Results for 'epiphenomenal qualia'

243 found
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  1. Mad Qualia.Umut Baysan - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):467-485.
    This paper revisits some classic thought experiments in which experiences are detached from their characteristic causal roles, and explores what these thought experiments tell us about qualia epiphenomenalism, i.e., the view that qualia are epiphenomenal properties. It argues that qualia epiphenomenalism is true just in case it is possible for experiences of the same type to have entirely different causal powers. This is done with the help of new conceptual tools regarding the concept of an (...) property. One conclusion is that it is not obvious if qualia epiphenomenalism is false; and it is also not obvious what should make us believe that it is false—or for that matter, true. Connections between qualia epiphenomenalism, physicalism, and non-physicalist property dualism are further explored. (shrink)
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  2. Hidden Qualia.Derek Shiller - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):165-180.
    In this paper, I propose that those who reject higher-order theories of consciousness should not rule out the possibility of having conscious experiences that they cannot introspect. I begin by offering four arguments that such non-introspectible conscious experiences are possible. Next, I offer two arguments for thinking that we actually have such experiences. According to the first argument, it is unlikely that evolution would have furnished us with a faculty of introspection that worked flawlessly. According to the second argument, there (...)
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  3. The Knowledge Argument.Brie Gertler - 2005 - In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. MacMillan.
    The definitive statement of the Knowledge Argument was formulated by Frank Jackson, in a paper entitled “Epiphenomenal Qualia” that appeared in The Philosophical Quarterly in 1982. Arguments in the same spirit had appeared earlier (Broad 1925, Robinson 1982), but Jackson’s argument is most often compared with Thomas Nagel’s argument in “What is it Like to be a Bat?” (1974). Jackson, however, takes pains to distinguish his argument from Nagel’s. This entry will follow standard practice in focusing on Jackson’s (...)
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  4. Can Science Explain Consciousness? Toward a Solution to the 'Hard Problem'.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate (...)
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  5. How the Brain Makes Up the Mind: A Heuristic Approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Dan Bruiger - manuscript
    A solution to the “hard problem” requires taking the point of view of the organism and its sub- agents. The organism constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that are assigned meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history. Phenomenality is a virtual representation, made to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self), which is tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future (...)
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  6. Artificial Qualia, Intentional Systems and Machine Consciousness.Robert James M. Boyles - 2012 - In Proceedings of the DLSU Congress 2012. pp. 110a–110c.
    In the field of machine consciousness, it has been argued that in order to build human-like conscious machines, we must first have a computational model of qualia. To this end, some have proposed a framework that supports qualia in machines by implementing a model with three computational areas (i.e., the subconceptual, conceptual, and linguistic areas). These abstract mechanisms purportedly enable the assessment of artificial qualia. However, several critics of the machine consciousness project dispute this possibility. For instance, (...)
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  7. Qualia and Introspection.Michael Beaton - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):88-110.
    The claim that behaviourally undetectable inverted spectra are possible has been endorsed by many physicalists. I explain why this starting point rules out standard forms of scientific explanation for qualia. The modern ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ is an updated way of defending problematic intuitions like these, but I show that it cannot help to recover standard scientific explanation. I argue that Chalmers is right: we should accept the falsity of physicalism if we accept this problematic starting point. I further argue (...)
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  8. Qualia: They’Re Not What They Seem.John Gibbons - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):397-428.
    Whether or not qualia are ways things seem, the view that qualia have the properties typically attributed to them is unjustified. Ways things seem do not have many of the properties commonly attributed to them. For example, inverted ways things seem are impossible. If ways things seem do not have the features commonly attributed to them, and qualia do have those same features, this looks like good reason to distinguish the two. But if your reasons for believing (...)
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  9. Qualia Qua Qualitons: Mental Qualities as Abstract Particulars.Hilan Bensusan & Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (2):155-163.
    In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory (...)
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  10. Three Laws of Qualia: What Neurology Tells Us About the Biological Functions of Consciousness.Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & William Hirstein - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6):429-457.
    Neurological syndromes in which consciousness seems to malfunction, such as temporal lobe epilepsy, visual scotomas, Charles Bonnet syndrome, and synesthesia offer valuable clues about the normal functions of consciousness and ‘qualia’. An investigation into these syndromes reveals, we argue, that qualia are different from other brain states in that they possess three functional characteristics, which we state in the form of ‘three laws of qualia’. First, they are irrevocable: I cannot simply decide to start seeing the sunset (...)
