El trabajo reflexiona sobre los fundamentos originarios de la ética. La tesis central que se defiende y que se busca mostrar consiste en asumir que las raíces históricas últimas de lo ético están en la vida humana misma, que lo ético responde a una necesidad humana vital y que es precisamente en la vida donde ha de encontrarse el buscado criterio de última instancia sobre lo que lo ético es. Esta hipótesis conduce necesariamente a analizar el tema de la vida, (...) a abordar el asunto también desde una perspectiva antropológica y a buscar lo que podría llamarse pre-historia biológica de lo ético. (shrink)

Luego de esclarecer y diferenciar conceptualmente los términos "educación " y "enseñanza", el trabajo profundiza en el concepto de "lo ético". La tesis que busca mostrar es que las raíces históricas últimas de lo ético están en la vida humana misma, que lo ético responde a una necesidad humana vital y que es precisamente en la vida donde hemos de encontrar el buscado criterio de última instancia sobre lo que lo ético es. Esta idea mueve necesariamente a analizar la vida (...) humana, a abordar el asunto también desde una perspectiva antropológica y a buscar incluso lo que podría llamarse «pre-historia» biológica de lo ético. En cualquier ser vivo encontramos una especie de «proto-valoración» del medio desde el ángulo de lo que él necesita de ese medio para realizar sus procesos autopoiéticos y conservar la vida, una suerte de separación de «lo bueno» y «lo malo» para él. De esa necesidad autopoiética emana el egocentrismo de todo ser vivo. Pero las inclinaciones egocéntricas conviven y coexisten con las inclinaciones genocéntricas, tendientes a la protección y defensa de la progenie. Las inclinaciones egocéntricas de los individuos tienen como una especie de muro de contención en sus inclinaciones genocéntricas. Es lógico que así sea, ya que el despliegue ilimitado del egocentrismo podría poner en riesgo o incluso terminar con la especie. Lo que en otros seres vivos se resuelve fundamentalmente a través de los instintos, en los seres humano se logra por medio de la conciencia valorativa, ética. Lo ético es un modo específicamente humano de combinar el genocentrismo con el egocentrismo. Las normas y valores constitutivos de la ética se integran a la experiencia histórico-social que se trasmite por la educación y la enseñanza. (shrink)

El objetivo de este ensayo es analizar cómo confluyen en una misma base teórica tres discursos de diferentes áreas. Uno de ellos es la ciencia, mediante el genocentrismo defendido en la síntesis moderna en Biología. Otro es el de la religión, mediante la perspectiva finalista del alma y del diseño divino, que comparten las religiones abrahámicas. Y finalmente, en la esfera político-social, donde diferentes movimientos conservadores se oponen a replantear la agenda de derechos. La confluencia teórica que nuclea a (...) las tres áreas mencionadas es un preformismo sobre los organismos. Por lo tanto, primero, veremos cómo el preformismo se encuentra presente en biología. Segundo, señalaremos dos ideas relacionadas al preformismo que subyacen tanto en la biología como en la religión. Finalmente, analizaremos cómo ambos discursos, el científico y el religioso, se encuentran presentes y empleando un rol argumentativo en debates actuales sobre derechos humanos, específicamente, relacionados al aborto ya los derechos de la población lgtbiq+. La principal conclusión es que la síntesis moderna promueve erróneamente una defensa de un preformismo genético, con connotaciones religiosas, que es usado por movimientos conservadores en el ámbito político-social. (shrink)

