Results for 'substance and accident'

958 found
Order:
  1. (1 other version)The Order Between Substance and Accidents in Aquinas’s thought.Luca Gili - 2011 - Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (1):16-37.
    In this paper I examine Aquinas’s commentary on a text of Aristotle in which the type of order between substance and accidents is discussed. I claim that Aquinas maintains that there cannot be any reference to sensibility, despite any prima facie interpretation of Aristotle’s texts, according to which it could be thought that substance is temporally prior to accidents and, hence, that we must presuppose a perceivable change in the world on the basis of which it is possible (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. On substances, accidents and universals: In defence of a constituent ontology.Barry Smith - 1997 - Philosophical Papers 26 (1):105-127.
    The essay constructs an ontological theory designed to capture the categories instantiated in those portions or levels of reality which are captured in our common sense conceptual scheme. It takes as its starting point an Aristotelian ontology of “substances” and “accidents”, which are treated via the instruments of mereology and topology. The theory recognizes not only individual parts of substances and accidents, including the internal and external boundaries of these, but also universal parts, such as the “humanity” which is an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  3. The substance of Brentano's ontology.Barry Smith - 1987 - Topoi 6 (1):39-49.
    This paper is a study of Brentano’s ontology, and more specifically of his theory of substance and accident as put forward toward the end of his life in the materials collected together as the Kategorienlehre or Theory of Categories. Here Brentano presents an auditious (re-)interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of substance and accidence. We show that on the Brentano initially defends, it is space which serves as the single substance upon which all other entities depend as accidents (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  4. A Glimpse into Spinoza’s Metaphysical Laboratory: The Development of Spinoza’s Concepts of Substance and Attribute.Yitzhak Melamed - 2015 - In Yitzhak Y. Melamed (ed.), The Young Spinoza: A Metaphysician in the Making. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 272-286.
    At the opening of Spinoza’s Ethics, we find the three celebrated definitions of substance, attribute, and God: E1d3: By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed [Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur; hoc est id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat]. E1d4: By attribute I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Hume on Substance: A Critique of Locke.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2014 - In Paul Lodge & Tom Stoneham (eds.), Locke and Leibniz on Substance. New York: Routledge. pp. 45-62.
    The ancient theory of substance and accident is supposed to make sense of complex unities in a way that respects both their unity and their complexity. On Hume’s view such complex unities are only fictitiously unities. This result follows from his thoroughgoing critique of the theory of substance. I will characterize the theory Hume is critiquing as it is presented in Locke, presupposing what Bennett calls the “Leibnizian interpretation.” Locke uses the word ‘substance’ in two senses. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Wolff on Substance, Power, and Force.Nabeel Hamid - forthcoming - Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    This paper argues that Wolff’s rejection of Leibnizian monads is rooted in a disagreement concerning the general notion of substance. Briefly, whereas Leibniz defines substance in terms of activity, Wolff retains a broadly scholastic and Cartesian conception of substance as that which per se subsists and sustains accidents. One consequence of this difference is that it leads Wolff to interpret Leibniz’s concept of a constantly striving force as denoting a feature of substance separate from its static (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Aristotle on Essence, Essential, Accident and Accidental.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    A. Accident 1. We call an accident (συμβεβηκὸς) that which attaches to something and can be truly asserted, but neither of necessity nor usually.’ (Met. , Δ, 1025a14-16) 2. Whenever an accident attaches to a subject, it attaches to it not because it is that subject (μὴ διότι τοδὶ ἧν). (Met., Δ, 1025a21-24) 3. ‘There is no definite cause for an accident, but a chance cause, i.e. an indefinite one.’ (Met., Δ, 1025a24-25) 4. ‘The accident (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Leibniz on Substance in the Discourse on Metaphysics.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2014 - In Paul Lodge & Tom Stoneham (eds.), Locke and Leibniz on Substance. New York: Routledge.
    In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz put forward his famous complete-concept definition of substance. Sometimes this definition is glossed as stating that a substance is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates, and it is thought that it follows directly from Leibniz’s theory of truth. Now, an adequate definition of substance should not apply to accidents. But, as I shall point out, if Leibniz’s theory of truth is correct then an (...) is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates. The aim of this paper is to clarify Leibniz’s notion of substance in the Discourse with a view to explaining how that definition successfully distinguishes between substances and accidents. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9. Thomas White on Location and the Ontological Status of Accidents.Han Thomas Adriaenssen - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 10:1-35.