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  11. Explaining Temporal Qualia.Matt Farr - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-24.
    Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a ‘flow-like’ quality. Call this ‘temporal qualia’. Temporal qualia are commonly thought to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as passing. I reject both claims (...)
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  12. Qualia in a Contemporary Neurobiological Perspective.Jakob Korf - 2015 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):39-44.
    Qualia are defined as subjective or private feelings associated with sensory and other experiences. This article argues that private feelings might be expressed by or in a personal brain and discusses possible neurobiological implications. Four issues are considered: Functional dualism implies that mental functions are realized as emergent properties of the brain. In practice, functional dualism is compatible with both substance dualism and pan-psychism. The (adult) human brain is the product of biological and environmental processes, including cultural influences, and (...)
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  13. Conceptual Qualia and Communication.Fabian Dorsch & Gianfranco Soldati - 2005 - In Gilian Crampton Smith (ed.), The Foundations of Interaction Design. pp. 1-14.
    The claim that consciousness is propositional has be widely debated in the past. For instance, it has been discussed whether consciousness is always propositional, whether all propositional consciousness is linguistic, whether propositional consciousness is always articulated, or whether there can be non-articulated propositions. In contrast, the question of whether propositions are conscious has not very often been the focus of attention.
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  14. The Origins of Qualia.Tim Crane - 2000 - In Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind-Body Problem. London: Routledge.
    The mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy has two parts: the problem of mental causation and the problem of consciousness. These two parts are not unrelated; in fact, it can be helpful to see them as two horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the causal interaction between mental and physical phenomena seems to require that all causally efficacious mental phenomena are physical; but on the other hand, the phenomenon of consciousness seems to entail that not all mental phenomena are (...)
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  15. Meta-Illusionism and Qualia Quietism.Pete Mandik - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):140-148.
    Many so-called problems in contemporary philosophy of mind depend for their expression on a collection of inter-defined technical terms, a few of which are qualia, phenomenal property, and what-it’s-like-ness. I express my scepticism about Keith Frankish’s illusionism, the view that people are generally subject to a systematic illusion that any properties are phenomenal, and scout the relative merits of two alternatives to Frankish’s illusionism. The first is phenomenal meta-illusionism, the view that illusionists such as Frankish, in holding their view, (...)
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  16. Four Meta-Methods for the Study of Qualia.Lok-Chi Chan & Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):145-167.
    In this paper, we describe four broad ‘meta-methods’ employed in scientific and philosophical research of qualia. These are the theory-centred metamethod, the property-centred meta-method, the argument-centred meta-method, and the event-centred meta-method. Broadly speaking, the theory-centred meta-method is interested in the role of qualia as some theoretical entities picked out by our folk psychological theories; the property-centred meta-method is interested in some metaphysical properties of qualia that we immediately observe through introspection ; the argument-centred meta-method is interested in (...)
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  17. The Case for Qualia[REVIEW]Stephen Robbins - 2010 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 31 (1-2):141-156.
    This is a review of "The Case for Qualia" (Ed., Edmund Wright). The review is in three parts. In Part 1, I briefly lay out the general metaphysic in which the debate on qualia has been unfolding. I term it the classical or spatial metaphysic. In Part 2, we traverse the essays and relate them – the problems with which they grapple, the pitfalls they encounter – to this classic metaphysic. In Part 3, I will briefly sketch out (...)
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  18. Qualia and the Problem of Universals.Mark Sharlow - 2007
    In this paper I explore the logical relationship between the question of the reality of qualia and the problem of universals. I argue that nominalism is inconsistent with the existence of qualia, and that realism either implies or makes plausible the existence of qualia. Thus, one's position on the existence of qualia is strongly constrained by one's answer to the problem of universals.
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  19. Form, Qualia and Time: The Hard Problem Reformed.Stephen E. Robbins - 2013 - Mind and Matter 2:153-181.
    The hard problem – focusing essentially on vision here – is in fact the problem of the origin of our image of the external world. This formulation in terms of the “image” is never seen stated, for the forms populating our image of the world are considered computable, and not considered qualia – the “redness” of the cube is the problem, not the cube as form. Form, however, cannot be divorced from motion and hence from time. Therefore we must (...)
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  20. Naturalizing Phenomenology? Dretske on Qualia.Ronald McIntyre - 1999 - In Jean Petitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford University Press. pp. 429--439.
