Milner and Goodale's influential account of the primate cortical visual streams involves a division of consciousness between them, for it is the ventral stream that has the responsibility for visual consciousness. Hence, the dorsal visual stream is a ‘zombie’ stream. In this article, I argue that certain information carried by the dorsal stream likely plays a central role in the egocentric spatial content of experience, especially the experience of visual spatial constancy. Thus, the (...) class='Hi'>dorsal stream contributes to a pervasive feature of consciousness. (shrink)

For almost half a century dual-stream advocates have vigorously defended the view that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in the primary visual cortex: a ventral, perception-related ‘conscious’ stream and a dorsal, action-related ‘unconscious’ stream. They furthermore maintain that the perceptual and memory systems in the ventral stream are relatively shielded from the action system in the dorsal stream. In recent years, this view has come under scrutiny. Evidence (...) points to two overlapping action pathways: a dorso-dorsal pathway that calculates features of the object to be acted on, and a ventro-dorsal pathway that transmits stored information about skilled object use from the ventral stream to the dorso-dorsal pathway. This evidence suggests that stored information may exert significantly more influence on visually guided action than hitherto assumed. I argue that this, in turn, supports the notion of skilled automatic action that is nonetheless agential. My focus here will be on actions influenced by implicit biases (stereotypes/prejudices). Action that is biased in this way, I argue, is in an important sense intentional and agential. (shrink)

David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action-related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception-related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision (...) for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action (Bruno & Franz, 2009; Dassonville & Bala, 2004; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action-guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi-conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division. (shrink)

Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of uncon- scious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and col- leagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight patients. Vision for action has also come under (...) scrutiny. Recent findings seem to show that information processed by the dor- sal stream for online action contributes to visual awareness. Some interpret these results as showing that some dorsal stream processes are conscious visual processes (e.g., Gallese, 2007; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). The aim of this paper is to provide new support for the more traditional view that blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious per- ceptual processes. I argue that individuals with blindsight do not have access to the kind of purely qualitative color and size information which normal individuals do. So, even though people with blindsight have a kind of cognitive consciousness, visual information process- ing in blindsight patients is not associated with a distinctly visual phenomenology. I argue further that while dorsal stream processing seems to contribute to visual awareness, only information processed by the early dorsal stream (V1, V2, and V3) is broadcast to working memory. Information processed by later parts of the dorsal stream (the parietal lobe) never reaches working memory and hence does not correlate with phenomenal awareness. I con- clude that both blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious visual processes. (shrink)

This paper examines Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis about the two visual streams and raises the questions of whether properties in egocentric space (commonly associated with the vision-for-action, or "dorsal," stream) can be part of the phenomenal content of perceptual experience, or only properties in allocentric space (commonly associated with the vision-for-perception, or "ventral," stream) can play this role, and how (if at all) properties in egocentric space differ from properties in allocentric space. These questions are reminiscent of (...) issues raised by Christopher Peacocke's "equal-sized trees" case: if you are looking at equal-sized trees on the side of a road, the trees will phenomenally look to you to be equally tall. But it is also true that a tree will take up more of the space in your visual field the closer it is to you. So, the equal-sized trees will also phenomenally look to you to have different heights. Your (visual) perceptual experience is not illusory. That is, the trees veridically look to you to have the same height, and they also veridically look to you to have different heights. Call the sort of issue raised here the "problem of dual looks." I provide a solution to the problem of dual looks that helps shed light on whether properties in egocentric space can be part of the phenomenal content of perceptual experience, and how (if at all) properties in egocentric space differ from properties in allocentric space. (shrink)

What representational state mediates between perception and action? Bence Nanay says pragmatic representations, which are outputs of perceptual systems. This commits him to the view that optic ataxics face difficulty in performing visually guided arm movements because the relevant perceptual systems output their pragmatic representations incorrectly. Here, I argue that it is not enough to say that pragmatic representations are output incorrectly; we also need to know why they are output that way. Given recent evidence that optic ataxia impairs peripersonal (...) space representation, I argue that pragmatic representations are output incorrectly because the organizing principle of the vision-for-action system is blocked by optic ataxia. I then show how this means that this principle, not pragmatic representations, is the representational state that mediates between perception and action, i.e. the principle, not pragmatic representations, is the immediate mental antecedent of action. (shrink)

According to Milner and Goodale’s dual visual systems (DVS) theory, a division obtains between visual consciousness and motor action, in that the visual system producing conscious vision (the ventral stream) is distinct from the one guiding action (the dorsal stream). That there would be this division is often taken (by Andy Clark and others) to undermine the folk view on how consciousness and action relate. However, even if this division obtains, this leaves open the possibility that con- (...) scious ventral information is often transmitted to the uncon- scious dorsal stream and then used to guide action, a possibility seeming to preserve a significant role for consciousness in action. This article assesses this possibility. In course of doing so, we will review those arguments recently having been made against the DVS view on how visual consciousness and action relate (ones due to, e.g., Briscoe and Schwenkler, or Schenk and McIntosh). What we will find is that, if we properly analyze the data upon which these arguments are based, we are still left with the impression that the DVS view is largely correct; i.e., it is only rarely that visual experience guides action. (shrink)

It is natural to assume that the fine-grained and highly accurate spatial information present in visual experience is often used to guide our bodily actions. Yet this assumption has been challenged by proponents of the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis , according to which visuomotor programming is the responsibility of a “zombie” processing stream whose sources of bottom-up spatial information are entirely non-conscious . In many formulations of TVSH, the role of conscious vision in action is limited to “recognizing objects, (...) selecting targets for action, and determining what kinds of action, broadly speaking, to perform” . Our aim in this study is to show that the available evidence not only fails to support this dichotomous view but actually reveals a significant role for conscious vision in motor programming, especially for actions that require deliberate attention. (shrink)

Empirical work and philosophical analysis have led to widespread acceptance that vision for action, served by the cortical dorsal stream, is unconscious. I argue that the empirical argument for this claim is unsound. That argument relies on subjects’ introspective reports. Yet on biological grounds, in light of the theory of primate cortical vision, introspection has no access to dorsal stream mediated visual states. It is thus wrongly assumed that introspective reports speak to absent phenomenology in the (...) dorsal stream. In light of this, I consider a different conception of consciousness’s relation to agency in terms of access. While theoretical reasons suggest that the inaccessibility of the dorsal stream to conceptual report is evidence that it is unconscious, this position begs important questions. I propose a broader notion of access in respect of the guidance of intentional agency and not, narrowly, conceptual report (Note: this paper contradicts my earlier paper, "The Case for Zombie Agency"). (shrink)

One necessary condition on any adequate account of perception is clarity regarding whether unconscious perception exists. The issue is complicated, and the debate is growing in both philosophy and science. In this paper we consider the case for unconscious perception, offering three primary achievements. First, we offer a discussion of the underspecified notion of central coordinating agency, a notion that is critical for arguments that purportedly perceptual states are not attributable to the individual, and thus not genuinely perceptual. We develop (...) an explication of what it is for a representational state to be available to central coordinating agency for guidance of behavior. Second, drawing on this explication, we place a more careful understanding of the attributability of a state to the individual in the context of a range of empirical work on vision-for-action, saccades, and skilled typing. The results place pressure on the skeptic about unconscious perception. Third, reflecting upon broader philosophical themes running through debates about unconscious perception, we highlight how our discussion places pressure on the view that perception is a manifest kind, rather than a natural kind. In doing so, we resist the tempting complaint that the debate about unconscious perception is merely verbal. (shrink)

A body schema is an agent's model of its own body that enables it to act on affordances in the environment. This paper presents a body schema system for the Learning Intelligent Decision Agent (LIDA) cognitive architecture. LIDA is a conceptual and computational implementation of Global Workspace Theory, also integrating other theories from neuroscience and psychology. This paper contends that the ‘body schema' should be split into three separate functions based on the functional role of consciousness in Global Workspace Theory. (...) There is (1) an online model of the agent's effectors and effector variables (Current Body Schema), (2) a long-term, recognitional storage of embodied capacities for action and affordances (Habitual Body Schema), and (3) "dorsal" stream information feeding directly from early perception to sensorimotor processes (Online Body Schema). This paper then discusses how the LIDA model of the body schema explains several experiments in psychology and ethology. (shrink)

Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the "two visual systems" hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver's bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main sources (...) of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis. I argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency. (shrink)

In response to Mole 2009, I present an argument for zombie action. The crucial question is not whether but rather to what extent we are zombie agents. I argue that current evidence supports only minimal zombie agency.

As an explicit organizing metaphor, memory aid, and conceptual framework, the prefrontal cortex may be viewed as a five-member ‘Executive Committee,’ as the prefrontal-control extensions of five sub-and-posterior-cortical systems: the ‘Perceiver’ is the frontal extension of the ventral perceptual stream which represents the world and self in object coordinates; the ‘Verbalizer’ is the frontal extension of the language stream which represents the world and self in language coordinates; the ‘Motivator’ is the frontal cortical extension of a subcortical extended-amygdala (...) stream which represents the world and self in motivational/emotional coordinates; the ‘Attender’ is the frontal cortical extension of a subcortical extended-hippocampal stream which represents the world and self in spatiotemporal coordinates and directs attention to internal and external events; and the ‘Coordinator’ is the frontal extension of the dorsal perceptual stream which represents the world and self in body- and eye-coordinates and controls willed action and working memory. This tutorial review examines the interacting roles of these five systems in perception, working memory, attention, long - term memory, motor control, and thinking. (shrink)

The physical basis of conscious experience is revealed by direct observation and analysis of any conscious experience. Human conscious experience has an invariant structural mode of organization based on the three types of space-time intervals (light-like, time-like, space-like). Sensory input activates the autonomic nervous system, endocrine system, and ascending reticular activating system to produce the awake conscious state. The dorsal and ventral frontoparietal attention networks are activated. Dorsal and ventral cortical functional streams carry “what”, “where”, and “when” information (...) to the medial temporal lobe for the encoding, storage, and recall of conscious experience (episodic memory). Hippocampal place cells and time cells encode events in space and time within spatiotemporal contexts conveyed by entorhinal cortex grid cells and ramping cells. Theta phase precession unifies the encoding of space and time in the hippocampus so that segments of space and time are encoded in the hippocampus. Theta travelling waves ensure that the instantaneous output of the hippocampus consists of topographically-organized segments of space and time, space-time intervals. By parsing spatiotemporal contexts into quantal units of where and when events occur (spacetime intervals), hippocampal neurons bridge, and thereby organize events, in a conceptual organization of events (conscious experience). Space-time intervals are extracted from the hippocampus by a prefrontal cortex-basal ganglia-thalamic-prefrontal cortex loop for the cognitive, affective, and motivational aspects of conscious experience. (shrink)

Williamson’s “anti-luminosity” argument aims to establish that there are no significant luminous conditions. “Far from forming a cognitive home”, luminous conditions are mere “curiosities”. Even supposing Williamson’s argument succeeds in showing that there are no significant luminous states his conclusion has not thereby been established. When it comes to determining what is luminous, mental events and processes are among the best candidates. It is events and processes, after all, which constitute the stream of consciousness. Judgment, for instance, is plausibly (...) self-conscious. If I am judging then plausibly I must know that I am. Similarly, deliberation is plausibly self-conscious. To be deliberating about some matter I plausibly must know that I am. That one is judging and that one is deliberating are thus plausibly luminous conditions. Furthermore, I argue, Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument fails to speak against this suggestion. This reveals that Williamson’s argument is more limited in scope than has been thought—something likely missed due to a misplaced focus on mental states in the luminosity debate as well as in epistemology and the philosophy of mind more generally. For all Williamson shows, there may be luminous events and processes of a sort apt to constitute a cognitive home. I conclude by considering how the anti-luminosity argument might be reinstated in the judgment case and argue that the natural way to do so fails. (shrink)

A poet is also a human being. He possesses thirst and hunger. He will have family responsibilities. He/she will have his or her social obligations. One has to take care of all these and then in their midst has to fine tune time to compose poetry. Money is essential to quench his thirst and hunger and discharge family responsibilities. These are not the times when one can make poetry-writing a livelihood. One has to do some other job and then write (...) poetry. Living and being engaged in literary creation are different. Ninety nine per cent of poets do not have the luxury of earning money by taking poetry-writing as a profession. And thus they cannot meet the obligations of taking care of themselves, their family and also discharge other social responsibilities. (shrink)

This is the English translation of Chapters Two and Three of Painless Civilization, which was published in Japanese in 2003. In this volume, I examine the problems of painless civilization from the perspective of philosophical psychology and ethics. I discuss how the essence of love is transformed in a society moving toward painlessness and how the painless stream penetrates each of us and makes us living corpses. In order to tackle the problems of painless civilization, we must look inside (...) our inner world because the “desire of the body” that lurks within us is the ultimate cause of our society’s movement toward painlessness. Love and the meaning of life are the central topics of discussion in the following chapters. Because the original manuscript was written in 1998, the discussion of social issues may seem slightly dated, especially when it comes to reproductive technologies and juvenile delinquency, but I believe my central argument here has not aged at all; on the contrary, I think the times have finally caught up with my theory of painless civilization. I hope readers will join me in thinking deeply about the essence of contemporary civilization. (Painless Civilization 1 is also available on PhilPapers.) . (shrink)

This chapter draws on insights from non-equilibrium thermodynamics to demonstrate the ontological inadequacy of the machine conception of the organism. The thermodynamic character of living systems underlies the importance of metabolism and calls for the adoption of a processual view, exemplified by the Heraclitean metaphor of the stream of life. This alternative conception is explored in its various historical formulations and the extent to which it captures the nature of living systems is examined. Following this, the chapter considers the (...) metaphysical implications of reconceptualizing the organism from complex machine to flowing stream. What do we learn when we reject the mechanical and embrace the processual? Three key lessons for biological ontology are identified. The first is that activity is a necessary condition for existence. The second is that persistence is grounded in the continuous self-maintenance of form. And the third is that order does not entail design. (shrink)

While there has been a lot of discussion of picture perception both in perceptual psychology and in philosophy, these discussions are driven by very different background assumptions. Nonetheless, it would be mutually beneficial to arrive at an understanding of picture perception that is informed by both the philosophers’ and the psychologists’ story. The aim of this paper is exactly this: to give an account of picture perception that is valid both as a philosophical and as a psychological account. I argue (...) that seeing trompe l’oeil paintings is, just as some philosophers suggested, different from other cases of picture perception. Further, the way our perceptual system functions when seeing trompe l’oeil paintings could be an important piece of the psychological explanation of perceiving pictures. (shrink)

In this article, we present the structuring of the unity of the stream of consciousness (Bewusstseinsfluss) and its continuum through the analysis of retentive consciousness, longitudinal intentionality (Längsintentionalität), and temporal perception in Husserl, based on § 39 of the Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Internal Time-Consciousness. Our hypothesis is that these elements play fundamental roles in the ordering of temporal conscious experience, since retentive consciousness, as delineated by Husserl, not only retains the past but actively constitutes the continuous (...) unity of the stream of consciousness, seamlessly integrating past experiences with the temporal now (Jetzt). This capacity is facilitated by the double intentionality of retention (doppelte Intentionalität der Retention), which allows consciousness to structure its temporal experiences in a continuous and cohesive manner. Additionally, longitudinal intentionality operates in the transformation of proto-sensations into more complex retentional structures, contributing decisively to the structuring of the temporal continuity of conscious experience. We also explore temporal perception in Husserlian phenomenology, highlighting how the interaction between the constitution of immanent (transcendental) time and the quasi-temporal insertion (quasi-zeitlich) of the phases of the stream of consciousness promotes a unified and continuous perception of time. We argue that this dynamic explains temporality in human experience and underscores the importance of the self-appearance (Selbsterscheinung) of the stream of consciousness for the cohesion of conscious life in Husserlian phenomenology. (shrink)

This book shows that in the naturalistic and Darwinian explanation of life and its evolution, a decisive factor is overlooked, namely the human, knowing mind. The questions about life and its evolution can be answered if consciousness is taken into account not as a spectator, but as an integral part of reality. In the first-person-perception of cognition, the forces and laws of organic development can be observed and explored. It becomes apparent that evolution was not a random event, but the (...) organic overall process of the becoming of man. (shrink)