    The work of Thomas White represents a systematic attempt to combine the best of the new science of the seventeenth century with the best of Aristotelian tradition. This attempt earned him the criticism of Hobbes and the praise of Leibniz, but today, most of his attempts to navigate between traditions remain to be explored in detail. This paper does so for his ontology of accidents. It argues that his criticism of accidents in the category of location as entities over and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. The Aristotelian Alternative to Humean Bundles and Lockean Bare Particulars: Lowe and Loux on Material Substance .Robert Allen - manuscript
    Must we choose between reducing material substances to collections of properties, a’ la Berkeley and Hume or positing bare particulars, in the manner of Locke? Having repudiated the notion that a substance could simply be a collection of properties existing on their own, is there a viable alternative to the Lockean notion of a substratum, a being essentially devoid of character? E.J. Lowe and Michael Loux would answer here in the affirmative. Both recommend hylomorphism as an upgrade on the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Classical Theists are Committed to the Palamite Distinction Between God’s Essence and Energies.James Dominic Rooney - 2023 - In Robert C. Koons & Jonathan Fuqua (eds.), Classical Theism: New Essays on the Metaphysics of God. Routledge. pp. 318-338.
    A distinction attributed to Gregory Palamas involves claiming that God’s essence and energies/activities are distinct, yet equally ‘uncreated.’ Traditionally, this Palamite distinction was attacked by some Latin theologians as compromising divine simplicity. A classical view holds that no properties really inhere in God, because God enters into no composition of any kind, including composition of substance and accident. God’s energies/activities seem like properties inhering in God or otherwise composing some kind of part of God. I will argue that, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Why Are Accidents Included under Being per se?Elliot Polsky - forthcoming - Nova et Vetera.
    In In V Metaphysics, lec. 9, Aquinas distinguishes between “being by accident” (ens per accidens) and “being by itself” (ens per se) and includes the nine accidental categories under the latter. But isn’t substance a being per se while accidents are, by definition, accidental beings? Several authors—including Ralph McInerny, Paul Symington, and Greg Doolan—have offered explanations of this strange classification. Drawing on an overlooked parallel text in the Posterior Analytics commentary and on Aquinas’s critique of Avicenna’s understanding of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. John Buridan on the Eucharist. With a Translation of his Questions on Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' 4.6.Boaz Faraday Schuman - 2023 - In Gyula Klima (ed.), The Metaphysics and Theology of the Eucharist: A Historical-Analytical Survey of the Problems of the Sacrament. Springer Verlag. pp. 297–319.
    It may come as a surprise to readers familiar with the life and work of the Arts Master that he discusses the Eucharist at all. As he likes to remind us, theological topics are generally out of his wheelhouse. Even so, in his Questions on the “Metaphysics” of Aristotle (QM) 4.6, Buridan takes the sacrament of the Eucharist as a key data point in his discussion of Aristotle’s Categories. In the Eucharist, the accidents of the bread and wine—their color, texture, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. al-Māturīdī and Atomism.Mehmet Bulğen - 2019 - ULUM Journal of Religious Inquiries 2 (2):223-264.
    This study aims to shed light on the position of Imām al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) on atomism. It consists of three sections. The first section will delineate some theories of matter along with the meaning of certain pertinent terms, which were widely accepted during al-Māturīdī’s time. The following section will discuss whether Imām al-Māturīdī understood such notions as body (jism), substance (jawhar), and accident (ʿaraḍ) within the frame of traditional Islamic atomism. Moreover, this section will give some information on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. The Real Distinction between Supposit and Nature in Angels in Thomas Aquinas.Elliot Polsky - forthcoming - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
    It is universally acknowledged that, for St. Thomas, there is a distinction between human persons or supposits and their natures or essences. But it is usually thought that there is no parallel distinction between the angelic person or supposit and its nature. Yet, as this paper argues, Aquinas consistently puts forward just such a distinction. This paper surveys Aquinas’s arguments for the unique identity of God with his essence and the corresponding distinctions between created persons and their essences, showing in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Spinoza’s Ontology.Valtteri Viljanen - 2009 - In Olli Koistinen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 56–78.
    In this essay, I present the basics of Spinoza’s ontology and attempt to go some distance toward clarifying its most pertinent problems. I start by considering the relationship between the concepts of substance and mode; my aim is to show that despite his somewhat peculiar vocabulary there is much here that we should find rather familiar and intelligible, as Spinoza’s understanding of these matters harks back to the traditional distinction of substance and accident, or thing and property. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17. Philoponus on the Priority of Substances.Riin Sirkel - 2016 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 54 (3):351-372.
