial en los albores del siglo XXI como es la Responsabilidad SocialCorporativa. Este trabajo también se basa en un estudio de caso, y la organización bajo análisis es el Museo del Carnaval, museo que tiene una conducta innovadora que posibilita vincular el museo con programas pioneros en responsabilidad social en Uruguay. El trabajo se denomina Balance Social Museo del Carnaval y fue tutorado en forma conjunta con un referente en Responsabilidad Social Empresaria como es el Cr. Walter Rossi. El cuarto trabajo fue una producción de los Licenciados en Economía Tatiana Cóppola y Fernando González y se titula Museos en el Uruguay: Una visión económica. La investigación buscó la relación entre la variable visitante de una institución museística, y otras variables explicativas, como son la valoración del acervo, costos operativos, apertura horaria, entre otras, logrando probar que la variable relacionada a la captación de visitantes, para la muestra analizada, es la variable Difusión. Esta monografía la tutoré en forma compartida con el Dr. Gustavo Bouquet y el Lic. Raúl Ramírez, en una situación absolutamente atípica en el que el número de tutores supera el de estudiantes. Pero bien valió la pena la excepción en vista de los excelentes logros alcanzados. Para finalizar, se presenta la monografía titulada Formación de Precios de Pintura Nacional en Subasta: un Modelo y su Aplicación con la que accedieron al título de Licenciados en Economía Javier Chiossi y Matías De Vecchi. Se incluyó dicho trabajo en este volumen, que trata básicamente sobre museos, porque entiendo que el Mercado de Arte está indudablemente vinculado a la política de compras de los museos, en especial los contemporáneos. Cabe destacar que este trabajo contó con el apoyo de la Dra. Celina Gutiérrez, quien accedió a compartir la tutoría de un tema que escapaba mis posibilidades, logrando un excelente resultado. Merece señalar que cada trabajo original supera el centenar de páginas, y que por ende, no es posible publicarlos completamente, por lo que para este libro se hicieron resúmenes de las investigaciones realizadas, intentando adecuar la terminología y quitándoles el formato estrictamente científico -poco amigable para un no especialista-, de forma tal que su lectura sea accesible al público en general. También quiero señalar, que el prólogo del primer volumen, lo finalicé con la frase: “Espero que este libro sea el primero de una larga lista. Las áreas de Economía de la Cultura y Gestión de Organizaciones Culturales son disciplinas jóvenes que necesitan seguir creciendo. La investigación realizada por trabajos monográficos de fin de carrera en estas áreas, será siempre bienvenida” La Facultad ha comenzado un nuevo plan de estudio, en el que se eliminó la obligatoriedad de presentar una tesina o monografía como condición necesaria para obtener el título. No obstante, aún contamos con una decena de monografías que no han sido publicadas y que espero se concreten en el o los siguientes volúmenes de esta serie. (shrink)

In 2016, Béziau introduces a restricted notion of paraconsistency, the so-called genuine paraconsistency. A logic is genuine paraconsistent if it rejects the laws $\varphi,\neg \varphi \vdash \psi$ and $\vdash \neg (\varphi \wedge \neg \varphi)$. In that paper, the author analyzes, among the three-valued logics, which of them satisfy this property. If we consider multiple-conclusion consequence relations, the dual properties of those above-mentioned are $\vdash \varphi, \neg \varphi$ and $\neg (\varphi \vee \neg \varphi) \vdash$. We call genuine paracomplete logics those rejecting (...) the mentioned properties. We present here an analysis of the three-valued genuine paracomplete logics. A very natural twist structures semantics for these logics is also found in a systematic way. This semantics produces automatically a simple and elegant Hilbert-style characterization for all these logics. Finally, we introduce the logic LGP which is genuine paracomplete is not genuine paraconsistent, not even paraconsistent and cannot be characterized by a single finite logical matrix. (shrink)

This paper explores some philosophical and mathematical relationships between the continuum hypothesis, the axiom of choice, logical independence within mathematics, the existence of a higher being, the size of the universe, and some of the objects that compose it. Different comparisons are made between the nature of various classes of infinities and their consistency with our universe, referencing the viewpoints of Cantor and Peirce.

Many philosophers hypothesize that our concept of personal identity is partly constituted by the one-person-one-place rule, which states that a person can only be in one place at a time. This hypothesis has been assumed by the most influential contemporary work on personal identity. In this paper, we report a series of studies testing whether the hypothesis is true. In these studies, people consistently judged that the same person existed in two different places at the same time. This result undermines (...) some widely held philosophical assumptions, supports others, and fits well with recent discoveries on identity judgments about inanimate objects and non-human animals. (shrink)

In juxtaposition with the myth and tragedy of Ovid’s Medea, this paper investigates the possibility within the Kantian conception of agency of understanding moral evil as acting against one’s better judgment. It defends the thesis that in Kant self-deception, i. e. the intentional untruthfulness to oneself, provides the fundamental structure for choosing against the moral law. I argue that, as Kant’s thought progresses, self-deception slowly proceeds to become the paradigmatic case of moral evil. This is discussed with regard to two (...) important topics in his later moral philosophy: the doctrine of radical evil and the crucial role of the duty of truthfulness in ethics. The inquiry into Kant’s theory of conscience unfolds both against this theoretical background and in light of its historical roots in the polemic against casuistry and probabilism. This contribution closes with a brief look at the tools Kant implements to counter this tendency to self-deception in moral judgment and particularly at the role casuistry plays within his conception of moral education. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a bi-intuitionistic sequent calculus and to give proofs of admissibility for its structural rules. The calculus I will present, called SC2Int, is a sequent calculus for the bi-intuitionistic logic 2Int, which Wansing presents in [2016a]. There he also gives a natural deduction system for this logic, N2Int, to which SC2Int is equivalent in terms of what is derivable. What is important is that these calculi represent a kind of bilateralist reasoning, since they (...) do not only internalize processes of verifcation or provability but also the dual processes in terms of falsifcation or what is called dual provability. In [Wansing, 2017] a normal form theorem for N2Int is stated, here, I want to prove a cut-elimination theorem for SC2Int, i.e., if successful, this would extend the results existing so far. (shrink)

Debates over what is fundamental assume that what is most fundamental must be either a “top” level (roughly, the biggest or highest-level thing), or a “bottom” level (roughly, the smallest or lowest-level things). Here I sketch an alternative to top-ism and bottom-ism, the view that a middle level could be the most fundamental, and argue for its plausibility. I then suggest that the view satisfies the desiderata of asymmetry, irreflexivity, transitivity, and well-foundedness of fundamentality, that the view has explanatory power (...) on par with that of top-ism and bottom-ism, and that it satisfies the Principle of Sufficient Reason. (shrink)

This paper gives a framework for understanding causal counterpossibles, counterfactuals imbued with causal content whose antecedents appeal to metaphysically impossible worlds. Such statements are generated by omissive causal claims that appeal to metaphysically impossible events, such as “If the mathematician had not failed to prove that 2+2=5, the math textbooks would not have remained intact.” After providing an account of impossible omissions, the paper argues for three claims: (i) impossible omissions play a causal role in the actual world, (ii) causal (...) counterpossibles have broad applications in philosophy, and (iii) the truth of causal counterpossibles provides evidence for the nonvacuity of counterpossibles more generally. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Marxist Buddhism may provide a novel approach to envy in society. It has been argued that envy arises in response to socio-political inequality, which is considered a problem given the social and moral harms associated with envy. Thus, achieving equality is expected to solve the problem of envy. However, anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that is not the case, and that, in particular, societies inspired by Marxist ideals are not envy-free—if anything, the opposite seems (...) true. Buddhism has traditionally condemned envy. It shares with Marxism the idea that individual wellbeing can be obtained, paradoxically, only through lessening emphasis on individuality—Marxism by means of economic collectivism, Buddhism by means of a spiritual transformation. Both aim at shrinking the self and are keenly aware of how quickly an emphasis on one’s own desires leads to greed and exploitation of others. However, Marxist ideals have failed to yield successful large-scale flourishing communities, while Buddhism is a religion practiced by millions of people but has not advanced a politically progressive agenda in particular. Marxist Buddhism—argue—may perhaps bring together the best of the respective traditions to solve the problem of envy. However, I end by cautioning against such a radical reshaping of our psychological makeup, especially given the evidence that shows that there are morally and prudentially good types of envy, and sketch the profile of a Buddhist-friendly type of envy as an alternative to total eradication. (shrink)

This paper develops and articulates a metaphysics of intersectionality, the idea that multiple axes of social oppression cross-cut each other. Though intersectionality is often described through metaphor, theories of intersectionality can be formulated using the tools of contemporary analytic metaphysics. A central tenet of intersectionality theory, that intersectional identities are inseparable, can be framed in terms of explanatory unity. Further, intersectionality is best understood as metaphysical and explanatory priority of the intersectional category over its constituents, akin to metaphysical priority of (...) the whole over its parts. (shrink)

