Recent work on hypercomputation has raised new objections against the Church–Turing Thesis. In this paper, I focus on the challenge posed by a particular kind of hypercomputer, namely, SAD computers. I first consider deterministic and probabilistic barriers to the physical possibility of SAD computation. These suggest several ways to defend a Physical version of the Church–Turing Thesis. I then argue against Hogarth's analogy between non-Turing computability and non-Euclidean geometry, showing that it is a non-sequitur. I conclude (...) that the Effective version of the Church–Turing Thesis is unaffected by SAD computation. (shrink)

In his 1950 paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Alan Turing proposed that we can determine whether a machine thinks by considering whether it can win at a simple imitation game. A neutral questioner communicates with two different systems – one a machine and a human being – without knowing which is which. If after some reasonable amount of time the machine is able to fool the questioner into identifying it as the human, the machine wins the game, and we (...) should conclude that it thinks. This imitation game, now known as the Turing Test, has been much discussed by philosophers of mind, and for more than half a century now there has been considerable debate about whether it is an adequate test for thinking. But what has not been much discussed are the sexed presuppositions underlying the test. Too often forgotten in the philosophical discussion is the fact that Turing’s imitation game is modeled on an imitation game in which a neutral questioner communicates with two different humans – one a man and one a woman – without knowing which is which. In this original imitation game, the man wins the game if he is able to fool the questioner into identifying him as the woman. In this paper, I explore the implications of this set-up. As I argue, the fact that the Turing test was modeled on a man/woman imitation game seems to have led us astray in various ways in our attempt to conduct an effective investigation and assessment of computer intelligence. (shrink)

Philosophical questions about minds and computation need to focus squarely on the mathematical theory of Turing machines (TM's). Surrogate TM's such as computers or formal systems lack abilities that make Turing machines promising candidates for possessors of minds. Computers are only universal Turing machines (UTM's)—a conspicuous but unrepresentative subclass of TM. Formal systems are only static TM's, which do not receive inputs from external sources. The theory of TM computation clearly exposes the failings of two (...) prominent critiques, Searle's Chinese room (1980) and arguments from Gödel's Incompleteness theorems (e.g., Lucas, 1961; Penrose, 1989), both of which fall short of addressing the complete TM model. Both UTM-computers and formal systems provide an unsound basis for debate. In particular, their special natures easily foster the misconception that computation entails intrinsically meaningless symbol manipulation. This common view is incorrect with respect to full-fledged TM's, which can process inputs non-formally, i.e., in a subjective and dynamically evolving fashion. To avoid a distorted understanding of the theory of computation, philosophical judgments and discussions should be grounded firmly upon the complete Turing machine model, the proper model for real computers. (shrink)

The Turing machine is one of the simple abstract computational devices that can be used to investigate the limits of computability. In this paper, they are considered from several points of view that emphasize the importance and the relativity of mathematical languages used to describe the Turing machines. A deep investigation is performed on the interrelations between mechanical computations and their mathematical descriptions emerging when a human (the researcher) starts to describe a Turing machine (the object of (...) the study) by different mathematical languages (the instruments of investigation). Together with traditional mathematical languages using such concepts as ‘enumerable sets’ and ‘continuum’ a new computational methodology allowing one to measure the number of elements of different infinite sets is used in this paper. It is shown how mathematical languages used to describe the machines limit our possibilities to observe them. In particular, notions of observable deterministic and non-deterministic Turing machines are introduced and conditions ensuring that the latter can be simulated by the former are established. (shrink)

The abstract basis of modern computation is the formal description of a finite state machine, the Universal Turing Machine, based on manipulation of integers and logic symbols. In this contribution to the discourse on the computer-brain analogy, we discuss the extent to which analog computing, as performed by the mammalian brain, is like and unlike the digital computing of Universal Turing Machines. We begin with ordinary reality being a permanent dialog between continuous and discontinuous worlds. So it (...) is with computing, which can be analog or digital, and is often mixed. The theory behind computers is essentially digital, but efficient simulations of phenomena can be performed by analog devices; indeed, any physical calculation requires implementation in the physical world and is therefore analog to some extent, despite being based on abstract logic and arithmetic. The mammalian brain, comprised of neuronal networks, functions as an analog device and has given rise to artificial neural networks that are implemented as digital algorithms but function as analog models would. Analog constructs compute with the implementation of a variety of feedback and feedforward loops. In contrast, digital algorithms allow the implementation of recursive processes that enable them to generate unparalleled emergent properties. We briefly illustrate how the cortical organization of neurons can integrate signals and make predictions analogically. While we conclude that brains are not digital computers, we speculate on the recent implementation of human writing in the brain as a possible digital path that slowly evolves the brain into a genuine (slow) Turing machine. (shrink)