    One of the issues that deeply interested the philosophers of late antiquity, the Ancient Greek Commentators, concerns the priority of substances. While questions concerning ontological priority have recently attracted attention in Aristotelian scholarship and contemporary metaphysics, the Commentators’ discussions have not yet received the attention they deserve. My aim is to start to fill in this gap, by focusing on John Philoponus’s account of the priority of substances in his commentary on Aristotle’s "Categories". In particular, I aim to show how (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18. (1 other version)Stumpf on categories.Riccardo Martinelli - 2015 - In Denis Fisette & Riccardo Martinelli (eds.), Philosophy from an Empirical Standpoint: Essays on Carl Stumpf. Boston: Rodopi. pp. 203-227.
    Stumpf’s doctrine of the categories is of great importance for our understanding of his philosophy. This theme had been widely discussed among German thinkers after Kant; Brentano himself had repeatedly dealt with it since his early works. However, Stumpf considerably diverges from Brentano on this crucial philosophical topic. Although a systematic discussion can be found only in Stumpf’s posthumous Erkenntnislehre, his core ideas on the categories can be traced to his early work on space of 1873. In fact, Stumpf claims (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Inherence and Denomination in the Trinity.Paul Thom - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):139--153.
    The present paper describes an ”ontological square’ mapping possible ways of combining the domains and converse domains of the relations of inherence and denomination. In the context of expounding and extending medieval appropriations of elements drawn from Aristotle’s Categories for theological purposes, the paper uses this square to examine different ways of defining Substance-terms and Accident-terms by reference to inherence and denomination within the constraints imposed by the doctrine of the Trinity. These different approaches are related to particular (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Facts vs. Things.Susan Brower-Toland - 2006 - Review of Metaphysics 60 (3):597-642.
    Commentators have long agreed that Wodeham’s account of objects of judgment is highly innovative, but they have continued to disagree about its proper interpretation. Some read him as introducing items that are merely supervenient on (and nothing in addition to) Aristotelian substances and accidents; others take him to be introducing a new type of entity in addition to substances and accidents—namely, abstract states of affairs. In this paper, I argue that both interpretations are mistaken: the entities Wodeham introduces are really (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  21. Nicolaus Taurellus on Forms and Elements.Andreas Blank - 2014 - Science in Context 27 (4):659-682.
    ArgumentThis article examines the conception of elements in the natural philosophy of Nicolaus Taurellus (1547–1606) and explores the theological motivation that stands behind this conception. By some of his early modern readers, Taurellus may have been understood as a proponent of material atoms. By contrast, I argue that considerations concerning the substantiality of the ultimate constituents of composites led Taurellus to an immaterialist ontology, according to which elements are immaterial forms that possess active and passive potencies as well as motion (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22. πολλαχῶς ἔστι; Plato’s Neglected Ontology.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    This paper aims to suggest a new approach to Plato’s theory of being in Republic V and Sophist based on the notion of difference and the being of a copy. To understand Plato’s ontology in these two dialogues we are going to suggest a theory we call Pollachos Esti; a name we took from Aristotle’s pollachos legetai both to remind the similarities of the two structures and to reach a consistent view of Plato’s ontology. Based on this theory, when Plato (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Emilio Uranga and Jorge Portilla on Accidentality as a Decolonial Tool.Juan Garcia Torres - 2024 - Res Philosophica 101 (1):55-80.
    Call ‘a substance’ a person who is at home in a relatively stable and unified sense-making framework: a social structure that to some degree specifies which categories are important for interpreting reality, which goals are worth pursing, which character traits are admirable, etc. Call ‘an accident’ a person who is not at home in one such framework. It is tempting to think that being a substance is preferable, but I present some considerations for thinking otherwise. Mexican philosophers (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. İbn Sînâ ve Molla Sadrâ’da İlâhi Erek Problemi The Problem of Divine Intentionalist in Avicenna and Mulla Sadra.Sedat Baran - 2019 - Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi - Cumhuriyet Theology Journal 23 (3):1101-1120.
    Divine intention is an important problem for both philosophy and Kalam. This problem has two aspects as the subject and action of the intention. The intention of the subject occurs for the motion or the action itself. The intention of the action is to reach the motion or the action itself. According to this, when a person travels to Mecca to visit Kaaba, the visit is the intention of the subject and the journey is the intention of the action. In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Mind-Dependence in Berkeley and the Problem of Perception.Umrao Sethi - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):648-668.
