Some philosophers advance the claim that the phenomena of logical omniscience and of the indiscernibility of metaphysical statements, which arise in (certain) interpretations of normal modal logic, provide strong reasons in favour of impossible world approaches. These two specific lines of argument will be presented and discussed in this paper. Contrary to the recent much-held view that the characteristics of these two phenomena provide us with strong reasons to adopt impossible world approaches, the view defended here is that no such (...) ‘knock-down arguments’ do emanate on those grounds. This is not to rule out that there cannot be any other good reasons for assuming impossible world semantics. However, the discussion of a further argument for impossible worlds will suggest that different attempts to argue for them likely present intertwined problems. (shrink)

At first glance, impossible world semantics appear to be useful adaptations of normal modal logic. Proponents of impossible worlds argue, e.g., that in the context of metaphysical disagreement, impossible worlds would provide a key to modelling the respective dispute situation. The same philosophers also argue that we need impossible worlds to model what they consider to be the conceivability of logical impossibilities. With the help of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, or, better said, with what I believe to be a visualisation of (...) his ideas on nesting models for possibility, I develop some thoughts on the likely shared weaknesses of such arguments for nonnormal world approaches. Said goes hand in hand with the supplementary proposal of rethinking our conventional nesting models for possibility. (shrink)

When information on a coma patient’s expected outcome is uncertain, a moral dilemma arises in clinical practice: if life-sustaining treatment is continued, the patient may survive with unacceptably poor neurological prospects, but if withdrawn a patient who could have recovered may die. Continuous electroencephalogram-monitoring is expected to substantially improve neuroprognostication for patients in coma after cardiac arrest. This raises expectations that decisions whether or not to withdraw will become easier. This paper investigates that expectation, exploring cEEG’s impacts when it becomes (...) part of a socio-technical network in an Intensive Care Unit. Based on observations in two ICUs in the Netherlands and one in the USA that had cEEG implemented for research, we interviewed 25 family members, healthcare professionals, and surviving patients. The analysis focuses on the way patient outcomes are constructed, the kind of decision support these outcomes provide, and how cEEG affects communication between professionals and relatives. We argue that cEEG can take away or decrease the intensity of the dilemma in some cases, while increasing uncertainty for others. It also raises new concerns. Since its actual impacts furthermore hinge on how cEEG is designed and implemented, we end with recommendations for ensuring responsible development and implementation. (shrink)

Aim: To elicit preferences for prognostic information, attitudes towards withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment (WLST) and perspectives on acceptable quality of life after post-anoxic coma within the adult general population of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United States of America. Methods: A web-based survey, consisting of questions on respondent characteristics, perspectives on quality of life, communication of prognostic information, and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, was taken by adult respondents recruited from four countries. Statistical analysis included descriptive analysis and chi2-tests for (...) dierences between countries. Results: In total, 2012 respondents completed the survey. In each country, at least 84% indicated they would prefer to receive early prognostic information. If a poor outcome was predicted with some uncertainty, 37-54% of the respondents indicated that WLST was not to be allowed. A conscious state with severe physical and cognitive impairments was perceived as acceptable quality of life by 17–44% of the respondents. Clear differences between countries exist, including respondents from the U.S. being more likely to allow WLST than respondents from Germany (OR = 1.99, p < 0.001) or the Netherlands (OR = 1.74, p < 0.001) and preferring to stay alive in a conscious state with severe physical and cognitive impairments more than respondents from Italy (OR = 3.76, p < 0.001), Germany (OR = 2.21, p < 0.001), or the Netherlands (OR = 2.39, p < 0.001). Conclusions: Over one-third of the respondents considered WLST unacceptable when there is any remaining prognostic uncertainty. Respondents had a more positive perspective on acceptable quality of life after coma than what is currently considered acceptable in medical literature. This indicates a need for a closer look at the practice of WLST based on prognostic information, to ensure responsible use of novel prognostic tests. (shrink)

Proceedings of Philosophical Festival Drift 2014. Theme: Under Influence. Includes lectures by Katrien Schaubroeck, Philippe Descola, Markus Gabriel, Ray Brassier, Francesco Berto, Henk Oosterling, and Tomáš Sedlácek (among others). Lectures are in Dutch or English.

In this paper I introduce the transcendental argument for Christian theism in the context of Reformed theologian and philosopher Cornelius Van Til’s thought. I then present the critique proffered by Barry Stroud against ambitious transcendental arguments, and survey various formulations of transcendental arguments in the literature, seeking how the objection bears upon them. I argue that Adrian Bardon’s (2005) interpretation is the most helpful in understanding the Stroudian objection. From this interpretation, two types of possible rebuttals are deduced. Proceeding to (...) survey the responses offered by Van Tillians to this objection in the recent literature, I discern two general strategies pursued in these responses, which map onto the previously deduced types of rebuttals: the Biblical justification strategy and the objection-undermining strategy. I argue that all the specific attempts to answer Stroud which I examine here (those of Butler, Bosserman, and Fluhrer) are inadequate and that these two strategies, in general, face serious problems. I conclude with considering the options before the proponent of the transcendental argument for Christian theism and with offering a new objection to the argument, which focuses on its inconsistency with the implications of Christian theism itself. (shrink)

Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) is an overarching logical framework apt for the analysis of all sorts of discourse, whether colloquial, scientific, mathematical or logical. The theory is a procedural (as opposed to denotational) one, according to which the meaning of an expression is an abstract, extra-linguistic procedure detailing what operations to apply to what procedural constituents to arrive at the product (if any) of the procedure that is the object denoted by the expression. Such procedures are rigorously defined as (...) TIL constructions. Though TIL analytical potential is very large, deduction in TIL has been rather neglected. Tichý defined a sequent calculus for pre-1988 TIL, that is TIL based on the simple theory of types. Since then no other attempt to define a proof calculus for TIL has been presented. The goal of this paper is to propose a generalization and adjustment of Tichý’s calculus to TIL 2010. First, I briefly recapitulate the rules of simple-typed calculus as presented by Tichý. Then, I propose the adjustments of the calculus so that it be applicable to hyperintensions within the ramified hierarchy of types. TIL operates with a single procedural semantics for all kinds of logical-semantic context, be it extensional, intensional or hyperintensional. I show that operating in a hyperintensional context is far from being technically trivial. Yet, it is feasible. To this end, we introduce a substitution method that operates on hyperintensions. It makes use of a four-place substitution function (called Sub) defined over hyperintensions. (shrink)

Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga represent two strands of American Protestant philosophical thought influenced by Dutch neo-Calvinism. This paper compares and synthetizes their models of knowledge in non-Christians given the noetic effects of sin and non-Christian worldview commitments. The paper argues that Van Til’s distinction between the partial realization of the antithesis in practice and its absolute nature in principle correlates with Plantinga’s insistence on prima facie–warranted common-sense beliefs and their ultimate defeasibility given certain metaphysical commitments. Van Til endorsed (...) more radical claims than Plantinga on epistemic defeat in non-Christian worldviews, the status of the sensus divinitatis, and conceptual accuracy in knowledge of the world. Finally, an approach to the use of evidence in apologetics is developed based on the proposed synthesis. This approach seeks to make more room for evidence than is generally recognized in Van Tilianism, while remaining consistent with the founder’s principles. (shrink)

There are two main approaches to the epistemology of science. On the one hand, some hold that a scientific hypothesis is confirmed to the extent that the hypothesis explains the evidence better than alternative hypotheses concerning the same subject-matter. This idea is often referred to as Inference to the Best Explanation. On the other hand, some hold that a scientific hypothesis is confirmed to the extent that the hypothesis is probable given the evidence. This idea is often associated with Bayesianism (...) or Bayesian epistemology. There has been some controversy on whether and how these two approaches may be reconciled. This paper criticizes some recent attempts to make peace between Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation and sketches a new account of how the two approaches may be reconciled. (shrink)

English title: The Right to be Punished: On Kant and Hegel's theories of punishment as respect for the criminal -/- The article discusses Kant and Hegel's theories of punishment in light of their broader legal philosophies. The purpose of punishment, and law in general, is to secure mutual freedom and mutual recognition. Punishment is a way of expressing respect for the freedom of the criminal, as well as the freedom of victims and all members of society. Though it might seem (...) odd that imprisoning somebody means respecting their freedom, Hegel famously insists that punishment is a right for the criminal. The article explains how punishment may respect mutual freedom, and defends the claim that this is a necessary condition for just punishment. However, the purpose of re-establishing mutual freedom may possibly be achieved by other methods than punishment. The article discusses the potential of restorative justice processes for expressing the kind of mutual recognition that Hegel ascribes to punishment. Punishment is therefore not necessary for achieving the just purpose that Kant and Hegel ascribe to it. We may thus accept the Kantian-Hegelian framework for the just sanctioning of crime while challenging their more controversial claim that punishment is a categorical imperative. (shrink)

English abstract: This paper discusses the delicate relationship between traditional epistemology and the increasingly influential probabilistic (or ‘Bayesian’) approach to epistemology. The paper introduces some of the key ideas of probabilistic epistemology, including credences or degrees of belief, Bayes’ theorem, conditionalization, and the Dutch Book argument. The tension between traditional and probabilistic epistemology is brought out by considering the lottery and preface paradoxes as they relate to rational (binary) belief and credence respectively. It is then argued that this tension can (...) be alleviated by rejecting the requirement that rational (binary) beliefs must be consistent and closed under logical entailment. Instead, it is suggested that this logical requirement applies to a different type of binary propositional attitude, viz. acceptance. (shrink)

I anledning af Judith Butlers forelæsning om klimasorg på KU er jeg blevet bedt om at besvare spørgsmålet om, hvad man kan bruge Butlers tænkning til i dag og om den stadig er aktuel. Min første tanke var at besvare spørgsmålet med svaret: Man kan bruge Butlers tænkning til ALT! Men for at fokusere mit svar, har jeg besluttet mig for at gennemgå Butlers tænkning i forhold til spørgsmålet om prekære liv og vold og ikke-vold, og hvordan disse emner udspringer (...) af Butlers tænkning om køn i 1990’erne. /// In connection with Judith Butler's lecture on climate grief at KU, I have been asked to answer the question of how Butler's thinking could be used today and whether it is still relevant. My first thought was to answer the question with the answer: You can use Butler's thinking for EVERYTHING! However, to focus my answer, I have decided to review Butler's thinking in relation to the issues of precarious lives and violence and non-violence and how these issues stem from Butler's thinking on gender in the 1990s. (shrink)