This volume celebrates the various facets of Alan Turing (1912–1954), the British mathematician and computing pioneer, widely considered as the father of computer science. It is aimed at the general reader, with additional notes and references for those who wish to explore the life and work of Turing more deeply. -/- The book is divided into eight parts, covering different aspects of Turing’s life and work. -/- Part I presents various biographical aspects of Turing, some from (...) a personal point of view. -/- Part II presents Turing’s universal machine (now known as a Turing machine), which provides a theoretical framework for reasoning about computation. His 1936 paper on this subject is widely seen as providing the starting point for the field of theoretical computer science. -/- Part III presents Turing’s working on codebreaking during World War II. While the War was a disastrous interlude for many, for Turing it provided a nationally important outlet for his creative genius. It is not an overstatement to say that without Turing, the War would probably have lasted longer, and may even have been lost by the Allies. The sensitive nature of Turning’s wartime work meant that much of this has been revealed only relatively recently. -/- Part IV presents Turing’s post-War work on computing, both at the National Physical Laboratory and at the University of Manchester. He made contributions to both hardware design, through the ACE computer at the NPL, and software, especially at Manchester. Part V covers Turing’s contribution to machine intelligence (now known as Artificial Intelligence or AI). Although Turing did not coin the term, he can be considered a founder of this field which is still active today, authoring a seminal paper in 1950. -/- Part VI covers morphogenesis, Turing’s last major scientific contribution, on the generation of seemingly random patterns in biology and on the mathematics behind such patterns. Interest in this area has increased rapidly in recent times in the field of bioinformatics, with Turing’s 1952 paper on this subject being frequently cited. -/- Part VII presents some of Turing’s mathematical influences and achievements. Turing was remarkably free of external influences, with few co-authors – Max Newman was an exception and acted as a mathematical mentor in both Cambridge and Manchester. -/- Part VIII considers Turing in a wider context, including his influence and legacy to science and in the public consciousness. -/- Reflecting Turing’s wide influence, the book includes contributions by authors from a wide variety of backgrounds. Contemporaries provide reminiscences, while there are perspectives by philosophers, mathematicians, computer scientists, historians of science, and museum curators. Some of the contributors gave presentations at Turing Centenary meetings in 2012 in Bletchley Park, King’s College Cambridge, and Oxford University, and several of the chapters in this volume are based on those presentations – some through transcription of the original talks, especially for Turing’s contemporaries, now aged in their 90s. Sadly, some contributors died before the publication of this book, hence its dedication to them. -/- For those interested in personal recollections, Chapters 2, 3, 11, 12, 16, 17, and 36 will be of interest. For philosophical aspects of Turing’s work, see Chapters 6, 7, 26–31, and 41. Mathematical perspectives can be found in Chapters 35 and 37–39. Historical perspectives can be found in Chapters 4, 8, 9, 10, 13–15, 18, 19, 21–25, 34, and 40. With respect to Turing’s body of work, the treatment in Parts II–VI is broadly chronological. We have attempted to be comprehensive with respect to all the important aspects of Turing’s achievements, and the book can be read cover to cover, or the chapters can be tackled individually if desired. There are cross-references between chapters where appropriate, and some chapters will inevitably overlap. -/- We hope that you enjoy this volume as part of your library and that you will dip into it whenever you wish to enter the multifaceted world of Alan Turing. (shrink)

Recent advances in neuroscience lead to a wider realm for philosophy to include the science of the Darwinian-evolved computational brain, our inner world producing organ, a non-recursive super- Turing machine combining 100B synapsing-neuron DNA-computers based on the genetic code. The whole system is a logos machine offering a world map for global context, essential for our intentional grasp of opportunities. We start from the observable contrast between the chaotic universe vs. our orderly inner world, the noumenal cosmos. So far, (...) philosophy has been rehearsing our thoughts, our human-internal world, a grand painting of the outer world, how we comprehend subjectively our experience, worked up by the logos machine, but now we seek a wider horizon, how humans understand the world thanks to Darwinian evolution to adapt in response to the metaphysical gap, the chasm between the human animal and its environment, shaping the organism so it can deal with its variable world. This new horizon embraces global context coded in neural structures that support the noumenal cosmos, our inner mental world, for us as denizens of the outer environment. Kant’s inner and outer senses are fundamental ingredients of scientific philosophy. Several sections devoted to Heidegger, his lizard debunked, but his version of the metaphysical gap & his doctrine of the logos praised. Rorty and others of the behaviorist school discussed also. (shrink)

This is a Turing Machine which computes the exponential function f(x,y) = xˆy. Instructions format and operation of this machine are intended to best reflect the basic conditions outlined by Alan Turing in his On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem (1936), using the simplest single-tape and single-symbol version, in essence due to Kleene (1952) and Carnielli & Epstein (2008). This machine is composed by four basic task machines: one which checks if exponent y is zero, (...) a second which checks if base x is zero, a third that is able to copy the base, and a fourth able to multiply multiple factors (in this case, factors will be all equal). They were conveniently separated in order to ease the reader's task to understand each step of its operation. We adopt the convention that a number n is represented by a string of n+1 symbols "1". Thus, an entry (x, y) will be represented by two respective strings of x+1 and y+1 symbols "1", separated by a single "0" (or a blank), and as an output, this machine will generate a string of (xˆy)+1 symbols "1". Some of the instructions are followed by a brief description of what's going on. (shrink)

I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the universe as computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a single citation and so I present this very brief summary. Wolpert proved some stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are independent of the device doing the (...) class='Hi'>computation, and even independent of the laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior. They make use of Cantor's diagonalization, the liar paradox and worldlines to provide what may be the ultimate theorem in Turing Machine Theory, and seemingly provide insights into impossibility,incompleteness, the limits of computation,and the universe as computer, in all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms, generating, among other things,a non-quantum mechanical uncertainty principle and a proof of monotheism. (shrink)

In the 70 years since Alan Turing’s ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ appeared in Mind, there have been two widely-accepted interpretations of the Turing test: the canonical behaviourist interpretation and the rival inductive or epistemic interpretation. These readings are based on Turing’s Mind paper; few seem aware that Turing described two other versions of the imitation game. I have argued that both readings are inconsistent with Turing’s 1948 and 1952 statements about intelligence, and fail to explain (...) the design of his game. I argue instead for a response-dependence interpretation. This interpretation has implications for Turing’s view of free will: I argue that Turing’s writings suggest a new form of free will compatibilism, which I call response-dependence compatibilism. The philosophical implications of rethinking Turing’s test go yet further. It is assumed by numerous theorists that Turing anticipated the computational theory of mind. On the contrary, I argue, his remarks on intelligence and free will lead to a new objection to computationalism. (shrink)

I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the universe as computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a single citation and so I present this very brief summary. Wolpert proved some stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are independent of the device doing the (...) class='Hi'>computation, and even independent of the laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior. They make use of Cantor's diagonalization, the liar paradox and worldlines to provide what may be the ultimate theorem in Turing Machine Theory, and seemingly provide insights into impossibility, incompleteness, the limits of computation,and the universe as computer, in all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms, generating, among other things,a non- quantum mechanical uncertainty principle and a proof of monotheism. There are obvious connections to the classic work of Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov and Wittgenstein and to the notion that no program (and thus no device) can generate a sequence (or device) with greater complexity than it possesses. One might say this body of work implies atheism since there cannot be any entity more complex than the physical universe and from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint, ‘more complex’ is meaningless (has no conditions of satisfaction, i.e., truth-maker or test). Even a ‘God’ (i.e., a ‘device’ with limitless time/space and energy) cannot determine whether a given ‘number’ is ‘random’ nor can find a certain way to show that a given ‘formula’, ‘theorem’ or ‘sentence’ or ‘device’ (all these being complex language games) is part of a particular ‘system’. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016). For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

