Results for 'scientific theories'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Coherence of Our Best Scientific Theories.Seungbae Park - 2011 - Foundations of Science 16 (1):21-30.
    Putnam (1975) infers from the success of a scientific theory to its approximate truth and the reference of its key term. Laudan (1981) objects that some past theories were successful, and yet their key terms did not refer, so they were not even approximately true. Kitcher (1993) replies that the past theories are approximately true because their working posits are true, although their idle posits are false. In contrast, I argue that successful theories which cohere with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  2. Accepting Our Best Scientific Theories.Seungbae Park - 2015 - Filosofija. Sociologija 26 (3):218-227.
    Dawes (2013) claims that we ought not to believe but to accept our best scientific theories. To accept them means to employ them as premises in our reasoning with the goal of attaining knowledge about unobservables. I reply that if we do not believe our best scientific theories, we cannot gain knowledge about unobservables, our opponents might dismiss the predictions derived from them, and we cannot use them to explain phenomena. We commit an unethical speech act (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  3. A Selective Survey of Theories of Scientific Method.Howard Sankey & Robert Nola - 2000 - In Robert Nola & Howard Sankey (eds.), After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 1-65.
    This is a survey of theories of scientific method which opens the book "After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method".
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  4. Scientific Theories as Intervening Representations.Thomas Mormann & Andoni Ibarra - 2006 - Theoria 21 (1):21-38.
    In this paper some classical representational ideas of Hertz and Duhem are used to show how the dichotomy between representation and intervention can be overcome. More precisely, scientific theories are reconstructed as complex networks of intervening representations (or representational interventions). The formal apparatus developed is applied to elucidate various theoretical and practical aspects of the in vivo/in vitro problem of biochemistry. Moreover, adjoint situations (Galois connections) are used to explain the relation berween empirical facts and theoretical laws in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  5. Kuznetsov V. From studying theoretical physics to philosophical modeling scientific theories: Under influence of Pavel Kopnin and his school.Volodymyr Kuznetsov - 2017 - ФІЛОСОФСЬКІ ДІАЛОГИ’2016 ІСТОРІЯ ТА СУЧАСНІСТЬ У НАУКОВИХ РОЗМИСЛАХ ІНСТИТУТУ ФІЛОСОФІЇ 11:62-92.
    The paper explicates the stages of the author’s philosophical evolution in the light of Kopnin’s ideas and heritage. Starting from Kopnin’s understanding of dialectical materialism, the author has stated that category transformations of physics has opened from conceptualization of immutability to mutability and then to interaction, evolvement and emergence. He has connected the problem of physical cognition universals with an elaboration of the specific system of tools and methods of identifying, individuating and distinguishing objects from a scientific theory domain. (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  46
    On the Aim of Scientific Theories in Relating to the World: A Defence of the Semantic Account.Michael Baur - 1990 - Dialogue 29 (3):323-.
    According to the received view of scientific theories, a scientific theory is an axiomatic-deductive linguistic structure which must include some set of guidelines (“correspondence rules”) for interpreting its theoretical terms with reference to the world of observable phenomena. According to the semantic view, a scientific theory need not be formulated as an axiomatic-deductive structure with correspondence rules, but need only specify models which are said to be “isomorphic” with actual phenomenal systems. In this paper, I consider (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. On Treating Past and Present Scientific Theories Differently.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):63-76.
    Scientific realists argue that present theories are more successful than past theories, so present theories will not be superseded by alternatives, even though past theories were superseded by alternatives. Alai (2016) objects that although present theories are more successful than past theories, they will be replaced by future theories, just as past theories were replaced by present theories. He contends, however, that past theories were partly true, and that present (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  8.  78
    The Ant Colony as a Test for Scientific Theories of Consciousness.Daniel A. Friedman & Eirik Søvik - 2019 - Synthese:1-24.
    The appearance of consciousness in the universe remains one of the major mysteries unsolved by science or philosophy. Absent an agreed-upon definition of consciousness or even a convenient system to test theories of consciousness, a confusing heterogeneity of theories proliferate. In pursuit of clarifying this complicated discourse, we here interpret various frameworks for the scientific and philosophical study of consciousness through the lens of social insect evolutionary biology. To do so, we first discuss the notion of a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. What Elements of Successful Scientific Theories Are the Correct Targets for “Selective” Scientific Realism?Dean Peters - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (3):377-397.