Ideen om at lovbrytere fortjener straff, må legges til grunn dersom vi skal kunne forstå og begrunne strafferetten i Norge og i andre rettsstater. Av noen teoretikere har dette kravet til fortjent straff blitt forstått som et negativt krav, som setter en begrensning på oppnåelsen av straffens formål. Straffen må da være «ikke ufortjent». I denne artikkelen argumenterer jeg for at en slik forståelse av fortjenesteideen er utilstrekkelig. Straff som fortjent må ansees som et positivt, selvstendig formål for strafferetten. Artikkelen (...) ser på norsk rettspraksis og lovforarbeider, og drøfter hvorfor det i norsk strafferett må legges til grunn at det er verdifullt å oppfylle lovbryterens fortjeneste. (shrink)

English summary: Provocative Public Philosophy In 2017, I argued that people with Down syndrome cannot live full lives. This sparked a heated debated in the Norwegian public sphere. This gave rise to a debate over what academics should and should not say in public. A certain form of public philosophy, what I will call provocative public philosophy, was criticized for being harmful, imperialistic, for eroding trust in philosophers, and for creating too much noise. In this article I will, in light (...) of the Down syndrome debate, defend provocative public philosophy against these allegations. -/- Norsk sammendrag: En uttalelse om at personer med Downs syndrom ikke kan leve fullverdige liv, satte i gang en stor og opphetet debatt i den norske offentligheten i 2017. Denne ga opphav til en mer overordnet debatt om hva akademikere bør og ikke bør si i offentligheten. En viss form for offentlig filosofi, det jeg vil kalle provokativ offentlig filosofi, er blitt utpekt som synder. I denne artikkelen vil jeg, med utgangspunkt i debatten om fullverdige liv, forsvare provokativ offentlig filosofi mot både epistemiske og etiske innvendinger. (shrink)

Språket vårt utgjør en stor del av vår identitet. Det er et redskap for kommunikasjon med andre mennesker, men også med oss selv. Vi uttrykker oss gjennom språket, og vi tenker ved hjelp av språket. Men hva er egentlig språk? Gjennom å ta for meg to vesensforskjellige tilnærminger til dette spørsmålet ønsker jeg å vise at det synet vi har på språk, har stor filosofiske betydning. Dette er fordi et språksyn nødvendigvis vil få konsekvenser for hvordan vi tenker om beslektede (...) filosofiske spørsmål, som blant annet: -/- – Hva er forholdet mellom språk og verden? -/- – Hva er sannhet? -/- – Hvordan får vi kunnskap om verden? -/- – Hva gjør vi når vi bruker språk? -/- – Hva er vår rolle som språkbrukere? -/- – Hvordan lærer vi språk? -/- Det er to ting som er viktig å avklare om vinklingen av denne artikkelen: Det første er at når jeg her velger å skissere to ulike filosofiske syn på språk, er det for å belyse de spørsmålene jeg har satt opp ovenfor, snarere enn å angripe eller fremme konkrete filosofiske teorier. Det andre er at når jeg her skriver om forholdet mellom språk og verden, og vår rolle som språkbrukere, vil jeg ta for gitt at dette omfatter alle naturlige språksystemer. Poengene mine er derfor ment å ha overføringsverdi til tegnspråk i sin alminnelighet, og selvfølgelig også til norsk tegnspråk. Dette innebærer at det jeg sier om ord, like gjerne kan sies om tegn. Målet med artikkelen er først og fremst å vise at språket må forstås som et gjennomgripende erkjennelsesmiddel i vårt møte med verden. (shrink)

We approach the topic of solution equivalence of propositional problems from the perspective of non-constructive procedural theory of problems based on Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL). The answer we put forward is that two solutions are equivalent if and only if they have equivalent solution concepts. Solution concepts can be understood as a generalization of the notion of proof objects from the Curry-Howard isomorphism.

Simone de Beauvoir is renown for The Second Sex (1949), a work now considered to be a feminist classic. Nevertheless, when Beauvoir wrote this book she did not explicitly endorse the women's movement, nor did she associate her analysis with the women's liberation. It took twenty-one years after the publication before she publicly declared herself a feminist, but from that point on she was a dedicated feminist. How can her development from a gender blind young philosopher to a radical feminist (...) activist be explained? In this article I argue that her less known moral philosophy might provide an answer, as it might be understood as the foundation for her later philosophical analysis and political commitments. In her existentialist ethics she assets that freedom to be the normative core value, and develops an ethical justification for why we should defend our own as well as the freedom of others. However, when this idealistic and abstract moral philosophy was applied to the concrete situation of women, she discovered a reality permeated with gendered structures that impeded women's possibilities of transcendence and to attain freedom. An examination of the philosophical link between Beauvoir's ethics, The Second Sex and her feminist analysis also reveals, Pettersen argues, what might happen when a gender blind moral philosophy is faced with a gendered reality. NORWEGIAN ABSTRACT: Hvordan kunne Simone de Beauvoir allerede i 1949 skrive Det annet kjønn uten tilknytning til en kvinnebevegelse, og uten å oppfatte seg som feminist? Svaret er trolig at hennes mindre kjente moralfilosofi danner grunnlaget for senere analyser, og også forklarer utviklingen fra kjønnsblind ung filosof til radikal feministisk aktivist. Forbindelsen mellom Beauvoirs etikk og senere femi- nistiske analyser viser dessuten hva som kan skje når idealistisk moralfilosofi møter en kjønnet virkelighet. (shrink)