On a literal reading of `Computing Machinery and Intelligence'', Alan Turing presented not one, but two, practical tests to replace the question `Can machines think?'' He presented them as equivalent. I show here that the first test described in that much-discussed paper is in fact not equivalent to the second one, which has since become known as `the Turing Test''. The two tests can yield different results; it is the first, neglected test that provides the more appropriate indication (...) of intelligence. This is because the features of intelligence upon which it relies are resourcefulness and a critical attitude to one''s habitual responses; thus the test''s applicablity is not restricted to any particular species, nor does it presume any particular capacities. This is more appropriate because the question under consideration is what would count as machine intelligence. The first test realizes a possibility that philosophers have overlooked: a test that uses a human''s linguistic performance in setting an empirical test of intelligence, but does not make behavioral similarity to that performance the criterion of intelligence. Consequently, the first test is immune to many of the philosophical criticisms on the basis of which the (so-called) `Turing Test'' has been dismissed. (shrink)

Turing used the expression “emotional” in three distinct ways: to state his philosophical theory of the concept of intelligence, to classify arguments for and against the possibility of machine intelligence, and to describe the education of a “child machine”. The remarks on emotion include several of the most important philosophical claims. This paper analyses these remarks and their significance for current research in Artificial Intelligence.

Ich habe viele kürzliche Diskussionen über die Grenzen der Berechnung und das Universum als Computer gelesen, in der Hoffnung, einige Kommentare über die erstaunliche Arbeit des Polymath Physikers und Entscheidungstheoretikers David Wolpert zu finden, aber habe kein einziges Zitat gefunden und so präsentiere ich diese sehr kurze Zusammenfassung. Wolpert bewies einige verblüffende Unmöglichkeit oder Unvollständigkeit Theoreme (1992 bis 2008-siehe arxiv dot org) über die Grenzen der Schlussfolgerung (Berechnung), die so allgemein sind, dass sie unabhängig von dem Gerät, das die Berechnung, (...) und sogar unabhängig von den Gesetzen der Physik, so dass sie für Computer, Physik und menschliches Verhalten gelten. Sie nutzen Cantors Diagonalisierung, das Lügner-Paradoxon und die Weltlinien, um das vielleicht ultimative Theorem in turing Machine Theory zu liefern, und geben scheinbar Einblicke in Unmöglichkeit, Unvollständigkeit, die Grenzen der Berechnung und das Universum als Computer, in alle möglichen Universen und alle Wesen oder Mechanismen, was unter anderem ein nicht quantenmechanisches Unsicherheitsprinzip und einen Beweis für Monotheismus erzeugt. Es gibt offensichtliche Verbindungen zum klassischen Werk von Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov und Wittgenstein und zu der Vorstellung, dass kein Programm (und damit kein Gerät) eine Sequenz (oder ein Gerät) mit größerer Komplexität erzeugen kann, als es besitzt. Man könnte sagen, dass dieses Werk den Atheismus impliziert, da es keine Entität geben kann, die komplexer ist als das physikalische Universum, und aus Wittgensteins Sicht ist "komplexer" bedeutungslos (hat keine Bedingungen der Befriedigung, d.h. Wahrheitsmacher oder Test). Selbst ein "Gott" (das heist ein "Gerät" mit unbegrenzter Zeit/Raum und Energie) kann weder bestimmen, ob eine bestimmte "Zahl" "zufällig"ist, noch einen bestimmten Weg finden, um nachzuweisen, dass eine bestimmte "Formel", "Satz" oder "Satz" oder "Gerät" (alles komplexe Sprachspiele) Teil eines bestimmten "Systems" ist. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 2nd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

Why are we so many? Or, in other words, Why is our species so successful? The ultimate cause of our success as species is that we, Homo sapiens, are the first and the only Turing complete species. Turing completeness is the capacity of some hardware to compute by software whatever hardware can compute. To reach the answer, I propose to see evolution and computing from the problem solving point of view. Then, solving more problems is evolutionarily better, computing (...) is for solving problems, and software is much cheaper than hardware, resulting that Turing completeness is evolutionarily disruptive. This conclusion, together with the fact that we are the only Turing complete species, is the reason that explains why we are so many. Most of our unique cognitive characteristics as humans can be derived from being Turing complete, as for example our complete language and our problem solving creativity. (shrink)

Due to his significant role in the development of computer technology and the discipline of artificial intelligence, Alan Turing has supposedly subscribed to the theory of mind that has been greatly inspired by the power of the said technology which has eventually become the dominant framework for current researches in artificial intelligence and cognitive science, namely, computationalism or the computational theory of mind. In this essay, I challenge this supposition. In particular, I will try to show that there is (...) no evidence in Turing’s two seminal works that supports such a supposition. His 1936 paper is all about the notion of computation or computability as it applies to mathematical functions and not to the nature or workings of intelligence. On the other hand, while his 1950 work is about intelligence, it is, however, particularly concerned with the problem of whether intelligence can be attributed to computing machines and not of whether computationality can be attributed to human intelligence or to intelligence in general. (shrink)

This work addresses a broad range of questions which belong to four fields: computation theory, general philosophy of science, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of mind. Dynamical system theory provides the framework for a unified treatment of these questions. ;The main goal of this dissertation is to propose a new view of the aims and methods of cognitive science--the dynamical approach . According to this view, the object of cognitive science is a particular set of dynamical systems, which (...) I call "cognitive systems". The goal of a cognitive study is to specify a dynamical model of a cognitive system, and then use this model to produce a detailed account of the specific cognitive abilities of that system. The dynamical approach does not limit a-priori the form of the dynamical models which cognitive science may consider. In particular, this approach is compatible with both computational and connectionist modeling, for both computational systems and connectionist networks are special types of dynamical systems. ;To substantiate these methodological claims about cognitive science, I deal first with two questions in two different fields: What is a computational system? What is a dynamical explanation of a deterministic process? ;Intuitively, a computational system is a deterministic system which evolves in discrete time steps, and which can be described in an effective way. In chapter 1, I give a formal definition of this concept which employs the notions of isomorphism between dynamical systems, and of Turing computable function. In chapter 2, I propose a more comprehensive analysis which is based on a natural generalization of the concept of Turing machine. ;The goal of chapter 3 is to develop a theory of the dynamical explanation of a deterministic process. By a "dynamical explanation" I mean the specification of a dynamical model of the system or process which we want to explain. I start from the analysis of a specific type of explanandum--dynamical phenomena--and I then use this analysis to shed light on the general form of a dynamical explanation. Finally, I analyze the structure of those theories which generate explanations of this form, namely dynamical theories. (shrink)

I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the universe as computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a single citation and so I present this very brief summary. Wolpert proved some stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv dot org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are independent of the device doing (...) the computation, and even independent of the laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior. They make use of Cantor's diagonalization, the liar paradox and worldlines to provide what may be the ultimate theorem in Turing Machine Theory, and seemingly provide insights into impossibility, incompleteness, the limits of computation, and the universe as computer, in all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms, generating, among other things, a non- quantum mechanical uncertainty principle and a proof of monotheism. There are obvious connections to the classic work of Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov and Wittgenstein and to the notion that no program (and thus no device) can generate a sequence (or device) with greater complexity than it possesses. One might say this body of work implies atheism since there cannot be any entity more complex than the physical universe and from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint, ‘more complex’ is meaningless (has no conditions of satisfaction, i.e., truth-maker or test). Even a ‘God’ (i.e., a ‘device’with limitless time/space and energy) cannot determine whether a given ‘number’ is ‘random’, nor find a certain way to show that a given ‘formula’, ‘theorem’ or ‘sentence’ or ‘device’ (all these being complex language games) is part of a particular ‘system’. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 2nd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

In the classical Turing test, participants are challenged to tell whether they are interacting with another human being or with a machine. The way the interaction takes place is not direct, but a distant conversation through computer screen messages. Basic forms of interaction are face-to-face and embodied, context-dependent and based on the detection of reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Our idea is that interaction detection requires the integration of proprioceptive and interoceptive patterns with sensorimotor patterns, within quite short time lapses, so (...) that they appear as mutually contingent, as reciprocal. In other words, the experience of interaction takes place when sensorimotor patterns are contingent upon one’s own movements, and vice versa. I react to your movement, you react to mine. When I notice both components, I come to experience an interaction. Therefore, we designed a “minimal” Turing test to investigate how much information is required to detect these reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Using a new version of the perceptual crossing paradigm, we tested whether participants resorted to interaction detection to tell apart human from machine agents in repeated encounters with these agents. In two studies, we presented participants with movements of a human agent, either online or offline, and movements of a computerized oscillatory agent in three different blocks. In each block, either auditory or audiovisual feedback was provided along each trial. Analysis of participants’ explicit responses and of the implicit information subsumed in the dynamics of their series will reveal evidence that participants use the reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies within short time windows. For a machine to pass this minimal Turing test, it should be able to generate this sort of reciprocal contingencies. (shrink)

Turing’s much debated test has turned 70 and is still fairly controversial. His 1950 paper is seen as a complex and multilayered text, and key questions about it remain largely unanswered. Why did Turing select learning from experience as the best approach to achieve machine intelligence? Why did he spend several years working with chess playing as a task to illustrate and test for machine intelligence only to trade it out for conversational question-answering in 1950? Why did (...) class='Hi'>Turing refer to gender imitation in a test for machine intelligence? In this article, I shall address these questions by unveiling social, historical and epistemological roots of the so-called Turing test. I will draw attention to a historical fact that has been only scarcely observed in the secondary literature thus far, namely that Turing’s 1950 test emerged out of a controversy over the cognitive capabilities of digital computers, most notably out of debates with physicist and computer pioneer Douglas Hartree, chemist and philosopher Michael Polanyi, and neurosurgeon Geoffrey Jefferson. Seen in its historical context, Turing’s 1950 paper can be understood as essentially a reply to a series of challenges posed to him by these thinkers arguing against his view that machines can think. Turing did propose gender learning and imitation as one of his various imitation tests for machine intelligence, and I argue here that this was done in response to Jefferson's suggestion that gendered behavior is causally related to the physiology of sex hormones. (shrink)

The Turing Test (TT), the Chinese Room Argument (CRA), and the Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP) are about the question “can machines think?” We propose to look at these approaches to Artificial Intelligence (AI) by showing that they all address the possibility for Artificial Agents (AAs) to generate meaningful information (meanings) as we humans do. The initial question about thinking machines is then reformulated into “can AAs generate meanings like humans do?” We correspondingly present the TT, the CRA and the (...) SGP as being about generation of human-like meanings. We model and address such possibility by using the Meaning Generator System (MGS) where a system submitted to an internal constraint generates a meaning in order to satisfy the constraint. The system approach of the MGS allows comparing meaning generations in animals, humans and AAs. The comparison shows that in order to have AAs capable of generating human-like meanings, we need the AAs to carry human constraints. And transferring human constraints to AAs raises concerns coming from the unknown natures of life and human mind which are at the root of human constraints. Implications for the TT, the CRA and the SGP are highlighted. It is shown that designing AAs capable of thinking like humans needs an understanding about the natures of life and human mind that we do not have today. Following an evolutionary approach, we propose as a first entry point an investigation about the possibility for extending a “stay alive” constraint into AAs. Ethical concerns are raised from the relations between human constraints and human values. Continuations are proposed. (This paper is an extended version of the proceedings of an AISB/IACAP 2012 presentation). (shrink)

Any computer can create a model of reality. The hypothesis that quantum computer can generate such a model designated as quantum, which coincides with the modeled reality, is discussed. Its reasons are the theorems about the absence of “hidden variables” in quantum mechanics. The quantum modeling requires the axiom of choice. The following conclusions are deduced from the hypothesis. A quantum model unlike a classical model can coincide with reality. Reality can be interpreted as a quantum computer. The physical processes (...) represent computations of the quantum computer. Quantum information is the real fundament of the world. The conception of quantum computer unifies physics and mathematics and thus the material and the ideal world. Quantum computer is a non-Turing machine in principle. Any quantum computing can be interpreted as an infinite classical computational process of a Turing machine. Quantum computer introduces the notion of “actually infinite computational process”. The discussed hypothesis is consistent with all quantum mechanics. The conclusions address a form of neo-Pythagoreanism: Unifying the mathematical and physical, quantum computer is situated in an intermediate domain of their mutual transformation. (shrink)

Ho letto molte recenti discussioni sui limiti del calcolo e dell'universo come computer, sperando di trovare alcuni commenti sull'incredibile lavoro del fisico polimatematico e del teorista delle decisioni David Wolpert, ma non ho trovato una sola citazione e quindi presento questo brevissimo riassunto. Wolpert si dimostrò una straordinaria impossibilità o incompletezza teoremi (1992-2008-see arxiv dot org) sui limiti dell'inferenza (calcolo) che sono così generali che sono indipendenti dal dispositivo che fa il calcolo, e anche indipendenti dalle leggi della fisica, in (...) modo che si applichino tra computer, fisica e comportamento umano. Fanno uso della diagonalizzazione di Cantor, del paradosso bugiardo e delle linee del mondo per fornire quello che potrebbe essere il teorema definitivo nella Teoria delle Macchine di Turing, e apparentemente forniscono intuizioni sull'impossibilità, l'incompletezza, i limiti del calcolo, e l'universo come computer, in tutti gli universi possibili e in tutti gli esseri o meccanismi, generando, tra le altre cose, un principio di incertezza meccanica non quantistica e una prova di monoteismo. Ci sono evidenti connessioni con l'opera classica di Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov e Wittgenstein e alla nozione che nessun programma (e quindi nessun dispositivo) può generare una sequenza (o dispositivo) con maggiore complessità di quella che possiede. Si potrebbe dire che questo corpo di lavoro implica l'ateismo poiché non può esserci alcuna entità più complessa dell'universo fisico e dal punto di vista della Wittgensteinian, "più complesso" non ha senso (non ha condizioni di soddisfazione, cioè, creatore di verità o test). Anche un 'Dio' (cioè un 'dispositivo'con tempo/spazio illimitato ed energia) non può, determinare se un dato "numero" è 'casuale', né trovare un modo per dimostrare che una determinata "formula", "teorema" o "sentenza" o "dispositivo" (tutti questi sono giochi linguistici complessi) fa parte di un particolare "sistema". Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019nd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Philosophical discussion of Alan Turing’s writings on intelligence has mostly revolved around a single point made in a paper published in the journal Mind in 1950. This is unfortunate, for Turing’s reflections on machine (artificial) intelligence, human intelligence, and the relation between them were more extensive and sophisticated. They are seen to be extremely well-considered and sound in retrospect. Recently, IBM developed a question-answering computer (Watson) that could compete against humans on the game show Jeopardy! There are hopes (...) it can be adapted to other contexts besides that game show, in the role of a collaborator of, rather than a competitor to, humans. Another, different, research project—an artificial intelligence program put into operation in 2010—is the machine learning program NELL (Never Ending Language Learning), which continuously ‘learns’ by ‘reading’ massive amounts of material on millions of web pages. Both of these recent endeavors in artificial intelligence rely to some extent on the integration of human guidance and feedback at various points in the machine’s learning process. In this paper, I examine Turing’s remarks on the development of intelligence used in various kinds of search, in light of the experience gained to date on these projects. (shrink)

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century there has been an increasing awareness that software rep- resents a blind spot in new media theory. The growing interest in software also influences the argument in this paper, which sets out from the assumption that Alan M. Turing's concept of the universal machine, the first theoretical description of a computer program, is a kind of bachelor machine. Previous writings based on a similar hypothesis have focused either on a comparison of the (...) universal machine and the bachelor machine in terms of the similarities of their structural features, or they have taken the bachelor machine as a metaphor for a man or a computer. Unlike them, this paper stresses the importance of the con- text as a key to interpreting the universal Turing machine as a bachelor machine and, potentially, as a self-portrait. (shrink)

This article offers comprehensive criticism of the Turing test and develops quality criteria for new artificial general intelligence (AGI) assessment tests. It is shown that the prerequisites A. Turing drew upon when reducing personality and human consciousness to “suitable branches of thought” re-flected the engineering level of his time. In fact, the Turing “imitation game” employed only symbolic communication and ignored the physical world. This paper suggests that by restricting thinking ability to symbolic systems alone Turing (...) unknowingly constructed “the wall” that excludes any possi-bility of transition from a complex observable phenomenon to an abstract image or concept. It is, therefore, sensible to factor in new requirements for AI (artificial intelligence) maturity assessment when approaching the Tu-ring test. Such AI must support all forms of communication with a human being, and it should be able to comprehend abstract images and specify con-cepts as well as participate in social practices. (shrink)

In computational complexity theory, decision problems are divided into complexity classes based on the amount of computational resources it takes for algorithms to solve them. In theoretical computer science, it is commonly accepted that only functions for solving problems in the complexity class P, solvable by a deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time, are considered to be tractable. In cognitive science and philosophy, this tractability result has been used to argue that only functions in P can feasibly work as (...) computational models of human cognitive capacities. One interesting area of computational complexity theory is descriptive complexity, which connects the expressive strength of systems of logic with the computational complexity classes. In descriptive complexity theory, it is established that only first-order (classical) systems are connected to P, or one of its subclasses. Consequently, second-order systems of logic are considered to be computationally intractable, and may therefore seem to be unfit to model human cognitive capacities. This would be problematic when we think of the role of logic as the foundations of mathematics. In order to express many important mathematical concepts and systematically prove theorems involving them, we need to have a system of logic stronger than classical first-order logic. But if such a system is considered to be intractable, it means that the logical foundation of mathematics can be prohibitively complex for human cognition. In this paper I will argue, however, that this problem is the result of an unjustified direct use of computational complexity classes in cognitive modelling. Placing my account in the recent literature on the topic, I argue that the problem can be solved by considering computational complexity for humanly relevant problem solving algorithms and input sizes. (shrink)