Advancements in cloud technologies have increased the infrastructural needs of data centers due to storage needs and processing of extensive dimensional data. Many service providers envisage anomaly detection criteria to guarantee availability to avoid breakdowns and complexities caused due to large-scale operations. The streaming log data generated is associated with multi-dimensional complexity and thus poses a considerable challenge to detect the anomalies or unusual occurrences in the data. In this research, a hybrid model is proposed that is motivated by deep (...) belief criteria and meta-heuristics. Using Search-and-Rescue—BrainStorm Optimization (SAR-BSO), a hybrid feature selection (FS) and deep belief network classifier is used to localize and detect anomalies for streaming data logs. The significant contribution of the research lies in FS, which is carried out using SAR-BSO which increases the detection power of the model as it selects the most significant variables by minimizing redundant features. The evaluation of accuracy is efficiently improved when compared with the predictable methods, such as Extract Local Outlier Factor (ELOF), Track-plus, Hybrid Distributed Batch Stream (HDBS), IForestASD, DBN, BSO-based Feature Selection with DBN, Genetic Algorithm-Deep Belief Network (GA-DBN), Mutual Information-Deep Belief Network (MI-DBN), information entropy-Deep Belief Network(I + DBN), Flat Field-Deep Belief Network (FF + DBN), African Vulture Optimization Algorithm-Deep Belief Network(AVOA + DBN), Gorilla Troop Optimizer-Deep Belief Network(GTO-DBN), and SARO-based Feature Selection with DBN. Further, the accurate detection of the anomalies in the data stream is established by the Deep Belief Neural Network (DBN) classifier. The model’s efficacy is determined using Apache, Hadoop, HDFS, Spark, and Linux datasets and evaluated against existing similar models. The model efficiency is provided using multiple evaluation metrics and is found effective. From the experimentation, the accuracy of the proposed model is found to be 93.3, 95.4, 93.6, 94.2, and 93.5% respectively for the dataset such as Apache, Hadoop, HDFS, spark, and Linux. This enhancement in accuracy is due to the selection of optimal features by the proposed SAR-BSO algorithm. (shrink)

This study of Ralph Pred’s Onflow (MIT Press, 2005) expands on Pred’s arguments and raises doubts about the viability of phenomenology. Showing that Pred’s method is indeed phenomenological, I validate his interpretations of William James as phenomenologist and his critique of John Searle in light of James, which documents the extent to which the role of habit in the constitution of experience is neglected by philosophers. In explaining habit, however, Pred himself reverts to non-phenomenological models drawn from James’ postulate of (...) psycho-physical parallelism. Habit, like causation, poses an unmet challenge to phenomenological methods. In his critique of Gerald Edelman, Pred notes that Edelman falls prey to a metaphysical bias inherent in modern Indo-European languages. But Pred’s acuity in exposing a latent linguistic bias in phenomenological data is a two-edged sword. Revealing an invisible dependence of appearance on language, it casts doubt on the project of getting beyond language to "appearances-in-themselves.". (shrink)

When Jonathan Swift published “A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Poor People of Being a Burden on their Country or Parents, and for Making Them Beneficial to the Publick” in 1729, many early readers were shocked and repulsed. Yet if a similar proposal were published today in a reputable academic journal, we could not be sure of its satirical character: it might well be entirely sincere. In late February this year, the Journal of Medical Ethics prepublished online a (...) paper that can be seen as a modernized bioethical version of Swift's “Modest Proposal.” All the authors had done is present a “well reasoned argument based on widely accepted premises” that allowed them to “proceed logically” from those premises to the conclusions. (shrink)

Jonathan Edwards' article “Modern Monads: Leibniz, Continuity, and the Stream of Consciousness” deals with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's (1646– 1716) famous monadology, especially with the perceiving entity, i.e. the subject or monad, and its identity over time. Edwards asks whether it is possible to combine Leibniz's theory of monads with modern biology and physics. His response is affirmative. I will start with some general points about his article, and then I will introduce it in details.

A show on Radio Romania Cultural, ”Springs of Philosophy” 22 May 2010. Moderator: Constantin Aslam. Guest: Marcel Chelba. The subject of the discussion was the topicality and modernity of Kant, on Marcel Chelba's book: Critical Introduction (On the Possibility of Metaphysics, as Science, in the Perspective of Kantian Critical Philosophy), Crates, 2004. The central idea is that Kant's transcendental aesthetics is the epistemological paradigm of modern science and that modern science has confirmed Kant, not refuted him, as is widely believed.

Ayurveda is considered one of the ancient systems of knowledge in India. Various compendiums of Ayurveda i.e., Charaka, Sushruta, or Vagbhatta have enumerated an education system based on Gurukuls i.e., An Educator and their pupils. It is evident from them that a very systematized and organized form of medical education starting from selection to induction and then to effective teaching and training were given during that ancient era. The triad of education viz. Adhyayan (studying), Adhyapan (teaching) and Sambhasha (an argument (...) based on logic) is key to knowledge and the learning process as per Charaka. The selection of students and teachers was based on some set of fixed criteria necessary to be fulfilled. Induction was done prior to admission and proper disciplinary, and ethical rules were practiced. For the development of knowledge and skills in branches of Ayurveda, problems-based case discussion, identification, causes, and treatment of diseases, their principles were taught. Yogya (a set of dummy objects) was used to practice prior to the final surgery. (shrink)

I aim to give a new account of picture perception: of the way our visual system functions when we see something in a picture. My argument relies on the functional distinction between the ventral and dorsal visual subsystems. I propose that it is constitutive of picture perception that our ventral subsystem attributes properties to the depicted scene, whereas our dorsal subsystem attributes properties to the picture surface. This duality elucidates Richard Wollheim’s concept of the “twofoldness” of our experience (...) of pictures: the “visual awareness not only of what is represented but also of the surface qualities of the representation.” I argue for the following four claims: (a) the depicted scene is represented by ventral perception, (b) the depicted scene is not represented by dorsal perception, (c) the picture surface is represented by dorsal perception, and (d) the picture surface is not necessarily represented by ventral perception. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to raise some serious worries about anti-representationalism: the recently popular view according to which there are no perceptual representations. Although anti-representationalism is more and more popular, I will argue that we have strong empirical reasons for mistrusting it. More specifically, I will argue that it is inconsistent with some important empirical findings about dorsal perception and about the multimodality of perception.