    ABSTRACT On the traditional picture, accidents must inhere in substances in order to exist. Berkeley famously argues that a particular class of accidents—the sensible qualities—are mere ideas—entities that depend for their existence on minds. To defend this view, Berkeley provides us with an elegant alternative to the traditional framework: sensible qualities depend on a mind, not in virtue of inhering in it, but in virtue of being perceived by it. This metaphysical insight, once correctly understood, gives us the resources to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  26. Substantial motion, 400 years of wishful thinking!Majid Borumand - manuscript
    The concept of Substantial motion (حركت جوهرى) is fundamentally flawed and severely muddled. Aristotle and Mulla Sadra’s conception of motion, substance (جوهر) and substantial form صورت نوعيه)) were all based on a severe misunderstanding of nature as later was established by the scientists and philosophers that came after them. Here, by recalling the established facts of modern science, particularly the universally accepted scientific fact that, properties of objects are reducible to the motion of their electrons and there’s no such (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Aristotelianism in Eucharistic Theology: Father Thomas Reese and Transubstantiation.David Francis Sherwood - 2023 - Homiletic and Pastoral Review.
    This article is a defense and explication of Aristotelian substance-accident terminology used in the Catholic dogma of transubstantiation following upon Fr. Thomas Reese's denigration of orthodox terminology and theology. It was reworked from a paper entitled “They Must Fall into Being: The Son’s Power as Quasi-Subject of the Accidents of Bread and Wine in the Sacrament of the Eucharist” which I delivered on Feb. 4, 2023, at The Holiness of God and the Mystery of the Eucharist conference at (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. Leibnizian soft reduction of extrinsic denominations and relations.Ari Maunu - 2004 - Synthese 139 (1):143-164.
    Leibniz, it seems, wishes to reduce statements involving relations or extrinsic denominations to ones solely in terms of individual accidents or, respectively, intrinsic denominations. His reasons for this appear to be that relations are merely mental things (since they cannot be individual accidents) and that extrinsic denominations do not represent substances as they are on their own. Three interpretations of Leibniz''s reductionism may be distinguished: First, he allowed only monadic predicates in reducing statements (hard reductionism); second, he allowed also `implicitly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. Categories and Modes of Being: A Discussion of Robert Pasnau’s Metaphysical Themes.Paul Symington - 2014 - In Gyula Klima & Alexander Hall (eds.), Medieval Themes, Medieval and Modern Volume 11: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 32-69.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. Hobbes: Metaphysics and Method.Stewart D. R. Duncan - 2003 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
    This dissertation discusses the work of Thomas Hobbes, and has two main themes. The first is Hobbes's materialism, and the second is Hobbes's relationships to other philosophers, in particular his place in the mechanist movement that is said to have replaced Aristotelianism as the dominant philosophy in the seventeenth century. -/- I argue that Hobbes does not, for most of his career, believe the general materialist view that bodies are the only substances. He believes, rather, that ideas, which are our (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. Newton's Metaphysics of Space: A “Tertium Quid” Betwixt Substantivalism and Relationism, or merely a “God of the (Rational Mechanical) Gaps”?Edward Slowik - 2009 - Perspectives on Science 17 (4):pp. 429-456.
    This paper investigates the question of, and the degree to which, Newton’s theory of space constitutes a third-way between the traditional substantivalist and relationist ontologies, i.e., that Newton judged that space is neither a type of substance/entity nor purely a relation among such substances. A non-substantivalist reading of Newton has been famously defended by Howard Stein, among others; but, as will be demonstrated, these claims are problematic on various grounds, especially as regards Newton’s alleged rejection of the traditional (...)/accident dichotomy concerning space. Nevertheless, our analysis of the metaphysical foundations of Newton’s spatial theory will strive to uncover its unique and innovative characteristics, most notably, the distinctive role that Newton’s “immaterialist” spatial ontology plays in his dynamics. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  32. St. Augustine on Time, Time Numbers, and Enduring Objects.Jason W. Carter - 2011 - Vivarium 49 (4):301-323.
