Results for 'Sufficientarianism'

18 found
Order:
  1. Relational Sufficientarianism and Basic Income.Justin Tosi - 2019 - In Michael Cholbi & Michael Weber (eds.), The Future of Work, Technology, and Basic Income. New York: Routledge. pp. 49-61.
    Basic income policies have recently enjoyed a great deal of discussion, but they are not a natural fit with views of distributive or social justice endorsed by many moral and political philosophers. This essay develops and defends a new view of social justice, called relational sufficientarianism, which is more compatible with a universal basic income. Relational sufficientarianism holds that persons in a just society must have sufficient social status, but not necessarily equal social status. It argues that this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  44
    Enough Is Too Much: The Excessiveness Objection to Sufficientarianism.Carl Knight - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy.
    The standard version of sufficientarianism maintains that providing people with enough, or as close to enough as is possible, is lexically prior to other distributive goals. This article argues that this is excessive - more than distributive justice allows - in four distinct ways. These concern the magnitude of advantage, the number of beneficiaries, responsibility and desert, and above-threshold distribution. Sufficientarians can respond by accepting that providing enough unconditionally is more than distributive justice allows, instead balancing sufficiency against other (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  33
    Justice, Thresholds, and the Three Claims of Sufficientarianism.Dick Timmer - forthcoming - Journal of Political Philosophy.
    In this article, I propose a novel characterization of sufficientarianism. I argue that sufficientarianism combines three claims: a priority claim that we have non-instrumental reasons to prioritize benefits in certain ranges over benefits in other ranges; a continuum claim that at least two of those ranges are on one continuum; and a deficiency claim that the lower a range on a continuum, the more priority benefits in that range have. This characterization of sufficientarianism sheds new light on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Justice After Catastrophe: Responsibility and Security.Makoto Usami - 2015 - Ritsumeikan Studies in Language and Culture 26 (4):215-230.
    The issue of justice after catastrophe is an enormous challenge to contemporary theories of distributive justice. In the past three decades, the controversy over distributive justice has centered on the ideal of equality. One of intensely debated issues concerns what is often called the “equality of what,” on which there are three primary views: welfarism, resourcism, and the capabilities approach. Another major point of dispute can be termed the “equality or another,” about which three positions debate: egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and (...). On these topics of distributive justice, authors are concerned with the current difference between the better-off and the worse-off or the present situation of the badly-off. By contrast, it is essential to take account of the past distribution of well-being as well as the present situation in order to explore questions of post-catastrophe justice. Without looking at the pre-disaster distribution of income, preference satisfaction, or basic capabilities among affected people, no present assessment of the damage caused by the disaster could be correct and no proposed remedy adequate. It is true that luck egalitarians assess the current distribution among people by referring to the decision that each individual made. Yet they pay scant attention to the situation in which each one stayed in the past. Therefore, we can legitimately say that most theorists of distributive justice, including luck egalitarians, have failed to give consideration to the past state of each person. -/- To fill this gap in the literature, the present article explores philosophical questions that arise when we take account of each person’s past and present situations in discussing distributive justice regarding public compensation and assistance to survivors and families of victims of natural and industrial disasters. In addressing these novel questions, I develop and refine various concepts, ideas, and arguments that have been presented in the study of distributive justice in normal settings. I tackle two tasks, the first of which is to explore the foundation and scope of luck egalitarianism. Despite the moral appeal it has in many cases, luck egalitarianism has attracted the so-called harshness objection. Some luck egalitarians attempt to avoid this objection in a pragmatic way by combining the luck egalitarian doctrine with the principle of basic needs satisfaction. However, they do not provide any systematic rationale for this combination. In contrast with such pragmatic responses, I seek to offer a principled argument for holding individuals responsible for their choices only when their basic needs are met, by invoking the ideas of respect for human voluntariness and rescue of human vulnerability. Based on this argument, I propose a form of responsibility-sensitive theory, which considers the pre-disaster distribution of well-being as a default position. The second task I take on is to refine sufficientarianism in the context of post-catastrophe justice. Luck egalitarianism with boundaries set by the basic needs principle seems to indicate the potential for sufficientarianism. But major proponents of this view conceive the welfarist assumption, a considerably high standard of well-being, and the controversial treatment of persons staying below the threshold, all of which seem problematic in the post-disaster situation. I try to construct a new version of sufficientarianism by replacing these current features with more robust ones. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Moderate Emissions Grandfathering.Carl Knight - 2014 - Environmental Values 23 (5):571-592.
