Results for 'computational mind'

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  1.  94
    Tractability and the Computational Mind.Rineke Verbrugge & Jakub Szymanik - 2018 - In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. Oxford, UK: pp. 339-353.
    We overview logical and computational explanations of the notion of tractability as applied in cognitive science. We start by introducing the basics of mathematical theories of complexity: computability theory, computational complexity theory, and descriptive complexity theory. Computational philosophy of mind often identifies mental algorithms with computable functions. However, with the development of programming practice it has become apparent that for some computable problems finding effective algorithms is hardly possible. Some problems need too much computational resource, (...)
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  2. Climbing to Consciousness: The Mind-Body Problem and the Computational Order.Trent Eady - 2009 - Res Cogitans 6 (1).
    In his book "The Structure of Behavior", the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty proposes a solution to the mind-body problem. Merleau-Ponty argues that there is a nested hierarchy of three orders—the physical order, the biological order, and the mental order—in which each lower order composes each higher order. Through the structuration or organization of a lower order, a higher order is created. Merleau-Ponty’s solution is promising, but it leaves an explanatory chasm between the biological order and the mental order that cannot (...)
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  3. Searle's and Penrose's Non-Computational Frameworks for Naturalizing the Mind.Napoleon Mabaquiao Jr - unknown
    John Searle and Roger Penrose are two staunch critics of computationalism who nonetheless believe that with the right framework the mind can be naturalized. While they may be successful in showing the shortcomings of computationalism, I argue that their alternative non-computational frameworks equally fail to carry out the project to naturalize the mind. The main reason is their failure to resolve some fundamental incompatibilities between mind and science. Searle tries to resolve the incompatibility between the subjectivity (...)
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  4. Fodor’s Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of Mind.Kirk Ludwig & Susan Schneider - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):123–143.
    In The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way, Jerry Fodor argues that mental representations have context sensitive features relevant to cognition, and that, therefore, the Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is mistaken. We call this the Globality Argument. This is an in principle argument against CTM. We argue that it is self-defeating. We consider an alternative argument constructed from materials in the discussion, which avoids the pitfalls of the official argument. We argue that it is also unsound (...)
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  5. Two Concepts of "Form" and the so-Called Computational Theory of Mind.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):795-821.
    According to the computational theory of mind , to think is to compute. But what is meant by the word 'compute'? The generally given answer is this: Every case of computing is a case of manipulating symbols, but not vice versa - a manipulation of symbols must be driven exclusively by the formal properties of those symbols if it is qualify as a computation. In this paper, I will present the following argument. Words like 'form' and 'formal' are (...)
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  6. Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind: A Defense of Content-Internalism and Semantic Externalism.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2007 - John Benjamins & Co.
    Contemporary philosophy and theoretical psychology are dominated by an acceptance of content-externalism: the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively, as opposed to causally, dependent on facts about the external world. In the present work, it is shown that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between semantics and pre-semantics---between, on the one hand, the literal meanings of expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must exploit in order to ascertain their literal meanings. It is (...)
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  7. The Central System as a Computational Engine.Susan Schneider - unknown
    The Language of Thought program has a suicidal edge. Jerry Fodor, of all people, has argued that although LOT will likely succeed in explaining modular processes, it will fail to explain the central system, a subsystem in the brain in which information from the different sense modalities is integrated, conscious deliberation occurs, and behavior is planned. A fundamental characteristic of the central system is that it is “informationally unencapsulated” -- its operations can draw from information from any cognitive domain. The (...)
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  8. The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation in Its Place.Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin, Anco Peeters & Farid Zahnoun - 2018 - In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. London: Routledge. pp. 272-282.
    The mainstream view in cognitive science is that computation lies at the basis of and explains cognition. Our analysis reveals that there is no compelling evidence or argument for thinking that brains compute. It makes the case for inverting the explanatory order proposed by the computational basis of cognition thesis. We give reasons to reverse the polarity of standard thinking on this topic, and ask how it is possible that computation, natural and artificial, might be based on cognition and (...)
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  9.  71
    Cognition as Embodied Morphological Computation.Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic - 2018 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017. Springer.