    First, I briefly characterize Dretske’s particular naturalization project, emphasizing his naturalistic reconstruction of the notion of representation. Second, I note some apparent similarities between his notion of representation and Husserl’s notion of intentionality, but I find even more important differences. Whereas Husserl takes intentionality to be an intrinsic, phenomenological feature of thought and experience, Dretske advocates an “externalist” account of mental representation. Third, I consider Dretske’s treatment of qualia, because he takes it to show that his representational account of (...)
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  21. Is Consciousness Epiphenomenal? Comment on Susan Pockett.Gilberto Gomes - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):77-79.
    In a provocative article published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, Susan Pockett argues for the plausibility of considering consciousness as an epiphenomenon of neural activity. This means that consciousness, though caused by the brain, would not in its turn have any role in the causation of neural activity and, consequently, of behaviour. Critical for her argument is the distinction she makes between 'consciousness per se' and 'the neural processing that accompanies it' . In her discussion, though, the author begs (...)
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  22. Is Qualia Meaning or Understanding?Cosmin Visan - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 5 (8):729-745.
    By arguing that qualia is meaning or understanding, a new framework for understanding consciousness is developed. In this way, the meaning of yellow and red are uncovered. The suggested solutions are that yellow means “source of light” and red means “important”. Also, in the process of arguing that qualia is meaning, remarkable similarities in the structure of qualia are uncovered. In this way, a reason for why very hot and very cold water feel the same, is given. (...)
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  23.  66
    Qualia.David Villena Saldaña - 2016 - Escritura y Pensamiento 39 (39):79-103.
    This paper shows why qualia constitute a problem for any theory of mental phenomena. We use the term ‘qualia’ in reference to non-intentional features of mental states which are eminently qualitative, i.e. perceptions, emotions, moods and body sensations. These non-intentional features are usually described as intrinsic, ineffable, infallible, atomic, private, direct and irreducible to the physical. The paper also explains the absent qualia argument which is addressed as a critique to functionalism.
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  24.  12
    Rescuing Qualia.Molly Graham - manuscript
    Daniel Dennett provides many compelling reasons to question the existence of phenomenal experiences in his paper titled Quining Qualia, however, from the perspective of the individual, qualia appear to be an inherent feature of consciousness. The act of reflecting on one’s experiences suggests that subjective feelings and sensations are a necessary element of human life, as personal opinions on various artistic works are apt to demonstrate. This paper argues that by considering subjective experiences from a naturalized functionalist perspective, (...)
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  25.  37
    Equations, Qualia, and Qualations.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    Abstract to Equations, Qualia, and Qualations -/- With regard to consciousness, we could write an equation B = black. But it is possible to rewrite this using a quale, namely, B = █. This latter equation might be called a ‘qualation’. It has the same meaning regardless of the physiology that apprehends it. This article argues a whole theory of qualations could be developed. Further, to a Dualist, it could be that a materialist is convinced by materialist arguments involving (...)
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  26. Qualia Logic.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    The logic of qualia is different than classical logic. We take the first steps in defining it and applying it to the Hard Problem.
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  27.  17
    Do Qualia Exist Necessarily?Paul Merriam - manuscript
    Why is there something rather than nothing? I don't know. But I give an argument that qualia exist *necessarily*. The *possibility* of the existence of red qualia requires actual red qualia to specify what the possibility is a possibility *of*.
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  28. Agency, Qualia and Life: Connecting Mind and Body Biologically.David Longinotti - 2017 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017. Cham: Springer. pp. 43-56.
    Many believe that a suitably programmed computer could act for its own goals and experience feelings. I challenge this view and argue that agency, mental causation and qualia are all founded in the unique, homeostatic nature of living matter. The theory was formulated for coherence with the concept of an agent, neuroscientific data and laws of physics. By this method, I infer that a successful action is homeostatic for its agent and can be caused by a feeling - which (...)
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  29.  40
    On the Big Bang, Qualia, Einstein’s Train, Temporal Flow Rates, Existence, Free Will, Hard Problems, Etc.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    On Einstein's Train and the Big Bang in Fragmental Presentism, Temporal Flow Rates, Existence, Free Will, Qualia, Hard Problems, etc.