    Throughout his works, St. Augustine offers at least nine distinct views on the nature of time, at least three of which have remained almost unnoticed in the secondary literature. I first examine each these nine descriptions of time and attempt to diffuse common misinterpretations, especially of the views which seek to identify Augustinian time as consisting of an un-extended point or a distentio animi . Second, I argue that Augustine's primary understanding of time, like that of later medieval scholastics, is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  33. Aristotle’s Principle of Non-Contradiction.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Some forms of defining PNC in Aristotle’s works are as follows: a) Everything must be either affirmed or denied (φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι). (Met., B, 996b28-29) or: it will not be possible to assert and deny the same thing truly at the same time. (Met., Γ, 1008a36-b1) In other words, ‘contradictory statements (ἀντικειμένας φάσεις) are not at the same time true. (Met., Γ, 1011b13-14) Also, ‘It is impossible that contradictories (ἀντίφασιν) should be at the same time true of the same thing.’ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Will I die (decease)? – I immortal (deathless) (how to realize immortality (deathlessness) in first person perspective) (Скончаюсь? – я бессмертен (как осознать бессмертие «от первого лица»)).Aleksandr Zhikharev - manuscript
    Will I die? As a hypothesis, in my natural scientific understanding, the psyche, is nothing more than, and exclusively just some states of my living brain – I will die as a result of his death. -/- In presented answer, psyche – itself own immediate reality itself, that is – undoubted. -/- This work was performed in reality “in the first person” (“subjective reality”, “phenomenal consciousness”). To realize, how, what it is the reality of the “in the first person” let’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Aristotle's Theory of Universal.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    The concept of universal in Aristotle’s philosophy has several aspects. 1) Universal and plurality Aristotle posits universal (καθόλου) versus particular (καθ᾿ ἕκαστον) each covering a range of elements: some elements are universal while others are particulars. Aristotle defines universal as ‘that which by nature is predicated (κατηγορεῖσθαι) of many subjects’ and particular as ‘that which is not’ so. (OI ., I, 7, 17a38-b1) The plurality of possible subjects of universal is what Aristotle insists on. The inclusion of the notion of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Aristotle's Theory of Predication.Mohammad Ghomi - manuscript
    Predication is a lingual relation. We have this relation when a term is said (λέγεται) of another term. This simple definition, however, is not Aristotle’s own definition. In fact, he does not define predication but attaches his almost in a new field used word κατηγορεῖσθαι to λέγεται. In a predication, something is said of another thing, or, more simply, we have ‘something of something’ (ἓν καθ᾿ ἑνὸς). (PsA. , A, 22, 83b17-18) Therefore, a relation in which two terms are posited (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Aristotle's Theory of Relatives.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Aristotle classifies opposition (ἀντικεῖσθαι) into four groups: relatives (τὰ πρός τι), contraries (τὰ ἐναντία), privation and possession (στρέσις καὶ ἓξις) and affirmation and negation (κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις). (Cat. , 10, 11b15-23) His example of relatives are the double and the half. Aristotle’s description of relatives as a kind of opposition is as such: ‘Things opposed as relatives are called just what they are, of their opposites (αὐτὰ ἃπερ ἐστι τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγεται) or in some other way in relation to them. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Aristotle on Definition.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Definition has the following features in Aristotle’s philosophy: 1. Each thing has only one definition and ‘it is impossible that there should be more than one definition for the same thing.’ (To., Z, 5, 142b^25; cf. To., Z, 4, 141a26) 2. Definition is ‘a formula of the essence’ (Met., H, 1042a17-18) and, thus, signifies the essence of the thing. (To., I, 5, ^101b30-) About the relation between definition and essence Aristotle regards three possibilities (PsA., B, 94a11-14): a) A definition as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. (1 other version)Corporeal Substances and True Unities: Abstract.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1994 - The Leibniz Review 4 (2):9-10.
    In the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz contends that each corporeal substance has a substantial form. In support he argues that to be real a corporeal substance must be one and indivisible, a true unity. I will show how this argument precludes a tempting interpretation of corporeal substances as composite unities. Rather it mandates the interpretation that each corporeal substance is a single monad.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  40. Science, substance and spatial appearances.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2097-2114.
    According to a certain kind of naïve or folk understanding of physical matter, everyday ‘solid’ objects are composed of a homogeneous, gap-less substance, with sharply defined boundaries, which wholly fills the space they occupy. A further claim is that our perceptual experience of the environment represents or indicates that the objects around us conform to this sort of conception of physical matter. Were this further claim correct, it would mean that the way that the world appears to us in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. The Concept of a Substance and its Linguistic Embodiment.Henry Laycock - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (6):114.