    Cognitive science is considered to be the study of mind (consciousness and thought) and intelligence in humans. Under such definition variety of unsolved/unsolvable problems appear. This article argues for a broad understanding of cognition based on empirical results from i.a. natural sciences, self-organization, artificial intelligence and artificial life, network science and neuroscience, that apart from the high level mental activities in humans, includes sub-symbolic and sub-conscious processes, such as emotions, recognizes cognition in other living beings as well as extended (...)
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  10. The Unsolvability of the Mind-Body Problem Liberates the Will.Scheffel Jan - manuscript
    The mind-body problem is analyzed in a physicalist perspective. By combining the concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment employing a basic nonlinear process, it is argued that epistemically strongly emergent properties may develop in a physical system. A comparison with the significantly more complex neural network of the brain shows that also consciousness is epistemically emergent in a strong sense. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness appears not possible; the mind-body problem does not have (...)
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  11. Cognitive Computation Sans Representation.Paul Schweizer - 2017 - In Thomas Powers (ed.), Philosophy and Computing: Essays in epistemology, philosophy of mind, logic, and ethics,. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 65-84.
    The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) holds that cognitive processes are essentially computational, and hence computation provides the scientific key to explaining mentality. The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) holds that representational content is the key feature in distinguishing mental from non-mental systems. I argue that there is a deep incompatibility between these two theoretical frameworks, and that the acceptance of CTM provides strong grounds for rejecting RTM. The focal point of the incompatibility is the fact (...)
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  12. The Swapping Constraint.Henry Schiller - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (3):605-622.
    Triviality arguments against the computational theory of mind claim that computational implementation is trivial and thus does not serve as an adequate metaphysical basis for mental states. It is common to take computational implementation to consist in a mapping from physical states to abstract computational states. In this paper, I propose a novel constraint on the kinds of physical states that can implement computational states, which helps to specify what it is for two physical (...)
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  13.  62
    Triviality Arguments Reconsidered.Paul Schweizer - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):287-308.
    Opponents of the computational theory of mind have held that the theory is devoid of explanatory content, since whatever computational procedures are said to account for our cognitive attributes will also be realized by a host of other ‘deviant’ physical systems, such as buckets of water and possibly even stones. Such ‘triviality’ claims rely on a simple mapping account of physical implementation. Hence defenders of CTM traditionally attempt to block the trivialization critique by advocating additional constraints on (...)
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  14.  90
    Artificial Brains and Hybrid Minds.Paul Schweizer - 2017 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 81-91.
    The paper develops two related thought experiments exploring variations on an ‘animat’ theme. Animats are hybrid devices with both artificial and biological components. Traditionally, ‘components’ have been construed in concrete terms, as physical parts or constituent material structures. Many fascinating issues arise within this context of hybrid physical organization. However, within the context of functional/computational theories of mentality, demarcations based purely on material structure are unduly narrow. It is abstract functional structure which does the key work in characterizing the (...)
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  15. Searle, Syntax, and Observer Relativity.Ronald P. Endicott - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):101-22.
    I critically examine some provocative arguments that John Searle presents in his book The Rediscovery of Mind to support the claim that the syntactic states of a classical computational system are "observer relative" or "mind dependent" or otherwise less than fully and objectively real. I begin by explaining how this claim differs from Searle's earlier and more well-known claim that the physical states of a machine, including the syntactic states, are insufficient to determine its semantics. In contrast, (...)
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  16. Formal Operations and Simulated Thought.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):221-234.
    A series of representations must be semantics-driven if the members of that series are to combine into a single thought: where semantics is not operative, there is at most a series of disjoint representations that add up to nothing true or false, and therefore do not constitute a thought at all. A consequence is that there is necessarily a gulf between simulating thought, on the one hand, and actually thinking, on the other. A related point is that a popular doctrine (...)
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  17. The Nature and Function of Content in Computational Models.Frances Egan - 2018 - In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. Routledge.
    Much of computational cognitive science construes human cognitive capacities as representational capacities, or as involving representation in some way. Computational theories of vision, for example, typically posit structures that represent edges in the distal scene. Neurons are often said to represent elements of their receptive fields. Despite the ubiquity of representational talk in computational theorizing there is surprisingly little consensus about how such claims are to be understood. The point of this chapter is to sketch an account (...)
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  18. Gestalt Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind.William Epstein & Gary Hatfield - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):163-181.