I Alderdommen (1970) fremsetter Simone de Beauvoir en filosofisk analyse av alderdom og eldre menneskers situa- sjon, og hevder at behandlingen de får er «skandaløs»; samfunnet «returnerer dem som en vare det ikke lenger er bruk for». Hun tilkjennegir et like stort engasjement mot den urett som eldre utsettes for som hun gjør i Det annet kjønn (1949) når det gjelder undertrykkelsen av kvinner. Likevel påstår Beauvoir at alderdommen først og fremst er et problem for mannen, og det har blitt (...) hevdet at Alderdommen er et verk om aldersdiskriminering hvor mannens aldringsprosess gjøres til norm – ikke et feministisk verk på linje med Det annet kjønn. I denne artikkelen argumen- terer Tove Pettersen for at det nettopp er den feministiske filosofien Beauvoir utvikler i Det annet kjønn som ligger til grunn for hennes undersøkelser av undertrykkelse og diskriminering av eldre. I tillegg demonstrerer Beauvoirs omfattende analyse av alderdommen at hverken alder eller kjønn kan studeres uavhengig av hverandre. Alder og kjønn virker sammen, og må ses i lys av den situasjon disse fenomenene fremtrer i hvor også klasse er av stor betydning. Alderdommen kan derfor leses som et verk hvor Beauvoir viser hvordan ulike former for undertrykkelse virker sammen og bidrar til marginalisering og diskriminering av eldre. Nøkkelord: Simone de Beauvoir, Alderdommen, Det annet kjønn, feministisk filosofi, Den andre, aldersdiskriminering, alderisme******* -/- In The Coming of Age (1970), Simone de Beauvoir presents a philosophical analysis of old age and the elderly’s situa- tion, and claims that the treatment they receive is “scandalous”; society ‘returns them as a commodity that is no longer needed.’ She exhibits the same level of commitment regarding the injustice to which the elderly are exposed as she does in The Second Sex (1949) when it comes to the oppression of women. Nevertheless, Beauvoir claims that old age first and foremost is a problem for men, and it has been argued that The Coming of Age is a work on age discrim- ination where the male aging process is made the norm – not a feminist work on par with The Second Sex. In thisarticle, Tove Pettersen argues that it is precisely the feminist philosophy that Beauvoir develops in The Second Sex that enables her to analyze the oppression and discrimination of the elderly. Additionally, Beauvoir's comprehensive analysis of old age demonstrates that neither age nor gender can be studied independently. Age and gender intersect, and must be be seen in light of the situation in which class is of great importance. Thus, The Coming of Age can be read as a work in which Beauvoir shows how different forms of oppression work together and contribute to the mar- ginalization and discrimination of the elderly. Keywords: Simone de Beauvoir, The Coming of Age, The Second Sex, Feminist Philosophy, The Other, Age Discrimination, Ageism. (shrink)

English title: Kant and the Right to Vote The article is a contribution to the ongoing debate in NFT about the moral responsibility of voters. Kristian Skagen Ekeli has argued that politically ignorant citizens have a duty to abstain from voting. He argues that such a duty fol- lows from Kant’s duty to respect other persons. I analyze Ekeli’s proposed duties by considering how they might fit into Kant’s system of duties. I conclude, contra Ekeli, that the Kantian duty to (...) respect persons does not give rise to a duty for politically ignorant voters to abstain from voting. -/- Denne artikkelen er et bidrag til debatten om velgeres moralske ansvar. Kristian Skagen Ekeli har i to artikler argu- mentert for at uvitende borgere har en plikt til ikke å stemme, noe han begrunner ut fra en kantiansk pliktetikk. Det er imidlertid uklart hvordan en uvitende borgers plikt til å avstå fra å stemme skulle følge av Kants plikt til å respek- tere personer, noe Cornelius og Herman Cappelen kort antyder i sin kommentar til Ekeli. I denne artikkelen foretar jeg en analyse av de pliktene som Ekeli tar til orde for, og undersøker hvordan disse eventuelt kunne passe inn i Kants system av plikttyper. Jeg konkluderer motsatt av Ekeli, med at den kantianske plikten til å respektere personer ikke gir grunnlag for en plikt for uvitende borgere til å avstå fra å stemme i valg. (shrink)

Hvad der sker i vores sovende hjerner, kan være et mareridt at tyde for en drømmeforsker. Og vi er desværre elendige til at huske det, når vi vågner. Heldigvis kan teknologien hjælpe med at løfte sløret for, hvad der foregår, mens vi ligger og trækker torsk i land. Nogle drømme er dybt bizarre. Andre fører til Nobelpriser. Og så er der dem, som bare er pinlige. De sidste vil vi nødig sende i en hjernescanner. Ifølge Melanie Gillespie Rosen, lysvågen filosof (...) ved Aarhus Universitet, handler de fleste drømme om noget så søvndyssende som arbejde. (shrink)

Den feministiske etikken har de siste 25 årene levert moralfilosofiske bidrag som åpner for etiske analyser av nye temaer og kjønnede maktstrukturer. I den norske etikkdiskursen er det likevel sjelden at kjønn eller feministisk etikk tematiseres – til tross for flere tiår med betydelig etikksatsing. Uttrykker tausheten en usynliggjøring som opprettholder et faglig makthierarki? Eller skyldes det at feministisk etikk ikke er «ekte» filosofi, men politikk forkledd som vitenskap? I denne artikkelen diskuteres den feministiske etikkens faglige bidrag og eksistensberettigelse.