This paper brings two fresh perspectives on Lewis’s theory of time travel. First: many key aspects and theoretical desiderata of Lewis’s theory can be captured in a framework that does not commit to eternalism about time. Second: implementing aspects of Lewisian time travel in a non-eternalist framework provides theoretical resources for a better treatment of time travel to the future. While time travel to the past has been extensively analyzed, time travel to the future has been comparatively underexplored. I make (...) progress on this topic. Along the way, I discuss Lewis’s lesser-known time travel oeuvre, especially his volume of correspondence and lectures on the topic collected in Beebee and Fisher (2020) and Janssen-Lauret & MacBride (forthcoming). Lewis’s body of unpublished work on time travel yields fruitful insights into his broader thinking on the subject. (shrink)

Proponents of grounding often describe the notion as "metaphysical causation" involving determination and production relations similar to causation. This paper argues that the similarities between grounding and causation are merely superficial. I show that there are several sorts of causation that have no analogue in grounding; that the type of "bringing into existence" that both involve is extremely different; and that the synchronicity of ground and the diachronicity of causation make them too different to be explanatorily intertwined.

Widespread causal overdetermination is often levied as an objection to nonreductive theories of minds and objects. In response, nonreductive metaphysicians have argued that the type of overdetermination generated by their theories is different from the sorts of coincidental cases involving multiple rock-throwers, and thus not problematic. This paper pushes back. I argue that attention to differences between types of overdetermination discharges very few explanatory burdens, and that overdetermination is a bigger problem for the nonreductive metaphysician than previously thought.

The debate on love's reasons ignores unrequited love, which—I argue—can be as genuine and as valuable as reciprocated love. I start by showing that the relationship view of love cannot account for either the reasons or the value of unrequited love. I then present the simple property view, an alternative to the relationship view that is beset with its own problems. In order to solve these problems, I present a more sophisticated version of the property view that integrates ideas from (...) different property theorists in the love literature. However, even this more sophisticated property view falls short in accounting for unrequited love's reasons. In response, I develop a new version of the property view that I call the experiential view. On this view, we love a person not only in virtue of properties shaped by and experienced in a reciprocal loving relationship, but also in virtue of perspectival properties, whose value can be properly assessed also outside of a reciprocal loving relationship. The experiential view is the only view that can account not only for reciprocated love's reasons, but also for unrequited love's reasons. (shrink)

In this paper I present a novel taxonomy of envy, according to which there are four kinds of envy: emulative, inert, aggressive and spiteful envy. An inquiry into the varieties of envy is valuable not only to understand it as a psychological phenomenon, but also to shed light on the nature of its alleged viciousness. The first section introduces the intuition that there is more than one kind of envy, together with the anecdotal and linguistic evidence that supports it. The (...) second section proposes and explains in detail a definition of envy tout court. The third section presents a recurring distinction between behavioral tendencies of envy, which has been explained in two distinct ways, one mostly proposed by psychologists, the other discernible in the philosophical tradition. The fourth section argues that these models of explanation track two variables, whose interplay is responsible for the existence of the four envies. The fifth section illustrates four paradigmatic cases, and provides a detailed analysis of the phenomenology, motivational structure, and typical behavioral outputs of each. The paper ends with a brief discussion of the implications of the taxonomy for moral education. (shrink)

This paper poses an original puzzle about the relationship between causation and moral responsibility called The Moral Difference Puzzle. Using the puzzle, the paper argues for three related ideas: (1) the existence of a new sort of moral luck; (2) an intractable conflict between the causal concepts used in moral assessment; and (3) inability of leading theories of causation to capture the sorts of causal differences that matter for moral evaluation of agents’ causal contributions to outcomes.

This paper examines both creepiness and the distinctive reaction had to creepiness, being “creeped out.” The paper defends a response-dependent account of creepiness in terms of this distinctive reaction, contrasting our preferred account to others that might be offered. The paper concludes with a discussion of the value of detecting creepiness.