"Una Pedagogía del Nosotros" pretende mostrar la esencia de la educación como punto de encuentro, compatible con todas las cosmovisiones. La pedagogía del nosotros invita a habitar la educación con originalidad, pero con un criterio más allá de la propia originalidad. Se trata de tener sensibilidad ante el peligro de manipulación, pero también ante el peligro de no educar, por temor a manipular. Los grandes problemas de la Humanidad no se producen por conflictos y crisis, sino por el egocentrismo. (...) Las dificultades, errores, debilidades, conflictos y crisis son humanos, y cuando se gestionan con nosicentrismo, suponen una oportunidad para crecer, pero si se gestionan con egocentrismo, no solo no se resuelven, sino que se agravan, y si se logra un equilibrio de egocentrismos que aporte apariencia de paz, en el fondo, no hay autorrealización porque los sujetos no están sabiendo madurar; simplemente viven para aplacar a su egocentrismo. El nosicentrismo es la maduración original de sí más allá de sí, que tiende a la autorrealización apoteósica entregándose al nosotros-maduro. Para que las comunidades sean vivencias de “nosotros” felices, es primordial que los sujetos se dispongan de forma nosicéntrica en cuerpo, mente y apertura. Cultivando el carácter, desarrollando las competencias y madurando la sensibilidad. De este modo, la unidad de sujetos forma un nosotros-maduro donde cada sí-mismo es más sí-mismo desplegándose hacia fuera, colaborando, sirviendo o dándose sin devorar y sin dejarse devorar. Es un salir para dar o darse, de modo que el sujeto se hace grande haciendo grandes a los demás y se enriquece interiormente, enriqueciendo lo otro. Cuando los sujetos desde su egocentrismo forman un nosotros, en realidad es un falso-nosotros. La educación apertural, libera del falsos-nosotros, cicatriza la originalidad y la despliega por medio de una pedagogía del nosotros-maduro. ¿Y cómo se educa la apertura? Aportando motivos por los que vale la pena abrirse, madurando la conciencia y capacitando al sujeto para una libertad consciente. El sentido es clave para dar, para darse y para saber a quién vale la pena darse por entero, por qué y para qué. ¿Y cómo descubrir el sentido de darse por entero? La clave está en enseñar a cada sujeto a mirar hacia su propio sentido original, que se encuentra en su conciencia. Y así es como realmente uno se hace original y creativo. La educación apertural no es un forzar hacia fuera “porque es bueno”, sino invitar a buscar hacia dentro para reconocerse en su origen y desplegar el sí-mismo original. Pero el sí-mismo no podrá ser plenamente sí-mismo sin el tú, así que será una educación de comunidad, comenzando por la familia. Desde esta interpretación, la acción educativa tiene mucho de acompañar a cada sujeto en la aventura de conocerse a sí mismo, descubrir su propia originalidad y disponerle para que la despliegue con sensibilidad y empatía. No se tratará de imponer desde fuera, sino invitar a sacar; ayudar a crecer. Desde la pedagogía del nosotros se busca el entendimiento de todas las cosmovisiones y de ellas entre sí, para ayudarnos a madurar y habitar en un nosotros-maduro. Así, se considera que lo más práctico es ir al fondo: ¿Cuál es el fin último de la educación? ¿Cuál es la esencia de la autorrealización máxima a la que puede aspirar un sujeto? Para sintetizar la respuesta, se tomará el concepto “apoteosis” del griego apothéōsis “deificación”, “divinización”, “endiosar”. Según cada cosmovisión, la apoteosis supone “estar en la gloria”, disfrutando del máximo bien, al que cada cual aspirará, según sus prioridades vitales: Placer, Poder, Sentido u Originalidad (se explica en el libro). Sea como fuere la cosmovisión del sujeto, el “tú” endiosa, pero es la propia conciencia la que está llamando a ser “dios” y si no se encuentra en el camino de la apoteosis, siente una especie de vacío interior, como que algo no va bien. No termina de vivir colmado; ni cuando prospera con actividades exitosas, ni en una situación general de bienestar, ni en una actitud vital de servicio a los demás, nada colma. La apoteosis es la máxima autorrealización de un sujeto en el “nosotros” o la mejor realización de la Humanidad como “nosotros total”. La educación apoteósica consiste en ayudar a descubrir o redescubrir, en conciencia, el sabor de las alegrías originales de la vida. La pedagogía del nosotros no plantea ninguna fórmula absoluta para educar ni para vivir. Sencillamente se considera el vivir humano como un vivir-con, que sorprende con descubrimientos constantes. Desde la Pedagogía del nosotros todas las instituciones intermedias: familia, escuela, etc., y la sociedad en su conjunto, contribuyen a la educación de cada sujeto, más o menos egocéntrico y más o menos abierto a la aventura de habitar la vida con mayor conciencia. La Pedagogía del nosotros invita a cada sujeto a que apueste toda su existencia a la exploración y experimentación de lo auténtico. Cada sujeto solo puede crecer y desarrollarse, una vez que ha aprendido a vivir en relación con los demás, a reconocer las posibilidades del espacio entre sus “nosotros”. El medio fundamental es el diálogo al que se ha llamado amor, que es lo que sucede cuando dos sujetos comparten en conciencia, algo o todo de sus vidas al mismo tiempo. Dice Antoine de Saint-Exúpery: "amor no es mirarse el uno al otro, sino mirar los dos en la misma dirección". Este compartir en conciencia es convivir en realidad. Dice Buber: "Toda vida real es reunión" y la sociedad, la familia y la escuela tienen la llave para reunirnos y enseñarnos a dialogar. Solo se vive la vida real, la vida auténtica desde la originalidad compartida, cohabitada. Ahí es donde los sujetos pueden ser más sí mismos, creativos y auténticamente felices. (shrink)

En atención a las críticas de la autointerpretación teórica heideggeriana, abordaremos tres temas fundamentales posteriores al “giro” trascendental husserliano. A la luz de la interpretación contemporánea, buscaremos evitar los lugares comunes de la crítica a Husserl, en aras de una discusión más sofisticada en torno al método fenomenológico. /// Considering the most extended arguments of Martin Heidegger against the transcendental " turn " of Phenomenology, we will approach to three main characters of this sui generis transcendentalism. In light of contemporary (...) phenomenological studies, we will avoid commonplaces of misinterpretation in order to gain a more sophisticated debate about phenomenological method. (shrink)

Background: With the coming of the Industrial Revolution, the levels of pollution grow significantly. This Technological development contributed to the worsening of shortness breath problems in great shape. especially in infants and children. There are many shortness breath diseases that infants and children face in their lives. Shortness of breath is one of a very serious symptom in children and infants and should never be ignored. Objectives: Along these lines, the main goal of this expert system is to help physician (...) in diagnosing and describe some common causes of shortness of breath in infants and children by diagnosing their cases through our expert system. Moreover, this system which we are presenting will give patient the appropriate diagnosis of disease and the treatment required. Methods: In this paper the strategy of the expert system for diagnosing a number of the existed shortness of breath in infants and children diseases such as (Asthma , Bronchiolitis, Viral Pneumonia, cough, Shortness of breath' dyspnea ', Epiglottitis, Croup, ABSCESS in the tonsil 'peritonsillar abscess', Bronchitis, Viral Bronchitis, Wheezing, sudden infant death syndrome 'SIDS' ) is introduced, an overview about the shortness of breath in children and infants diseases are delineated, the cause of diseases are sketched and the treatment of disease whenever conceivable is given . SL5 Object Expert System language was utilized for designing and implementing the proposed expert system. Results: The proposed shortness of breath in children and infants diseases diagnosis expert system was estimated by Medical students and they were satisfied with its result. Conclusions: The Proposed expert system is very useful for Respiratory physician, pediatrician, recently graduated physician, and for children's parents with shortness of breath problem. (shrink)

