Results for 'logical pluralism'

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  1. Rivalry, Normativity, and the Collapse of Logical Pluralism.Erik Stei - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. This very general characterization gives rise to a whole family of positions. I argue that not all of them are stabl...
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  2.  76
    Limiting Logical Pluralism.Suki Finn - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    In this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited. I argue that the content of this basic meta-logic must include the analogue of logical rules Modus Ponens (MP) and (...)
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  3.  25
    Non-Normative Logical Pluralism and the Revenge of the Normativity Objection.Erik Stei - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly:1-16.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Most logical pluralists think that logic is normative in the sense that you make a mistake if you accept the premisses of a valid argument but reject its conclusion. Some authors have argued that this combination is self-undermining: Suppose that L1 and L2 are correct logics that coincide except for the argument from Γ to φ, which is valid in L1 but invalid in L2. (...)
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  4.  21
    Logical Pluralism: Where the Conflict Really Lies.Mohsen Haeri & Davood Hosseini - forthcoming - Wisdom and Philosophy.
    Recent years have seen a surge of attention to the problem of logical pluralism; most of which has been a reaction to Beall and Restall’s account of logical pluralism as the existence of more than one equally correct semantic relation of logical consequence. The underlying thesis is that the indeterminacy of the notion of validity goes beyond what the inductive-deductive distinction can precisify. The notion of deductive validity itself is indeterminate as well and this indeterminacy (...)
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  5. Logical Pluralism is Compatible with Monism About Metaphysical Modality.Nicola Ciprotti & Luca Moretti - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):275-284.
    Beall and Restall 2000; 2001; 2006 advocate a comprehensive pluralist approach to logic, which they call Logical Pluralism, according to which there is not one true logic but many equally acceptable logical systems. They maintain that Logical Pluralism is compatible with monism about metaphysical modality, according to which there is just one correct logic of metaphysical modality. Wyatt 2004 contends that Logical Pluralism is incompatible with monism about metaphysical modality. We first suggest that (...)
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  6.  20
    Perspective and Logical Pluralism in Hegel.Christopher Yeomans - 2019 - Hegel Bulletin 40 (1):29-50.
    In this paper, I consider the role of perspective in Hegel’s metaphysics, and in particular the role that multiple perspectives play within the ultimate structure in Hegel’s metaphysics, which Hegel calls ‘the idea [die Idee].’ My (somewhat anachronistic) way into this topic will be to inquire about Hegel’s stance on what Adrian Moore has called ‘absolute representations.’ I argue for the claim that perspective is maintained, even in the absolute idea, which generates the task of understanding the nature of that (...)
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  7. Pluralism and the Logical Basis of Metaphysics.N. Kurbis - 2007 - In Logica Yearbook.
    I argue for a kind of logical pluralism on the basis of a difficulty with defining the meaning of negation in the framework of Dummett's and Prawitz' proof-theoretic semantics.
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  8. The Metaphysical Interpretation of Logical Truth.Tuomas Tahko - 2014 - In Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic: Logical Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All Things In Between. Cambridge University Press. pp. 233-248.
    The starting point of this paper concerns the apparent difference between what we might call absolute truth and truth in a model, following Donald Davidson. The notion of absolute truth is the one familiar from Tarski’s T-schema: ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. Instead of being a property of sentences as absolute truth appears to be, truth in a model, that is relative truth, is evaluated in terms of the relation between sentences and models. (...)
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  9. A Survey of Logical Realism.Tuomas E. Tahko - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Logical realism is a view about the metaphysical status of logic. Common to most if not all the views captured by the label ‘logical realism’ is that logical facts are mind- and language-independent. But that does not tell us anything about the nature of logical facts or about our epistemic access to them. The goal of this paper is to outline and systematize the different ways that logical realism could be entertained and to examine some (...)
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  10. On Logical Relativity.Achille C. Varzi - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):197-219.
    One logic or many? I say—many. Or rather, I say there is one logic for each way of specifying the class of all possible circumstances, or models, i.e., all ways of interpreting a given language. But because there is no unique way of doing this, I say there is no unique logic except in a relative sense. Indeed, given any two competing logical theories T1 and T2 (in the same language) one could always consider their common core, T, and (...)
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  11. A Modality Called ‘Negation’.Francesco Berto - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):761-793.