El tema central de esta tesis de maestría en filosofía de la ciencia es el de la naturaleza de la persistencia a través del tiempo, en el contexto de nuestras mejores teorías físicas acerca del espacio-tiempo. Este problema involucra uno de los conceptos centrales en nuestra comprensión científica del mundo físico, a saber, el concepto de tiempo. La forma usual en que se plantea el problema de la persistencia involucra ciertas nociones que están conectadas con la física, pero estos supuestos (...) rara vez suelen ser formulados de manera explícita, empero, extrapolar las disputas filosóficas en torno a la naturaleza de la persistencia al contexto de espacios newtonianos, galileanos y relativistas (minkowski) no es una tarea trivial. Estos espacios son algunos de los espacios fundamentales donde ocurre la dinámica de los objetos físicos en física clásica. -/- En esta investigación he perseguido diferentes objetivos que vinculan el problema de la persistencia, las diferentes tesis que buscan resolver el problema y las estructuras espacio-temporales postuladas nuestras mejores teorías físicas: -/- 1. Articular el problema de la persistencia, así como varios supuestos de metafísica y filosofía de la ciencia indispensables para plantear la discusión, así como para formular mi solución. 2. Introducir a detalle las diversas estructuras-espacio temporales que, en nuestras mejores teorías de física, albergan a los objetos materiales persistentes. 3. Introducir herramientas formales que permitan analizar la relación de todo-parte en contextos temporales (mereología), así como las propiedades formales de la relación de ubicación que mantienen los objetos materiales con las regiones espacio-temporales. 4. Reformular las posiciones, con estas herramientas, en las estructuras espacio-temporales previamente mencionadas. 5. Ofrecer una serie de argumentos que favorecen lo que más adelante caracterizo como “perdurantismo de ubicación”, desde dos posiciones metafísicas: el unitismo, la tesis de que el tiempo y el espacio son aspectos de una sustancia más fundamental, el espacio-tiempo y el supersustantivismo, la tesis de que el espacio-tiempo y sus propiedades son suficientes para dar soporte a una ontología realista en el caso de nuestras mejores teorías físicas. -/- De esos cinco puntos me ocupo, en ese orden, en los cinco capítulos de esta investigación, con el capítulo V siendo mi contribución original a la literatura especializada sobre el tema. En los primeros capítulos (I, II) el enfoque es en presentar una serie de posiciones y asunciones estructurales en filosofía y física. En los capítulos intermedios (III, IV), hay también una presentación de posiciones filosóficas dominantes en la literatura (Balashov, 2010; Gibson y Pooley, 2006; Gilmore, 2008, 2014; Calosi y Fano, 2015; Saucedo, 2011) que acompañan a una discusión de elementos formales de mereología y postulados estructurales de las teorías naturalizadas de persistencia a través del tiempo. El capítulo V, que es mi contribución original a la discusión filosófica, integra todo lo discutido en los capítulos anteriores en una serie de argumentos que presento en favor del perdurantismo de ubicación. (shrink)

I present and develop the view that omissions are de re possibilities of actual events. Omissions do not literally fail to occur; rather, they possibly occur. An omission is a tripartite metaphysical entity composed of an actual event, a possible event, and a contextually specified counterpart relation between them. This view resolves ontological, causal, and semantic puzzles about omissions, and also accounts for important data about moral responsibility for outcomes resulting from omissions.

Should you take a pill that gives you all the health benefits of sleep and allows you to stay awake? I argue that you shouldn’t. I propose three reasons why sleeping, conceived of as a socially and culturally embedded human activity, is valuable. First, there is aesthetic value in the rituals that typically precede sleeping; second, there is interpersonal value in the intimacy that stems from sleeping with other people; third, there is ethical value in mere presence and in retreating (...) from consciousness. In order to fully support my argument, I situate it within a conception of goodness that embraces the fragility of the human condition and the limitations stemming from our corporeal nature. I conclude with some practical implications of my view. (shrink)

This paper argues that several sorts of metaphysical and semantic indeterminacy afflict the causal relation. If, as it is plausible to hold, there is a relationship between causation and moral responsibility, then indeterminacy in the causal relation results in indeterminacy of moral responsibility more generally.

In "Changing the Past" (2010), Peter van Inwagen argues that a time traveler can change the past without paradox in a growing block universe. After erasing the portion of past existence that generates paradox, a new, non-paradox-generating block can be "grown" after the temporal relocation of the time traveler. -/- I articulate and explore the underlying mechanism of Van Inwagen's model: the time traveler's control over the location of the objective present. Van Inwagen's model is aimed at preventing paradox by (...) changing the past, but it achieves something broader than paradox avoidance: it gives tools for a new model of time travel. I use van Inwagen's tools to develop a new kind of time travel in which in which the location of the objective present is shifted by the time traveler. I call this type of time travel Movable Objective Present, or MOP. After defining MOP, I argue that it is compatible with any theory of time that accepts hypertime, including presentism and moving spotlight theory. (shrink)