    Selective scientific realists disagree on which theoretical posits should be regarded as essential to the empirical success of a scientific theory. A satisfactory account of essentialness will show that the (approximate) truth of the selected posits adequately explains the success of the theory. Therefore, (a) the essential elements must be discernible prospectively; (b) there cannot be a priori criteria regarding which type of posit is essential; and (c) the overall success of a theory, or ‘cluster’ of propositions, not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  10. Non-Empirical Requirements Scientific Theories Must Satisfy: Simplicity, Unification, Explanation, Beauty.Nicholas Maxwell - 2004 - PhilSci Archive.
    A scientific theory, in order to be accepted as a part of theoretical scientific knowledge, must satisfy both empirical and non-empirical requirements, the latter having to do with simplicity, unity, explanatory character, symmetry, beauty. No satisfactory, generally accepted account of such non-empirical requirements has so far been given. Here, a proposal is put forward which, it is claimed, makes a contribution towards solving the problem. This proposal concerns unity of physical theory. In order to satisfy the non-empirical requirement (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. The Structure of Scientific Theories in Logical Empiricism.Thomas Mormann - 2007 - In A. Richardson & T. Uebel (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism. Cambridge University Press.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  12. The Semblance of Ideologies and Scientific Theories and the Constitution of Facts.Rory J. Conces - 1996 - Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Science 21 (1 & 2):1-18.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Three Dogmas on Scientific Theory.Massimiliano Badino - manuscript
    Most philosophical accounts on scientific theories are affected by three dogmas or ingrained attitudes. These dogmas have led philosophers to choose between analyzing the internal structure of theories or their historical evolution. In this paper, I turn these three dogmas upside down. I argue (i) that mathematical practices are not epistemically neutral, (ii) that the morphology of theories can be very complex, and (iii) that one should view theoretical knowledge as the combination of internal factors and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Theories Are Not Partially Ordered.Thomas William Barrett & Hans Halvorson - manuscript
    This paper presents a simple example of first-order theories T1 and T2 such that i) T1 can be embedded in T2 and vice versa, ii) T1 posits all of the structure of T2 and vice versa, but iii) T1 and T2 are not equivalent. This shows that theories lack both the Cantor-Bernstein and co-Cantor-Bernstein properties and are neither partially ordered by the relation 'is embeddable in' nor by 'posits all of the structure of'. In addition, these results clarify (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Scientific Realism, the Semantic View and Evolutionary Biology.Fabio Sterpetti - 2016 - In Emiliano Ippoliti, Fabio Sterpetti & Thomas Nickles (eds.), Models and Inferences in Science. Springer. pp. 55-76.
    The semantic view of theories is normally considered to be an ac-count of theories congenial to Scientific Realism. Recently, it has been argued that Ontic Structural Realism could be fruitfully applied, in combination with the semantic view, to some of the philosophical issues peculiarly related to bi-ology. Given the central role that models have in the semantic view, and the relevance that mathematics has in the definition of the concept of model, the fo-cus will be on population (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. Scientific Realism and the Future Development of Science.Seungbae Park - 2019 - Diametros 60:61-71.
    Nickles (2016, 2017, forthcoming) raises many original objections against scientific realism. One of them holds that scientific realism originates from the end of history illusion. I reply that this objection is self-defeating and commits the genetic fallacy. Another objection is that it is unknowable whether our descendants will regard our current mature theories as true or false. I reply that this objection entails skepticism about induction, leading to skepticism about the world, which is inconsistent with the appeal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. Discovering Empirical Theories of Modular Software Systems. An Algebraic Approach.Nicola Angius & Petros Stefaneas - 2016 - In Vincent Müller (ed.), Computing and Philosophy: Selected Papers from IACAP 2014 (Synthese Library). Springer. pp. 99-115.
    This paper is concerned with the construction of theories of software systems yielding adequate predictions of their target systems’ computations. It is first argued that mathematical theories of programs are not able to provide predictions that are consistent with observed executions. Empirical theories of software systems are here introduced semantically, in terms of a hierarchy of computational models that are supplied by formal methods and testing techniques in computer science. Both deductive top-down and inductive bottom-up approaches in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Theories at Work: On the Structure and Functioning of Theories in Science, in Particular During the Copernican Revolution by Marinus Dirk Stafleu. [REVIEW]Gary Hatfield - 1990 - Isis 81 (2):340-341.