    Emissions grandfathering holds that a history of emissions strengthens an agent’s claim for future emission entitlements. Though grandfathering appears to have been influential in actual emission control frameworks, it is rarely taken seriously by philosophers. This article presents an argument for thinking this an oversight. The core of the argument is that members of countries with higher historical emissions are typically burdened with higher costs when transitioning to a given lower level of emissions. According to several appealing views in political (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Republican Justice.Nicholas Southwood - 2015 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18 (6):669-678.
    I raise three objections to Pettit’s republican account of justice: 1) that it fails to account adequately for the role of certain values such as substantive fairness; 2) that it represents an uncomfortable hybrid of egalitarianism and sufficientarianism; and 3) that it fails Pettit’s own “eyeball test”. I then conclude in a more constructive vein, speculating about the kind of account of justice it is supposed to be and suggesting that, construed a certain way, it may have resources for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  43
    Thresholds in Distributive Justice.Dick Timmer - forthcoming - Utilitas:1-20.
    Despite the prominence of thresholds in theories of distributive justice, there is no general account of what sort of role is played by the idea of a threshold within such theories. This has allowed an ongoing lack of clarity and misunderstanding around views that employ thresholds. In this article, I develop an account of the concept of thresholds in distributive justice. I argue that this concept contains three elements, which threshold views deploy when ranking possible distributions. These elements are (i) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Justice and Public Health.Govind Persad - 2019 - In Anna Mastroianni, Jeff Kahn & Nancy Kass (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Public Health Ethics. New York, NY, USA: pp. ch. 4.
    This chapter discusses how justice applies to public health. It begins by outlining three different metrics employed in discussions of justice: resources, capabilities, and welfare. It then discusses different accounts of justice in distribution, reviewing utilitarianism, egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism, as well as desert-based theories, and applies these distributive approaches to public health examples. Next, it examines the interplay between distributive justice and individual rights, such as religious rights, property rights, and rights against discrimination, by discussing examples such as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9.  39
    (Draft) The Prospects for Prospect Utilitarianism.Benjamin Davies - manuscript
    Sufficientarianism is a view of distributive justice that places importance on one or more ‘thresholds’, whereby those who are above the threshold have much weaker claims to additional benefits than those below, and may even have no claims at all. Hun Chung has recently argued for a new theory of distributive justice that overcomes two central problems faced by sufficientarianism. Sufficientarianism cannot give intuitively compelling answers to ‘lifeboat cases’, where we can save the lives of some but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  37
    Abandoning the Abandonment Objection: Luck Egalitarian Arguments for Public Insurance.Carl Knight - 2015 - Res Publica 21 (2):119-135.
    Critics of luck egalitarianism have claimed that, far from providing a justification for the public insurance functions of a welfare state as its proponents claim, the view objectionably abandons those who are deemed responsible for their dire straits. This article considers seven arguments that can be made in response to this ‘abandonment objection’. Four of these arguments are found wanting, with a recurrent problem being their reliance on a dubious sufficientarian or quasi-sufficientarian commitment to provide a threshold of goods unconditionally. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  11.  31
    Health(Care) and the Temporal Subject.Ben Davies - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (3):38-64.
    Many assume that theories of distributive justice must obviously take people’s lifetimes, and only their lifetimes, as the relevant period across which we distribute. Although the question of the temporal subject has risen in prominence, it is still relatively underdeveloped, particularly in the sphere of health and healthcare. This paper defends a particular view, “momentary sufficientarianism,” as being an important element of healthcare justice. At the heart of the argument is a commitment to pluralism about justice, where theorizing about (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Distributive Justice, Geoengineering and Risks.Pak-Hang Wong - 2014 - The Climate Geoengineering Governance Working Papers.