Theories of causation grounded in counterfactual dependence face the problem of profligate omissions: numerous irrelevant omissions count as causes of an outcome. A recent purported solution to this problem is proportionality, which selects one omission among many candidates as the cause of an outcome. This paper argues that proportionality cannot solve the problem of profligate omissions for two reasons. First: the determinate/determinable relationship that holds between properties like aqua and blue does not hold between negative properties like not aqua and (...) not blue. Negative properties are those at stake in omissive causation. Second: proportionality misconstrues the nature of the problem to be solved. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss in some detail my experience teaching women philosophers in the context of a survey course in ancient Greek philosophy at a small liberal arts college. My aim is to share the peculiar difficulties one may encounter when teaching this topic in a lower-level undergraduate course, difficulties stemming from a multiplicity of methodological hurdles that do not arise when teaching women philosophers in other periods, such as the modern era. In the first section, I briefly review (...) some of what we know about ancient Greek women philosophers, which is not only very little but frustratingly uncertain and highly debated. I devote the second section to some of the scholarly debates surrounding these philosophers’ doctrines, the details of their biographies, and their very existence. The third section is about the corresponding pedagogical challenges, and the fourth and final section describes the strategies I implemented to face those challenges. (shrink)

Some religious requirements seem genuinely arbitrary in the sense that there seem to be no sufficient explanation of why those requirements with those contents should pertain. This paper aims to understand exactly what it might mean for a religious requirement to be genuinely arbitrary and to discern whether and how a religious practitioner could ever be rational in obeying such a requirement. We lay out four accounts of what such arbitrariness could consist in, and show how each account provides a (...) different sort of baseline for understanding how obedience to arbitrary requirements could, in principle, be rational. (shrink)

Where do values live in thought? A straightforward answer is that we (or our brains) make decisions using explicit value representations which are our values. Recent work applying reinforcement learning to decision-making and planning suggests that more specifically, we may represent both the instrumental expected value of actions as well as the intrinsic reward of outcomes. In this paper, I argue that identifying value with either of these representations is incomplete. For agents such as humans and other animals, there is (...) another place where reward can be located in thought: the division of the space of possibilities or ‘state space’. (shrink)

Arguments of stability, intended in a wide sense, including the discussion of the conditions of the onset of instability and of stability changes, play a central role in the main theorizations of morphogenesis in 20th century theoretical biology. The aim of this essay is to shed light on concepts and images mobilized in the construction of arguments of stability in theorizing morphogenesis, since they are pivotal in establishing meaningful relationships between mathematical models and empirical morphologies.

This paper argues that so-called “trumping preemption” is in fact overdetermination or early preemption, and is thus not a distinctive form of redundant causation. I draw a novel lesson from cases thought to be trumping: that the boundary between preemption and overdetermination should be reconsidered.

Episodic and semantic memory are often taken to be fundamentally different mental systems, and contemporary philosophers often pursue research questions about episodic memory, in particular, in isolation from semantic memory. This paper challenges that assumption, and puts pressure on philosophical approaches to memory that break off episodic memory as its own standalone topic. I present and systematize psychological and neuroscientific theories of semanticization, the thesis that memory content tends to drift from episodic to semantic in structure over time and exposure (...) to an environment. Semanticization, I argue, is a long-term interconnection between episodic and semantic systems that requires approaching both the content and function of these two memory systems as a whole. Thus we have a reason to reject projects by Michael Martin, which aims to carve out a uniquely episodic memory content, and Kourken Michaelian, which pairs episodic memory to its own unique function. Instead, seeing declarative memory as a single system with two facets or even a continuum of features allows for deeper insight into both content and function. (shrink)

In this paper I will develop a lambda-term calculus, lambda-2Int, for a bi-intuitionistic logic and discuss its implications for the notions of sense and denotation of derivations in a bilateralist setting. Thus, I will use the Curry-Howard correspondence, which has been well-established between the simply typed lambda-calculus and natural deduction systems for intuitionistic logic, and apply it to a bilateralist proof system displaying two derivability relations, one for proving and one for refuting. The basis will be the natural deduction system (...) of Wansing's bi-intuitionistic logic 2Int, which I will turn into a term-annotated form. Therefore, we need a type theory that extends to a two-sorted typed lambda-calculus. I will present such a term-annotated proof system for 2Int and prove a Dualization Theorem relating proofs and refutations in this system. On the basis of these formal results I will argue that this gives us interesting insights into questions about sense and denotation as well as synonymy and identity of proofs from a bilateralist point of view. (shrink)