The article deals with some ideas by Turing concerning the background and the birth of the well-known Turing Test, showing the evolution of the main question proposed by Turing on thinking machine. The notions he used, especially that one of imitation, are not so much exactly defined and shaped, but for this very reason they have had a deep impact in artificial intelligence and cognitive science research from an epistemological point of view. Then, it is suggested that (...) the fundamental concept involved in Turing’s imitation game, conceived as a test for detecting the presence of intelligence in an artificial entity, is the concept of interaction, that Turing adopts in a wider, more intuitive and more fruitful sense than the one that is proper to the current research in interactive computing. (shrink)

The problem of emergence in physical theories makes necessary to build a general theory of the relationships between the observed system and the observing system. It can be shown that there exists a correspondence between classical systems and computational dynamics according to the Shannon-Turing model. A classical system is an informational closed system with respect to the observer; this characterizes the emergent processes in classical physics as phenomenological emergence. In quantum systems, the analysis based on the computation theory (...) fails. It is here shown that a quantum system is an informational open system with respect to the observer and able to exhibit processes of observational, radical emergence. Finally, we take into consideration the role of computation in describing the physical world. (shrink)

This paper argues that the idea of a computer is unique. Calculators and analog computers are not different ideas about computers, and nature does not compute by itself. Computers, once clearly defined in all their terms and mechanisms, rather than enumerated by behavioral examples, can be more than instrumental tools in science, and more than source of analogies and taxonomies in philosophy. They can help us understand semantic content and its relation to form. This can be achieved because they have (...) the potential to do more than calculators, which are computers that are designed not to learn. Today’s computers are not designed to learn; rather, they are designed to support learning; therefore, any theory of content tested by computers that currently exist must be of an empirical, rather than a formal nature. If they are designed someday to learn, we will see a change in roles, requiring an empirical theory about the Turing architecture’s content, using the primitives of learning machines. This way of thinking, which I call the intensional view of computers, avoids the problems of analogies between minds and computers. It focuses on the constitutive properties of computers, such as showing clearly how they can help us avoid the infinite regress in interpretation, and how we can clarify the terms of the suggested mechanisms to facilitate a useful debate. Within the intensional view, syntax and content in the context of computers become two ends of physically realizing correspondence problems in various domains. (shrink)

Pattern recognition is represented as the limit, to which an infinite Turing process converges. A Turing machine, in which the bits are substituted with qubits, is introduced. That quantum Turing machine can recognize two complementary patterns in any data. That ability of universal pattern recognition is interpreted as an intellect featuring any quantum computer. The property is valid only within a quantum computer: To utilize it, the observer should be sited inside it. Being outside it, the observer (...) would obtain quite different result depending on the degree of the entanglement of the quantum computer and observer. All extraordinary properties of a quantum computer are due to involving a converging infinite computational process contenting necessarily both a continuous advancing calculation and a leap to the limit. Three types of quantum computation can be distinguished according to whether the series is a finite one, an infinite rational or irrational number. (shrink)

The main goal of this essay is to demonstrate the creativity of computational systems (both living and non-living) through a philosophical interpretation of Alan Turing's halting theorem. The first part consists of a brief genealogy of studies focused on the analogy between humans and machines, with a specific focus on the issue of creativity. It aims to show how, since the publication of Turing's 1950 paper Computing Machinery and Intelligence, a subjectivist approach has become dominant in these studies—namely, (...) the tendency to shift the locus of inquiry into machine intelligence and creativity from the machines themselves to their observers, inferring the potential of the former from the latter’s reactions of surprise. We will demonstrate how this approach has, over time, downplayed the question of whether machines are genuinely creative (as explored by Boden) and has instead anchored research on the premise that creativity lies in the eyes of the beholder (as proposed by Ritchie. As an alternative to this approach, the second part will attempt to revive an objectivist perspective, showing how it is possible—once again drawing on Turing—to argue for the real creativity of machines. However, this will be done by leveraging the important philosophical implications of the logical-mathematical results Turing achieved in his 1936 paper on computable numbers. In the conclusion, the essay will propose identifying the equivalent of real machine creativity in the human ability to take one thing for another—a concept described by Cornelius Castoriadis as a quid pro quo intrinsic to language understood as a code. This ability enables individuals to consistently align experiential data with their own rules. (shrink)

This paper is a follow-up of the first part of the persons reply to the Chinese Room Argument. The first part claims that the mental properties of the person appearing in that argument are what matter to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper tries to discern what those mental properties are by applying a series of hypothetical psychological and strengthened Turing tests to the person, and argues that the results support the thesis that the Man performing the (...) computations characteristic of understanding Chinese actually understands Chinese. The supposition that the Man does not understand Chinese has gone virtually unquestioned in this foundational debate. The persons reply acknowledges the intuitive power behind that supposition, but knows that brute intuitions are not epistemically sacrosanct. Like many intuitions humans have had, and later deposed, this intuition does not withstand experimental scrutiny. The second part of the persons reply consequently holds that computational cognitive science is confirmed by the Chinese Room thought experiment. (shrink)

The recent debate on hypercomputation has raised new questions both on the computational abilities of quantum systems and the Church-Turing Thesis role in Physics.We propose here the idea of “effective physical process” as the essentially physical notion of computation. By using the Bohm and Hiley active information concept we analyze the differences between the standard form (quantum gates) and the non-standard one (adiabatic and morphogenetic) of Quantum Computing, and we point out how its Super-Turing potentialities derive from (...) an incomputable information source in accordance with Bell’s constraints. On condition that we give up the formal concept of “universality”, the possibility to realize quantum oracles is reachable. In this way computation is led back to the logic of physical world. (shrink)