    The Gestalt psychologists adopted a set of positions on mind-body issues that seem like an odd mix. They sought to combine a version of naturalism and physiological reductionism with an insistence on the reality of the phenomenal and the attribution of meanings to objects as natural characteristics. After reviewing basic positions in contemporary philosophy of mind, we examine the Gestalt position, characterizing it m terms of phenomenal realism and programmatic reductionism. We then distinguish Gestalt philosophy of mind (...)
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  19. Psychological and Computational Models of Language Comprehension.David Pereplyotchik - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):31-72.
    In this paper, I argue for a modified version of what Devitt calls the Representational Thesis. According to RT, syntactic rules or principles are psychologically real, in the sense that they are represented in the mind/brain of every linguistically competent speaker/hearer. I present a range of behavioral and neurophysiological evidence for the claim that the human sentence processing mechanism constructs mental representations of the syntactic properties of linguistic stimuli. I then survey a range of psychologically plausible computational models (...)
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  20. Easy's Gettin' Harder All the Time: The Computational Theory and Affective States.Jason Megill & Jon Cogburn - 2005 - Ratio 18 (3):306-316.
    We argue that A. Damasio’s (1994) Somatic Marker hypothesis can explain why humans don’t generally suffer from the frame problem, arguably the greatest obstacle facing the Computational Theory of Mind. This involves showing how humans with damaged emotional centers are best understood as actually suffering from the frame problem. We are then able to show that, paradoxically, these results provide evidence for the Computational Theory of Mind, and in addition call into question the very distinction between (...)
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  21. Transcendence and the Elusive Science of the Mind.Napoleon M. Mabaquiao Jr - 2009 - Budhi: A Journal of Ideas and Culture 13 (1-3).
    This essay shows the presence of transcendence in the on-going attempt to come up with a purely scientific account of the workings of the human mind. At the center of the developmental stages of this attempt is the computational theory of mind, which regards the human mind as some kind of computer. With Wittgenstein’s analysis of the limits of linguistic representation in the Tractatus as a framework, it is argued that the various difficulties encountered by this (...)
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  22. Computers, Dynamical Systems, Phenomena, and the Mind.Marco Giunti - 1992 - Dissertation, Indiana University
    This work addresses a broad range of questions which belong to four fields: computation theory, general philosophy of science, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of mind. Dynamical system theory provides the framework for a unified treatment of these questions. ;The main goal of this dissertation is to propose a new view of the aims and methods of cognitive science--the dynamical approach . According to this view, the object of cognitive science is a particular set of dynamical systems, which (...)
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  23.  30
    The Emotional Mind: The Affective Roots of Culture and Cognition.Stephen Asma & Rami Gabriel - 2019 - Harvard University Press.
    Tracing the leading role of emotions in the evolution of the mind, a philosopher and a psychologist pair up to reveal how thought and culture owe less to our faculty for reason than to our capacity to feel. Many accounts of the human mind concentrate on the brain’s computational power. Yet, in evolutionary terms, rational cognition emerged only the day before yesterday. For nearly 200 million years before humans developed a capacity to reason, the emotional centers of (...)
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  24. Classical Computational Models.Richard Samuels - 2018 - In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. Oxford, UK: pp. 103-119.
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  25.  85
    Can a Computer Have a Religious Experience?Justin Charles Hite - manuscript
    A religious experience is a phenomenological occurrence which is interpreted by the perceiver in such a way as to affirm or strengthen the belief in a higher being or the beliefs of a particular religion. Religion and, therefore, religious experiences are primarily mental constructs. Computational theory of mind provides the strongest capabilities of applying mental activities to computers. However, cognitive science and philosophy needs to establish the link between beliefs and physical states in order for computational theory (...)
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  26. Direct Perception and the Predictive Mind.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3145-3164.
    Predictive approaches to the mind claim that perception, cognition, and action can be understood in terms of a single framework: a hierarchy of Bayesian models employing the computational strategy of predictive coding. Proponents of this view disagree, however, over the extent to which perception is direct on the predictive approach. I argue that we can resolve these disagreements by identifying three distinct notions of perceptual directness: psychological, metaphysical, and epistemological. I propose that perception is plausibly construed as psychologically (...)
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  27. Computation in Physical Systems: A Normative Mapping Account.Paul Schweizer - 2019 - In Matteo Vincenzo D'Alfonso & Don Berkich (eds.), On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence. Springer Verlag.
    The relationship between abstract formal procedures and the activities of actual physical systems has proved to be surprisingly subtle and controversial, and there are a number of competing accounts of when a physical system can be properly said to implement a mathematical formalism and hence perform a computation. I defend an account wherein computational descriptions of physical systems are high-level normative interpretations motivated by our pragmatic concerns. Furthermore, the criteria of utility and success vary according to our diverse purposes (...)
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  28. Functional Integration and the Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):315-328.
    Different cognitive functions recruit a number of different, often overlapping, areas of the brain. Theories in cognitive and computational neuroscience are beginning to take this kind of functional integration into account. The contributions to this special issue consider what functional integration tells us about various aspects of the mind such as perception, language, volition, agency, and reward. Here, I consider how and why functional integration may matter for the mind; I discuss a general theoretical framework, based on (...)
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  29. Natural Language Understanding: Methodological Conceptualization.Vitalii Shymko - 2019 - Psycholinguistics 25 (1):431-443.
    This article contains the results of a theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of natural language understanding (NLU), as a methodological problem. The combination of structural-ontological and informational-psychological approaches provided an opportunity to describe the subject matter field of NLU, as a composite function of the mind, which systemically combines the verbal and discursive structural layers. In particular, the idea of NLU is presented, on the one hand, as the relation between the discourse of a specific speech message and the (...)
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  30. Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Technology and Mental Mechanisms.Thomas Raleigh - 2018 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 22 (3):447-471.
    This article provides a survey of Wittgenstein’s remarks in which he discusses various kinds of technology. I argue that throughout his career, his use of technological examples displays a thematic unity: technologies are invoked in order to illustrate a certain mechanical conception of the mind. I trace how his use of such examples evolved as his views on the mind and on meaning changed. I also discuss an important and somewhat radical anti-mechanistic strain in his later thought and (...)
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  31. A Dialogue Concerning Two World Systems: Info-Computational Vs. Mechanistic.Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic & Vincent C. Müller - 2011 - In Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic & Mark Burgin (eds.), Information and computation: Essays on scientific and philosophical understanding of foundations of information and computation. World Scientific. pp. 149-184.
    The dialogue develops arguments for and against a broad new world system - info-computationalist naturalism - that is supposed to overcome the traditional mechanistic view. It would make the older mechanistic view into a special case of the new general info-computationalist framework (rather like Euclidian geometry remains valid inside a broader notion of geometry). We primarily discuss what the info-computational paradigm would mean, especially its pancomputationalist component. This includes the requirements for a the new generalized notion of computing that (...)
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  32. Semantics and the Computational Paradigm in Cognitive Psychology.Eric Dietrich - 1989 - Synthese 79 (1):119-141.
    There is a prevalent notion among cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind that computers are merely formal symbol manipulators, performing the actions they do solely on the basis of the syntactic properties of the symbols they manipulate. This view of computers has allowed some philosophers to divorce semantics from computational explanations. Semantic content, then, becomes something one adds to computational explanations to get psychological explanations. Other philosophers, such as Stephen Stich, have taken a stronger view, advocating doing (...)
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  33. Symbol Grounding in Computational Systems: A Paradox of Intentions.Vincent C. Müller - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):529-541.
    The paper presents a paradoxical feature of computational systems that suggests that computationalism cannot explain symbol grounding. If the mind is a digital computer, as computationalism claims, then it can be computing either over meaningful symbols or over meaningless symbols. If it is computing over meaningful symbols its functioning presupposes the existence of meaningful symbols in the system, i.e. it implies semantic nativism. If the mind is computing over meaningless symbols, no intentional cognitive processes are available prior (...)
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  34. Computational Theories of Conscious Experience: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.Gary Bartlett - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (2):195-209.
    Very plausibly, nothing can be a genuine computing system unless it meets an input-sensitivity requirement. Otherwise all sorts of objects, such as rocks or pails of water, can count as performing computations, even such as might suffice for mentality—thus threatening computationalism about the mind with panpsychism. Maudlin in J Philos 86:407–432, ( 1989 ) and Bishop ( 2002a , b ) have argued, however, that such a requirement creates difficulties for computationalism about conscious experience, putting it in conflict with (...)
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  35. It Does So: Review of Jerry Fodor, The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. [REVIEW]Eric Dietrich - 2001 - AI Magazine 22 (4):121-24.