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  30. Qualia and the Representational Theory of Phenomenal Character.Tim Klaassen - manuscript
    Representationalism is an influential theory about the nature of phenomenal character. Extensive formulations of the theory can be found in (Dretske;1995) and (Tye; 1995). Much has been written on representationalism since the publication of these books. However, straightforward and concise characterizations of the theory are hard to fi nd. In this paper I attempt to give one such. It has been my aim to clarify what exactly representationalism is a theory of, the problems it aims to solve, and how it (...)
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  31. Let's Dance! The Equivocation in Chalmers' Dancing Qualia Argument.B. van Heuveln, Eric Dietrich & M. Oshima - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (2):237-249.
    David Chalmers' dancing qualia argument is intended to show that phenomenal experiences, or qualia, are organizational invariants. The dancing qualia argument is a reductio ad absurdum, attempting to demonstrate that holding an alternative position, such as the famous inverted spectrum argument, leads one to an implausible position about the relation between consciousness and cognition. In this paper, we argue that Chalmers' dancing qualia argument fails to establish the plausibility of qualia being organizational invariants. Even stronger, (...)
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  32. Qualia Logic 2 Brief Notes on Qualia Logic.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    Some not quite random thoughts on the logic of qualia.
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  33. Between Language and Consciousness: Linguistic Qualia, Awareness, and Cognitive Models.Piotr Konderak - 2017 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 48 (1):285-302.
    The main goal of the paper is to present a putative role of consciousness in language capacity. The paper contrasts the two approaches characteristic for cognitive semiotics and cognitive science. Language is treated as a mental phenomenon and a cognitive faculty. The analysis of language activity is based on the Chalmers’ distinction between the two forms of consciousness: phenomenal and psychological. The approach is seen as an alternative to phenomenological analyses typical for cognitive semiotics. Further, a cognitive model of the (...)
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  34. Naturalizing Qualia.Alessandra Buccella - 2017 - Phenomenology and Mind 12:152 - 161.
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  35. Seeing Qualitons as Qualia: A Dialogue with Wittgenstein on Private Experience, Sense Data and the Ontology of Mind.Hilan Bensusan & Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2013 - Papers of the 33rd International Wittgenstein Symposium.
    In this paper we put forward the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. Further, we maintain that Wittgenstein hints in this direction. We also find in Wittgenstein elements of an account of language acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition. We conclude by pointing out some difficulties of this view.
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  36.  22
    The Archeology of Qualia.Cosmin Visan - 2021 - Journal Of Anthropological And Archeological Sciences 4 (5):565-569.
    Researching into our past, scientists use different methods, from looking at the night sky to digging traces of our past and analyzing DNA. I propose here another method, that can have the potential of shedding more light into our history and the type of entities that we are. Working under philosophical idealism, I propose that evolution is in the first place the evolution of consciousness, and thus the traces of evolution are mostly not to be found in our physical bodies, (...)
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  37. Qualia Ain't in the Head Review of Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind by Michael Tye. [REVIEW]David M. Armstrong - 1995 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 2:31--4.
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  38. Qualia of God: Phenomenological Materiality in Introspection, with a Reference to Advaita Vedanta.Olga Louchakova-Schwartz - 2017 - Open Theology 3 (1):257-273.
    Applying Michel Henry’s philosophical framework to the phenomenological analysis of religious experience, the author introduces a concept of material introspection and a new theory of the constitution of religious experience in phenomenologically material interiority. As opposed to ordinary mental self-scrutiny, material introspection happens when the usual outgoing attention is reverted onto embodied self-awareness in search of mystical self-knowledge or union with God. Such reversal posits the internal field of consciousness with the self-disclosure of phenomenological materiality. As shown by the example (...)
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  39.  57
    The Realization of Qualia, Persons, and Artifacts.Ben White - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):182-204.
    This article argues that standard causal and functionalist definitions of realization fail to account for the realization of entities that cannot be individuated in causal or functional terms. By modifying such definitions to require that realizers also logically suffice for any historical properties of the entities they realize, one can provide for the realization of entities whose resistance to causal/functional individuation stems from their possession of individuative historical properties. But if qualia cannot be causally or functionally individuated, then (...) can be physically realized only if the thesis that all things are physical or physically realized is insufficient for physicalism. (shrink)
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  40. Color and Figure-Ground: From Signals to Qualia.Birgitta Dresp-Langley & Adam Reeves (eds.) - 2014 - Routledge.