    Review of: Marinus Dirk Stafleu. Theories at Work: On the Structure and Functioning of Theories in Science, in Particular during the Copernican Revolution. (Christian Studies Today.) 310 pp., bibl., index. Lanham, Md./New York: University Press of America, 1987; Toronto: Institute for Christian Studies, 1987. $28.75 (cloth); $16.50 (paper).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  97
    The Legitimate Route to the Scientific Truth.Joseph Krecz - manuscript
    We leave in a beautiful and uniform world, a world where everything probable is possible. Since the epic theory of relativity many scientists have embarked in a pursuit of astonishing theoretical fantasies, abandoning the prudent and logical path to scientific inquiry. The theory is a complex theoretical framework that facilitates the understanding of the universal laws of physics. It is based on the space-time continuum fabric abstract concept, and it is well suited for interpreting cosmic events. However, it is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  39
    Kilka uwag o "postulowanej ontologii" teorii naukowych.Grzegorz Bugajak - 2004 - Studia Philosophiae Christianae 40 (2):315-322.
    The notion of so-called "postulated ontology" appears in the context of a well- -known thesis of the underdetermination of scientific theories by empirical data. It is argued in the paper, that the conviction of the existence of some kind of relation between a given theory and ontological ideas can be derived from this thesis, regardless of its particular form. Therefore, certain solutions to classical philosophical questions can be obtained, in principle, by careful inspection of scientific achievements. However, (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Are Quine’s Two Indeterminacy Theses Compatible?Gábor Forrai - 1999 - Acta Analytica 14 (23.):89-99..
    The paper seeks to show that Quine’s theses concerning the underdetermination of scientific theories by experience and the indeterminacy of reference cannot be reconciled if some of Quine’s central assumptions are accepted. The argument is this. Quine holds that the thesis about reference is not just a special case of the other thesis. In order to make sense of this comment we must distinguish between factual and epistemic indeterminacy. Something is factual indeterminate if it is not determined by (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. To Save the Semantic View: An Argument for Returning to Suppes' Interpretation.Thomas Cunningham - manuscript
    Recent work on the semantic view of scientific theories is highly critical of the position. This paper identifies two common criticisms of the view, describes two popular alternatives for responding to them, and argues those responses do not suffice. Subsequently, it argues that retuning to Patrick Suppes’ interpretation of the position provides the conceptual resources for rehabilitating the semantic view.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  50
    Stegmuller on the Structure of Theories.Mario Alai - 1985 - Scientia 79:105-115.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Welche Kompetenz hat Wissenschaftsphilosophie?.Kay Herrmann - 2012 - Universitätsverlag Chemnitz.
    Many prominent scientists have pointed out that philosophy is of no benefit to science. Stephen Hawking asserts: Philosophy is dead! Sciences use conceptions like natural laws, matter, nature, theories, etc. But science is also confronted with questions such as: “What is a natural law?” “What is nature?” “What is matter?” and “What is a scientific theory?” These (metatheoretical) questions exceed the sphere of competence of science – they are items of the philosophy of science. Philosophy of science is (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  75
    Inference Belief and Interpretation in Science.Avijit Lahiri - manuscript
    This monograph is an in-depth and engaging discourse on the deeply cognitive roots of human scientific quest. The process of making scientific inferences is continuous with the day-to-day inferential activity of individuals, and is predominantly inductive in nature. Inductive inference, which is fallible, exploratory, and open-ended, is of essential relevance in our incessant efforts at making sense of a complex and uncertain world around us, and covers a vast range of cognitive activities, among which scientific exploration constitutes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Scientific Realism and the Pessimistic Meta-Modus Tollens.Timothy D. Lyons - 2002 - In Steve Clarke & Timothy D. Lyons (eds.), Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific Realism and Commonsense. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 63-90.