    I propose a comprehensive account of negation as a modal operator, vindicating a moderate logical pluralism. Negation is taken as a quantifier on worlds, restricted by an accessibility relation encoding the basic concept of compatibility. This latter captures the core meaning of the operator. While some candidate negations are then ruled out as violating plausible constraints on compatibility, different specifications of the notion of world support different logical conducts for negations. The approach unifies in a philosophically motivated (...)
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  12. Logic, Logical Form and the Disunity of Truth.Will Gamester - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):34-43.
    Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural constraints on a (...)
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  13. The Logical Space of Democracy.Christian List - 2011 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (3):262-297.
    Can we design a perfect democratic decision procedure? Condorcet famously observed that majority rule, our paradigmatic democratic procedure, has some desirable properties, but sometimes produces inconsistent outcomes. Revisiting Condorcet’s insights in light of recent work on the aggregation of judgments, I show that there is a conflict between three initially plausible requirements of democracy: “robustness to pluralism”, “basic majoritarianism”, and “collective rationality”. For all but the simplest collective decision problems, no decision procedure meets these three requirements at once; at (...)
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  14.  54
    Ontological Pluralism and Notational Variance.Bruno Whittle - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.
    Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways to exist. It is a position with deep roots in the history of philosophy, and in which there has been a recent resurgence of interest. In contemporary presentations, it is stated in terms of fundamental languages: as the view that such languages contain more than one quantifier. For example, one ranging over abstract objects, and another over concrete ones. A natural worry, however, is that the languages proposed by the (...)
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  15. Tractatus Versus Quantum Mechanics.Berislav Žarnić & Lovre de Grisogono - 2015 - In Luka Boršić, Ivana Skuhala Karsman & Franjo Sokolić (eds.), Physics and Philosophy. Institute of Philosophy in Zagreb. pp. 27–44.
    This paper is divided in four parts. In the first part we introduce the method of internal critique of philosophical theories by examination of their external consistency with scientific theories. In the second part two metaphysical and one epistemological postulate of Wittgenstein's Tractatus are made explicit and formally expressed. In the third part we examine whether Tractarian metaphysical and epistemological postulates (the independence of simple states of affairs, the unique mode of their composition, possibility of complete empirical knowledge) are externally (...)
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  16. Sulla relatività logica.Achille C. Varzi - 2004 - In Massimiliano Carrara & Pierdaniele Giaretta (eds.), Filosofia e logica. Rubbettino Editore. pp. 135–173.
    Italian translation of "On Logical Relativity" (2002), by Luca Morena.
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  17. Substructural Logics, Pluralism and Collapse.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Pailos & Damian Szmuc - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, (...)
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  18. Meaning and Argument. A Theory of Meaning Centred on Immediate Argumental Role.Cesare Cozzo - 1994 - Almqvist & Wiksell.
    This study presents and develops in detail (a new version of) the argumental conception of meaning. The two basic principles of the argumental conception of meaning are: i) To know (implicitly) the sense of a word is to know (implicitly) all the argumentation rules concerning that word; ii) To know the sense of a sentence is to know the syntactic structure of that sentence and to know the senses of the words occurring in it. The sense of a sentence is (...)
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  19. Jaina Logic and the Philosophical Basis of Pluralism.Jonardon Ganeri - 2002 - History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (4):267-281.
    What is the rational response when confronted with a set of propositions each of which we have some reason to accept, and yet which taken together form an inconsistent class? This was, in a nutshell, the problem addressed by the Jaina logicians of classical India, and the solution they gave is, I think, of great interest, both for what it tells us about the relationship between rationality and consistency, and for what we can learn about the logical basis of (...)
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  20.  93
    Quantifier Variance Dissolved.Suki Finn & Otávio Bueno - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:289-307.
    Quantifier variance faces a number of difficulties. In this paper we first formulate the view as holding that the meanings of the quantifiers may vary, and that languages using different quantifiers may be charitably translated into each other. We then object to the view on the basis of four claims: (i) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning extensionally by changing the domain of quantification; (ii) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning intensionally without collapsing into logical pluralism; (iii) quantifier variance is (...)
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  21.  19
    Epistemic Pluralism.Fabien Schang - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 239 (60):337-353.