How should a machine intelligence perform unsupervised structure discovery over streams of sensory input? One approach to this problem is to cast it as an apperception task [1]. Here, the task is to construct an explicit interpretable theory that both explains the sensory sequence and also satisfies a set of unity conditions, designed to ensure that the constituents of the theory are connected in a relational structure. However, the original formulation of the apperception task had one fundamental limitation: it assumed (...) the raw sensory input had already been parsed using a set of discrete categories, so that all the system had to do was receive this already-digested symbolic input, and make sense of it. But what if we don't have access to pre-parsed input? What if our sensory sequence is raw unprocessed information? The central contribution of this paper is a neuro-symbolic framework for distilling interpretable theories out of streams of raw, unprocessed sensory experience. First, we extend the definition of the apperception task to include ambiguous (but still symbolic) input: sequences of sets of disjunctions. Next, we use a neural network to map raw sensory input to disjunctive input. Our binary neural network is encoded as a logic program, so the weights of the network and the rules of the theory can be solved jointly as a single SAT problem. This way, we are able to jointly learn how to perceive (mapping raw sensory information to concepts) and apperceive (combining concepts into declarative rules). (shrink)

In the present paper, these authors argue on actual reasons why Hilbert’s axiomatic program to unify gravitation theory and electromagnetism failed completely. An outline of plausible resolution of this problem is given here, based on: a) Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, b) Newton’s aether stream model. And in another paper we will present our calculation of receding Moon from Earth based on such a matter creation hypothesis. More experiments and observations are called to verify this new hypothesis, albeit it is inspired (...) from Newton’s theory himself. (shrink)

Most online platforms are becoming increasingly algorithmically personalized. The question is if these practices are simply satisfying users preferences or if something is lost in this process. This article focuses on how to reconcile the personalization with the importance of being able to share cultural objects - including fiction – with others. In analyzing two concrete personalization examples from the streaming giant Netflix, several tendencies are observed. One is to isolate users and sometimes entirely eliminate shared world aspects. Another tendency (...) is to blur the boundary between shared cultural objects and personalized content, which can be misleading and disorienting. A further tendency is for personalization algorithms to be optimized to deceptively prey on desires for content that mirrors one’s own lived experience. Some specific - often minority targeting -“clickbait” practices received public blowback. These practices show disregard both for honest labeling and for our desires to have access and representation in a shared world. The article concludes that personalization tendencies are moving towards increasingly isolating and disorienting interfaces, but that platforms could be redesigned to support better social world orientation. (shrink)

Three decades after Chalmers named it, the ‘hard problem’ remains. I suggest a parsimonious solution. Biological dynamic systems interact according to simple rules (while the environment provides simple constraints) and thus self-organize to become a new, more complex dynamic system at the next level. This spiral repeats several times generating a hierarchy of levels. A leap to the next level is frequently creative and surprising. From ants, themselves self-organized according to physical/chemical laws, may emerge an ant colony self-organized according to (...) eusocial laws. A dynamic system need not be material. A living language (immaterial) is a complex adaptive system. Body/brain are material but the next level of complexity, a psychological dynamic system, a thought, feeling, image or ideal, is less material. From several psychological dynamic systems emerges the next level, narrative (immaterial), and from multiple narratives emerges personality. Concrete evidence explains how an early narrative emerges from body-and-brain. Evidence also shows that personality emerges from narrative. Even an objective narrative captures subjectivity since the teller’s choice of content is subjective. I argue that the ‘stream-of-consciousness’ story (movie) you are currently telling yourself (watching) is your conscious experience, ‘what it is like’ for you to be conscious. Adriana Cavarero’s arguments support this. Each level of a hierarchy of dynamic systems must necessarily be homeostatic, at that level. McDowell et al. (2023: submitted, in revision) reported evidence that a dream (a narrative) supports personality homeostatically. Perhaps the evolutionary advantage of conscious experience, also a narrative, has always been that it too supports personality homeostatically. Personality and body/brain, a chimera of symbiotic life-forms, constitute interactionist duality. (shrink)