    The laws which predict how the perceptual quality of figure-ground can be extracted from the most elementary visual signals were discovered by the Gestaltists, and form an essential part of their movement (see especially Metzger, 1930, and Wertheimer, 1923 translated and re-edited by Lothar Spillmann, 2009 and 2012, respectively). Distinguishing figure from ground is a prerequisite for perception of both form and space (the relative positions, trajectories, and distances of objects in the visual field. The human brain has an astonishing (...)
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  41. Two Types of Qualia Theory.Pär Sundström - 2014 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 20:107-131.
    This paper distinguishes two types of qualia theory, which I call Galilean and non-Galilean qualia theories. It also offers considerations against each type of theory. To my mind the considerations are powerful. In any case, they bring out the importance of distinguishing the two types of theory. For they show that different considerations come into play—or considerations come into play in quite different ways—in assessing the two types of theory.
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  42.  53
    The Subject is Qualia.Robert F. Allen - manuscript
    Things strike me in a variety ways. F and F# sound slightly different, ripe and unripe tomatoes neither look nor taste nor smell the same, and silk feels smoother than corduroy. In each case, I distinguish an experience of something on the basis of what it is like to be its subject. That is to say, in philosophical parlance, if not quite the vernacular, its “quale,” leads me to categorize it and, thus, respond appropriately to its stimulus. The function of (...)
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  43. The Logic of Qualia.Drew McDermott - manuscript
    Logic is useful as a neutral formalism for expressing the contents of mental representations. It can be used to extract crisp conclusions regarding the higher-order theory of phenomenal consciousness developed in (McDermott 2001, 20007). A key aspect of conscious perceptions is their connection to the distinction between appearance and reality. Perceptions must often be corrected. To do so requires that the logic of perception be able to represent the logical structure of judgment events, that is, to include the formulas of (...)
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  44. The Logic of Qualia.Merriam Paul - manuscript
    We indicate how to construct a logic of qualia.
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  45. Growing Evidence That Perceptual Qualia Are Neuroelectrical Not Computational.Mostyn W. Jones - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6):89-116.
    Computational neuroscience attributes coloured areas and other perceptual qualia to calculations that are realizable in multiple cellular forms. This faces serious issues in explaining how the various qualia arise and how they bind to form overall perceptions. Qualia may instead be neuroelectrical. Growing evidence indicates that perceptions correlate with neuroelectrical activity spotted by locally activated EEGs, the different qualia correlate with the different electrochemistries of unique detector cells, a unified neural-electromagnetic field binds this activity to form (...)
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  46. Non-Eliminative Reductionism: Reconciling Qualia and Physicalism.Dennis Nicholson - manuscript
    A physicalist view of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. First, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical, can be studied and explained using the standard scientific approach, and present no problem any harder than any other scientists face. Second, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia – they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist position without any (...)
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  47. The Problem of Qualia.Brent Silby - unknown
    One of the major concerns for the contemporary philosophy of mind involves the problem of qualia. The word qualia refers to our subjective experience of the world and includes the properties of our experience that cannot be located in the world external to our minds. For example, the ineffable feel of a blue experience when one looks at the sky, or the pain one feels when one is stuck with a pin. These sensations are the essence of our (...)
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  48. The Place of Qualia in a Relational Universe.Lee Smolin - manuscript
    We propose an approach to the question of how qualia fit into the physical world, in the context of a relational and realist completion of quantum theory, called the causal theory of views\cite{views}. This is a combination of an approach to a dynamics of discrete causal structures, called energetic causal sets, developed with M. Cortes, with a realist approach to quantum foundations, called the real ensemble formulation. In this theory, the beables are the information available at each event from (...)
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  49.  64
    Explanation of Qualia and Self-Awareness Using Elastic Membrane Concept.Alexander Egoyan - 2017 - General Science Journal 2:10-16.
    In this work we show that our self-awareness and perception may be successfully explained using two dimensional holistic structures with closed topology embedded into our brains - elastic membranes. These membranes are able to preserve their structure during conscious processes. Their elastic oscillations may be associated with our perceptions, where the frequency of the oscillations is responsible for the perception of different colors, sounds and other stimuli, while the amplitude of the oscillations is responsible for the feeling of a distance. (...)
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  50. Yet Another Objection to Fading and Dancing Qualia.Nir Aides - manuscript
    In this paper I present objections to the Fading Qualia and Dancing Qualia thought experiments, which David Chalmers uses to argue that functional organization fully determines conscious experience.
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