    Broadly speaking, the contemporary scientific realist is concerned to justify belief in what we might call theoretical truth, which includes truth based on ampliative inference and truth about unobservables. Many, if not most, contemporary realists say scientific realism should be treated as ‘an overarching scientific hypothesis’ (Putnam 1978, p. 18). In its most basic form, the realist hypothesis states that theories enjoying general predictive success are true. This hypothesis becomes a hypothesis to be tested. To justify (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  27. Scientific Realism Without the Wave-Function: An Example of Naturalized Quantum Metaphysics.Valia Allori - 2020 - In Juha Saatsi & Steven French (eds.), Scientific Realism and the Quantum. Oxford University Press.
    Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories can be regarded as (approximately) true. This is connected with the view that science, physics in particular, and metaphysics could (and should) inform one another: on the one hand, science tells us what the world is like, and on the other hand, metaphysical principles allow us to select between the various possible theories which are underdetermined by the data. Nonetheless, quantum mechanics has always been regarded as, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Scientific Progress: Four Accounts.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12525.
    Scientists are constantly making observations, carrying out experiments, and analyzing empirical data. Meanwhile, scientific theories are routinely being adopted, revised, discarded, and replaced. But when are such changes to the content of science improvements on what came before? This is the question of scientific progress. One answer is that progress occurs when scientific theories ‘get closer to the truth’, i.e. increase their degree of truthlikeness. A second answer is that progress consists in increasing theories (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. The History of Science as a Graveyard of Theories: A Philosophers’ Myth?Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):263-278.
    According to the antirealist argument known as the pessimistic induction, the history of science is a graveyard of dead scientific theories and abandoned theoretical posits. Support for this pessimistic picture of the history of science usually comes from a few case histories, such as the demise of the phlogiston theory and the abandonment of caloric as the substance of heat. In this article, I wish to take a new approach to examining the ‘history of science as a graveyard (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  30. Scientific Realism.Timothy D. Lyons - 2016 - In Paul Humphreys (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 564-584.
    This article endeavors to identify the strongest versions of the two primary arguments against epistemic scientific realism: the historical argument—generally dubbed “the pessimistic meta-induction”—and the argument from underdetermination. It is shown that, contrary to the literature, both can be understood as historically informed but logically validmodus tollensarguments. After specifying the question relevant to underdetermination and showing why empirical equivalence is unnecessary, two types of competitors to contemporary scientific theories are identified, both of which are informed by science (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  31. Epistemic Selectivity, Historical Threats, and the Non-Epistemic Tenets of Scientific Realism.Timothy D. Lyons - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3203-3219.
    The scientific realism debate has now reached an entirely new level of sophistication. Faced with increasingly focused challenges, epistemic scientific realists have appropriately revised their basic meta-hypothesis that successful scientific theories are approximately true: they have emphasized criteria that render realism far more selective and, so, plausible. As a framework for discussion, I use what I take to be the most influential current variant of selective epistemic realism, deployment realism. Toward the identification of new case studies (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  32. Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account.Jamin Asay - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-21.
    This paper investigates the nature of scientific realism. I begin by considering the anomalous fact that Bas van Fraassen’s account of scientific realism is strikingly similar to Arthur Fine’s account of scientific non-realism. To resolve this puzzle, I demonstrate how the two theorists understand the nature of truth and its connection to ontology, and how that informs their conception of the realism debate. I then argue that the debate is much better captured by the theory of truthmaking, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  33. Extensional Scientific Realism Vs. Intensional Scientific Realism.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:46-52.
    Extensional scientific realism is the view that each believable scientific theory is supported by the unique first-order evidence for it and that if we want to believe that it is true, we should rely on its unique first-order evidence. In contrast, intensional scientific realism is the view that all believable scientific theories have a common feature and that we should rely on it to determine whether a theory is believable or not. Fitzpatrick argues that extensional (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  34.  85
    La Dinamica Delle Teorie Scientifiche. Strutturalismo Ed Interpretazione Logico-Formale Dell’Epistemologia di Kuhn, with a Preface of C. Ulises Moulines.Tommaso Perrone - 2012 - Franco Angeli.
    Philosophy of science in the 20th century is to be considered as mostly characterized by a fundamentally systematic heuristic attitude, which looks to mathematics, and more generally to the philosophy of mathematics, for a genuinely and epistemologically legitimate form of knowledge. Rooted in this assumption, the book provides a formal reconsidering of the dynamics of scientific theories, especially in the field of the physical sciences, and offers a significant contribution to current epistemological investigations regarding the validity of using (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Scientific Realism Versus Antirealism in Science Education.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija 24 (1):72-81.