‘Substance’ (substantia, zelfstandigheid) is a key term of Spinoza’s philosophy. Like almost all of Spinoza’s philosophical vocabulary, Spinoza did not invent this term, which has a long history that can be traced back at least to Aristotle. Yet, Spinoza radicalized the traditional notion of substance and made a very powerful use of it by demonstrating – or at least attempting to demonstrate -- that there is only one, unique substance -- God (or Nature) -- and that all other things are (...) merely modes or states of God. Some of Spinoza’s readers understood these claims as committing him to the view that only God truly exists, and while this interpretation is not groundless, we will later see that this enticing and bold reading of Spinoza as an ‘acosmist’ comes at the expense of another audacious claim Spinoza advances, i.e., that God/Nature is absolutely and actually infinite. But before we reach this last conclusion, we have a long way to go. So, let me first provide an overview of our plan. In the first section of this paper we will examine Spinoza’s definitions of ‘substance’ and ‘God’ at the opening of his magnum opus, the Ethics. Following a preliminary clarification of these two terms and their relations to the other key terms defined at the beginning of the Ethics, we will briefly address the Aristotelian and Cartesian background of Spinoza’s discussion of substance. In the second section, we will study the properties of the fundamental binary relations pertaining to Spinoza’s substance: inherence, conception, and causation. The third section will be dedicated to a clarification of Spinoza’s claim that God, the unique substance, is absolutely infinite. This essential feature of Spinoza’s substance has been largely neglected in recent Anglo-American scholarship, a neglect which has brought about an unfortunate tendency to domesticate Spinoza’s metaphysics to more contemporary views. The fourth section will study the nature of Spinoza’s monism. It will discuss and criticize the interesting yet controversial views of the eminent Spinoza scholar, Martial Gueroult, about the plurality of substances in the beginning of the Ethics; address Spinoza’s claim in Letter 50 that, strictly speaking, it is improper to describe God as “one”; and, finally, evaluate Spinoza’s kind of monism against the distinction between existence and priority monism recently introduced into the contemporary philosophical literature. The fifth and final section will explain the nature, reality, and manner of existence of modes. We therefore have an ambitious plan; let’s get down to business. (shrink)

Ligado directamente a la dinámica de los movimientos renovadores del arte que surgieron en la España de los años veinte, el texto de Ortega y Gasset ofrece unas perspectivas más amplias y entronca con la renovación de la estética y la historia del arte que había iniciado la tradición teórica e historiográfica alemana a finales del siglo XIX. Ofrecemos, además otros escritos que, como «¿Una exposición Zuloaga?», «La Gioconda», «Diálogo sobre el arte nuevo», «Ensayo de estética a manera de prólogo» (...) y «Sobre la crítica del arte», permiten una mejor comprensión del pensamiento de Ortega y del debate artístico y estético en España. La presente edición va precedida de un prólogo de Valeriano Bozal. (shrink)

Jonathan Y. Tsou examines and defends positions on central issues in philosophy of psychiatry. The positions defended assume a naturalistic and realist perspective and are framed against skeptical perspectives on biological psychiatry. Issues addressed include the reality of mental disorders; mechanistic and disease explanations of abnormal behavior; definitions of mental disorder; natural and artificial kinds in psychiatry; biological essentialism and the projectability of psychiatric categories; looping effects and the stability of mental disorders; psychiatric classification; and the validity of the DSM's (...) diagnostic categories. The main argument defended by Tsou is that genuine mental disorders are biological kinds with harmful effects. This argument opposes the dogma that mental disorders are necessarily diseases that result from biological dysfunction. Tsou contends that the broader ideal of biological kinds offers a more promising and empirically ascertainable naturalistic standard for assessing the reality of mental disorders and the validity of psychiatric categories. (shrink)

Is a human more conscious than an octopus? In the science of consciousness, it’s oftentimes assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But in recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. This paper (1) argues that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, (2) examines the semantics of ‘more conscious than’ expressions, (3) develops an analysis of what it is for a (...) degreed property to count as degrees of consciousness, and (4) applies the analysis to various theories of consciousness. I argue that whether consciousness comes in degrees ultimately depends on which theory of consciousness turns out to be correct. But I also argue that most theories of consciousness entail that consciousness comes in degrees. (shrink)

The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to “mental privacy.” In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are—at least for now—no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection (...) technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum’s “contextual integrity” theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts—healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy. (shrink)

Los fenómenos urbanos son objeto de complejos modelos cuantitativos que persiguen explicar la emergencia de futuras tendencias. De similar manera, la intuición opera en algunos visionarios, cuya propiedad de percibir lo que esta por venir, los acerca a la realidad de un modo distinto. Este es el caso de Víctor Jara, cuya canción “Las Casitas del Barrio Alto” es objeto de estudio a través de un análisis crítico del discurso. En el trabajo se aprecia que Víctor Jara tiene la capacidad (...) de anticipar el futuro con esta canción, enunciando las características de lo que seria el porvenir urbano de Chile post dictatorial. (shrink)