    The present paper wants to promote epistemic pluralism as an alternative view of non-classical logics. For this purpose, a bilateralist logic of acceptance and rejection is developed in order to make an important di erence between several concepts of epistemology, including information and justi cation. Moreover, the notion of disagreement corresponds to a set of epistemic oppositions between agents. The result is a non-standard theory of opposition for many-valued logics, rendering total and partial disagreement in terms of epistemic negation (...)
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  22.  37
    A Hierarchy of Classical and Paraconsistent Logics.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Pailos & Damian Szmuc - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-28.
    In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic is to (...)
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  23. What Are Beall and Restall Pluralists About?Nicole Wyatt - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):409 – 420.
    In this paper I argue that Beall and Restall's claim that there is one true logic of metaphysical modality is incompatible with the formulation of logical pluralism that they give. I investigate various ways of reconciling their pluralism with this claim, but conclude that none of the options can be made to work.
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  24. Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen - 2015 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 24 (3):377-399.
    Epistemic logics based on the possible worlds semantics suffer from the problem of logical omniscience, whereby agents are described as knowing all logical consequences of what they know, including all tautologies. This problem is doubly challenging: on the one hand, agents should be treated as logically non-omniscient, and on the other hand, as moderately logically competent. Many responses to logical omniscience fail to meet this double challenge because the concepts of knowledge and reasoning are not properly separated. (...)
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  25. Sophism and Moral Agnosticism, or, How to Tell a Relativist From a Pluralist. Torcello - 2011 - The Pluralist 6 (1):87.
    Is it possible to recognize the limits of rationality, and thus to embrace moral pluralism, without embracing moral relativism? My answer is yes; nevertheless, certain anti-foundational positions, both recent and ancient, take a cynical stance toward the possibility of any critical moral judgment, and as such, must be regarded as relativistic.1 It is such cynicism, I argue, whether openly announced or unknowingly implied, that marks the distinction between relativism and pluralism.2 The danger of this cynicism is not so (...)
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  26. Pluralism About Knowledge.Robin McKenna - 2017 - In Annalisa Coliva & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 171-198.
    In this paper I consider the prospects for pluralism about knowledge, that is, the view that there is a plurality of knowledge relations. After a brief overview of some views that entail a sort of pluralism about knowledge, I focus on a particular kind of knowledge pluralism I call standards pluralism. Put roughly, standards pluralism is the view that one never knows anything simpliciter. Rather, one knows by this-or-that epistemic standard. Because there is a plurality (...)
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  27. Two Kinds of Logical Impossibility.Alexander Sandgren & Koji Tanaka - forthcoming - Noûs.
    In this paper, we argue that a distinction ought to be drawn between two ways in which a given world might be logically impossible. First, a world w might be impossible because the laws that hold at w are different from those that hold at some other world (say the actual world). Second, a world w might be impossible because the laws of logic that hold in some world (say the actual world) are violated at w. We develop a novel (...)
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  28. What is Logical Form?Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig - 2002 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Logical Form and Language. Clarendon Press. pp. 54--90.
    Bertrand Russell, in the second of his 1914 Lowell lectures, Our Knowledge of the External World, asserted famously that ‘every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical’ (Russell 1993, p. 42). He went on to characterize that portion of logic that concerned the study of forms of propositions, or, as (...)
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  29. What Are Logical Notions?John Corcoran & Alfred Tarski - 1986 - History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (2):143-154.
    In this manuscript, published here for the first time, Tarski explores the concept of logical notion. He draws on Klein's Erlanger Programm to locate the logical notions of ordinary geometry as those invariant under all transformations of space. Generalizing, he explicates the concept of logical notion of an arbitrary discipline.
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  30. Ideal Rationality and Logical Omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.
    Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs (...)
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  31. Normative Alethic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - In Nathan Kellen, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 145-168.
    Some philosophers have argued that truth is a norm of judgement and have provided a variety of formulations of this general thesis. In this paper, I shall side with these philosophers and assume that truth is a norm of judgement. What I am primarily interested in here are two core questions concerning the judgement-truth norm: (i) what are the normative relationships between truth and judgement? And (ii) do these relationships vary or are they constant? I argue for a pluralist picture—what (...)