I denne artikel argumenteres der for, at døden i Phaidon primært skal forstås metaforisk, som sjælens adskillelse fra kroppen i den rene tænkning. Artiklens hovedtese er, at de fire argumenter for sjælens udødelighed, der findes i dialogen, skal læses som en fremadskridende afklaring af, hvilken væremåde sjælen har, når den isolerer sig fra kroppen, snarere end at læses bogstaveligt som beviser for, at sjælen er udødelig. Tillige argumenteres der for, at den såkaldt anden sejlads – Sokrates’ beskrivelse af, hvorledes han (...) for at forstå virkeligheden søgte tilflugt i argumenter og ideer snarere end i sanserne – skal forstås som et forsvar for en bestemt opfattelse af menneskelig frihed. Når Sokrates indfører ideerne som årsager i løbet af Phaidon, skal dette først og fremmest ses som en forklaring på, hvordan den rene tænkning kan erkende virkeligheden og derigennem kontrollere vores umiddelbare tilbøjeligheder. Det er mulighedsbetingelsen for menneskelig frihed som Platons Sokrates forstår den. Frihed skal da primært forstås som mulighed, nemlig mulighed til at handle i overensstemmelse med det, den fornuftsbestemte indsigt tilsiger en, at man skal gøre, uden hensyntagen til umiddelbare, kropsligt bestemte tilbøjeligheder, herunder tilbøjeligheden til selvopretholdelse for enhver pris. Den foreslåede læsning peger dermed på en politisk dimension af Phaidon, der ofte overses som følge af, at argumenterne for sjælens udødelighed tages for bogstaveligt. (shrink)

Denne artikel argumenterer for at når et vidnesbyrds uoprigtighed blokerer tilhørerens videnstilegnelse, kan dette svigt forklares som en form for upålidelighed. Dette motiverer et princip ifølge hvilket det er en nødvendig betingelse for viden via vidnesbyrd at vidnesbyrdet blev givet på en pålidelig basis. Et sådant krav adskiller sig fra andre pålidelighedskrav til viden via vidnesbyrd ved at indføre en snævrere opfattelse af sådan viden.

The behaviour of a multi-agent system is driven by messaging. Usually, there is no central dispatcher and each autonomous agent, though resource-bounded, can make less or more rational decisions to meet its own and collective goals. To this end, however, agents must communicate with their fellow agents and account for the signals from their environment. Moreover, in the dynamic, permanently changing world, agents’ behaviour, i.e. their activities, must also be dynamic. By communicating with other fellow agents and with their environment, (...) agents should be able to learn new concepts and enrich their knowledge base. Processes and events that happened in the past may be irrelevant in the present or have a significant impact in the future, and vice versa. Therefore, the fine-grained analysis of agents’ activities as well as events within or beyond the system is very important so that the system can run smoothly without falling into inconsistencies. Moreover, as the system should communicate with its environment, the analysis should be as close to natural language as possible. The goal of this paper is a proposal for such an analysis. To this end, I apply Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) because TIL is particularly apt for a fine-grained analysis of processes and events specified in the present, past or future tense with reference to the time when they happened, happen or will happen. (shrink)

Insertar el fenómeno dentro del discurso es posible únicamente cuando se lo arropa conceptualmente. La metáfora cumple la función retórica cuando se aleja de su fenómeno en la vida empírica y surge en la vida simbólica como forma de expresión ulterior y conceptual respecto al fenómeno mentado. Las metáforas no son literales, sino que tienen un sentido figurado. Los límites de la metáfora en torno a la tecnología, en nuestro caso, se delimitan cuando el fenómeno no permite un segundo plano (...) retórico dentro del discurso en el que la metáfora tendría lugar. En este artículo trataré de demostrar por qué una metáfora no es útil en el lenguaje de taller o en el lenguaje técnico. (shrink)