James a maintes fois célébré les rencontres philosophiques et l’on sait les efforts de James et de Bergson pour se voir, lors des passages de James en Europe. Proximité physique ne signifie évidemment pas convergence ni capillarité philosophiques, comme l’apprend à ses dépens Agathon dans le Banquet de Platon. Or, le rapprochement, mais aussi les confusions, entre la philosophie de Bergson et celle de James, voire entre « bergsonisme » et « pragmatisme », restent un passage obligé de l’étude des (...) deux hommes. Si cette confusion — peut-être ces familles de confusions — sont caractéristiques du début du XXe siècle , il serait sans doute illusoire de croire que nous en sommes sortis aujourd’hui. C’est en France une expérience encore très répandue chez le jamesien que devoir se justifier par rapport au « bergsonisme », et c’en est une autre pour le « bergsonien » que de devoir dire qu’il n’est pas forcément « pragmatiste ». Ces glissements ont déjà été maintes fois analysés et je tiendrai ici pour acquis que Horace Kallen , Floris Delattre , Ralph Barton Perry et Millic Capek , qui ont procédé à la revue de détail, nous ont donné suffisamment d’éléments pour qu’il ne soit pas nécessaire de reprendre le dossier dans son ensemble. Le propos sera plutôt de décomposer un travers de lecture que l’on inflige généralement aux deux auteurs à partir d’un terrain plus limité : le thème du « courant », ou flux (stream), de conscience, thème prétendument commun aux deux hommes. Je vais pour cela tenter d’identifier, dans la première section, deux grandes manières d’aborder le rapport entre les deux hommes qui ont conduit à méconnaître leur apport propre. L’une interdit tout simplement de les lire comme philosophes, même si elle est couramment pratiquée, ce que j’illustrerai à la lumière de deux exemples. L’autre type de lecture engage, lui, un contresens sur la thèse même de James, et c’est ici que la face critique de ce chapitre se retourne en argument positif. Le cœur de ce contresens est de croire que James aurait introduit le thème du courant de pensée ou de conscience, et que ce serait là son originalité. Or, comme il est normal chez un auteur pragmatiste après tout, l’originalité réside dans l’usage qui est fait de ce thème. En examinant dans la deuxième section les rouages de ce contresens, dont il n’est pas certain que tous les lecteurs de Bergson l’aient totalement évité alors même qu’ils pensaient le déposer, on tentera donc de préciser tout d’abord en quoi le thème lui-même n’est pas spécifiquement jamesien, ensuite en quoi le propos de James n’est pas tant de décrire ce flux pour lui-même que de nous expliquer ce qui nous guette si nous le négligeons systématiquement, enfin quelles sont les fonctions remplies par les passages sur le courant de conscience dans l’argument de James. (shrink)

The stream of human consciousness appears to be interruptible, in that we can experience a sensation of ‘returning to ourselves after an absence of content’ (e.g. sleep, anaesthesia, full-absorption meditation). Prima facie, such evidence poses a challenge to simple applications of theories of consciousness based on electromagnetic or neural activity in the brain, because some of this activity persists during periods of interruption. This paper elaborates one of several possible responses to the challenge. We build on a previous theory (...) in which EM field topology delineates complex macrophenomenal experience. We first apply an analytic lens to identify different ways in which field topologies might generate sensations of ‘absence of content’. We then test the feasibility of a particular phenomenological approach for assessing those field topologies, powered by the unusual lucidity about cessation pathways induced via certain meditation practices and psychedelic dosages. We build computational simulations of these cessation pathways and test them on eight interviewees with various levels of experience in cessation states. We conclude that this approach can generate usable insight, but requires further formalisation to fulfil its potential. The findings tentatively support our claims but the theory remains speculative at this stage. We set out empirical tests with 11 specific predictions, both for further phenomenological research and for brain manipulation research. Although they align neatly, our ontological and cessation theories can also be separated. The paper describes how our theories can be consistent with other perspectives on consciousness, such as variants of predictive processing or global network theory. (shrink)

A stream in transhumanism argues that the aims of Buddhism and transhumanists are akin. It is the case that transhumanism contains religious tropes, and its parallels to Christianity are readily apparent. It does not share much, however, with Buddhism’s Zen tradition. Zen tends to focus its practitioners on becoming fully present and human, not on becoming transcendent, super-powered, or posthuman. This paper explores some of the tensions between transhumanism and Buddhism through the lens of Zen, and suggests that transhumanist (...) Buddhists should be careful not to conflate moments of spiritual enlightenment with permanent techno-social transcendence. (shrink)

In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency, mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency at (...) all. This personal-level difference in agency and purposiveness has, furthermore, the consequence that instances of mind-wandering do not constitute unified and self-contained segments of the stream of consciousness—in stark contrast to focused daydreams. Besides, the two kinds of mental phenomena differ in whether they possess a narrative structure, and in how we may make sense of the succession of mental episodes involved. (shrink)

According to many criteria, agency, intentionality, responsibility and freedom of decision, require conscious decisions. Freud already assumed that many of our decisions are influenced by dynamically unconscious motives or that we even perform unconscious actions based on completely unconscious considerations. Such actions might not be intentional, and perhaps not even actions in the narrow sense, we would not be responsible for them and freedom of decision would be missing. Recent psychological and neurophysiological research has added to this a number of (...) phenomena (the "new unconscious") in which behavior is completely unconscious or in which the decision or its execution is influenced by unconscious factors: priming, automatic behavior, habitualized behavior, actions based on plain unconscious deliberations, intrusion of information from the dorsal pathway, etc. However, since this makes up the largest part of the behavior which is generally regarded as action, intentionality, yet agency, responsibility and even compatibilist freedom of decision for the largest part of our behavior may be threatened. Such considerations have led to a lively debate, which, however, suffers from generalizations that lump all these unconscious phenomena together. In contrast, the aim of this article is to discuss individual unconscious influences on our behavior separately with respect to what extent they require changes in traditional conceptualizations. The first part (2-4) of the article outlines the "traditions" and their elaborations: the intentional causalist concept of action, an associated empirical theory of action and standard concepts of responsibility and compatibilist freedom of decision, as well as the challenges for them. In the second part (5-9), the aforementioned unconscious influences on our actions (except for automated and habitualized actions, which I discuss elsewhere) are examined: 1. unconscious priming, 2. dynamically unconscious motives, 3. dorsal pathway information influencing conscious decisions, 4. unconsciously altered execution of conscious intentions, 5. unconscious deliberations and decisions. To what extent do these phenomena C1. require a change in the concept of action, C2. curtail intentionality or agency, C3. responsibility and C4. freedom? The result is: The curtailments prove to be far less dramatic than they initially appear; they require more watchfulness but no conceptual change. (shrink)