    My objective is a better comprehension of two theoretically fundamental concepts. One, the concept of a substance in an ordinary (non-Aristotelian) sense, ranging over such things as salt, carbon, copper, iron, water, and methane – kinds of stuff that now count as (chemical) elements and compounds. The other I’ll call the object-concept in the abstract sense of Russell, Wittgenstein, and Frege in their logico-semantical enquiries. The material object-concept constitutes the heart of our received logico / ontic system, still massively (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. (2 other versions)Spinoza's Metaphysics: Substance and Thought.Yitzhak Y. Melamed - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press USA.
    Yitzhak Melamed here offers a new and systematic interpretation of the core of Spinoza's metaphysics. In the first part of the book, he proposes a new reading of the metaphysics of substance in Spinoza: he argues that for Spinoza modes both inhere in and are predicated of God. Using extensive textual evidence, he shows that Spinoza considered modes to be God's propria. He goes on to clarify Spinoza's understanding of infinity, mereological relations, infinite modes, and the flow of finite (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  43. Primary Substances and Their Homonyms in Aristotle’s Teleology.Mikolaj Domaradzki - 2018 - Diametros (58):2-17.
    The purpose of this article is to reconstruct Aristotle’s distinction between primary substances and their homonyms. It is shown that the Stagirite regards both body parts and artefacts as mere homonyms of primary substances when they are no longer capable of performing their function (ergon) and actualizing their end (telos). In the course of the present discussion, Aristotle’s approach is confronted with his famous doctrine of the four causes, whilst an analysis of the examples given by the Stagirite serves the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Corporeal Substances and True Unities.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1995 - Studia Leibnitiana 27 (2):157.
    In the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz contends that each corporeal substance has a substantial form. In support he argues that to be real a corporeal substance must be one and indivisible, a true unity. I will show how this argument precludes a tempting interpretation of corporeal substances as composite unities. Rather it mandates the interpretation that each corporeal substance is a single monad.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  45. Leibniz’s Lost Argument Against Causal Interaction.Tobias Flattery - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7.
    Leibniz accepts causal independence, the claim that no created substance can causally interact with any other. And Leibniz needs causal independence to be true, since his well-known pre-established harmony is premised upon it. So, what is Leibniz’s argument for causal independence? Sometimes he claims that causal interaction between substances is superfluous. Sometimes he claims that it would require the transfer of accidents, and that this is impossible. But when Leibniz finds himself under sustained pressure to defend causal independence, those (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  46. Responsibility, Compensation and Accident Law Reform.Nicole A. Vincent - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Adelaide
    This thesis considers two allegations which conservatives often level at no-fault systems — namely, that responsibility is abnegated under no-fault systems, and that no-fault systems under- and over-compensate. I argue that although each of these allegations can be satisfactorily met – the responsibility allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that to properly take responsibility for our actions we must accept liability for those losses for which we are causally responsible; and the compensation allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that tort (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  47. (1 other version)Spinoza's Thinking Substance and the Necessity of Modes.Karolina Hübner - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):3-34.
    The paper offers a new account of Spinoza's conception of “substance”, the fundamental building block of reality. It shows that it can be demonstrated apriori within Spinoza's metaphysical framework that (i) contrary to Idealist readings, for Spinoza there can be no substance that is not determined or modified by some other entity produced by substance; and that (ii) there can be no substance (and hence no being) that is not a thinking substance.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  48. Aristotle on Form, Substance, and Universals: A Dilemma.James H. Lesher - 1971 - Phronesis 16 (1):169-178.
    In book Zeta of the Metaphysics and elsewhere Aristotle appears to commit himself to the following propositions: (1) No universal can be substance; (2) Form is a universal; and (3) Form is that which is most truly substance. These propositions appear to constitute an inconsistent triad lying at the heart of Aristotle’s ontology. A number of attempts have been made to rescue Aristotle from the charge of inconsistency. Some have claimed that Aristotle did not subscribe to (1), but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  49. The chemistry of substances and the philosophy of mass terms.J. Brakel - 1986 - Synthese 69 (3):291 - 324.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  50. Aristotle on the Relation between Substance and Essence.Samuel Meister - 2021 - Ancient Philosophy 41 (2):477-94.
    In Metaphysics Z.6, Aristotle argues that each substance is the same as its essence. In this paper, I defend an identity reading of that claim. First, I provide a general argument for the identity reading, based on Aristotle’s account of sameness in number and identity. Second, I respond to the recent charge that the identity reading is incoherent, by arguing that the claim in Z.6 is restricted to primary substances and hence to forms.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 958