This paper develops a theory of analog representation. We first argue that the mark of the analog is to be found in the nature of a representational system’s interpretation function, rather than in its vehicles or contents alone. We then develop the rulebound structure theory of analog representation, according to which analog systems are those that use interpretive rules to map syntactic structural features onto semantic structural features. The theory involves three degree-theoretic measures that capture three independent ways in which (...) a system can be more or less analog. We explain how our theory improves upon prior accounts of analog representation, provides plausible diagnoses for novel challenge cases, extends to hybrid systems that are partially analog and partially symbolic, and accounts for some of the advantages and disadvantages of representing analogically versus symbolically. (shrink)

This study aimed to identify the learning and business incubation processes and their impact on developing the performance of business incubators in Gaza Strip, and the study relied on the descriptive analytical approach, and the study population consisted of all employees working in business incubators in Gaza Strip in addition to experts and consultants in incubators where their total number reached (62) individuals, and the researchers used the questionnaire as a main tool to collect data through the comprehensive survey method, (...) where (55) questionnaires were retrieved with a recovery rate of (88.7%). The results of the study showed that there is a high approval of the variables of the study, where the dimension of incubation operations came with a relative weight (84.89%), followed by the learning dimension which got a relative weight (82.50%), while the performance level of the incubators got a relative weight (80.12%) and as the study results showed There is a positive relationship statistically between the two dimensions of learning and business incubation processes and performance development in business incubators, and the linear regression analysis model showed that the main effect in improving the performance of business incubators is "after business incubation operations" while it showed weak effect after learning. The study came out with several recommendations, the most important of which is that business incubators seek to reinforce the learning process and incubation processes for business, and the need to periodically evaluate their performance, and that a more effective mechanism be designed to follow up with companies after the end of the incubation period and monitor the progress of these companies. (shrink)

This chapter examines the legacy of Kuhn’s Structure for normative philosophy of science. As an argument regarding the history of 20th century philosophy of science, I contend that the main legacy of Structure was destructive: Structure shifted philosophy of science away from addressing general normative philosophical issues (e.g., the demarcation problem, empirical testability) towards more deflationary and local approaches to normative issues. This is evident in the first generation of post-Structure philosophers of science in the 1980s and 1990s, who adopted (...) a pluralist approach to HPS. As a metaphilosophical argument regarding the methods adopted in HPS, I argue that there are a plurality of legitimate philosophical methodologies for inferring normative claims from historical cases. I frame this argument as a response to Pitt’s dilemma of case studies. I reject Pitt’s dilemma for its presupposition of an unrealistic and unfruitful standard (viz., epistemic certainty) for assessing HPS arguments and its analysis of philosophical methodology at the level of individual arguments. Pitt’s dilemma is most usefully understood as identifying potential points of criticism for HPS arguments. -/- The chapter begins with an examination of Kuhn’s normative philosophy of science in Structure and his position that historical cases provide evidence for philosophical claims. Kuhn’s philosophical methodology is insufficiently articulated, and his utilization of case studies is subject to objections (viz., interpretative bias, hasty generalization) implied by Pitt’s dilemma. I subsequently examine four post-Kuhnian methodological perspectives: (1) Ian Hacking’s particularism, (2) Helen Longino’s practice-based approach, (3) Michael Friedman’s neo-Kantianism, and (4) Hasok Chang’s complementary science. These views suggest alternative methodological strategies in HPS for addressing normative issues. I conclude by articulating some outstanding methodological challenges for the pluralist tradition of HPS—associated with the Stanford and Minnesota schools of philosophy of science—that emerged in the 1980s and remains influential. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION[|]It can be thought that ethical problems will rise as the population gets older. Issues such as competence and autonomy of the elderly are among the rising ehtical problems. The fact people aged 65 and over are being questioned about their competence, is an ethical problem in Turkey and this issue is discussed in this work. [¤]METHODS[|]Many institutions subject people over 65 to adequacy audit in decision making stage and this is repeated for every new situation. As a result of (...) this, people over 65 have to be examined by a doctor although there isn't a medical condition. This problem has been discussed within the framework of the following questions: 'In what extent is it legitimate to question the adequacy of a person aged over 65? How does a person feel when her/his adequacy is questioned? Can she/he be the same person as she/he feels before? When does being and individual or adequacy of a person disappear? And, who can decide in this issue?' [¤]RESULTS[|]-[¤]DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION[|]It has been thought that autonomy of people over 65 years is violated partly and being over 65 years is perceieved as an abnormal situation. [¤]. (shrink)

In psychiatry, pharmacological research has played a crucial role in the formulation, revision, and refinement of neurobiological theories of psychopathology. Besides being utilized as potential treatments for various mental disorders, pharmacological drugs play an important epistemic role as experimental instruments that help scientists uncover the neurobiological underpinnings of mental disorders (Tsou, 2012). Interventions with psychiatric patients using pharmacological drugs provide researchers with information about the neurobiological causes of mental disorders that cannot be obtained in other ways. This important source of (...) evidence for the biological causes of mental disorder is often overlooked in philosophical analyses of psychiatry, especially in skeptical analyses that debase the biological aspects of psychopathology (e.g., Szasz, 1960; Scheff, 1963; Laing, 1967). In discussing pharmacological interventions as a form of evidence for the physical basis of mental disorders, this paper aims to clarify the nature, reliability, and limitations of this evidence. In addition, it illustrates the central role that pharmacological findings in applied clinical contexts play in the acquisition of neurobiological knowledge in research contexts. (shrink)