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  32.  30
    Attention and Mindwandering in Skilled Behavior: An Argument for Pluralism.Carolyn Dicey Jennings & Alex Dayer - manuscript
    Peak human performance—whether of Olympic athletes, Nobel prize winners, or Carnegie Hall musicians—depends on skill. Skill is at the heart of what it means to excel. Yet, the fixity of skilled behavior can sometimes make it seem a lower-level activity, more akin to the movements of an invertebrate or a machine. Experts in multiple domains have described what they do as sometimes “automatic.” Expert gamers describe themselves as “playing with” automaticity (Taylor and Elam 2018). Expert musicians are said to balance (...)
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  33.  29
    The Football of Logic.Fabien Schang - 2017 - Studia Humana 6 (1):50-60.
    An analogy is made between two rather different domains, namely: logic, and football. Starting from a comparative table between the two activities, an alternative explanation of logic is given in terms of players, ball, goal, and the like. Our main thesis is that, just as the task of logic is preserving truth from premises to the conclusion, footballers strive to keep the ball as far as possible until the opposite goal. Assuming this analogy may help think about logic in the (...)
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  34.  77
    Explaining the Behaviour of Random Ecological Networks: The Stability of the Microbiome as a Case of Integrative Pluralism.Roger Deulofeu, Javier Suárez & Alberto Pérez-Cervera - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    Explaining the behaviour of ecosystems is one of the key challenges for the biological sciences. Since 2000, new-mechanicism has been the main model to account for the nature of scientific explanation in biology. The universality of the new-mechanist view in biology has been however put into question due to the existence of explanations that account for some biological phenomena in terms of their mathematical properties (mathematical explanations). Supporters of mathematical explanation have argued that the explanation of the behaviour of ecosystems (...)
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  35. Kant on the Logical Form of Singular Judgments.Huaping Lu-Adler - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (3):367-92.
    At A71/B96–7 Kant explains that singular judgements are ‘special’ because they stand to the general ones as Einheit to Unendlichkeit. The reference to Einheit brings to mind the category of unity and hence raises a spectre of circularity in Kant’s explanation. I aim to remove this spectre by interpreting the Einheit-Unendlichkeit contrast in light of the logical distinctions among universal, particular and singular judgments shared by Kant and his logician predecessors. This interpretation has a further implication for resolving a (...)
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  36. Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):368-393.
    ABSTRACTEcumenical Alethic Pluralism is a novel kind of alethic pluralism. It is ecumenical in that it widens the scope of alethic pluralism by allowing for a normatively deflated truth property alongside a variety of normatively robust truth properties. We establish EAP by showing how Wright’s Inflationary Arguments fail in the domain of taste, once a relativist treatment of the metaphysics and epistemology of that domain is endorsed. EAP is highly significant to current debates on the nature of (...)
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  37. Explanatory Pluralism in Cognitive Science.Rick Dale, Eric Dietrich & Anthony Chemero - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (2):739-742.
    This brief commentary has three goals. The first is to argue that ‘‘framework debate’’ in cognitive science is unresolvable. The idea that one theory or framework can singly account for the vast complexity and variety of cognitive processes seems unlikely if not impossible. The second goal is a consequence of this: We should consider how the various theories on offer work together in diverse contexts of investigation. A final goal is to supply a brief review for readers who are compelled (...)
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  38. Explanatory Pluralism: An Unrewarding Prediction Error for Free Energy Theorists.Matteo Colombo & Cory Wright - 2017 - Brain and Cognition 112:3–12.
    Courtesy of its free energy formulation, the hierarchical predictive processing theory of the brain (PTB) is often claimed to be a grand unifying theory. To test this claim, we examine a central case: activity of mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic (DA) systems. After reviewing the three most prominent hypotheses of DA activity—the anhedonia, incentive salience, and reward prediction error hypotheses—we conclude that the evidence currently vindicates explanatory pluralism. This vindication implies that the grand unifying claims of advocates of PTB are unwarranted. More (...)
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  39. Impossible Worlds and Logical Omniscience: An Impossibility Result.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2505-2524.
    In this paper, I investigate whether we can use a world-involving framework to model the epistemic states of non-ideal agents. The standard possible-world framework falters in this respect because of a commitment to logical omniscience. A familiar attempt to overcome this problem centers around the use of impossible worlds where the truths of logic can be false. As we shall see, if we admit impossible worlds where “anything goes” in modal space, it is easy to model extremely non-ideal agents (...)
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  40. Factoring Out the Impossibility of Logical Aggregation.Philippe Mongin - 2008 - Journal of Economic Theory 141:p. 100-113.