Joseph Butler was an Anglican priest and later a bishop who wrote about ethics, religion, and other philosophical themes. He is not well known today. During his lifetime and into the early part of the twentieth century he was better known especially for his major work the Analogy of Religion (1736). Today he is known mostly for his sermons which are interpreted as essays on ethics and for his essay on identity. Butler had a profound effect on J. H. Newman, (...) Matthew Arnold, and W. E. Gladstone and some effect on many other popular, academic, and professional readers. This book is as much about Butler’s sources and his reception as it is about the way he arranged and presented the evidence in the first half of the 18th century. He was a good man and is recognized by the Anglican church as a divine. We have no interest in taking a nostalgic look at a quaint figure in English church history. To those who claim Butler is unknown, that he was “blown out of the water” by John Wesley or Karl Barth, or Cornelius van Til, we can only say Butler is not as well known in the 20th and 21st centuries as in the 19th, but he is certainly not unknown to those who have taken any interest in philosophy, religion, or ethics. Today there has been a revival of interest in Bishop Butler. Our concern is to build and maintain a bridge that will help to keep this momentum. He offers an ethic that is universal and clearly Christian, yet it is based on the nature of man. Kant had a similar project, but in our opinion, Butler makes more compelling arguments. What is of interest to the Christian apologist is Butler’s work in this area. The purpose of this book is to present Butler’s ideas. We believe that his ethics have a universality that is applicable to people of all religious faiths and those that have none. It is common sense way of looking at ethics for everyday interaction. This book is a narrative argument presenting in detail how Butler’s creative arrangement of the evidence served as a bridge between the ancients as known in the Greek, Latin, and Hebrew originals, and the moderns, mostly Anglophone, who constituted Butler’s work environment and his reception in the latter day down to the present. We can hardly expect everyone to agree with Butler on all points, we certainly do not. The point at issue is rather whether he merits a seat at the present-day round table of deliberation on matters pertaining to philosophy, religion, and ethics. (shrink)

In this paper I will explore the question whether the Trivialization construction of transparent intensional logic (TIL) can be understood in terms of the Execution construction, specifically, in terms of its degenerate case known as the 0-Execution. My answer will be positive and the apparent contrast between the intuitive understanding of Trivialization and 0-Execution will be explained as a matter of distinct yet related informal perspectives, not as a matter of technical or conceptual differences.

På mange måter er dette en bok som blir utgitt alt for sent. Det er den første antologien av sitt slag, og retter fokus på kvinnelige metafysikere som virket i den tidlige moderne perioden (16. og tidlig 17. århundre). Redaktør Emily Thomas skriver i introduksjonen at til tross for at flere antologier om moderne metafysikk allerede finnes, er kvinnelige filosofer fortsatt underrepresentert og den filosofiske kanon mannsdominert. De ni filosofene som blir omtalt i totalt 13 kapitler var alle originale og (...) velkjente tenkere i sin samtid, men har blitt glemt i filosofihistoriens løp. (shrink)

This paper is the twin of (Duží and Jespersen, in submission), which provides a logical rule for transparent quantification into hyperprop- ositional contexts de dicto, as in: Mary believes that the Evening Star is a planet; therefore, there is a concept c such that Mary be- lieves that what c conceptualizes is a planet. Here we provide two logical rules for transparent quantification into hyperpropositional contexts de re. (As a by-product, we also offer rules for possible- world propositional contexts.) One (...) rule validates this inference: Mary believes of the Evening Star that it is a planet; therefore, there is an x such that Mary believes of x that it is a planet. The other rule validates this inference: the Evening Star is such that it is believed by Mary to be a planet; therefore, there is an x such that x is believed by Mary to be a planet. Issues unique to the de re variant include partiality and existential presupposition, sub- stitutivity of co-referential (as opposed to co-denoting or synony- mous) terms, anaphora, and active vs. passive voice. The validity of quantifying-in presupposes an extensional logic of hyperinten- sions preserving transparency and compositionality in hyperinten- sional contexts. This requires raising the bar for what qualifies as co-denotation or equivalence in extensional contexts. Our logic is Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic. The syntax of TIL is the typed lambda calculus; its highly expressive semantics is based on a procedural redefinition of, inter alia, functional abstraction and application. The two non-standard features we need are a hyper- intension (called Trivialization) that presents other hyperintensions and a four-place substitution function (called Sub) defined over hy- perintensions. (shrink)

«Hva er det vi egentlig mener når vi sier, mennesket er dødelig?» spør Woody Allen i boken The Insanity Defence. Han legger til: «Det er åpenbart ikke et kompliment.»1 Jeg tror Woody tar feil her. Vår dødelighet er et kompliment – eller i det minste av det gode – siden livet uten døden ville være katastrofalt. Udødelige liv fører til dyp kjedsomhet, eksistensiell angst og en radikal form for verdinihilistisk tilværelse. Grunnen er at udødeligheten gjør at vi en gang i (...) fremtiden må konfronteres med de radikalt livsfiendtlige stadiene av universets historie. Jeg argumenterer for at dette er en skjebne langt verre enn døden. Konklusjonen blir derfor, med et nikk til Voltaire, at om døden ikke hadde eksistert, hadde vi vært nødt til å finne den opp. (shrink)

CAT4 is proposed as a general method for representing information, enabling a powerful programming method for large-scale information systems. It enables generalised machine learning, software automation and novel AI capabilities. This is Part 3 of a five-part introduction. The focus here is on explaining the semantic model for CAT4. Points in CAT4 graphs represent facts. We introduce all the formal (data) elements used in the classic semantic model: sense or intension (1st and 2nd joins), reference (3rd join), functions (4th join), (...) time and truth (logical fields), and symbolic content (name/value fields). Concepts are introduced through examples alternating with theoretical discussion. Some concepts are assumed from Part 1 and 2, but key ideas are re-introduced. The purpose is to explain the CAT4 interpretation, and why the data structure and CAT4 axioms have been chosen: to make the semantic model consistent and complete. We start with methods to translate information from database tables into graph DBs and into CAT4. We conclude with a method for translating natural language into CAT4. We conclude with a comparison of the system with an advanced semantic logic, the hyper-intensional logic TIL, which also aims to translate NL into a logical calculus. The CAT4 Natural Language Translator is discussed in further detail in Part 4, when we introduce functions more formally. Part 5 discusses software design considerations. (shrink)