Let a smooth experience be an experience with perfectly gradual changes in phenomenal character. Consider, as examples, your visual experience of a blue sky or your auditory experience of a rising pitch. Do the phenomenal characters of smooth experiences have continuous or discrete structures? If we appeal merely to introspection, then it may seem that we should think that smooth experiences are continuous. This paper (1) uses formal tools to clarify what it means to say that an experience is continuous (...) or discrete, and (2) develops a discrete model of the phenomenal characters of smooth experiences. As a result, I'll argue that introspection leaves open whether smooth experiences are continuous or discrete. Yet I’ll also argue—perhaps surprisingly—that the discrete theory may better fit our introspective evidence. (shrink)

To be conscious—according to a common metaphor—is for the “lights to be on inside.” Is this a good metaphor? I argue that the metaphor elicits useful intuitions while staying neutral on controversial philosophical questions. But I also argue that there are two ways of interpreting the metaphor. Is consciousness the inner light itself? Or is consciousness the illuminated room? Call the first sense subjectivity (where ‘consciousness’ =def what makes an entity feel some way at all), and the second sense phenomenal (...) character (where ‘consciousness’ =def what it feels like to be an entity). I use this distinction—as well as the metaphor of the inner light—to clarify some philosophical questions about whether consciousness comes in degrees, whether consciousness is multidimensional, and whether there are borderline cases of consciousness. (shrink)

A phenome occurs through the many pathways of the complex net of interaction between the phenome and its environment; therefore researching and understanding how it arises requires investigation into many possible causes that are in constant interaction with each other. The most comprehensive investigations in biology are the ones in which many biologists from different sub-areas—evolutionary biology, developmental biology, molecular biology, physiology, genetics, epigenetics, ecology—have collaborated. Still, biologists do not always need to collaborate or look for the most comprehensive explanations. (...) A more standard investigation in biology occurs within a single subarea, and uses well-defined experiments with very specific conditions. This paper is about causation and related explanation in plant phenome research and its relevance to Aristotle’s Theory of Four Causes. I argue that there are causes which resemble Aristotle’s formal, material, and efficient causes in phenotype explanation and occurrence; but causes which resemble Aristotle’s final causes occur in phenotype explanation only, not in the occurrence. (shrink)

This paper examines the idea of "objective phenomenology," or a way of understanding the phenomenal character of conscious experiences that doesn’t require one to have had the kinds of experiences under consideration. My central thesis is that structural facts about experience—facts that characterize purely how conscious experiences are structured—are objective phenomenal facts. I begin by precisifying the idea of objective phenomenology and diagnosing what makes any given phenomenal fact subjective. Then I defend the view that structural facts about experience are (...) objective. I also argue that structural facts about experience, despite being objective, nevertheless still give rise to an explanatory gap. (shrink)

Some philosophers think that life is worth living not merely because of the goods and the bads within it, but also because life itself is good. I explain how this idea can be formalized by associating each version of such of a view with a function from length of life to the value generated by life itself. Then I argue that every version of the view that life itself is good faces some version of the following dilemma: either (1) good (...) human lives are worse than very long lives wholly devoid of pleasure, desire-satisfaction, knowledge, or any other goods, or (2) very short lives containing nothing but suffering are worth living. Since neither result is plausible, we ought to reject the view that life itself is good. On the view I favor, any given life may be worth living because of the goods that it contains, but life itself is neutral. (shrink)

Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in geometrical spaces, where distances between points inversely correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This paper argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more powerful and flexible. The core problem for the standard framework is that it cannot capture precision structure: for example, (...) consider the phenomenal contrast between seeing an object as crimson in foveal vision versus merely as red in peripheral vision. The solution I favor is to model mental qualities using regions, rather than points. I explain how this seemingly simple formal innovation not only provides a natural way of modeling precision, but also yields a variety of further theoretical fruits: it enables us to formulate novel hypotheses about the space and structures of mental qualities, formally differentiate two dimensions of phenomenal similarity, generate a quantitative model of the phenomenal sorites, and define a measure of discriminatory grain. A noteworthy consequence is that the structure of the mental qualities of conscious experiences is fundamentally different from the structure of the perceptible qualities of external objects. (shrink)

Abstract— Anatomy of the anterior compartment includes the tibia and the fibula. It also includes the tibialis anterior tendon, the extensor hallucis longus tendon and the extensor digitorum longus tendons. The anterior tibial artery and the deep peroneal nerve and finally the superior and inferior extensor retinaculum. In this paper an expert system was designed to help users to correctly diagnose ankle problems. There are many structures present at the anterior aspect of the ankle; these structures are often susceptible to (...) injury common injuries and conditions around the anterior ankle. Clips expert system language was used to design and implement this expert system. (shrink)

Discussion of a short text on ethics, originally Greek, translated into Arabic and Hebrew, and adopted by some Christians, Muslims and Jews for guiding their lives.

Is consciousness intrinsically valuable? Some theorists favor the positive view, according to which consciousness itself accrues intrinsic value, independent of the particular kind of experience instantiated. In contrast, I favor the neutral view, according to which consciousness is neither intrinsically valuable nor disvaluable. The primary purpose of this paper is to clarify what is at stake when we ask whether consciousness is intrinsically valuable, to carve out the theoretical space, and to evaluate the question rigorously. Along the way, I also (...) show why the neutral view is attractive and why certain arguments for the positive view do not work. (shrink)

Reseña en español del diálogo entre A. Badiou y J.-L. Nancy, editado por Jan Völker y publicado en 2017.