This paper concerns “human symbolic output,” or strings of characters produced by humans in our various symbolic systems; e.g., sentences in a natural language, mathematical propositions, and so on. One can form a set that consists of all of the strings of characters that have been produced by at least one human up to any given moment in human history. We argue that at any particular moment in human history, even at moments in the distant future, this set is finite. (...) But then, given fundamental results in recursion theory, the set will also be recursive, recursively enumerable, axiomatizable, and could be the output of a Turing machine. We then argue that it is impossible to produce a string of symbols that humans could possibly produce but no Turing machine could. Moreover, we show that any given string of symbols that we could produce could also be the output of a Turing machine. Our arguments have implications for Hilbert’s sixth problem and the possibility of axiomatizing particular sciences, they undermine at least two distinct arguments against the possibility of Artificial Intelligence, and they entail that expert systems that are the equals of human experts are possible, and so at least one of the goals of Artificial Intelligence can be realized, at least in principle. (shrink)

Saul Kripke once noted that there is a tight connection between computation and de re knowledge of whatever the computation acts upon. For example, the Euclidean algorithm can produce knowledge of which number is the greatest common divisor of two numbers. Arguably, algorithms operate directly on syntactic items, such as strings, and on numbers and the like only via how the numbers are represented. So we broach matters of notation. The purpose of this article is to explore the (...) relationship between the notations acceptable for computation, the usual idealizations involved in theories of computability, flowing from Alan Turing’s monumental work, and de re propositional attitudes toward numbers and other mathematical objects. (shrink)

An important lesson that philosophy can learn from the Turing Test and computer science more generally concerns the careful use of the method of Levels of Abstraction (LoA). In this paper, the method is first briefly summarised. The constituents of the method are “observables”, collected together and moderated by predicates restraining their “behaviour”. The resulting collection of sets of observables is called a “gradient of abstractions” and it formalises the minimum consistency conditions that the chosen abstractions must satisfy. Two (...) useful kinds of gradient of abstraction – disjoint and nested – are identified. It is then argued that in any discrete (as distinct from analogue) domain of discourse, a complex phenomenon may be explicated in terms of simple approximations organised together in a gradient of abstractions. Thus, the method replaces, for discrete disciplines, the differential and integral calculus, which form the basis for understanding the complex analogue phenomena of science and engineering. The result formalises an approach that is rather common in computer science but has hitherto found little application in philosophy. So the philosophical value of the method is demonstrated by showing how making the LoA of discourse explicit can be fruitful for phenomenological and conceptual analysis. To this end, the method is applied to the Turing Test, the concept of agenthood, the definition of emergence, the notion of artificial life, quantum observation and decidable observation. It is hoped that this treatment will promote the use of the method in certain areas of the humanities and especially in philosophy. (shrink)

The claim has often been made that passing the Turing Test would not be sufficient to prove that a computer program was intelligent because a trivial program could do it, namely, the “Humongous-Table (HT) Program”, which simply looks up in a table what to say next. This claim is examined in detail. Three ground rules are argued for: (1) That the HT program must be exhaustive, and not be based on some vaguely imagined set of tricks. (2) That the (...) HT program must not be created by some set of sentient beings enacting responses to all possible inputs. (3) That in the current state of cognitive science it must be an open possibility that a computational model of the human mind will be developed that accounts for at least its nonphenomenological properties. Given ground rule 3, the HT program could simply be an “optimized” version of some computational model of a mind, created via the automatic application of program-transformation rules [thus satisfying ground rule 2]. Therefore, whatever mental states one would be willing to impute to an ordinary computational model of the human psyche one should be willing to grant to the optimized version as well. Hence no one could dismiss out of hand the possibility that the HT program was intelligent. This conclusion is important because the Humongous-Table Program Argument is the only argument ever marshalled against the sufficiency of the Turing Test, if we exclude arguments that cognitive science is simply not possible. (shrink)

This is the 3rd edition. Although a number of new technological applications require classical deductive computation with non-classical logics, many key technologies still do well—or exclusively, for that matter—with classical logic. In this first volume, we elaborate on classical deductive computing with classical logic. The objective of the main text is to provide the reader with a thorough elaboration on both classical computing – a.k.a. formal languages and automata theory – and classical deduction with the classical first-order predicate calculus (...) with a view to computational implementations, namely in automated theorem proving and logic programming. The present third edition improves on the previous ones by providing an altogether more algorithmic approach: There is now a wholly new section on algorithms and there are in total fourteen clearly isolated algorithms designed in pseudo-code. Other improvements are, for instance, an emphasis on functions in Chapter 1 and more exercises with Turing machines. (shrink)

The most cursory examination of the history of artificial intelligence highlights numerous egregious claims of its researchers, especially in relation to a populist form of ‘strong’ computationalism which holds that any suitably programmed computer instantiates genuine conscious mental states purely in virtue of carrying out a specific series of computations. The argument presented herein is a simple development of that originally presented in Putnam’s (Representation & Reality, Bradford Books, Cambridge in 1988 ) monograph, “Representation & Reality”, which if correct, has (...) important implications for turing machine functionalism and the prospect of ‘conscious’ machines. In the paper, instead of seeking to develop Putnam’s claim that, “everything implements every finite state automata”, I will try to establish the weaker result that, “everything implements the specific machine Q on a particular input set ( x )”. Then, equating Q ( x ) to any putative AI program, I will show that conceding the ‘strong AI’ thesis for Q (crediting it with mental states and consciousness) opens the door to a vicious form of panpsychism whereby all open systems, (e.g. grass, rocks etc.), must instantiate conscious experience and hence that disembodied minds lurk everywhere. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that whether or not a computer can be built that passes the Turing test is a central question in the philosophy of mind. Then I show that the possibility of building such a computer depends on open questions in the philosophy of computer science: the physical Church-Turing thesis and the extended Church-Turing thesis. I use the link between the issues identified in philosophy of mind and philosophy of computer science to respond to (...) a prominent argument against the possibility of building a machine that passes the Turing test. Finally, I respond to objections against the proposed link between questions in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of computer science. (shrink)

Computational functionalism posits that consciousness is a computation. Here we show, perhaps surprisingly, that it cannot be a Turing computation. Rather, computational functionalism implies that consciousness is a novel type of computation that has recently been proposed by Geoffrey Hinton, called mortal computation.