Det er min strid at tabellen av intensjonalitet (rasjonalitet, bevissthet, sinn, tanke, språk, personlighet etc.) som har fremtredende her beskriver mer eller mindre nøyaktig, eller i det minste fungerer som en heuristisk for, hvordan vi tenker og oppfører oss, og så omfatter det ikke bare filosofi og psykologi, men alt annet (historie, litteratur, matematikk, politikk etc.). Legg spesielt merke til at intensjonalitet og rasjonalitet som jeg (sammen med Searle, Wittgenstein og andre) ser det, inkluderer både bevisst deliberativspråklig system 2 og (...) bevisstløs automatisert prelinguistic System 1 handlinger eller reflekser. Jeg gir en kritisk undersøkelse av noen av de viktigste funnene fra to av de mest eminente studentene i moderne tid, Ludwig Wittgenstein og John Searle, om den logiske strukturen av intensjonalitet (sinn, språk, bevissthet, oppførsel), tar som utgangspunkt Wittgensteins grunnleggende oppdagelse - at alle virkelig "filosofiske" problemer er de samme - forvirringer om hvordan man bruker språk i en bestemt sammenheng, og så alle løsninger er de samme - ser på hvordan språket kan brukes i sammenheng en sammenheng slik at sannheten forhold (Vilkår for tilfredshet eller COS) er klare. Det grunnleggende problemet er at man kan si noe, men man kan ikke bety (stat klar COS for) noen vilkårlig ytring og mening er bare mulig i en svært spesifikk sammenheng. Jeg analyserer ulike skrifter av og om dem fra det moderne perspektivet til de to tankesystemene (popularisert som "tenker raskt, tenker sakte"), ved hjelp av en ny tabell med intensjonatitet og nye doble systemer nomenklatur. Jeg viser at dette er en mektig heuristisk for å beskrive atferd. Dermed er all oppførsel nært forbundet hvis man tar riktig synspunkt. Den fenomenologiske illusjonen (glemsel en automatisert system 1) er universell og strekker seg ikke bare gjennom filosofi, men gjennom hele livet. Jeg er sikker på at Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg og paven ville være vantro hvis fortalt at de lider av det samme problemet som Hegel, Husserl og Heidegger, (eller at de skiller seg bare i grad fra narkotika- og sexavhengige i å være motivert av stimulering av deres frontale kortices ved levering av dopamin (og over 100 andre kjemikalier) via ventral tegmentum og kjernen accumbens), men det er helt klart sant. Mens fenomenologene bare kastet bort mye folks tid, kaster de bort jorden og deres etterkommers fremtid. (shrink)

Det er min strid at tabellen av intensjonalitet (rasjonalitet, bevissthet, sinn, tanke, språk, personlighet etc.) som har fremtredende her beskriver mer eller mindre nøyaktig, eller i det minste fungerer som en heuristisk for, hvordan vi tenker og oppfører oss, og så omfatter det ikke bare filosofi og psykologi, men alt annet (historie, litteratur, matematikk, politikk etc.). Legg spesielt merke til at intensjonalitet og rasjonalitet som jeg (sammen med Searle, Wittgenstein og andre) ser det, inkluderer både bevisst deliberativspråklig system 2 og (...) bevisstløs automatisert prelinguistic System 1 handlinger eller reflekser. Jeg gir en kritisk undersøkelse av noen av de viktigste funnene fra to av de mest eminente studentene i moderne tid, Ludwig Wittgenstein og John Searle, om den logiske strukturen av intensjonalitet (sinn, språk, bevissthet, oppførsel), tar som utgangspunkt Wittgensteins grunnleggende oppdagelse - at alle virkelig "filosofiske" problemer er de samme - forvirringer om hvordan man bruker språk i en bestemt sammenheng, og så alle løsninger er de samme - ser på hvordan språket kan brukes i sammenheng en sammenheng slik at sannheten forhold (Vilkår for tilfredshet eller COS) er klare. Det grunnleggende problemet er at man kan si noe, men man kan ikke bety (stat klar COS for) noen vilkårlig ytring og mening er bare mulig i en svært spesifikk sammenheng. Jeg analyserer ulike skrifter av og om dem fra det moderne perspektivet til de to tankesystemene (popularisert som "tenker raskt, tenker sakte"), ved hjelp av en ny tabell med intensjonatitet og nye doble systemer nomenklatur. Jeg viser at dette er en mektig heuristisk for å beskrive atferd. Dermed er all oppførsel nært forbundet hvis man tar riktig synspunkt. Den fenomenologiske illusjonen (glemsel en automatisert system 1) er universell og strekker seg ikke bare gjennom filosofi, men gjennom hele livet. Jeg er sikker på at Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg og paven ville være vantro hvis fortalt at de lider av det samme problemet som Hegel, Husserl og Heidegger, (eller at de skiller seg bare i grad fra narkotika- og sexavhengige i å være motivert av stimulering av deres frontale kortices ved levering av dopamin (og over 100 andre kjemikalier) via ventral tegmentum og kjernen accumbens), men det er helt klart sant. Mens fenomenologene bare kastet bort mye folks tid, kaster de bort jorden og deres etterkommers fremtid. (shrink)