Many philosophers accept both of the following claims: (1) consciousness matters morally, and (2) species membership doesn’t matter morally. In other words, many reject speciesism but accept what we might call 'sentientism'. But do the reasons against speciesism yield analogous reasons against sentientism, just as the reasons against racism and sexism are thought to yield analogous reasons against speciesism? This paper argues that speciesism is disanalogous to sentientism (as well as racism and sexism). I make a case for the following (...) asymmetry: (a) some non-humans clearly have interests, but (b) no non-conscious entities clearly have interests. This asymmetry, I argue, renders sentientism resistant to the standard argument against speciesism. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the existence of new epistemological possibilities in the context of the separation between science and non-science by analyzing the discussions on the demarcation of science in the twentieth century.

This paper addresses philosophical issues concerning whether mental disorders are natural kinds and how the DSM should classify mental disorders. I argue that some mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, depression) are natural kinds in the sense that they are natural classes constituted by a set of stable biological mechanisms. I subsequently argue that a theoretical and causal approach to classification would provide a superior method for classifying natural kinds than the purely descriptive approach adopted by the DSM since DSM-III. My argument (...) suggests that the DSM should classify natural kinds in order to provide predictively useful (i.e., projectable) diagnostic categories and that a causal approach to classification would provide a more promising method for formulating valid diagnostic categories. (shrink)

Este artículo está enfocado en la primera etapa de las investigaciones husserlianas sobre la imaginación, enmarcadas en su obra “estática” y determinadas, especialmente, por las características de una concepción centrada en la imagen figurativa (Abbild).

A minimal essentialism (‘intrinsic biological essentialism’) about natural kinds is required to explain the projectability of human science terms. Human classifications that yield robust and ampliative projectable inferences refer to biological kinds. I articulate this argument with reference to an intrinsic essentialist account of HPC kinds. This account implies that human sciences (e.g., medicine, psychiatry) that aim to formulate predictive kind categories should classify biological kinds. Issues concerning psychiatric classification and pluralism are examined.

This study is a theoretical work in the field of sociology of religion which aims to explain the origin of the act of sin and the fundamental motives of crime and deviation tendencies in this context, from Adam’s story in the Qur'an, the main source of Islam. Sin is regarded as a negative act in religious-cultural sense where one struggles for life and tries to protect itself. Though a direct correlation cannot be established with belief values, the sense of sin (...) can be effective in shaping our everyday life and controlling our behavior. Adam’s story is worthy of examination in this context as it carries the qualification of being a religious text that allows us to study the nature of sin. This is based on the Qur'anic text which we think is the simplest form of expression. Adam and Eve, Satan, Abel and Cain are the actors of this story and prototypes helping us to analyze the nature of sin. In this sense, sin acts in the form of various crimes and deviance behaviors as the result of man's eternity of property, power and status struggle in the person of these prototypes. Some theories which have been put forward about crimes and deviations can give a certain explanation on the subject. Also there is the possibility of giving more comprehensive factual explanations about the act of sin which contains a great deal of crime and deviant behavior, moving from the story of Adam. (shrink)

David Lewis—famously—never tasted vegemite. Did he have any knowledge of what it's like to taste vegemite? Most say 'no'; I say 'yes'. I argue that knowledge of what it’s like varies along a spectrum from more exact to more approximate, and that phenomenal concepts vary along a spectrum in how precisely they characterize what it’s like to undergo their target experiences. This degreed picture contrasts with the standard all-or-nothing picture, where phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge lack any such degreed structure. (...) I motivate the degreed picture by appeal to (1) limits in epistemic abilities such as recognition, imagination, and inference, and (2) the semantics of ‘knows what it’s like’ expressions. I argue that approximate phenomenal knowledge cannot be explained merely via determinable or vague phenomenal concepts. I develop a framework for systematizing approximate knowledge of phenomenal character. And I explain how my view challenges some standard assumptions about the acquisition conditions, requirements for mastery, and referential mechanisms of phenomenal concepts. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that depression and suicide are natural kinds insofar as they are classes of abnormal behavior underwritten by sets of stable biological mechanisms. In particular, depression and suicide are neurobiological kinds characterized by disturbances in serotonin functioning that affect various brain areas (i.e., the amygdala, anterior cingulate, prefrontal cortex, and hippocampus). The significance of this argument is that the natural (biological) basis of depression and suicide allows for reliable projectable inferences (i.e., predictions) to be made about (...) individual members of a kind. In the context of assisted suicide, inferences about the decision-making capacity of depressed individuals seeking physician-assisted suicide are of special interest. I examine evidence that depression can hamper the decision-making capacity of individuals seeking assisted suicide and discuss some implications. (shrink)

In psychiatry, pharmacological drugs play an important experimental role in attempts to identify the neurobiological causes of mental disorders. Besides being developed in applied contexts as potential treatments for patients with mental disorders, pharmacological drugs play a crucial role in research contexts as experimental instruments that facilitate the formulation and revision of neurobiological theories of psychopathology. This paper examines the various epistemic functions that pharmacological drugs serve in the discovery, refinement, testing, and elaboration of neurobiological theories of mental disorders. I (...) articulate this thesis with reference to the history of antipsychotic drugs and the evolution of the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia in the second half of the twentieth century. I argue that interventions with psychiatric patients through the medium of antipsychotic drugs provide researchers with information and evidence about the neurobiological causes of schizophrenia. This analysis highlights the importance of pharmacological drugs as research tools in the generation of psychiatric knowledge and the dynamic relationship between practical and theoretical contexts in psychiatry. (shrink)