    Objections to AI and computational cognitive science are myriad. Accordingly, there are many different reasons for these attacks. But all of them come down to one simple observation: humans seem a lot smarter that computers -- not just smarter as in Einstein was smarter than I, or I am smarter than a chimpanzee, but more like I am smarter than a pencil sharpener. To many, computation seems like the wrong paradigm for studying the mind. (Actually, I think there (...)
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  36.  55
    Modeling Inference of Mental States: As Simple as Possible, as Complex as Necessary.Ben Meijering, Niels A. Taatgen, Hedderik van Rijn & Rineke Verbrugge - 2014 - Interaction Studies: Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 15 (3):455-477.
    Behavior oftentimes allows for many possible interpretations in terms of mental states, such as goals, beliefs, desires, and intentions. Reasoning about the relation between behavior and mental states is therefore considered to be an effortful process. We argue that people use simple strategies to deal with high cognitive demands of mental state inference. To test this hypothesis, we developed a computational cognitive model, which was able to simulate previous empirical findings: In two-player games, people apply simple strategies at first. (...)
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  37. Epistemic Modality, Mind, and Mathematics.Hasen Khudairi - 2017 - Gutenberg.
    This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how phenomenal consciousness and gradational possible-worlds models in Bayesian perceptual psychology relate to epistemic modal space. The book demonstrates, then, how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; deontic modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the (...)
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  38. Shaking Up the Mind’s Ground Floor: The Cognitive Penetration of Visual Attention.Wayne Wu - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (1):5-32.
    In this paper, I argue that visual attention is cognitively penetrated by intention. I present a detailed account of attention and its neural basis, drawing on a recent computational model of neural modulation during attention: divisive normalization. I argue that intention shifts computations during divisive normalization. The epistemic consequences of attentional bias are discussed.
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  39. Growing Evidence That Perceptual Qualia Are Neuroelectrical Not Computational.Mostyn W. Jones - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6):89-116.
    Computational neuroscience attributes coloured areas and other perceptual qualia to calculations that are realizable in multiple cellular forms. This faces serious issues in explaining how the various qualia arise and how they bind to form overall perceptions. Qualia may instead be neuroelectrical. Growing evidence indicates that perceptions correlate with neuroelectrical activity spotted by locally activated EEGs, the different qualia correlate with the different electrochemistries of unique detector cells, a unified neural-electromagnetic field binds this activity to form overall perceptions, and (...)
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  40. Consciousness Modeled: Reification and Promising Pluralism.Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther - 2011 - Pensamiento 67 (254):617-630.
    Paradoxically, explorers of the territory of consciousness seem to be studying consciousness out of existence, from inside the field of "consciousness studies". How? Through their love of the phenomenon/process, they have developed powerful single models or lenses through which to understand consciousness. But in doing so, they also seek to destroy the other /equally useful/ lenses. Our opportunity lies in halting the vendettas and cross-speakings/cross-fire. The imploration is to stop the dichotomous thinking and pernicious reification of single models, and instead (...)
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  41. Homunkulismus in den Kognitionswissenschaften.Geert Keil - 2003 - In Wolfgang R. Köhler & Hans-Dieter Mutschler (eds.), Ist der Geist berechenbar? Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. pp. 77-112.
    1. Was ist ein Homunkulus-Fehlschluß? 2. Analyse des Mentalen und Naturalisierung der Intentionalität 3. Homunkulismus in Theorien der visuellen Wahrnehmung 4. Homunkulismus und Repräsentationalismus 5. Der homunkulare Funktionalismus 6. Philosophische Sinnkritik und empirische Wissenschaft Literatur .
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  42. Some Strangeness in the Proportion, or How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Mechanistic Forces of Darkness.Eric Dietrich - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):349-352.
    Understanding humans requires viewing them as mechanisms of some sort, since understanding anything requires seeing it as a mechanism. It is science’s job to reveal mechanisms. But science reveals much more than that: it also reveals enduring mystery—strangeness in the proportion. Concentrating just on the scientific side of Selinger’s and Engström’s call for a moratorium on cyborg discourse, I argue that this strangeness prevents cyborg discourse from diminishing us.
