Results for 'metalogical self-reference'

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  1. Reflexivity: A Source-Book in Self-Reference.Steven James Bartlett (ed.) - 1992 - Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co..
    From the Editor’s Introduction: "The Internal Limitations of Human Understanding." We carry, unavoidably, the limits of our understanding with us. We are perpetually confined within the horizons of our conceptual structure. When this structure grows or expands, the breadth of our comprehensions enlarges, but we are forever barred from the wished-for glimpse beyond its boundaries, no matter how hard we try, no matter how much credence we invest in the substance of our learning and mist of speculation. -/- The limitations (...)
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  2. Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument - Book Review. [REVIEW]Steven James Bartlett - 1979 - Review of Metaphysics (4):738-740.
    A book review of _Free Choice: A Self-referential Argument_ by J. M. Boyle, Jr., G. Grisez, and O. Tollefsen. The review concerns the pragmatical self-referential argument employed in the book, and points to the fact that the argument is itself self-referentially inconsistent, but on the level of metalogical self-reference.
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  3. The Idea of a Metalogic of Reference.Steven James Bartlett - 1976 - Methodology and Science: Interdisciplinary Journal for the Empirical Study of the Foundations of Science and Their Methodology 9 (3):85-92.
    This paper sought to state in a concise and comparatively informal, unsystematic, and more accessible form the more technical approach the author developed during a research fellowship in 1974-75 at the Max-Planck-Institut in Starnberg, Germany. The ideas presented in this paper are more fully developed in later publications by the author which are listed in the two-page addendum to this paper.
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  4. Referential Consistency as a a Criterion of Meaning.Steven James Bartlett - 1982 - Synthese 52 (2):267 - 282.
    NOTE TO THE READER - October, 2020¶¶ After a long period of time devoted to research in other areas, the author has returned to the subject of this paper in a book-length study, CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning, which has been published as an open access eBook by Studies in Theory and Behavior in August, 2020. In this book (Chapter 11, “The Metalogic of Meaning”), the position developed in the 1982 paper that follows is substantively revised (...)
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  5. Self-Reference, Phenomenology, and Philosophy of Science.Steven James Bartlett - 1980 - Methodology and Science: Interdisciplinary Journal for the Empirical Study of the Foundations of Science and Their Methodology 13 (3):143-167.
    The paper begins by acknowledging that weakened systematic precision in phenomenology has made its application in philosophy of science obscure and ineffective. The defining aspirations of early transcendental phenomenology are, however, believed to be important ones. A path is therefore explored that attempts to show how certain recent developments in the logic of self-reference fulfill in a clear and more rigorous fashion in the context of philosophy of science certain of the early hopes of phenomenologists. The resulting dual (...)
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  6. Self-Reference and the Languages of Arithmetic.Richard Heck - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (1):1-29.
    I here investigate the sense in which diagonalization allows one to construct sentences that are self-referential. Truly self-referential sentences cannot be constructed in the standard language of arithmetic: There is a simple theory of truth that is intuitively inconsistent but is consistent with Peano arithmetic, as standardly formulated. True self-reference is possible only if we expand the language to include function-symbols for all primitive recursive functions. This language is therefore the natural setting for investigations of (...)-reference. (shrink)
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  7. Paradox Without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251.
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  8.  59
    Varieties of Self-Reference.Steven James Bartlett - 1987 - In Steven James Bartlett & Peter Suber (eds.), Self-reference: Reflections on Reflexivity. Dordrecht, Holland: Martinus Nijhoff; now published by Springer Science. pp. 5-28.
    This is the introduction to Self-reference: Reflections on Reflexivity, edited by Steven James Bartlett and Peter Suber. The introduction identifies and describes a wide range of varieties of self-reference, some which have become important topics of investigation in philosophy, and others which are of significance in other disciplines. /// The anthology is the first published collection of essays to give a sense of depth and breadth of current work on this fascinating and important set of issues. (...)