Categorization and memory for specific items are fundamental processes that allow us to apply knowledge to novel stimuli. This study directly compares categorization and memory using delay match to category (DMC) and delay match to sample (DMS) tasks. In DMC participants view and categorize a stimulus, maintain the category across a delay, and at the probe phase view another stimulus and indicate whether it is in the same category or not. In DMS, a standard item working memory task, participants encode (...) and maintain a specific individual item, and at probe decide if the stimulus is an exact match or not. Constrained Principal Components Analysis was used to identify and compare activity within neural networks associated with these tasks, and we relate these networks to those that have been identified with resting state-fMRI. We found that two frontoparietal networks of particular interest. The first network included regions associated with the dorsal attention network and frontoparietal salience network; this network showed patterns of activity consistent with a role in rapid orienting to and processing of complex stimuli. The second uniquely involved regions of the frontoparietal central executive network; this network responded more slowly following each stimulus and showed a pattern of activity consistent with a general role in role in decision-making across tasks. Additional components were identified that were associated with visual, somatomotor and default mode networks. (shrink)

Sobre esta edição A terceira edição de A Semântica transcendental de Kant (Campinas, CLE, 2005) encontra-se esgotada há vários anos. Este fato recomenda a sua reedição, tendo em vista o interesse que as edições anteriores suscitaram na comunidade kantiana brasileira. Desde a primeira edição em 2000, dediquei numerosos artigos e resenhas – publicados nas revistas Analytica, Cadernos de História e Filosofia da Ciência, Manuscrito, O que nos faz pensar e Studia Kantiana, entre outras – foram dedicados à apresentação e divulgação (...) de pesquisas, bem como aos debates, sobre o lugar da semântica transcendental na obra de Kant. Sobre a coleção Zeljko Loparic: Obras Reunidas A idade pede que se olhe para o passado, o caminho percorrido e as realizações. Minhas Obras reunidas são uma tentativa de fazer tal balanço. Elas conterão a totalidade de minha produção intelectual no campo da filosofia publicada entre 1975 e 2022. Os trabalhos serão agrupados em seis partes temáticas e ordenados cronologicamente, seguindo as principais linhas de desenvolvimento da minha compreensão das perguntas filosóficas ao longo dos anos. Uma sétima parte conterá traduções de minha produção para outras línguas. Os volumes de cada parte terão títulos refletindo sua fonte de inspiração ou seu conteúdo, o que será esboçado em prefácios. Os escritos desse período ainda inéditos serão a disponibilizados online via streaming na Coleção Inéditos Loparic. (shrink)

The late tenth century siddha and scholar Ratnākaraśānti, also known as the Mahāsiddha Śāntipa, was renowned as the author of both philosophical śāstras and commentaries on tantra. Typically, these are considered separate spheres of activity. However, Ratnākaraśānti’s approach, building on the tradition of scholarship associated with the Mahāvairocanābhisaṃbodhitantra and the Guhyasamājatantra, as well as on Yogācāra analysis and Buddhist pramāṇa theory, is highly syncretic. This paper is a study of Ratnākaraśānti’s commentaries that highlights his synthesis of the exoteric and esoteric (...) streams of Buddhist discourse, with particular emphasis on the nondual nature of reflexive awareness (svasaṃvitti, rang rig), or 'luminosity' (prakāśa, gsal ba), which serves as the conceptual bridge between sūtra and tantra. (shrink)

Altruisme pada makhluk sosial, selain manusia, selalu menjadi topik yang menarik. Satu dari contoh tipikalnya adalah semut pekerja – semut mandul yang bekerja tanpa kenal lelah demi ratu mereka. Bisa dibilang, evaluasi menurut asas biaya-manfaat dalam sistem koloni semut sedang berlangsung di tingkat kolektif dan bukan tingkat individu. Perlu dicatat bahwa hal ini secara biologis lebih merupakan batasan yang “keras” daripada pilihan yang bersifat “pribadi”. Perilaku altruistik yang dipilih secara alami pada hewan bermanfaat bagi kelangsungan hidup dan reproduksi spesies yang (...) membawa biaya individu (pengorbanan). Secara keseluruhan, perilaku seperti ini disebut altruisme biologis [1]. Niat dan perilaku manusia sering kali merupakan gabungan yang jauh lebih rumit dari naluri biologis dan kognisi tingkat lanjut. Perilaku altruistik pada manusia yang banyak ditemukan telah dikaitkan secara positif dengan kebahagiaan, kesehatan mental yang lebih baik, dan kesehatan fisik yang lebih baik, yang disarankan selaras dengan prinsip biologis dan evolusioner alam [2]. Dalam sebuah studi di tahun 2019 yang diterbitkan dalam Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), peneliti menemukan bahwa perilaku altruistik dapat menghilangkan rasa sakit fisik dengan mengurangi aktivitas otak di dorsal anterior cingulate cortex dan bilateral insula dalam merespon rangsangan yang menyakitkan [3]. (shrink)