Denne artikel hedder ”Musikalske Omgangsformer”. Men den fortæller ikke så meget om, hvorledes musikalske omgangsformer tager sig ud, som den fører til et punkt, hvor musikalske omgangsformer bliver sigtbare og påtrængende. Snarere end at præsentere en teori om musikalske omgangsformer anviser den et sted, hvor en teoridannelse er påkrævet. Udgangspunktet bliver en påvisning af, hvorledes den fænomenologiske tilgang til det musikalske fænomen svigter ved tematisk og dog stiltiende at hævde musikstykket, satsen, som sin genstand. Utilstrækkeligheden påpeges inden for den fænomenologiske (...) analyses eget univers. Som sådan vil den ved artiklens afslutning yderligere omfatte formuleringen af den påpegede utilstrækkelighed. Fra dette – negative – udgangspunkt tages skridtet ind i et rum, der skal indbefatte de påviste løse ender og samtidig give plads for, at vi med positivt udgangspunkt i en praxis-orienteret filosofi kan komme til at binde de nødvendige knuder. (shrink)

Foucault var i en lang periode av sitt omfangsrike forfatterskap opptatt av makt. Vi skal her følge utviklingen i Foucaults maktanalyser med utgangspunkt i Overvåkning og straff og maktbegrepet som utvikles der. Deretter går vi inn på revisjonen av maktbegrepet gjennom utarbeidingen av begrepet om biopolitikk i Viljen til Viten og forelesningsserien «Il faut defendre la societé». Artikkelen avsluttes med en redegjørelse for Foucaults analyser av regjeringsrasjonalitet og stiller spørsmålet om hvordan disse analysene kan brukes i dag.

I bought this thinking anything from Bradford books and MIT must be good. Instead it's a boring, stupid, incompetent, antiscientific and antirational piece of closet creationist trash. Heads should roll at Bradford for this atrocity! If you must then start by reading the last chapter first as he conceals a frank statement of his anti-rationality til the end. I made detailed notes on it as I thought it was a serious work of science and was going to do a long (...) page by page refutation but why bother! The praise from some Science and Nature reviewers shows they did not read it and/or have as little understanding of behavior as Buller. The positive comments from the jacket by Sterelny, Wilson, Sober and Caporael are due to the fact that they all share Buller's retro antirational blank slate views that human nature is due to our culture and the delusion of group selection (see my review of Wilson's The Social Conquest of Earth). The first part of the book is dull repeats of basic biology cribbed from intro texts and unrelieved by photos or drawings. Along the way there are some incredibly bizarre takes on the use of language and scientific method. Then you find an attempt to refute some well known studies of stepchild abuse. As you get to the end he lets his anti-science and anti-rationality out in the open, telling us that regardless of whether our behavior is innate we should not investigate it! The fact that our brain is no different from our other organs and it's functions a product of genes and evolution continues to be resisted or just ignored not only by academics but by the general public. Nevertheless the basics of our behavior are as innate as our heartbeat and detailed evidence (for those who have trouble with the obvious) is all around us everywhere we look once our eyes are opened-just watch people doing anything or turn on the tv (or see the huge and rapidly growing scientific literature). Novices can start with Pinker's "The Blank Slate" but there are now dozens of good popular and scientific books on evolutionary psychology and hundreds of articles in the literature of philosophy, psychology, economics etc. The articles in Buss's The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology and some at the end of Gazzinaga's The Cognitive Neurosciences 3 are good starting points for the serious reader., and science are all manifestations of our innate psychology (with the minor extensions we call culture and civilization), you can look almost anywhere in literature or life to study our adapted mind except here. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

”Hvad er musik?” lyder et gammelt og godt spørgsmål, og svaret udformes i reglen som en redegørelse for, hvordan musik lyder. Med modernismen (Ligeti, Stockhausen, etc.). har vi imidlertid gjort den erfaring, at musikken kan forblive musik, selv når den er uden melodi, uden metrisk puls etc. Men hvis der ingen grænser er for, hvordan musik- ken kan lyde, kan vi heller ikke afgrænse – definere – musikken ved at henvise til, hvordan den lyder. Vi må, mener jeg, snarere tage (...) udgangspunkt i den særlige måde, vi sanseligt indstiller os på lyden – ”omgås” den – når vi hører den som musik. (shrink)

This chapter deals with the way our psychology and actions a scaffolded by their environment but also the tensions that can appear between individual and environment, both at the level of biology and culture. The chapter is grounded in an analysis of the early 20th century theoretical biologist Jacob von Uexkull and his notion of "Umwelt" or "surround world". But also raises the question of whether organisms fit their environment as neatly as Uexkull and many later thinkers have proposed or (...) assumed. (shrink)