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  9. Self-Reference and Logical Memory in Hegel's Theory of the Concept.Elisa Magrì - 2011 - Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos 1 (15):129-143.
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  10.  82
    Formalizing Self-Reference Paradox Using Predicate Logic.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    We begin with the hypothetical assumption that Tarski’s 1933 formula ∀ True(x) φ(x) has been defined such that ∀x Tarski:True(x) ↔ Boolean-True. On the basis of this logical premise we formalize the Truth Teller Paradox: "This sentence is true." showing syntactically how self-reference paradox is semantically ungrounded.
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  11. Self-Reference and the Divorce Between Meaning and Truth.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2013 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (4):445-452.
    This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence's meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.
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  12. Self-Reference Self-Explained.Achille C. Varzi - 2004 - PhiNews 6:36–39.
    A dialogue among statements that try to explain to each other the mechanisms and peculiarities of self-referential assertions and, particularly, of their context-dependence.
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  13. Self-Reference, Reality Principles, Marxism, and Social Transformations in the Postmodern Era.Andras Balazs - 2010 - World Futures 66 (1):53-64.
    Three distinct turning points (“bottleneck breakings”) in universal evolution are discussed at some length in terms of “self-reference” and (corresponding) “Reality Principles.” The first (origin and evolution of animate Nature) and second (human consciousness) are shown to necessarily precede a third one, that of Marxist philosophy. It is pointed out that while the previous two could occupy a natural (so in a sense neutral) place as parts of human science, the self-reference of Marxism, as a _social_ (...)
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  14. Self-Reference and Gödel's Theorem: A Husserlian Analysis. [REVIEW]Albert Johnstone - 2003 - Husserl Studies 19 (2):131-151.
    A Husserlian phenomenological approach to logic treats concepts in terms of their experiential meaning rather than in terms of reference, sets of individuals, and sentences. The present article applies such an approach in turn to the reasoning operative in various paradoxes: the simple Liar, the complex Liar paradoxes, the Grelling-type paradoxes, and Gödel’s Theorem. It finds that in each case a meaningless statement, one generated by circular definition, is treated as if were meaningful, and consequently as either true or (...)
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  15.  63
    Causal Overlap and Self-Reference: A Brief Summary.Vitor Silva Tschoepke - manuscript
    The purpose of this text is to present a summary of the theory of self-reference as a result of the superposition of the causal history of a system. Self-reference is discussed here as an effect of the association between memory and causality. When considering the eventual situation of a physical system, different previous alternatives can take it to the same state. The means that constituted it are not intrinsic to it, there are no elements in it (...)
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  16. Self-Conscious Self-Reference: An Approach Based on Agent's Knowledge (DPhil Manuscript).Anne Newstead - 2004 - Dissertation, Oxford University
    This thesis proposes that an account of first-person reference and first-person thinking requires an account of practical knowledge. At a minimum, first-person reference requires at least a capacity for knowledge of the intentional act of reference. More typically, first-person reasoning requires deliberation and the ability to draw inferences while entertaining different 'I' thoughts. Other accounts of first-person reference--such as the perceptual account and the rule-based account--are criticized as inadequate. An account of practical knowledge is provided by (...)
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  17. Paradigms and Self-Reference: What is the Point of Asserting Paradoxical Sentences?Jakub Mácha - 2020 - In Shyam Wuppuluri & Newton da Costa (eds.), Wittgensteinian (adj.): Looking at the World from the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Cham, Švýcarsko: pp. 123-134.
    A paradox, according to Wittgenstein, is something surprising that is taken out of its context. Thus, one way of dealing with paradoxical sentences is to imagine the missing context of use. Wittgenstein formulates what I call the paradigm paradox: ‘one sentence can never describe the paradigm in another, unless it ceases to be a paradigm.’ (PG, p.346) There are several instances of this paradox scattered throughout Wittgenstein’s writings. I argue that this paradox is structurally equivalent to Russell’s paradox. The above (...)
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  18. Formalizing the Logical (Self-Reference) Error of the Liar Paradox.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    This paper decomposes the Liar Paradox into its semantic atoms using Meaning Postulates (1952) provided by Rudolf Carnap. Formalizing truth values of propositions as Boolean properties of these propositions is a key new insight. This new insight divides the translation of a declarative sentence into its equivalent mathematical proposition into three separate steps. When each of these steps are separately examined the logical error of the Liar Paradox is unequivocally shown.
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  19.  76
    Graph of Socratic Elenchos.John Bova - manuscript
    From my ongoing "Metalogical Plato" project. The aim of the diagram is to make reasonably intuitive how the Socratic elenchos (the logic of refutation applied to candidate formulations of virtues or ruling knowledges) looks and works as a whole structure. This is my starting point in the project, in part because of its great familiarity and arguable claim to being the inauguration of western philosophy; getting this point less wrong would have broad and deep consequences, including for philosophy’s (...)-understanding. -/- (i.) is the first pass at elenchos in which the Socratic interlocutor does not reflect on knowledge being the crux of the problem. (ii.) is the second, rarer, reflective pass in which they are, making the investigation explicitly about knowledge. Its centrality in the Charmides makes that neglected dialogue of superlative importance. This structure is also the gateway through which the discussion/dialectic crosses into the Agathology (discussion of the form of the good) at Republic 505. -/- The problem of elenchos, then, grasped as a whole structure, is that it seems that knowledge can neither satisfactorily be included in nor excluded from its own scope. The development of the ti esti (“what is ---?”) question leads to the introduction of knowledge into its own scope (i. implicitly, as goodness contrasted with blind rule-following ii. explicitly qua knowledge) while the development of the dual peri tinos (“----about what?) question leads to K’s elimination from its own scope. The introductions are motivated to avoid contradiction, but produce regress; the eliminations are motivated to avoid regress, but produce contradiction. In scholarship, and in the history of philosophy, the ti esti question is universally recognized, to the point of being identified with philosophy’s origin and essence; the peri tinos question is neglected textually and never recognized as the equal dual to the ti esti. This, I claim, has blocked the development of a nontrivial logical appreciation of what Plato's Socrates is up to. (One rather disastrous effect of this neglect is taking Aristotle as the beginning of the development of logic, rather than, correctly, for the beginning of logic’s fatal separation from mathematics and dialectic.) -/- Further, because of this monopticism of the ti esti, the function of consistency in the elenchos has not been understood, even with respect to the ti esti. The ti esti is actually in search of completeness, given a norm of consistency; the peri tinos is in search of consistency, given a norm of completeness. Only appreciating the two questions as dual allows space in the structure to clarify these different orientations relative to consistency. (And, dually, to completeness, whose function in the elenchos is generally entirely missed by scholars and relegated to discussions of eros; it's not out of place there, of course, but its significance is secured here.) Recognizing the duality of the ti esti and peri tinos questions is thus the royal road, in the Socratic-Platonic context, to catching sight of what we post-Cantorians can recognize as the metalogical duality of consistency and completeness. (The salutary disruptive effects of this Plato-Cantor proximity have, of course, been traced in complementary ways by Badiou.) -/- Note that the diagram is supposed to provide a relatively accessible orientation, not to stand on its own, and certainly not to be the last word on any subject. An important qualification (telegraphed in the previous paragraph) is that what elenchos shows is not finally circular or paradoxical, though the problem first presents as such (stubbornly, obdurately, as "difficult" Plato's Socrates always says with characteristic understatement). What is depicted here is meant, at a first pass, to be the shape of that first presentation, the form of the problem of elenchos, rather than of its solution. It's not an accident that this problem strongly resembles "Russell's paradox" (not Russell's not a paradox.) Problem is to solution as RP is to the diagonal theorems. (shrink)
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  20. I Who? A New Look at Peirce's Theory of Indexical Self-Reference.Marco Stango - 2015 - The Pluralist 10 (2):220-246.
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  21. Minimal Sartre: Diagonalization and Pure Reflection.John Bova - 2018 - Open Philosophy 1:360-379.
    These remarks take up the reflexive problematics of Being and Nothingness and related texts from a metalogical perspective. A mutually illuminating translation is posited between, on the one hand, Sartre’s theory of pure reflection, the linchpin of the works of Sartre’s early period and the site of their greatest difficulties, and, on the other hand, the quasi-formalism of diagonalization, the engine of the classical theorems of Cantor, Godel, Tarski, Turing, etc. Surprisingly, the dialectic of mathematical logic from its inception (...)
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  22. CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning.Steven James Bartlett - 2020 - Salem, USA: Studies in Theory and Behavior.
    The _Critique of Impure Reason: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning_ comprises a major and important contribution to philosophy. Thanks to the generosity of its publisher, this massive 885-page volume has been published as a free open access eBook (3.2MB). It inaugurates a revolutionary paradigm shift in philosophical thought by providing compelling and long-sought-for solutions to a wide range of philosophical problems. In the process, the work fundamentally transforms the way in which the concepts of reference, meaning, and possibility are (...)
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  23. Self, Belonging, and Conscious Experience: A Critique of Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Timothy Lane - 2015 - In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 103-140.
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several (...)
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  24. Self-Made People.David Mark Kovacs - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1071-1099.
    The Problem of Overlappers is a puzzle about what makes it the case, and how we can know, that we have the parts we intuitively think we have. In this paper, I develop and motivate an overlooked solution to this puzzle. According to what I call the self-making view it is within our power to decide what we refer to with the personal pronoun ‘I’, so the truth of most of our beliefs about our parts is ensured by the (...)
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  25. The Self and its Brain.Stan Klein - 2012 - Social Cognition 30 (4):474-518.
    In this paper I argue that much of the confusion and mystery surrounding the concept of "self" can be traced to a failure to appreciate the distinction between the self as a collection of diverse neural components that provide us with our beliefs, memories, desires, personality, emotions, etc (the epistemological self) and the self that is best conceived as subjective, unified awareness, a point of view in the first person (ontological self). While the former can, (...)
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  26. A Relativistic Theory of Phenomenological Constitution: A Self-Referential, Transcendental Approach to Conceptual Pathology.Steven James Bartlett - 1970 - Dissertation, Universite de Paris X (Paris-Nanterre) (France)
    A RELATIVISTIC THEORY OF PHENOMENOLOCICAL CONSTITUTION: A SELF-REFERENTIAL, TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACH TO CONCEPTUAL PATHOLOGY. (Vol. I: French; Vol. II: English) -/- Steven James Bartlett -/- Doctoral dissertation director: Paul Ricoeur, Université de Paris Other doctoral committee members: Jean Ladrière and Alphonse de Waehlens, Université Catholique de Louvain Defended publically at the Université Catholique de Louvain, January, 1971. -/- Universite de Paris X (France), 1971. 797pp. -/- The principal objective of the work is to construct an analytically precise methodology which can (...)
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  27. Qualitative Assessment of Self-Identity in Advanced Dementia.Sadhvi Batra, Jacqueline Sullivan, Beverly R. Williams & David S. Geldmacher - 2015 - Dementia: The International Journal of Social Research and Practice:1-19.
    This study aimed to understand the preserved elements of self-identity in persons with moderate to severe dementia attributable to Alzheimer’s disease. A semi-structured interview was developed to explore the narrative self among residents with dementia in a residential care facility and residents without dementia in an independent living setting. The interviews were transcribed verbatim from audio recordings and analyzed for common themes, while being sensitive to possible differences between the groups. The participants with dementia showed evidence of (...)-reference even though losses in explicit memory were evident. The most noticeable difference between the two groups was time frame reference. Nonetheless, all participants showed understanding of their role in relationships and exhibited concrete preferences. Our findings suggest that memory loss and other cognitive deficits associated with moderate to severe dementia do not necessarily lead to a loss of “self.”. (shrink)
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  28. The Synonymy Antinomy.Roger Wertheimer - 2000 - In A. Kanamori (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Document Center. pp. 67-88.
    Resolution of Frege's Puzzle by denying that synonym substitution in logical truths preserves sentence sense and explaining how logical form has semantic import. Intensional context substitutions needn't preserve truth, because intercepting doesn't preserve sentence meaning. Intercepting is nonuniformly substituting a pivotal term in syntactically secured truth. Logical sentences and their synonym interceptions share factual content. Semantic content is factual content in synthetic predications, but not logical sentences and interceptions. Putnam's Postulate entails interception nonsynonymy. Syntax and vocabulary explain only the factual (...)
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  29. "The Paradox of Self-Consciousness" by José Luis Burmùdez. [REVIEW]Tim Crane - 2001 - Philosophical Review 1 (4):624.
    What José Luis Bermúdez calls the paradox of self-consciousness is essentially the conflict between two claims: (1) The capacity to use first-personal referential devices like “I” must be explained in terms of the capacity to think first-person thoughts. (2) The only way to explain the capacity for having a certain kind of thought is by explaining the capacity for the canonical linguistic expression of thoughts of that kind. (Bermúdez calls this the “Thought-Language Principle”.) The conflict between (1) and (2) (...)
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  30. The Self-Referential Aspect of Consciousness.Cosmin Visan - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 8 (11):864-880.
    Following the phenomenology that is revealed by the emergent structure of consciousness, the path will lead to the acknowledgement of consciousness having a self-referential aspect. By following phenomenological clues, properties of self-reference will be revealed. The two most prominent properties of self-reference will be shown to be inclusion and transcendence that will be shown to be found everywhere in the phenomenology of consciousness. Also, self-reference will turn out to be unformalizable, this imposing limits (...)
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  31. Handedness, Self-Models and Embodied Cognitive Content.Holger Lyre - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):529–538.
    The paper presents and discusses the “which-is-which content of handedness,” the meaning of left as left and right as right, as a possible candidate for the idea of a genuine embodied cognitive content. After showing that the Ozma barrier, the non-transferability of the meaning of left and right, provides a kind of proof of the non-descriptive, indexical nature of the which-is-which content of handedness, arguments are presented which suggest that the classical representationalist account of cognition faces a perplexing problem of (...)
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  32. Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. [REVIEW]Anne Newstead - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):5.
    This is a very short book review of a recent volume on the philosophy of Gareth Evans with special attention to work on first-person reference.
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  33. Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self Location.Frederic Peters - 2010 - Psychological Research.
    At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particualr way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations (...)
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  34. Wholistic Reference, Truth-Values, Universes of Discourse, and Formal Ontology: Tréplica to Oswaldo Chateaubriand.John Corcoran - 2005 - Manuscrito 28 (1):143-167.
    ABSTRACT: In its strongest unqualified form, the principle of wholistic reference is that in any given discourse, each proposition refers to the whole universe of that discourse, regardless of how limited the referents of its non-logical or content terms. According to this principle every proposition of number theory, even an equation such as "5 + 7 = 12", refers not only to the individual numbers that it happens to mention but to the whole universe of numbers. This principle, its (...)
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  35. Kant and the Problem of Self-Identification.Luca Forgione - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (2):178-198.
    Ever since Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception device has become a theoretical reference point to shed light on the criterionless selfascription form of mental states, reformulating a contemporary theoretical place tackled for the first time in explicit terms by Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. By investigating thoroughly some elements of the critical system the issue of the identification of the transcendental subject with reference to the I think will be singled out. In this respect, the debate presents (...)
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  36. Hoisted by Their Own Petards: Philosophical Positions That Self-Destruct.Steven James Bartlett - 1988 - Argumentation 2 (2):221-232.
    Philosophers have not resisted temptation to transgress against the logic of their own conceptual structures. Self-undermining position-taking is an occupational hazard. Philosophy stands in need of conceptual therapy. The author describes three conceptions of philosophy: the narcissistic, disputatious, and therapeutic. (i) Narcissistic philosophy is hermetic, believing itself to contain all evidence that can possibly be relevant to it. Philosophy undertaken in this spirit has led to defensive, monadically isolated positions. (ii) Disputatious philosophies are fundamentally question-begging, animated by assumptions that (...)
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  37. The Trajectory of Self.Timothy Lane, Niall W. Duncan, Tony Cheng & Georg Northoff - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (7):481-482.
    In a recent Opinion article, Sui and Humphreys [1] argue that experimental findings suggest self is ‘special’, in that self-reference serves a binding function within human cognitive economy. Contrasting their view with other functionalist positions, chiefly Dennett's [2], they deny that self is a convenient fiction and adduce findings to show that a ‘core self representation’ serves as an ‘integrative glue’ helping to bind distinct types of information as well as distinct stages of psycho- logical (...)
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  38. Sacrifice and Repentance as Self-Restraint. Hans Jonas’ Ethics for a Technological Epoch.Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo - 2011 - Toronto Journal of Jewish Thought 3.
    The present article tries to analyze the role played in Hans Jonas’ ethical reflection by religious—namely, Jewish—tradition. Jonas goes in search of an ultimate foundation for his ethics and his theory of the good in order to face the challenges currently posed by technology’s nihilistic attitude towards life and ethics. Jonas’ ethical investigation enters into the domain of metaphysics, which offers an incomparable contribution to the philosophical endeavour, without undermining its overall independence. In this way, Jewish categories—such as remorse, shame, (...)
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  39. Othered Body, Obscene Self(Ie): A Sartrean Reading of Kim Kardashian-West.Elese Dowden - 2017 - Hecate 43 (2):117-130.
    In this existential reading of Kim Kardashian-West's International Women's Day selfie of 2016, I focus on the rise of selfie culture and public discourse around emerging digital representations of women's bodies. The selfie is a relatively new phenomenon, and is particularly curious because of the subject/object paradox it creates; in taking a selfie, a person asserts control over their own image, but at the same time, becomes object in their own gaze. My argument is that selfies, like other assertions of (...)
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  40. Kant and the Problem of Self-Knowledge.Luca Forgione - 2018 - New York, Stati Uniti: Routledge.
    This book addresses the problem of self-knowledge in Kant’s philosophy. As Kant writes in his major works of the critical period, it is due to the simple and empty representation ‘I think’ that the subject’s capacity for self-consciousness enables the subject to represent its own mental dimension. This book articulates Kant’s theory of self-knowledge on the basis of the following three philosophical problems: 1) a semantic problem regarding the type of reference of the representation ‘I’; 2) (...)
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  41. The Collision of Language and Metaphysics in the Search for Self-Identity: On Ahaṃkāra and Asmitā in Sāṃkhya-Yoga.Marzenna Jakubczak - 2011 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 1 (1):37-48.
    The author of this paper discusses some major points vital for two classical Indian schools of philosophy: (1) a significant feature of linguistic analysis in the Yoga tradition; (2) the role of the religious practice (iśvara-pranidhana) in the search for true self-identity in Samkhya and Yoga darśanas with special reference to their gnoseological purposes; and (3) some possible readings of ‘ahamkara’ and ‘asmita’ displayed in the context of Samkhya-Yoga phenomenology and metaphysics. The collision of language and metaphysics refers (...)
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  42.  71
    Self-Measure and Self-Moderation in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.Michael Baur - 2001 - In Daniel Breazeale & Tom Rockmore (eds.), New Studies in Fichte’s Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre. Amherst, NY, USA: pp. 81-102.
    In the opening chapter of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke explains that the self-understanding or self-measure of the human mind includes an account of the mind’s limits, and so the mind’s self-understanding can provide adequate grounds for intellectual self-moderation or self-control: “If we can find out, how far the Understanding can extend its view; how far it has Faculties to attain Certainty; and in what Cases it can only judge and guess, we may (...)
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  43. The Self and Its World: Husserlian Contributions to a Metaphysics of Einstein’s Theory of Relativity and Heisenberg’s Indeterminacy Principle in Quantum Physics.Maria Eliza Cruz - manuscript
    This paper centers on the implicit metaphysics beyond the Theory of Relativity and the Principle of Indeterminacy – two revolutionary theories that have changed 20th Century Physics – using the perspective of Husserlian Transcedental Phenomenology. Albert Einstein (1879-1955) and Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976) abolished the theoretical framework of Classical (Galilean- Newtonian) physics that has been complemented, strengthened by Cartesian metaphysics. Rene Descartes (1596- 1850) introduced a separation between subject and object (as two different and self- enclosed substances) while Galileo and (...)
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  44. Irrationality in Philosophy and Psychology: The Moral Implications of Self-Defeating Behavior.Christine James - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (2):224-234.
    The philosophical study of irrationality can yield interesting insights into the human mind. One provocative issue is self-defeating behaviours, i.e. behaviours that result in failure to achieve one’s apparent goals and ambitions. In this paper I consider a self-defeating behaviour called choking under pressure, explain why it should be considered irrational, and how it is best understood with reference to skills. Then I describe how choking can be explained without appeal to a purely Freudian subconscious or ‘sub-agents’ (...)
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  45. Kant, the Transcendental Designation of I, and the Direct Reference Theory.Luca Forgione - 2019 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 34 (1): 31-49.
    The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity (...)
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  46. The Structure of I-Thoughts. Kant and Wittgenstein on the Genesis of Cartesian Self.Luca Forgione - 2019 - Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica 3:535-548.
    The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphysical questions. The aim of this paper is to highlight that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the “I" doesn’t perform a referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. Particularly, as far as the Cartesian illusion concerning the thinking subject’s immaterial nature is concerned, Kant and Wittgenstein seem to share the (...)
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  47. The Problem of the Self.Cosmin Visan - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 5 (11):1145-1151.
    Consciousness presents us with many aspects. In trying to explain consciousness, one may be tempted to address only the problem of qualia, as for example explaining color red. But can this attempt be done on its own without somehow taking into account also the subject of experience? In this paper, we will concentrate in addressing the problem of the Self without any reference to any particular quale. The best place where the Self can be analyzed is at (...)
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  48.  92
    Critical Review of John Campbell: Reference and Consciousness. [REVIEW]Ingar Brinck - 2005 - Theoria 3:266-276.
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  49. Quong on Proportionality in Self-Defense and the “Stringency Principle”.Steinhoff Uwe - manuscript
    Jonathan Quong proposes the following “Stringency Principle” for proportionality in self-defense: “If a wrongful attacker threatens to violate a right with stringency level X, then the level of defensive force it is proportionate to impose on the attacker is equivalent to X.” I adduce a counter-example that shows that this principle is wrong. Furthermore, Quong assumes that what determines the stringency of a person’s right is exclusively the amount of force that one would have to avert from someone else (...)
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  50. Consciousness And Self-Identity: A Phenomenological View on a Cognitive Issue.Nicola Zippel - 2011 - Philosophy Today 55 (Supplement):143-150.
    The paper aims at analyzing the inner development of self-identity from its pre-reflective level to the full awareness one. The recent findings of neurosciences and cognitive studies suggest focusing attention on the complex relation between self as consciousness and self as subjectivity, both with regard to their interdependency and to their reference to a shared context. Phenomenology, thanks to the careful consideration of the issues regarding the constitution of mental life articulated by its classic researches and (...)
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