I argue for the view that envy and jealousy are distinct emotions, whose crucial difference is that envy involves a perception of lack while jealousy involves a perception of loss. I start by noting the common practice of using ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ almost interchangeably, and I contrast it with the empirical evidence that shows that envy and jealousy are distinct, albeit similar and often co-occurring, emotions. I then argue in favor of a specific way of understanding their distinction: the view (...) that envy is a response to a perceived lack of a valuable object, while jealousy is a response to a perceived loss of a valuable object. I compare such a view with the most compelling alternative theories, and show that it accounts better for paradigmatic cases. I conclude by showing how the lack vs. loss model can handle complications: ambiguous cases, that is, when it is epistemically unclear whether one experiences lack or loss; hybrid cases, that is, when one seems to experience both lack and loss; and borderline cases, that is, when it is metaphysically unclear whether one experiences lack or loss. (shrink)

In this paper, I ask whether there is a defensible philosophical view according to which everybody is beautiful. I review two purely aesthetical versions of this claim. The No Standards View claims that everybody is maximally and equally beautiful. The Multiple Standards View encourages us to widen our standards of beauty. I argue that both approaches are problematic. The former fails to be aspirational and empowering, while the latter fails to be sufficiently inclusive. I conclude by presenting a hybrid ethical–aesthetical (...) view according to which everybody is beautiful in the sense that everybody can be perceived through a loving gaze. I show that this view is inclusive, aspirational and empowering, and authentically aesthetical. (shrink)

Empiricist philosophers like Carnap invoked analyticity in order to explain a priori knowledge and necessary truth. Analyticity was “truth purely in virtue of meaning”. The view had a deflationary motivation: in Carnap’s proposal, linguistic conventions alone determine the truth of analytic sentences, and thus there is no mystery in our knowing their truth a priori, or in their necessary truth; for they are, as it were, truths of our own making. Let us call this “Carnapian conventionalism”, conventionalismC and cognates for (...) short. This conventionalistC explication of the a priori has been the target of sound criticisms. Arguments like Quine’s in “Truth by Convention” are in our view decisive: the truth of conventionalismC requires that the class of logical truths and logical validities be reductively accounted for as conventionally established; however, no such reduction is forthcoming, because logic is needed to generate the entire class from any given set of conventions properly so-called. Granted that conventionalismC is untenable, we want to take issue with a different, usually made criticism. Although the argument uncovers some difficulties for the way conventionalist claims are defended by some of its advocates, we will try to show that it fails. The criticism thus stands in the way of a proper appreciation of why the Carnapian account of the a priori is not correct. We will try to illustrate this by showing that the criticism we will dispute would dispose of conventionalist claims not only regarding philosophically problematic cases – logical and mathematical truths –, but also regarding cases for which they have some prima facie plausibility. One such case is that of truths that follow from mere abbreviations, “nominal” definitions; ‘someone is a bachelor if and only if he is an unmarried adult male’ can serve at this point for illustration. We will try to articulate a clear sense in which the contents of assertion such as this can be truths by convention. We do not need to prove that a conventionalist claim is true in those cases; it is enough for us to show that it is intelligible, for the arguments we will confront question even this. (shrink)

The social categories to which we belong—Latino, disabled, American, woman— causally influence our lives in deep and unavoidable ways. One might be pulled over by police because one is Latino, or one might receive a COVID vaccine sooner because one is American. Membership in these social categories most often falls outside of our control. This paper argues that membership in social categories constitutes a restriction on human agency, creating a situation of non-ideal agency for many human individuals. -/- However, there (...) are ways to resist the causal influence of social categories, and certain socially marginalized groups can be understood as attempting to do just this. I discuss two instances of social category resistance: gender pronouns and the rights of trans individuals. I suggest that the intentional declaration of gender pronouns (“she/her” or “they/them”) can be understood as an attempt to resist the causal powers of nonconsensual social categorization. Similarly, one among many reasons to support the rights of trans individuals is that their self-declarations of gender identity can be viewed as a reclamation of agency in the face of causal constraints imposed by socially defined and imposed gender categories. This lesson can be generalized to people belonging to a broad range of marginalized groups. (shrink)

This paper suggests that time travelling scenarios commonly depicted in science fiction introduce problems and dangers for the time traveller. If time travel takes time, then time travellers risk collision with past objects, relocation to distant parts of the universe, and time travel-specific injuries. I propose several models of time travel that avoid the dangers and risks of time travel taking time, and that introduce new questions about the relationship between time travel and spatial location.