A general definition of consciousness is: ‘consciousness is a mental aspect of a system or a process, which is a conscious experience, a conscious function, or both depending on the context’, where the term context refers to metaphysical views, constraints, specific aims, and so on. One of the aspects of visual consciousness is the visual subjective experience (SE) or the first person experience that occurs/emerges in the visual neural-network of thalamocortical system (which includes dorsal and ventral visual pathways and (...) frontal cortex) during dynamic interactions among widely distributed neuronal groups. In this article, however, consciousness and SE are interchangeably used unless noted. Consciousness can be either access (reportable) or phenomenal consciousness. For access consciousness, the interactions are between feed forward stimulus dependent signals and fronto-parietal feedback attentional signals. The necessary ingredients for access (reportable) consciousness are (i) wakefulness, (ii) reentrant interactions among neural populations, (iii) fronto-parietal and thalamic-reticular-nucleus attentional signals that modulate consciousness, (iv) working memory that retains information for consciousness, (v) stimulus at or above threshold level, and (vi) neural-network proto-experiences (PEs) that are superposed SEs embedded in a neural-network. Attention and the ability to report are not necessary for phenomenal consciousness. The neural source for the arousal system is the ascending reticular activating system in the brain stem, which brings the thalamocortical neural networks to wakeful state as a baseline for consciousness to occur. Reentrant interactions among neural populations bind stimulus attributes (such as location and features) and entail consciousness. Attention could be the results of reentry and competitive interactions, and modulates the stimulus related feed forward signal and consciousness. The ‘sources’ of attention may be thalamic reticular nucleus for bottom-up or frontal cortex for top-down direction. The ‘target’ of visual attention is ‘V4/V8/VO’ for Red-Green (R-G) channel. The neural correlates of the psychophysical entity R-G channel appear to be ‘V4/V8/VO’-neural-network (retina → LGN ↔ V1 ↔ V2 ↔ ‘V4/V8/VO’, and areas for attention, memory, and wakefulness). The psychophysical Red-Green Channel, its neurophysiological correlates V4/V8/VO-neural-network, and related experience (such as redness) are integrated. The dual-aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework (Vimal, J Integr Neurosci 7:49–73, 2008) was used to address the explanatory gap problem of materialism. Neural-network and related SEs are the results of the co-evolution and co-development of the material aspect (mass, charge, spin, force, quanta, and space-time) and the mental aspect of fundamental particles (strings or elementary particles (fermions and bosons)). Their mental aspects are considered as the carriers of superposed multiple possible experiences (SEs/PEs) in unexpressed form. These possibilities are actualized when neural-networks are formed via neural Darwinism, and a specific SE is selected by a matching process when the necessary ingredients of consciousness/SE are satisfied. A simple experimental design is suggested to address the necessary and sufficient attributes of consciousness. (shrink)

Purpose: This article aims to highlight key indicators of residents' quality of life in a specific contemporary building in Kruja, Albania. -/- Design/Method/Approach: A questionnaire with 30 questions was prepared for the inhabitance, and the Binary or Tobit probabilistic models were taken into consideration as part of the methodology, to conclude. The study will further analyze the implications of the inhabitants and their behavior in a specific contemporary building in the city of Kruja. It was examined the statistical significance of (...) each variable (questions) in the models elaborated with EViews 8 software. The stable models that are associated with the “Log-likelihood” statistics were statistically significant at a significance level of p < 5%, or with 95% confidence, based on the model tests. -/- Findings: The study concluded that the most statistically significant quality of life indicators part of the questionnaire is related to the typology of the apartments, methods of cooling during summer, present living conditions, apartment improvement, apartment orientation, and time spent in the living room. Furthermore, the study reveals that most of the quality-of-life indicators (part of the questionnaire) are not statistically important, so they will not be considered part of the models created in the article. The study reveals that increasing the living space and improving orientation is crucial to enhance the satisfaction of apartment inhabitants. When apartment sizes increase and orientation is improved, residents are more likely to opt for fans over air conditioners to reduce electricity costs and avoid installing additional cooling facilities during summer. They believe that better living conditions require larger apartments, additional water supply, increased electrical costs, and more time spent in the living room. The inhabitants also emphasize the importance of reducing moisture levels, decreasing window opening frequency, and increasing time spent with family. Interestingly, a one-degree improvement in summer cooling methods (e.g., switching from air blowers to air conditioning) corresponds to a one-degree improvement in winter heating methods (e.g., switching from gas to electricity), leading to a heightened need for clean electric heating. Overall, the study emphasizes the importance of meeting the physical and spatial needs of the residents to enhance their overall satisfaction and quality of life. Urban policies significantly impact housing affordability, quality, transport systems, environmental sustainability, and social equity, affecting overall living standards and economic growth. Cities must create well-designed policies that consider residents' needs and study findings to ensure sustainable development and citizen welfare. -/- Theoretical Implications: Gujarati’s (Basic Economics) theory was developed in the article. -/- Practical Implications: This study will serve as an indicator to analyze the further improvements that might occur in the specific building (not just in the city of Kruja), considering the main quality of life indicators. -/- Originality/Value: The article will serve as a base for further analysis of resident’s behavior and their social impact in the community in order to be aware of their needs for further developments in the construction field. -/- Research Limitations/Future Research: The findings depend profoundly on the type of building the residents are living in. The research stream that can be inspired by the research is strongly related to mathematical regression models, statistics, and probability. -/- Paper Type: Empirical . (shrink)

Resting state networks comprise several brain regions that exhibit complex patterns of interaction. Switching from eyes closed (EC) to eyes open (EO) during the resting state modifies these patterns of connectivity, but precisely how these change remains unclear. Here we use functional magnetic resonance imaging to scan healthy participants in two resting conditions (viz., EC and EO). Seven resting state networks were chosen for this study: salience network (SN), default mode network (DMN), central executive network (CEN), dorsal attention network (...) (DAN), visual network (VN), motor network (MN) and auditory network (AN). We performed functional connectivity (FC) analysis for each network, comparing the FC maps for both EC and EO. Our results show increased connectivity between most networks during EC relative to EO, thereby suggesting enhanced integration during EC and greater modularity or specialization during EO. Among these networks, SN is distinctive: during the transition from EO to EC it evinces increased connectivity with DMN and decreased connectivity with VN. This change might imply that SN functions in a manner analogous to a circuit switch, modulating resting state relations with DMN and VN, when transitioning between EO and EC. (shrink)