The paper investigates how the mathematical languages used to describe and to observe automatic computations influence the accuracy of the obtained results. In particular, we focus our attention on Single and Multi-tape Turing machines which are described and observed through the lens of a new mathematical language which is strongly based on three methodological ideas borrowed from Physics and applied to Mathematics, namely: the distinction between the object (we speak here about a mathematical object) of an observation and the (...) instrument used for this observation; interrelations holding between the object and the tool used for the observation; the accuracy of the observation determined by the tool. Results of the observation executed by the traditional and new languages are compared and discussed. (shrink)

This paper commences from the critical observation that the Turing Test (TT) might not be best read as providing a definition or a genuine test of intelligence by proxy of a simulation of conversational behaviour. Firstly, the idea of a machine producing likenesses of this kind served a different purpose in Turing, namely providing a demonstrative simulation to elucidate the force and scope of his computational method, whose primary theoretical import lies within the realm of mathematics rather than (...) cognitive modelling. Secondly, it is argued that a certain bias in Turing’s computational reasoning towards formalism and methodological individualism contributed to systematically unwarranted interpretations of the role of the TT as a simulation of cognitive processes. On the basis of the conceptual distinction in biology between structural homology vs. functional analogy, a view towards alternate versions of the TT is presented that could function as investigative simulations into the emergence of communicative patterns oriented towards shared goals. Unlike the original TT, the purpose of these alternate versions would be co-ordinative rather than deceptive. On this level, genuine functional analogies between human and machine behaviour could arise in quasi-evolutionary fashion. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss the issue of the adequacy of the Minimum Intelligent Signal Test (MIST) as an alternative to the Turing Test. MIST has been proposed by Chris McKinstry as a better alternative to Turing’s original idea. Two of the main claims about MIST are that (1) MIST questions exploit commonsense knowledge and as a result are expected to be easy to answer for human beings and difficult for computer programs; and (...) that (2) the MIST design aims at eliminating the problem of the role of judges in the test. To discuss these design assumptions we will present Peter D. Turney’s PMI-IR algorithm which allows for MIST-type questions to be answered. We will also present and discuss the results of our own study aimed at the judge problem for MIST. (shrink)

This volume offers very selected papers from the 2014 conference of the “International Association for Computing and Philosophy” (IACAP) - a conference tradition of 28 years. - - - Table of Contents - 0 Vincent C. Müller: - Editorial - 1) Philosophy of computing - 1 Çem Bozsahin: - What is a computational constraint? - 2 Joe Dewhurst: - Computing Mechanisms and Autopoietic Systems - 3 Vincenzo Fano, Pierluigi Graziani, Roberto Macrelli and Gino Tarozzi: - Are Gandy Machines really local? (...) - 4 Doukas Kapantais: - A refutation of the Church-Turing thesis according to some interpretation of what the thesis says - 5 Paul Schweizer: - In What Sense Does the Brain Compute? - 2) Philosophy of computer science & discovery - 6 Mark Addis, Peter Sozou, Peter C R Lane and Fernand Gobet: - Computational Scientific Discovery and Cognitive Science Theories - 7 Nicola Angius and Petros Stefaneas: - Discovering Empirical Theories of Modular Software Systems. An Algebraic Approach. - 8 Selmer Bringsjord, John Licato, Daniel Arista, Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu and Paul Bello: - Introducing the Doxastically Centered Approach to Formalizing Relevance Bonds in Conditionals - 9 Orly Stettiner: - From Silico to Vitro: - Computational Models of Complex Biological Systems Reveal Real-world Emergent Phenomena - 3) Philosophy of cognition & intelligence - 10 Douglas Campbell: - Why We Shouldn’t Reason Classically, and the Implications for Artificial Intelligence - 11 Stefano Franchi: - Cognition as Higher Order Regulation - 12 Marcello Guarini: - Eliminativisms, Languages of Thought, & the Philosophy of Computational Cognitive Modeling - 13 Marcin Miłkowski: - A Mechanistic Account of Computational Explanation in Cognitive Science and Computational Neuroscience - 14 Alex Tillas: - Internal supervision & clustering: - A new lesson from ‘old’ findings? - 4) Computing & society - 15 Vasileios Galanos: - Floridi/Flusser: - Parallel Lives in Hyper/Posthistory - 16 Paul Bello: - Machine Ethics and Modal Psychology - 17 Marty J. Wolf and Nir Fresco: - My Liver Is Broken, Can You Print Me a New One? - 18 Marty J. Wolf, Frances Grodzinsky and Keith W. Miller: - Robots, Ethics and Software – FOSS vs. Proprietary Licenses. (shrink)

Las máquinas aceleradas de Turing (ATMs) son dispositivos capaces de ejecutar súper-tareas. Sin embargo, el simple ejercicio de definirlas ha generado varias paradojas. En el presente artículo se definirán las nociones de súper-tarea y ATM de manera exhaustiva y se aclarará qué debe entenderse en un contexto lógico-formal cuando se pregunta por la existencia de un objeto. A partir de la distinción entre posibilidades lógicas y físicas se disolverán las paradojas y se concluirá que las ATMs son posibles y (...) existen como objetos abstractos. (shrink)

For many years now, Harnad has argued that transduction is special among cognitive capacities -- special enough to block Searle's Chinese Room Argument. His arguments (as well as Searle's) have been important and useful, but not correct, it seems to me. Their arguments have provided the modern impetus for getting clear about computationalism and the nature of computing. This task has proven to be quite difficult. Which is simply to say that dealing with Harnad's arguments (as well as Searle's) has (...) been difficult. Turing, it turns out, only got us started. But Harnad's (and Searle's) arguments ultimately fail. Turing, it turns out, was on the right track. (shrink)

Natural argument is represented as the limit, to which an infinite Turing process converges. A Turing machine, in which the bits are substituted with qubits, is introduced. That quantum Turing machine can recognize two complementary natural arguments in any data. That ability of natural argument is interpreted as an intellect featuring any quantum computer. The property is valid only within a quantum computer: To utilize it, the observer should be sited inside it. Being outside it, the observer (...) would obtain quite different result depending on the degree of the entanglement of the quantum computer and observer. All extraordinary properties of a quantum computer are due to involving a converging infinite computational process contenting necessarily both a continuous advancing calculation and a leap to the limit. Three types of quantum computation can be distinguished according to whether the series is a finite one, an infinite rational or irrational number. -/- . (shrink)