    Scientific realists believe both what a scientific theory says about observables and unobservables. In contrast, scientific antirealists believe what a scientific theory says about observables, but not about unobservables. I argue that scientific realism is a more useful doctrine than scientific antirealism in science classrooms. If science teachers are antirealists, they are caught in Moore’s paradox when they help their students grasp the content of a scientific theory, and when they explain a phenomenon (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  36. A Pessimistic Induction Against Scientific Antirealism.Seungbae Park - 2014 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 21 (1):3-21.
    There are nine antirealist explanations of the success of science in the literature. I raise difficulties against all of them except the latest one, and then construct a pessimistic induction that the latest one will turn out to be problematic because its eight forerunners turned out to be problematic. This pessimistic induction is on a par with the traditional pessimistic induction that successful present scientific theories will be revealed to be false because successful past scientific theories (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  37. The Ontic Account of Scientific Explanation.Carl F. Craver - 2014 - In Marie I. Kaiser, Oliver R. Scholz, Daniel Plenge & Andreas Hüttemann (eds.), Explanation in the Special Sciences: The Case of Biology and History. Springer Verlag. pp. 27-52.
    According to one large family of views, scientific explanations explain a phenomenon (such as an event or a regularity) by subsuming it under a general representation, model, prototype, or schema (see Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36(2), 421–441; Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge: MIT Press; Darden (2006); Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  38. Should Scientific Realists Embrace Theoretical Conservatism?Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A:30-38.
    A prominent type of scientific realism holds that some important parts of our best current scientific theories are at least approximately true. According to such realists, radically distinct alternatives to these theories or theory-parts are unlikely to be approximately true. Thus one might be tempted to argue, as the prominent anti-realist Kyle Stanford recently did, that realists of this kind have little or no reason to encourage scientists to attempt to identify and develop theoretical alternatives that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39.  79
    A Cognitive Perspective on Scientific Realism.Michael Vlerick - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (8):1157-1178.
    The debate about scientific realism is concerned with the relation between our scientific theories and the world. Scientific realists argue that our best theories or components of those theories correspond to the world. Anti-realists deny such a correspondence. Traditionally, this central issue in the philosophy of science has been approached by focusing on the theories themselves (e.g., by looking at theory change or the underlying experimental context). I propose a relatively unexplored way to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Meta-Incommensurability Between Theories of Meaning: Chemical Evidence.Nicholas W. Best - 2015 - Perspectives on Science 23 (3):361-378.
    Attempting to compare scientific theories requires a philosophical model of meaning. Yet different scientific theories have at times—particularly in early chemistry—pre-supposed disparate theories of meaning. When two theories of meaning are incommensurable, we must say that the scientific theories that rely upon them are meta-incommensurable. Meta- incommensurability is a more profound sceptical threat to science since, unlike first-order incommensurability, it implies complete incomparability.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defence.Howard Sankey - 2001 - Theoria A Journal of Social and Political Theory 98 (98):35-54.
    This paper describes the position of scientific realism and presents the basic lines of argument for the position. Simply put, scientific realism is the view that the aim of science is knowledge of the truth about observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent, objective reality. Scientific realism is supported by several distinct lines of argument. It derives from a non-anthropocentric conception of our place in the natural world, and it is grounded in the epistemology and metaphysics of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  42. Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen Part One: How to Solve the Problem of Induction.Nicholas Maxwell - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):61-79.
    In this three-part paper, my concern is to expound and defend a conception of science, close to Einstein's, which I call aim-oriented empiricism. I argue that aim-oriented empiricsim has the following virtues. (i) It solve the problem of induction; (ii) it provides decisive reasons for rejecting van Fraassen's brilliantly defended but intuitively implausible constructive empiricism; (iii) it solves the problem of verisimilitude, the problem of explicating what it can mean to speak of scientific progress given that science advances from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  43. Scientific Realism and Ontology.Uskali Mäki - 2008 - In Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics : volume 7 : real balances - stochastic volatility models. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Economists customarily talk about the ‘realism’ of economic models and of their assumptions and make descriptive and prescriptive judgements about them: this model has more realism in it than that, the realism of assumptions does not matter, and so on. This is not the way philosophers mostly use the term ‘realism’ thus there is a major terminological discontinuity between the two disciplines. The following remarks organise and critically elaborate some of the philosophical usages of the term and show some of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  44. Realism: Metaphysical, Scientific, and Semantic.Panu Raatikainen - 2014 - In Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.), Realism, Science, and Pragmatism. Routledge. pp. 139-158.