There has been a long history of tension between feminists and feminist philosophy, on the one hand, and logic, on the other hand. This tension expresses itself in many ways, including claims that logic is a tool of the patriarchy, that logic/rationality/analytical tools in philosophy need to be rejected if women are to fully participate, that women = body and man = mind, that to do feminist philosophy one must do it as a situated, embodied person, not as an impersonal, (...) disembodied mind, that logic is “a masculine subject”. However the tension is expressed, it is women in logic and women logicians who are caught in between. The goal of my paper is to explore a conception of logic that not only is not inconsistent with being a feminist, but is actively welcoming of women as logicians. (shrink)

Every day nurses are required to make ethical decisions in the course of caring for their patients. Ethics in Nursing Practice provides the background necessary to understand ethical decision making and its implications for patient care. The authors focus on the individual nurse’s responsibilities, as well as considering the wider issues affecting patients, colleagues and society as a whole. This third edition is fully updated, and takes into account recent changes in ICN position statements, WHO documents, as well as addressing (...) current issues in healthcare, such as providing for the health and care needs of refugees and asylum seekers, bioethics and the enforcement of nursing codes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“An Equivocal Couple Overwhelmed by Life”A Phenomenological Analysis of PregnancySara HeinämaaTwo conceptions of human generativity prevail in contemporary feminist philosophy. First, several contributors argue that the experience of pregnancy, when analyzed by phenomenological tools, undermines several distinctions that are central to Western philosophy, most importantly the subject-object distinction and the self-other and own-alien distinctions. This line of argument was already outlined by Iris Marion Young in her influential essay (...) “Pregnant Embodiment: Subjectivity and Alienation” (1984). The other dominant argument is related to the first one, and it states that organic birth is the event that establishes the first experiential separation between the self and the other. On this understanding, the mother-fetus relation would not involve any relations between two corporeal selves; all such relations would be postnatal. This notion has been defended, for example, by Christine Schües (1997; 2000) and Johanna Oksala (2003).1On the other hand, classical phenomenology is dominated by the idea that the rigorous first-person methodology that is essential to phenomenology dictates that the sense of birth must be studied primarily by reflection on the structures of our own recollection or memory. Consequently, the primary sense of human birth would be that of an unattainable limit. This is argued on the basis of the existential fact that we all are born but cannot recall our own birth, or else on the basis of the transcendental fact that the structure [End Page 31] of retention ties each living present to an earlier one and implies that the transcendental ego cannot be subject to generation.2 From this perspective, all analyses and reflections of the experiences of labor, gestation, and pregnancy would be secondary since the sense of birth that these experiences involve is the nativity of another human being and not the nativity of the reflecting self.This paper challenges both the feminist and the classical phenomenological approach. I maintain that careful phenomenological analyses of the experience of pregnancy undermine both notions. Such analyses show, on the one hand, that pregnancy does not imply a nondistinction or self-other fusion but on the contrary involves a specific self-other divide. At the same time, they demonstrate that the sense of birth is more complex than the classical recollection-paradigm suggests and that it includes more components than the signification of an unattainable limit. A proper phenomenology of birth must take into account not only the universal fact that we all are born, but also the equally universal fact that each of us is born from another human being, that is, some other human subject.3 This other human being who “gave” us birth or “from whose flesh we were born” provides us with a unique perspective on our own past, beyond the limits of our own recollection. Her perspective is incomparable to any other external perspective; rather than simply giving us an additional third-person viewpoint on our own organic birth, this one person is able to open a second-person perspective on our pre- and postnatal life and the transition between them—all of which is beyond our own recollection.My argument proceeds by the following steps:First, I develop a fresh discourse on the experience of pregnancy, by studying a set of remarks to be found in Julia Kristeva’s postphenomenological discourse on maternity, on the one hand, and in Simone de Beauvoir’s existential-phenomenological discourse on feminine embodiment, on the other hand. I use these remarks as leading clues for a novel phenomenological study of the experience of pregnancy.4 Contra Young’s influential account mentioned above, I argue that gestation, as experienced by women who live it in the first person, includes a separation between two sensory-motor beings in a nesting relation: the pregnant self and the embryonic other. The alternative account that I provide hinges on my analysis of the experience of fetal movements and the role of touch-sensations and kinesthetic sensations in such experiences. Ultimately, I argue that pregnancy does not erode the self-other boundary or the own-alien boundary but reestablishes both divisions.Second, I compare my account of the experience of pregnancy to Merleau... (shrink)