Mindfulness training has been used to improve emotional wellbeing in early adolescents. However, little is known about treatment outcome moderators, or individual differences that may differentially impact responses to treatment. The current study focused on gender as a potential moderator for affective outcomes in response to school-based mindfulness training. Sixth grade students (N = 100) were randomly assigned to either the six weeks of mindfulness meditation or the active control group as part of a history class curriculum. Participants in the (...) mindfulness meditation group completed short mindfulness meditation sessions four to five times per week, in addition to didactic instruction (Asian history). The control group received matched experiential activity in addition to didactic instruction (African history) from the same teacher with no meditation component. Self-reported measures of emotional wellbeing/affect, mindfulness, and self-compassion were obtained at pre and post intervention. Meditators reported greater improvement in emotional wellbeing compared to those in the control group. Importantly, gender differences were detected, such that female meditators reported greater increases in positive affect compared to females in the control group, whereas male meditators and control males displayed equivalent gains. Uniquely among females but not males, increases in self-reported self-compassion were associated with improvements in affect. These findings support the efficacy of school-based mindfulness interventions, and interventions tailored to accommodate distinct developmental needs of female and male adolescents. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to clarify the nature of the shift in Feyerabend’s philosophical thinking in the 1970s, focusing on issues of realism, relativism, and pluralism. Contra-Preston, I argue that realism-relativism is a misleading variable for characterizing Feyerabend’s shift in the 1970s. Rather, I characterize this shift as Feyerabend’s expansion of pluralism and suggest that this shift appears in Feyerabend’s publications starting in the late-1960s (e.g., Feyerabend 1968b, 1969b, 1970a, 1970c). Adopting the terminology of Brown and Kidd (2016), (...) this shift is characterized by a move from arguments for pluralism within science to broader arguments for pluralism in society. I argue that this shift was largely due to: (1) Feyerabend’s rejection of an empiricist demarcation criterion for science in the mid-1960s, and (2) Feyerabend’s incorporation of Mill’s arguments for pluralism into his own publications starting in 1970. This shift can be characterized as a broadening or expanding the scope of Feyerabend’s arguments for pluralism from contexts of scientific knowledge to the broader context of social or cultural (including ethical) knowledge. I articulate this argument with reference to the framework for classifying Feyerabend’s works formulated by Brown and Kidd (2016). Against Brown and Kidd (and Preston), I argue that realism-relativism is a red-herring as a variable for distinguishing Feyerabend’s early and middle works. Brown and Kidd’s distinction between pluralism within science and pluralism in society is a more useful variable for characterizing Feyerabend’s shift in thinking in the 1970s. Whereas Preston (1997) and Brown and Kidd (2016) identify the beginning of Feyerabend’s pluralism in society phase in 1978 with the publication of Science in a Free Society (Feyerabend 1978), I suggest that the relevant shift occurs much earlier, and it appears in Feyerabend’s publications starting in 1970 (Feyerabend 1970a, 1970b). On this understanding, Feyerabend’s philosophical shift (c. 1970) should be viewed as an expansion (or broadening) of the scope of application of his pluralist arguments, inspired by Mill’s ethical arguments for pluralism in society (Mill 1859/1977). (shrink)

Yitzhak Melamed here offers a new and systematic interpretation of the core of Spinoza's metaphysics. In the first part of the book, he proposes a new reading of the metaphysics of substance in Spinoza: he argues that for Spinoza modes both inhere in and are predicated of God. Using extensive textual evidence, he shows that Spinoza considered modes to be God's propria. He goes on to clarify Spinoza's understanding of infinity, mereological relations, infinite modes, and the flow of finite things (...) from God's essence. In the second part of the book, Melamed relies on this interpretation of the substance-mode relation and the nature of infinite modes and puts forward two interrelated theses about the structure of the attribute of Thought and its overarching role in Spinoza's metaphysics. First, he shows that Spinoza had not one, but two independent doctrines of parallelism. Then, in his final main thesis, Melamed argues that, for Spinoza, ideas have a multifaceted structure that allows one and the same idea to represent the infinitely many modes which are parallel to it in the infinitely many attributes. Thought turns out to be coextensive with the whole of nature. Spinoza cannot embrace an idealist reduction of Extension to Thought because of his commitment to the conceptual separation of the attributes. Yet, within Spinoza's metaphysics, Thought clearly has primacy over the other attributes insofar as it is the only attribute which is as elaborate, as complex, and, in some senses, as powerful as God. (shrink)

A large part of the controversy surrounding the publication of DSM-5 stems from the possibility of replacing the purely descriptive approach to classification favored by the DSM since 1980. This paper examines the question of how mental disorders should be classified, focusing on the issue of whether the DSM should adopt a purely descriptive or theoretical approach. I argue that the DSM should replace its purely descriptive approach with a theoretical approach that integrates causal information into the DSM’s descriptive diagnostic (...) categories. The paper proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I examine the goals (viz., guiding treatment, facilitating research, and improving communication) associated with the DSM’s purely descriptive approach. In the second section, I suggest that the DSM’s purely descriptive approach is best suited for improving communication among mental health professionals; however, theoretical approaches would be superior for purposes of treatment and research. In the third section, I outline steps required to move the DSM towards a hybrid system of classification that can accommodate the benefits of descriptive and theoretical approaches, and I discuss how the DSM’s descriptive categories could be revised to incorporate theoretical information regarding the causes of disorders. I argue that the DSM should reconceive of its goals more narrowly such that it functions primarily as an epistemic hub that mediates among various contexts of use in which definitions of mental disorders appear. My analysis emphasizes the importance of pluralism as a methodological means for avoiding theoretical dogmatism and ensuring that the DSM is a reflexive and self-correcting manual. (shrink)