    Three influential forms of realism are distinguished and interrelated: realism about the external world, construed as a metaphysical doctrine; scientific realism about non-observable entities postulated in science; and semantic realism as defined by Dummett. Metaphysical realism about everyday physical objects is contrasted with idealism and phenomenalism, and several potent arguments against these latter views are reviewed. -/- Three forms of scientific realism are then distinguished: (i) scientific theories and their existence postulates should be taken literally; (ii) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. The Problem of Deep Competitors and the Pursuit of Epistemically Utopian Truths.Timothy D. Lyons - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (2):317-338.
    According to standard scientific realism, science seeks truth and we can justifiably believe that our successful theories achieve, or at least approximate, that goal. In this paper, I discuss the implications of the following competitor thesis: Any theory we may favor has competitors such that we cannot justifiably deny that they are approximately true. After defending that thesis, I articulate three specific threats it poses for standard scientific realism; one is epistemic, the other two are axiological (that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  46. Bridging a Fault Line: On Underdetermination and the Ampliative Adequacy of Competing Theories.Guy Axtell - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Synthese Library. pp. 227-245.
    This paper pursues Ernan McMullin‘s claim ("Virtues of a Good Theory" and related papers on theory-choice) that talk of theory virtues exposes a fault-line in philosophy of science separating "very different visions" of scientific theorizing. It argues that connections between theory virtues and virtue epistemology are substantive rather than ornamental, since both address underdetermination problems in science, helping us to understand the objectivity of theory choice and more specifically what I term the ampliative adequacy of scientific theories. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  47. The Rationality of Scientific Discovery Part 1: The Traditional Rationality Problem.Nicholas Maxwell - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (2):123--53.
    The basic task of the essay is to exhibit science as a rational enterprise. I argue that in order to do this we need to change quite fundamentally our whole conception of science. Today it is rather generally taken for granted that a precondition for science to be rational is that in science we do not make substantial assumptions about the world, or about the phenomena we are investigating, which are held permanently immune from empirical appraisal. According to this standard (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  48.  60
    The Linguistic - Cultural Nature of Scientific Truth.Damian Islas - 2012 - Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research (3):80-88.
    While we typically think of culture as defined by geography or ethnicity (e.g., American culture, Mayan culture), the term also applies to the practices and expectations of smaller groups of people. Though embedded in the larger culture surrounding them, such subcultures have their own sets of rules like those that scientists do. Philosophy of science has as its main object of studio the scientific activity. A way in which we have tried to explain these scientific practices is from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49. What Can Artificial Intelligence Do for Scientific Realism?Petr Spelda & Vit Stritecky - forthcoming - Axiomathes:1-20.
    The paper proposes a synthesis between human scientists and artificial representation learning models as a way of augmenting epistemic warrants of realist theories against various anti-realist attempts. Towards this end, the paper fleshes out unconceived alternatives not as a critique of scientific realism but rather a reinforcement, as it rejects the retrospective interpretations of scientific progress, which brought about the problem of alternatives in the first place. By utilising adversarial machine learning, the synthesis explores possibility spaces of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Werner Heisenberg’s Position on a Hypothetical Conception of Science.Gregor Schiemann - 2009 - In M. Heidelberger & G. Schiemann (eds.), The Significance of the Hypothetical in the Natural Sciences. de Gruyter.
    Werner Heisenberg made an important – and as yet insufficiently researched – contribution to the transformation of the modern conception of science. This transformation involved a reassessment of the status of scientific knowledge from certain to merely hypothetical – an assessment that is widely recognized today. I examine Heisenberg’s contribution in particular by taking his conception of “closed theories” as an example according to which the established physical theories have no universal and exclusive, but only a restricted (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 1000