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  43.  15
    Mind, Cognition, Semiosis: Ways to Cognitive Semiotics.Piotr Konderak - 2018 - Lublin, Polska: Maria Curie-Sklodowska University Press.
    What is meaning-making? How do new domains of meanings emerge in the course of child’s development? What is the role of consciousness in this process? What is the difference between making sense of pointing, pantomime and language utterances? Are great apes capable of meaning-making? What about dogs? Parrots? Can we, in any way, relate their functioning and behavior to a child’s? Are artificial systems capable of meaning-making? -/- The above questions motivated the emergence of cognitive semiotics as a discipline devoted (...)
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  44. Computationalism Under Attack.Roberto Cordeschi & Marcello Frixione - 2007 - In M. Marraffa, M. De Caro & F. Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Springer.
    Since the early eighties, computationalism in the study of the mind has been “under attack” by several critics of the so-called “classic” or “symbolic” approaches in AI and cognitive science. Computationalism was generically identified with such approaches. For example, it was identified with both Allen Newell and Herbert Simon’s Physical Symbol System Hypothesis and Jerry Fodor’s theory of Language of Thought, usually without taking into account the fact ,that such approaches are very different as to their methods and aims. (...)
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  45. Computers, Persons, and the Chinese Room. Part 2: Testing Computational Cognitive Science.Ricardo Restrepo - 2012 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 33 (3):123-140.
    This paper is a follow-up of the first part of the persons reply to the Chinese Room Argument. The first part claims that the mental properties of the person appearing in that argument are what matter to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper tries to discern what those mental properties are by applying a series of hypothetical psychological and strengthened Turing tests to the person, and argues that the results support the thesis that the Man performing the (...)
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  46. Advantages of Artificial Intelligences, Uploads, and Digital Minds.Kaj Sotala - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (01):275-291.
    I survey four categories of factors that might give a digital mind, such as an upload or an artificial general intelligence, an advantage over humans. Hardware advantages include greater serial speeds and greater parallel speeds. Self-improvement advantages include improvement of algorithms, design of new mental modules, and modification of motivational system. Co-operative advantages include copyability, perfect co-operation, improved communication, and transfer of skills. Human handicaps include computational limitations and faulty heuristics, human-centric biases, and socially motivated cognition. The shape (...)
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  47. Data Mining the Brain to Decode the Mind.Daniel Weiskopf - forthcoming - In Neural Mechanisms: New Challenges in the Philosophy of Neuroscience.
    In recent years, neuroscience has begun to transform itself into a “big data” enterprise with the importation of computational and statistical techniques from machine learning and informatics. In addition to their translational applications such as brain-computer interfaces and early diagnosis of neuropathology, these tools promise to advance new solutions to longstanding theoretical quandaries. Here I critically assess whether these promises will pay off, focusing on the application of multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) to the problem of reverse inference. I argue (...)
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  48. Some Puzzles Concerning Relations Between Minds, Brains, and Bodies.Rick Grush - 2016
    In this article I explore a number of questions that have not been adequately investigated in philosophy of mind circles: are minds located in the same place as the brains (or other computing machinery) supporting them? Must they exist at the same location as the body? Must they exist at the same time? Could a single mind be implemented in multiple brains, or multiple minds in a single brain? Under what conditions might a single mind persist despite (...)
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  49. Supermachines and Superminds.Eric Steinhart - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (1):155-186.
    If the computational theory of mind is right, then minds are realized by machines. There is an ordered complexity hierarchy of machines. Some finite machines realize finitely complex minds; some Turing machines realize potentially infinitely complex minds. There are many logically possible machines whose powers exceed the Church–Turing limit (e.g. accelerating Turing machines). Some of these supermachines realize superminds. Superminds perform cognitive supertasks. Their thoughts are formed in infinitary languages. They perceive and manipulate the infinite detail of fractal (...)
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  50. Transcendental Imaging and Augmented Reality.Peter Stott - 2011 - Technoetic Arts 9 (1):49-64.
    Man has built tools to extend his visual experience in order to explore reality beyond his sensory capacity, for example microscopes, telescopes, high shutter speed and infrared cameras. However he has yet to build a tool to fully explore visual realms beyond his ordinary cognitive faculties. With the development of computing, comes the possibility of building a tool to explore the virtual forms/spaces of images that are ordinarily inaccessible to the mind. This article identifies how cognition is ordinarily limited (...)
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