This chapter examines philosophical issues surrounding the classification of mental disorders by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). In particular, the chapter focuses on issues concerning the relative merits of descriptive versus theoretical approaches to psychiatric classification and whether the DSM should classify natural kinds. These issues are presented with reference to the history of the DSM, which has been published regularly by the American Psychiatric Association since 1952 and is currently in its fifth edition. While the (...) first two editions of the DSM adopted a theoretical (psychoanalytic) and etiological approach to classification, subsequent editions of the DSM have adopted an atheoretical and purely descriptive (“neo-Kraepelinian”) approach. It is argued that largest problem with the DSM at present—viz., its failure to provide valid diagnostic categories—is directly related to the purely descriptive methodology championed by the DSM since the third edition of the DSM. In light of this problem, the chapter discusses the prospects of a theoretical and causal approach to psychiatric classification and critically examines the assumption that the DSM should classify natural kinds. (shrink)

Objective: The nutrient artery which enters through the nutrient foramen (NF) provides blood circulation and nutrition in long bones. This supply is essential during the growing period, the early phases of ossification, and in some surgical procedures. This study aimed to investigate NF in adult human ulnas in the Turkish population. -/- Methods: For this study, 155 (70 right and 85 left) Turkish dry adult human ulnas were used. The presence, number, and patency of NF were recorded as well as (...) its topography and direction. The vertical distance between the most proximal point of the olecranon and the proximal edge of the NF (DONF), and the longitudinal distance between the most ventral point of the coronoid process on the sagittal plane and the proximal edge of the NF (DCpNF) was calculated. Additionally, the foraminal index (FI) was assessed. -/- Results: Single and double NFs were in 139 ulnas (89.67%), and 3 ulnas (1.94%), respectively. NFs were not observed in 13 ulnas (8.39%). The majority of NFs (93.12%) were situated on the anterior surface of the ulna. The direction of all NFs was towards the elbow. The mean DONF and DCpNF were 9.48 ± 1.57 cm, and 6.68 ± 1.44 cm, respectively. The FI was 37.45% in ulnas with a single NF, while it was 41.46% in ulnas with a double NF. -/- Conclusion: Our study has presented additional information such as the FI of ulnas with 2 NFs, and the distance between the coronoid process and NF in the Turkish population. (shrink)

A famous mathematical theorem says that the sum of an infinite series of numbers can depend on the order in which those numbers occur. Suppose we interpret the numbers in such a series as representing instances of some physical quantity, such as the weights of a collection of items. The mathematics seems to lead to the result that the weight of a collection of items can depend on the order in which those items are weighed. But that is very hard (...) to believe. A puzzle then arises: How do we interpret the metaphysical significance of this mathematical theorem? I first argue that prior solutions to the puzzle lead to implausible consequences. Then I develop my own solution, where the basic idea is that the weight of a collection of items is equal to the limit of the weights of its finite subcollections contained within ever-expanding regions of space. I show how my solution is intuitively plausible and philosophically motivated, how it reveals an underexplored line of metaphysical inquiry about quantities and locations, and how it elucidates some classic puzzles concerning supertasks. (shrink)

Abstract Recently, some philosophers of psychiatry (viz., Rachel Cooper and Dominic Murphy) have analyzed the issue of psychiatric classification. This paper expands upon these analyses and seeks to demonstrate that a consideration of the history of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) can provide a rich and informative philosophical perspective for critically examining the issue of psychiatric classification. This case is intended to demonstrate the importance of history for philosophy of psychiatry, and more generally, the potential benefits (...) of historically-informed approaches to philosophy of science. (shrink)

I discuss whether "sentience" (i.e., phenomenal consciousness) comes in degrees.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views. I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis of the history of physics and geometry. In (...) the remainder of the paper, I explore connections between Putnam’s account of relativized a priori principles and contemporary views. In particular, I situate Putnam’s account in relation to analyses advanced by Michael Friedman, David Stump, and William Wimsatt. From this comparison, I address issues concerning whether a priori scientific principles are appropriately characterized as “constitutive” or “entrenched”. I argue that these two features need to be clearly distinguished, and that only the constitutive function is essential to apriority. By way of conclusion, I explore the relationship between the constitutive function of a priori principles and entrenchment. (shrink)

Much of the contemporary thought about ecology begins with the questioning of the human exceptionality. By means of this, anthropocentrism is rejected and replaced by a post-humanist framework. In this context, Martin Heidegger‘s oeuvre is credited for its search of alternatives to humanism, particularly because of its rejection of Sartre‘s anthropocentrism. However, while post-humanisms tend to behold the role of technology positively, Heidegger‘s critiques to the technique as a consequence of the same metaphysical and anthropocentric movement are widely known. Instead (...) of considering the common Heideggerian texts about technique, in this paper I explore the relationship between Heidegger and contemporary post-humanisms from the perspective of his existential analytic. In the first place, I will briefly describe the contemporary techno-scientific context, following the insights of Wiener, Haraway and Latour. In the second place, I will consider the relationship between Dasein, cyborgs and animals, discussing the Heideggerian interpretations of Hubert Dreyfus (What Computers Can’t Do) and Steven Crowell (We Have Never Been Animals). (shrink)

I argue that experiences can have microphenomenal structures, where the macrophenomenal properties we introspect are realized by non-introspectible microphenomenal properties. After explaining what it means to ascribe a microstructure to experience, I defend the thesis against its principal philosophical challenge, discuss how the thesis interacts with other philosophical issues about experience, and consider our prospects for investigating the microphenomenal realm.