I argue that fitting envy plays a special role in safeguarding our happiness and flourishing. After presenting my theory of envy and its fittingness conditions, I contrast Kant’s view that envy is always unfitting with D’Arms and Jacobson’s defense of fitting envy as an evolutionarily-shaped response to a deep and wide human concern, that is, relative positioning. However, D’Arms and Jacobson don’t go far enough. First, I expand on their analysis of positional goodness, distinguishing between an epistemic claim, according to (...) which we use implicit or explicit comparison to know what position we occupy in a continuum of goodness, and thus to form judgments of goodness, and a metaphysical one, according to which much human goodness depends on implicit or explicit rankings and positionality. Second, I argue that fitting envy is not only intrinsically valuable qua fitting response to authentic goodness, but can be epistemically, morally and prudentially valuable. (shrink)

In this paper I will show the problems that are encountered when dealing with uniqueness of connectives in a bilateralist setting within the larger framework of proof-theoretic semantics and suggest a solution. Therefore, the logic 2Int is suitable, for which I introduce a sequent calculus system, displaying - just like the corresponding natural deduction system - a consequence relation for provability as well as one dual to provability. I will propose a modified characterization of uniqueness incorporating such a duality of (...) consequence relations, with which we can maintain uniqueness in a bilateralist setting. (shrink)

People often answer why-questions with what we call experiential explanations: narratives or stories with temporal structure and concrete details. In contrast, on most theories of the epistemic function of explanation, explanations should be abstractive: structured by general relationships and lacking extraneous details. We suggest that abstractive and experiential explanations differ not only in level of abstraction, but also in structure, and that each form of explanation contributes to the epistemic goals of individual learners and of science. In particular, experiential explanations (...) support mental simulation and survive transitions across background theories; as a result, they support learning and help us translate between competing frameworks. Experiential explanations play an irreducible role in human cognition – and perhaps in science. (shrink)

This paper discusses a puzzling tension in attributions of moral responsibility in cases of resultant moral luck: we seem to hold agents fully morally responsible for unlucky outcomes, but less-than-fully-responsible for unlucky outcomes brought about differently than intended. This tension cannot be easily discharged or explained, but it does shed light on a famous puzzle about causation and responsibility, the Thirsty Traveler.

In a recent paper, Max Deutsch argues that there is no “qua problem” for purely causal theories of reference, according to which the extensions of some expressions are grounded in causal relations to members of their extensions during dubbing acts. The qua problem is the difficulty in specifying the facts in virtue of which the reference of “elephant” is grounded by causal contact with something _qua_ elephant and not _qua_ its other properties. If no such specification can be given, reference (...) remains unacceptably indeterminate. This has led many to abandon purely causal reference grounding. Deutsch’s argument for the dissolution of the problem goes as follows: we usually agree that an event can cause its effect _qua_ some of its properties and not _qua_ others. For example, a hot acidic solution causes a glass beaker to break due to its heat and not due to its acidity. Given this assumption, we can simply say that an event caused a dubbing act _qua_ the causally relevant property and not _qua_ the causally irrelevant properties, thus grounding the reference of the term; the qua problem has vanished. I will argue that causal mechanisms, and in particular the facts about causal relevance appealed to by Deutsch, are insufficient to dissolve the qua problem. It is not generally the case that a _unique_ property is causally relevant in purely physical cases of causation; but this is precisely what is required to avoid the referential indeterminacy highlighted by the qua problem. I will demonstrate that if we rely on causal relevance to dissolve the qua problem, there is no way to respect the uniqueness requirement: there are too many properties that are causally relevant to the occurrence of any single dubbing act, including the intentional states of the dubber. (shrink)

Living with chronic illness can involve fluctuating between radically different bodily states depending on whether you are experiencing flareups of illness symptoms. What you can do in these bodily states can differ drastically from one another. Sometimes, these fluctuations in abilities lead to fluctuations in your values. That is, your evaluative perspective can shift when you are experiencing flareups of the illness. This can give rise to a puzzle for planning, since it is unclear what you should plan on doing (...) when you do not have a stable set of preferences guiding your plans. This paper argues that one way to navigate this puzzle is for the agent to adopt an overarching plan that mediates the conflict between her differing perspectives. (shrink)

This paper argues that causal idealism, the view that causation is a product of mental activity, should be considered a competetitor to contemporary views that incorporate human thought and agency into the causal relation. Weighing contextualism, contrastivism, or pragmatism about causation against causal idealism results in at least a tie with respect to the virtues of these theories.