    According to a theorem recently proved in the theory of logical aggregation, any nonconstant social judgment function that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is dictatorial. We show that the strong and not very plausible IIA condition can be replaced with a minimal independence assumption plus a Pareto-like condition. This new version of the impossibility theorem likens it to Arrow’s and arguably enhances its paradoxical value.
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  41. Logical Atomism in Russell and Wittgenstein.Ian Proops - 2011 - In Marie McGinn & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein. Oxford University Press.
    An essay examining logical atomism as it arises in Russell and the early Wittgenstein.
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  42.  36
    Philosophie des modalités épistémiques (la logique assertorique revisitée).Fabien Schang - 2007 - Dissertation, Nancy Université
    The relevance of any logical analysis lies in its ability to solve paradoxes and trace conceptual troubles back; with this respect, the task of epistemic logic is to handle paradoxes in connection with the concept of knowledge. Epistemic logic is currently introduced as the logical analysis of crucial concepts within epistemology, namely: knowledge, belief, truth, and justification. An alternative approach will be advanced here in order to enlighten such a discourse, as centred upon the word assertion and displayed (...)
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  43.  46
    (Master Thesis) Of Madness and Many-Valuedness: An Investigation Into Suszko's Thesis.Sanderson Molick - 2015 - Dissertation, UFRN
    Suszko’s Thesis is a philosophical claim regarding the nature of many-valuedness. It was formulated by the Polish logician Roman Suszko during the middle 70s and states the existence of “only but two truth values”. The thesis is a reaction against the notion of many-valuedness conceived by Jan Łukasiewicz. Reputed as one of the modern founders of many-valued logics, Łukasiewicz considered a third undeter- mined value in addition to the traditional Fregean values of Truth and Falsehood. For Łukasiewicz, his third value (...)
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  44. A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):501-521.
    The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of what they believe, including all logical truths. This is widely considered a problem if we want to reason about the epistemic lives of non-ideal agents who—much like ordinary human beings—are logically competent, but not logically omniscient. A popular strategy for avoiding logical omniscience centers around the use of impossible worlds: worlds that, in one way or another, (...)
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  45. The Myth of Logical Behaviourism and the Origins of the Identity Theory.Sean Crawford - 2013 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The identity theory’s rise to prominence in analytic philosophy of mind during the late 1950s and early 1960s is widely seen as a watershed in the development of physicalism, in the sense that whereas logical behaviourism proposed analytic and a priori ascertainable identities between the meanings of mental and physical-behavioural concepts, the identity theory proposed synthetic and a posteriori knowable identities between mental and physical properties. While this watershed does exist, the standard account of it is misleading, as it (...)
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  46. Epistemic Relativism, Scepticism, Pluralism.Martin Kusch - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4687-4703.
    There are a number of debates that are relevant to questions concerning objectivity in science. One of the eldest, and still one of the most intensely fought, is the debate over epistemic relativism. —All forms of epistemic relativism commit themselves to the view that it is impossible to show in a neutral, non-question-begging, way that one “epistemic system”, that is, one interconnected set of epistemic standards, is epistemically superior to others. I shall call this view “No-metajustification”. No-metajustification is commonly taken (...)
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  47. The Doctrinal Paradox, the Discursive Dilemma, and Logical Aggregation Theory.Philippe Mongin - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (3):315-355.
    Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and List and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final objective of the paper is to give the (...)
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  48.  90
    Logical Conceptualization of Knowledge on the Notion of Language Communication.Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 2017 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 52 (1):247-269.
    The main objective of the paper is to provide a conceptual apparatus of a general logical theory of language communication. The aim of the paper is to outline a formal-logical theory of language in which the concepts of the phenomenon of language communication and language communication in general are defined and some conditions for their adequacy are formulated. The theory explicates the key notions of contemporary syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. The theory is formalized on two levels: token-level and (...)
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  49. Two Notions of Logical Form.Andrea Iacona - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (12):617-643.
    This paper claims that there is no such thing as the correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfil two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and semantics. The first part of the paper outlines the thesis that a unique notion of logical form fulfils both roles, and argues that the alleged best candidate for making it true is unsuited for one of (...)
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  50. The Problem of Logical Omniscience, the Preface Paradox, and Doxastic Commitments.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):917-939.
    The main goal of this paper is to investigate what explanatory resources Robert Brandom’s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. One such case in particular (...)
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