    It is generally recognised that the potential positive and negative impacts of geoengineering will be distributed unevenly both geographically and temporally. The question of distributive justice in geoengineering thus is one of the major ethical issues associated with geoengineering. Currently, the question of distributive justice in geoengineering is framed in terms of who gets what (potential) benefits and harms from geoengineering, i.e. it is about the distribution of the outcomes of geoengineering. In this paper, I argue that the discussions on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Why Inequality Matters: Luck Egalitarianism, its Meaning and Value. [REVIEW]Alex Voorhoeve - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3.
    I review Shlomi Segall's book 'Why Inequality Matters'. I argue that it conclusively establishes that alongside egalitarians, prioritarians and sufficientarians must sometimes regard a prospect as better (in at least one respect) when it is not better (in terms of well-being) for anyone. Sufficientarians and prioritarians must therefore relinquish a treasured anti-egalitarian argument. It also makes a powerful case that among these three views, egalitarians are in the best position to explain such departures from what is in each person’s prudential (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  57
    What is the Sufficientarian Precautionary Principle?G. Owen Schaefer - 2019 - Bioethics 33 (9):1083-1084.
    In their recent article, Koplin, Gyngell and Savulescu (2019) assess the viability of the precautionary principle as a decision-making tool to determine whether and under what circumstances germline gene editing should proceed. While their survey of different forms of the precautionary principle is illuminating, the most novel contribution is a new account of the precautionary principle, what they dub the Sufficientarian Precautionary Principle (SPP). SPP is meant to avoid several problems with existing accounts, while comporting with at least some of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  76
    Equality for Inegalitarians. [REVIEW]Andy Lamey - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (1):140-144.
    Equality for Inegalitarians, by George Sher, Cambridge University Press, 2014. Luck egalitarianism has been a leading view in analytic political philosophy since it rose to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s. The theory holds that economic inequalities are acceptable when they are the result of choice but those due to luck should be redistributed away. Proponents generally favour extensive redistribution, on the grounds that luck -- including the luck of being born with a lucrative talent -- plays an extensive role (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Sufficiency, Comprehensiveness of Health Care Coverage, and Cost-Sharing Arrangements in the Realpolitik of Health Policy.Govind Persad & Harald Schmidt - 2016 - In Carina Fourie & Annette Rid (eds.), What is Enough?: Sufficiency, Justice, and Health. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 267-280.
    This chapter explores two questions in detail: How should we determine the threshold for costs that individuals are asked to bear through insurance premiums or care-related out-of-pocket costs, including user fees and copayments? and What is an adequate relationship between costs and benefits? This chapter argues that preventing impoverishment is a morally more urgent priority than protecting households against income fluctuations, and that many health insurance plans may not adequately protect individuals from health care costs that threaten to drop their (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Hunger, Need, and the Boundaries of Lockean Property.David G. Dick - 2019 - Dialogue 58 (3):527-552.
    Locke’s property rights are now usually understood to be both fundamental and strictly negative. Fundamental because they are thought to be basic constraints on what we may do, unconstrained by anything deeper. Negative because they are thought to only protect a property holder against the claims of others. Here, I argue that this widespread interpretation is mistaken. For Locke, property rights are constrained by the deeper ‘fundamental law of nature,’ which involves positive obligations to those in need and confines the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  77
    Equality of Opportunity Versus Sufficiency of Capabilities in Healthcare.Efrat Ram Tiktin - 2016 - World Journal of Social Science Research 3 (3):418-437.
    The paper compares three accounts of distributive justice in health (and more specifically healthcare). I discuss two egalitarian accounts—Daniels's fair equality of opportunity for health and Segall's luck-egalitarian equity in health—and contrast them with a sufficientarian account based on sufficiency of capabilities. The discussion highlights some important theoretical differences and similarities among the three accounts. The focus, however, is on the practical implications of each account regarding four hypothetical cases (synthesized growth hormone for short children, non-therapeutic abortion, forms of compensation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark