Results for 'Jonathan Beale'

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Jonathan Beale
University of Reading (PhD)
  1.  91
    Wittgenstein's Anti-Scientistic Worldview.Jonathan Beale - 2017 - In Jonathan Beale & Ian James Kidd (eds.), Wittgenstein and Scientism. London: Routledge. pp. 59-80.
    This chapter outlines ways in which Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientism is manifest in his later conception of philosophy and the negative attitude he held toward his times. The chapter tries to make clear how these two areas of Wittgenstein’s thought are connected and reflect an anti-scientistic worldview he held, one intimated in the above passage. -/- It is argued that the later Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy is marked out against two scientistic claims in particular. First, the view that the scientific method is (...)
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  2.  18
    A Confusion of Categories: Wittgenstein's Kierkegaardian Argument Against Heidegger.Jonathan Beale - 2010 - Philosophical Writings (Special Issue):15-26.
    A mysterious remark to Friedrich Waismann on 30 December 1929 marks the only occasion where Wittgenstein refers to both Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Yet although this has generated much controversy, little attention has been paid to the charge of nonsense that Wittgenstein here appears to bring against Heidegger; thus, the supporting argument that may be latent has not been unearthed. Through analysis of this remark, Wittgenstein's arguments in the Tractatus and 'A Lecture on Ethics', and Heidegger's account of anxiety (Angst) in (...)
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  3. Objectivism and Perspectivism About the Epistemic Ought.McHugh Conor & Way Jonathan - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    What ought you believe? According to a traditional view, it depends on your evidence: you ought to believe (only) what your evidence supports. Recently, however, some have claimed that what you ought to believe depends not on your evidence but simply on what is true: you ought to believe (only) the truth. In this paper, we present and defend two arguments against this latter view. We also explore some of the parallels between this debate in epistemology, and the debate in (...)
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  4.  13
    Ontology Based Annotation of Contextualized Vital Signs.Goldfain Albert, Xu Min, Bona Jonathan & Barry Smith - 2013 - In Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Biomedical Ontology (ICBO). Montreal: pp. 28-33.
    Representing the kinetic state of a patient (posture, motion, and activity) during vital sign measurement is an important part of continuous monitoring applications, especially remote monitoring applications. In contextualized vital sign representation, the measurement result is presented in conjunction with salient measurement context metadata. We present an automated annotation system for vital sign measurements that uses ontologies from the Open Biomedical Ontology Foundry (OBO Foundry) to represent the patient’s kinetic state at the time of measurement. The annotation system is applied (...)
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  5.  70
    Science and Consciousness Just Wed: Should This Union Be Annulled?Bricklin Jonathan - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):250-253.
    If science relates only to the objectifiable, how can it relate to consciousness? I.
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  6.  15
    Acquiring Universal Values Through a Particular Tradition: A Perspective on Judaism and Modern Pluralism.Jacobs Jonathan - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2):1--22.
    Religious traditions can be sources of values and attitudes supporting the liberal polity in ways that political theorizing and conceptions of public reason often fail to recognize. moreover, religious traditions can give support through the ways reason is crucial to their self-understanding. one understanding of Judaism is examined as an example. Also, the particularism of traditions can encourage commitment to universally valid values and ideals. reason’s role in Judaism and other religious traditions makes possible constructive interaction between those traditions and (...)
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  7. Review of I and Tao: Martin Buber's Encounter with Chuang Tzu by Jonathan R. Herman. [REVIEW]Robert Allinson - 1998 - Philosophy East and West 48 (3):529-534.
    This review confirms Herman’s work as a praiseworthy contribution to East-West and comparative philosophical literature. Due credit is given to Herman for providing English readers with access to Buber’s commentary on, a personal translation of, the Chuang-Tzu; Herman’s insight into the later influence of I and Thou on Buber’s understanding of Chuang-Tzu and Taoism is also appropriately commended. In latter half of this review, constructive criticisms of Herman’s work are put forward, such as formatting inconsistencies, a tendency toward verbosity and (...)
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  8.  30
    Jonathan Edwards's Monism.Antonia LoLordo - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.
    The 18th-century American philosopher Jonathan Edwards argues that nothing endures through time. I analyze his argument, paying particular attention to a central principle it relies on, namely that “nothing can exert itself, or operate, when and where it is not existing”. I also consider what I supposed to follow from the conclusion that nothing endures. Edwards is sometimes read as the first four-dimensionalist. I argue that this is wrong. Edwards does not conclude that things persist by having different temporal (...)
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  9. Proof, Knowledge, and Scepticism: Essays in Ancient Philosophy III By Jonathan Barnes Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. 720, £85, HB ISBN: 9780199577538. [REVIEW]Tamer Nawar - 2015 - Philosophy 90 (3):539-544.
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  10.  76
    Composition Models of the Incarnation: Unity and Unifying Relations: Anna Marmodoro & Jonathan Hill.Anna Marmodoro - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (4):469-488.
    In this paper we investigate composition models of incarnation, according to which Christ is a compound of qualitatively and numerically different constituents. We focus on three-part models, according to which Christ is composed of a divine mind, a human mind, and a human body. We consider four possible relational structures that the three components could form. We argue that a ‘hierarchy of natures’ model, in which the human mind and body are united to each other in the normal way, and (...)
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  11. Lectures on the History of Moral and Political Philosophy G.A. Cohen; Edited by Jonathan Wolff Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014; V + 360 Pp. $35.00. [REVIEW]Kyle Johannsen - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (3):575-7.
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  12. Jonathan Hodge and Gregory Radick, Eds. The Cambridge Companion to Darwin. 2nd Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. Xiii+548. $35.99. [REVIEW]Kathryn Tabb - 2011 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (2):355-359.
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  13. Review: Jonathan A. Waskan: Models and Cognition. [REVIEW]Mark Jago - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):220-225.
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  14.  96
    Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta, by Jonathan Beere. [REVIEW]A. Marmodoro - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):1138-1141.
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  15.  56
    The Cruelty of Reason’. Review of Kenneth Craven, Jonathan Swift and the Millennium of Madness: The Information Age in Swift's A Tale of a Tub. [REVIEW]John Sutton - 1994 - Metascience 6:183-185.
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  16.  43
    Review: Beyond an Absence of Faith Edited by Jonathan M.S.Pearce and Tristan Vick. [REVIEW]Elly Vintiadis - 2014 - Science, Religion andCulture 1 (2):122-125.
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  17.  27
    Review: Jonathan L. Kvanvig . Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Volume Six. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 320 Pages; $90.00/Hardcover. [REVIEW]Yin Zhang - 2016 - Philosophical Forum 47 (1):91-95.
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  18.  12
    Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill , The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, Oxford University Press, 2011.David Efird - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2):185-189.
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  19.  12
    The Three Languages of Mentoring: Saul, Jonathan, and David--Which Will I Be?Don Michael Hudson - 1996 - Mars Hill Review:23-31.
    Our generation is turning to mentoring as an instrument of God to repair the ruin of our personal losses.
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  20. Public Reason Can Be Reasonably Rejected.Franz Mang - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (2):343-367.
    Public reason as a political ideal aims to reconcile reasonable disagreement; however, is public reason itself the object of reasonable disagreement? Jonathan Quong, David Estlund, Andrew Lister, and some other philosophers maintain that public reason is beyond reasonable disagreement. I argue this view is untenable. In addition, I consider briefly whether or not two main versions of the public reason principle, namely, the consensus version and the convergence version, need to satisfy their own requirements. My discussion has several important (...)
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  21. Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy's Attack on Propositionalism.Attila Tanyi & Morganti Matteo - 2017 - Theoria 83 (3):185-205.
    The topic of this article is the ontology of practical reasons. We draw a critical comparison between two views. According to the first, practical reasons are states of affairs; according to the second, they are propositions. We first isolate and spell out in detail certain objections to the second view that can be found only in embryonic form in the literature – in particular, in the work of Jonathan Dancy. Next, we sketch possible ways in which one might respond (...)
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  22. The Asymmetry Objection to Political Liberalism: Evaluation of a Defence.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This paper evaluates Jonathan Quong’s attempt to defend a version of political liberalism from the asymmetry objection. I object that Quong’s defence relies on a premise that has not been adequately supported and does not look as if it can be given adequate support.
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  23.  7
    Reasons and Beliefs.Attila Tanyi & Matteo Morganti - manuscript
    The present paper identifies a challenge for a certain view of practical reasons, according to which practical reasons (both normative and motivating) are worldly facts. In particular, the challenge has been taken to affect the particular ontological conception of practical reasons that has been defended by Jonathan Dancy. The problem is that Dancy seems forced to maintain both a) that the contents of beliefs are facts and b) that the view according to which the contents of beliefs are facts (...)
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  24. Justifying Defense Against Non-Responsible Threats and Justified Aggressors: The Liability Vs. The Rights-Infringement Account.Uwe Steinhoff - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (1):247-265.
    Even among those who find lethal defense against non-responsible threats, innocent aggressors, or justified aggressors justified even in one to one cases, there is a debate as to what the best explanation of this permissibility is. The contenders in this debate are the liability account, which holds that the non-responsible or justified human targets of the defensive measures are liable to attack, and the justified infringement account, which claims that the targets retain their right not to be attacked but may (...)
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  25. Berkeley's Stoic Notion of Spiritual Substance.Stephen H. Daniel - 2008 - In New Interpretations of Berkeley's Thought. Humanity Books.
    For Berkeley, minds are not Cartesian spiritual substances because they cannot be said to exist (even if only conceptually) abstracted from their activities. Similarly, Berkeley's notion of mind differs from Locke's in that, for Berkeley, minds are not abstract substrata in which ideas inhere. Instead, Berkeley redefines what it means for the mind to be a substance in a way consistent with the Stoic logic of 17th century Ramists on which Leibniz and Jonathan Edwards draw. This view of mind, (...)
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  26. Will Retributivism Die and Will Neuroscience Kill It?Iskra Fileva & Jon Tresan - 2015 - Cognitive Systems Research 34:54-70.
    In a widely read essay, “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,” Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen argue that the advance of neuroscience will result in the widespread rejection of free will, and with it – of retributivism. They go on to propose that consequentialist reforms are in order, and they predict such reforms will take place. We agree that retributivism should be rejected, and we too are optimistic that rejected it will be. But we don’t think that (...)
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  27.  82
    Quong on Proportionality in Self-Defense and the “Stringency Principle”.Steinhoff Uwe - manuscript
    Jonathan Quong proposes the following “Stringency Principle” for proportionality in self-defense: “If a wrongful attacker threatens to violate a right with stringency level X, then the level of defensive force it is proportionate to impose on the attacker is equivalent to X.” I adduce a counter-example that shows that this principle is wrong. Furthermore, Quong assumes that what determines the stringency of a person’s right is exclusively the amount of force that one would have to avert from someone else (...)
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  28.  84
    Liberal Perfectionism and Quong’s Internal Conception of Political Liberalism.Paul Billingham - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (1):79-106.
    Debates between political liberals and liberal perfectionists have been reinvigorated by Jonathan Quong’s Liberalism Without Perfection. In this paper I argue that certain forms of perfectionism can rebut or evade Quong’s three central objections – that perfectionism is manipulative, paternalistic, and illegitimate. I then argue that perfectionists can defend an ‘internal conception’ of perfectionism, parallel in structure to Quong’s ’internal conception’ of political liberalism, but with a different conception of the justificatory constituency. None of Quong’s arguments show that his (...)
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  29. Quong on Agent-Relative Prerogatives to Do Harm: A Very Brief Refutation.Uwe Steinhoff - manuscript
    In a recent paper, Jonathan Quong tries to offer further support for “the proposition that there are sometimes agent-relative prerogatives to harm nonliable persons.” In this brief paper, I will demonstrate that Quong’s argument implicitly relies on the premise that the violinist in Thomson’s famous example has a right not to be unplugged. Yet, first, Quong provides no argument in support of this premise; and second, the premise is clearly wrong. Moreover, throughout his paper Quong just question-beggingly and without (...)
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  30. Firth and Quong on Liability to Defensive Harm: A Critique.Uwe Steinhoff - manuscript
    Joanna Mary Firth and Jonathan Quong argue that both an instrumental account of liability to defensive harm, according to which an aggressor can only be liable to defensive harms that are necessary to avert the threat he poses, and a purely noninstrumental account which completely jettisons the necessity condition, lead to very counterintuitive implications. To remedy this situation, they offer a “pluralist” account and base it on a distinction between “agency rights” and a “humanitarian right.” I argue, first, that (...)
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  31. Berkeley's Pantheistic Discourse.Stephen H. Daniel - 2001 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 49 (3):179-194.
    Berkeley's immaterialism has more in common with views developed by Henry More, the mathematician Joseph Raphson, John Toland, and Jonathan Edwards than those of thinkers with whom he is commonly associated (e.g., Malebranche and Locke). The key for recognizing their similarities lies in appreciating how they understand St. Paul's remark that in God "we live and move and have our being" as an invitation to think to God as the space of discourse in which minds and ideas are identified. (...)
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  32. Strict Conditionals: A Negative Result.Jan Heylen & Leon Horsten - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):536–549.
    Jonathan Lowe has argued that a particular variation on C.I. Lewis' notion of strict implication avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. We show that Lowe's notion of implication does not achieve this aim, and offer a general argument to demonstrate that no other variation on Lewis' notion of constantly strict implication describes the logical behaviour of natural-language conditionals in a satisfactory way.
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  33. Edwards' Occasionalism.Stephen H. Daniel - 2010 - In Don Schweitzer (ed.), Jonathan Edwards as Contemporary. Peter Lang. pp. 1-14.
    Instead of focusing on the Malebranche-Edwards connection regarding occasionalism as if minds are distinct from the ideas they have, I focus on how finite minds are particular expressions of God's will that there be the distinctions by which ideas are identified and differentiated. This avoids problems, created in the accounts of Fiering, Lee, and especially Crisp, about the inherently idealist character of Edwards' occasionalism.
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  34. Review: A Matter of Principle. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):568 - 580.
    This article is a joint critical notice of Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge's book Principled Ethics and Jonathan Dancy's book Ethics Without Principles.
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  35.  83
    William James on Emotion and Morals.Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Jacob Goodson (ed.), Cries of the Wounded: William James, Moral Philosophy, and the Moral Life. Rowman & Littlefield.
    The Emotions chapter (XXV) in James' Principles of Psychology traverses the entire range of experienced emotions from the “coarser” and more instinctual to the “subtler” emotions intimately involved in cognitive, moral, and aesthetic aspects of life. But Principles limits himself to an account of emotional consciousness and so there are few direct discussions in the text of Principles about what later came to be called moral psychology, and fewer about anything resembling philosophical ethics. Still, James’ short section on the subtler (...)
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  36. Pure Cognitivism and Beyond.Attila Tanyi - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):331-348.
    The article begins with Jonathan Dancy’s attempt to refute the Humean Theory of Motivation. It first spells out Dancy’s argument for his alternative position, the view he labels ‘Pure Cognitivism’, according to which what motivate are always beliefs, never desires. The article next argues that Dancy’s argument for his position is flawed. On the one hand, it is not true that desire always comes with motivation in the agent; on the other, even if this was the case, it would (...)
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  37.  31
    Assertion: Just One Way to Take It Back.Mona Simion - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):385-391.
    According to Jonathan Kvanvig, the practice of taking back one’s assertion when finding out that one has been mistaken or gettiered fails to speak in favour of a knowledge norm of assertion. To support this claim, he introduces a distinction between taking back the content of the assertion, and taking back the speech act itself. This paper argues that Kvanvig’s distinction does not successfully face close speech-act-theoretic scrutiny. Furthermore, I offer an alternative diagnosis of the target cases sourced in (...)
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  38. Edwards as Philosopher.Stephen H. Daniel - 2007 - In Stephen J. Stein (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards. Cambridge University Press. pp. 162-80.
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  39. A Niggle at Nagel: Causally Active Desires and the Explanation of Action.Charles Pigden - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 220--40.
    This paper criticizes an influential argument from Thomas Nagel’s THE POSSIBILTIY OF ALTRUISM, an argument that plays a foundational role in the philosophies of (at least) Philippa Foot, John McDowell and Jonathan Dancy. Nagel purports to prove that a person can be can be motivated to perform X by the belief that X is likely to bring about Y, without a causally active or biffy desire for Y. If Cullity and Gaut are to be believed (ETHICS AND PRACTICAL REASONING) (...)
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  40.  38
    On Maxwell Suffis’s “From the Ground Up: Explaining Category Differences in Ontological Pluralism”.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2014 - Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (2):17-24.
    Maxwell Suffis discusses what he calls the problem of fundamental difference: Why do things belong to different ontological categories? Suffis focuses on two attempts to answer the question: 1. Jonathan Schaffer's Neo-Aristotelian conception of grounding (according to which things belong to different ontological categories because they are grounded by different levels of things), and 2. Kris McDaniel's ontological pluralism, "the doctrine that there are ways of being" (according to which things belong to different ontological categories because things having one (...)
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  41. Controlling Attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
    I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.
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  42. Priority Monism and Essentiality of Fundamentality: A Reply to Steinberg.Matteo Benocci - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1983-1990.
    Steinberg has recently proposed an argument against Schaffer’s priority monism. The argument assumes the principle of Necessity of Monism, which states that if priority monism is true, then it is necessarily true. In this paper, I argue that Steinberg’s objection can be eluded by giving up Necessity of Monism for an alternative principle, that I call Essentiality of Fundamentality, and that such a principle is to be preferred to Necessity of Monism on other grounds as well.
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  43. Priority Monism and Part/Whole Dependence.Alex Steinberg - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2025-2031.
    Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the only independent concrete object. The paper argues that, pace its proponents, Priority monism is in conflict with the dependence of any whole on any of its parts: if the cosmos does not depend on its parts, neither does any smaller composite.
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  44. Belief, Acceptance, and What Happens in Groups.Margaret Gilbert & Daniel Pilchman - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    This paper argues for a methodological point that bears on a relatively long-standing debate concerning collective beliefs in the sense elaborated by Margaret Gilbert: are they cases of belief or rather of acceptance? It is argued that epistemological accounts and distinctions developed in individual epistemology on the basis of considering the individual case are not necessarily applicable to the collective case or, more generally, uncritically to be adopted in collective epistemology.
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  45. Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, and the Possibility of Vindication.Attila Tanyi - 2009 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):87-107.
    The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA), the other is Derek (...)
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  46.  58
    Commonsense, Skeptical Theism, and Different Sorts of Closure of Inquiry Defeat.Jonathan Rutledge - 2017 - Faith and Philosophy 34 (1):17-32.
    Trent Dougherty argues (contra Jonathan Matheson) that when taking into consideration the probabilities involving skeptical theism (ST) and gratuitous evils, an agent may reasonably affirm both ST and that gratuitous evils exist. In other words, Dougherty thinks that assigning a greater than .5 probability to ST is insufficient to defeat the commonsense problem of evil. I argue that Dougherty’s response assumes, incorrectly, that ST functions solely as an evidential defeater, and that, when understood as a closure of inquiry defeater, (...)
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  47.  76
    A Critical Examination of BonJour’s, Haack’s, and Dancy’s Theory of Empirical Justification.Dionysis Christias - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (1): 7-34.
    In this paper, we shall describe and critically evaluate four contemporary theories which attempt to solve the problem of the infinite regress of reasons: BonJour's ‘impure’ coherentism, BonJour's foundationalism, Haack's ‘foundherentism’ and Dancy's pure coherentism. These theories are initially put forward as theories about the justification of our empirical beliefs; however, in fact they also attempt to provide a successful response to the question of their own ‘metajustification.’ Yet, it will be argued that 1) none of the examined theories is (...)
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  48. 'Privacy, Private Property and Collective Property'.Annabelle Lever - 2012 - The Good Society 21 (1):47-60.
    This article is part of a symposium on property-owning democracy. In A Theory of Justice John Rawls argued that people in a just society would have rights to some forms of personal property, whatever the best way to organise the economy. Without being explicit about it, he also seems to have believed that protection for at least some forms of privacy are included in the Basic Liberties, to which all are entitled. Thus, Rawls assumes that people are entitled to form (...)
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  49. Illuminating the Radical Democratic Enlightenment. [REVIEW]Ericka Tucker - 2012 - Studies in Social and Political Thought 20:138-141.
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  50. Defending Particularism From Supervenience/Resultance Attack.Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (4):387-402.
    I take the debate between the particularists and the principlists to be centered on the issue of whether there are true moral principles. One argument the principlists often appeal to in support of their claim that there are true moral principles is the argument from supervenience. Roughly, the argument is made up of the following three statements: (P1) If the thesis of moral supervenience holds, then there are true moral principles. (P2) The thesis of moral supervenience holds. (C) There are (...)
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