Results for 'transcendental freedom'

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  1. On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:35-104.
    Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and (...)
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  2. Timeless Freedom in Kant: Transcendental Freedom and Things-in-Themselves.Joe Saunders - 2022 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 39 (3):275-292.
    This paper draws attention to two problems with Kant's claim that transcendental freedom is timeless. The problems are that this causes conceptual difficulties and fails to vindicate important parts of our moral practices. I then put forward three ways in which we can respond to these charges on Kant's behalf. The first is to defend Kant's claim that transcendental freedom occurs outside of time. The second is to reject this claim, but try to maintain transcendental (...)
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  3. Ought implies can, asymmetrical freedom, and the practical irrelevance of transcendental freedom.Matthé Scholten - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):25-42.
    In this paper, I demonstrate that Kant's commitment to an asymmetry between the control conditions for praise and blame is explained by his endorsement of the principle Ought Implies Can (OIC). I argue that Kant accepts only a relatively weak version of OIC and that he is hence committed only to a relatively weak requirement of alternate possibilities for moral blame. This suggests that whether we are transcendentally free is irrelevant to questions about moral permissibility and moral blameworthiness.
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  4. To be able to, or to be able not to? That is the Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Nadine Elzein & Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):13-32.
    A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is (...)
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  5. Freedom and ethical necessity: a Kantian response to Ulrich.Katerina Deligiorgi - 2021 - In James A. Clarke & Gabriel Gottlieb (eds.), Practical Philosophy from Kant to Hegel: Freedom, Right, Revolution. Cambridge University Press.
    The paper starts with outlining the problems of determinism presented in Ulrich's Eleuthériologie and then examines what resources are available to Kant to address these problems. Although the initial focus is historical, one of the aims is to show that the problems with determinism continue to be live problems for those who seek to defend Kant's theory. So the attempt to seek resources in Kant to address these problems will also involve an attempt to offer a diagnosis of what is (...)
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  6. Ontological-Transcendental Defence of Metanormative Realism.Michael Kowalik - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):573-586.
    If there is something (P) that every possible agent is committed to value, and certain actions or attitudes either enhance or diminish P, then normative claims about a range of intentional actions can be objectively and non-trivially evaluated. I argue that the degree of existence as an agent depends on the consistency of reflexive-relating with other individuals of the agent-kind: the ontological thesis. I then show that in intending to act on a reason, every agent is rationally committed to value (...)
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  7. Moral Education and Transcendental Idealism.Joe Saunders & Martin Sticker - 2020 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102 (4):646-673.
    In this paper, we draw attention to several important tensions between Kant’s account of moral education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that, in locating freedom outside of space and time, transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, but also to confirm that his own account actually works. Having laid out these problems, we then offer a response on Kant’s behalf. We argue that, (...)
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  8. An Asymmetrical Approach to Kant's Theory of Freedom.Benjamin Vilhauer - forthcoming - In Dai Heide & Evan Tiffany (eds.), The Idea of Freedom: New Essays on the Kantian Theory of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Asymmetry theories about free will and moral responsibility are a recent development in the long history of the free will debate. Kant commentators have not yet explored the possibility of an asymmetrical reconstruction of Kant's theory of freedom, and that is my goal here. By "free will", I mean the sort of control we would need to be morally responsible for our actions. Kant's term for it is "transcendental freedom", and he refers to the attribution of moral (...)
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  9. Is it possible to live a right life in a wrong life? -Adorno's critique of Kant's view of freedom and the moral imperative.Huitong Zhou - manuscript
    This article discusses a crucial question through an analysis of Adorno's critique of Kant's moral philosophy: can human beings live a good life? Kant optimistically argues that human beings as rational beings have transcendental freedom and can autonomously formulate and follow universal moral laws without any empirical conditions. Therefore, human beings can always act morally and live a good life. Adorno, on the other hand, argues that there is no right life in a wrong life. Adorno, who was (...)
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  10. Transcendental Idealism F.S.Frances Rosemary Shaw - manuscript
    In this paper I present an interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories (a dangerous interpretation it turns out), based primarily on the “two-step” argument of the B deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason. I undertake to show that Kant’s distinction between the “pure forms of intuition” and “pure formal intuition” is successful in its attempt to prove that all sensible intuitions presuppose the a priori categories, in a way which is compatible, I claim, with Kant’s (...)
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  11. Kantian Notion of freedom and Autonomy of Artificial Agency.Manas Kumar Sahu - 2021 - Prometeica - Revista De Filosofía Y Ciencias 23:136-149.
    The objective of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of the Kantian notion of freedom (especially the problem of the third antinomy and its resolution in the critique of pure reason); its significance in the contemporary debate on free-will and determinism, and the possibility of autonomy of artificial agency in the Kantian paradigm of autonomy. Kant's resolution of the third antinomy by positing the ground in the noumenal self resolves the problem of antinomies; however, invites an explanatory (...)
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  12. A Lawful Freedom: Kant’s Practical Refutation of Noumenal Chance.Nicholas Dunn - 2015 - Kant Studies Online (1):149-177.
    This paper asks how Kant’s mature theory of freedom handles an objection pertaining to chance. This question is significant given that Kant raises this criticism against libertarianism in his early writings on freedom before coming to adopt a libertarian view of freedom in the Critical period. After motivating the problem of how Kant can hold that the free actions of human beings lack determining grounds while at the same maintain that these are not the result of ‘blind (...)
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  13. The kantian notion of freedom and autonomy of artificial agency.Manas Sahu - 2021 - Prometeica - Revista De Filosofía Y Ciencias 23:136-149.
    The objective of this paper is to provide critical analysis of the Kantian notion of freedom ; its significance in the contemporary debate on free-will and determinism, and the possibility of autonomy of artificial agency in the Kantian paradigm of autonomy. Kant's resolution of the third antinomy by positing the ground in the noumenal self resolves the problem of antinomies; however, it invites an explanatory gap between phenomenality and the noumenal self; even if he has successfully established the compatibility (...)
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  14. Kant's Four Notions of Freedom.Martin F. Fricke - 2005 - Hekmat Va Falsafeh (Wisdom and Philosophy). Academic Journal of Philosophy Department Allameh Tabataii University 1 (2):31-48.
    Four different notions of freedom can be distinguished in Kant's philosophy: logical freedom, practical freedom, transcendental freedom and freedom of choice ("Willkür"). The most important of these is transcendental freedom. Kant's argument for its existence depend on the claim that, necessarily, the categorical imperative is the highest principle of reason. My paper examines how this claim can be made plausible.
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  15. Me, My Will, and I: Kant's Republican Conception of Freedom of the Will and Freedom of the Agent.Pauline Kleingeld - 2020 - Studi Kantiani 33:103-123.
    Kant’s theory of freedom, in particular his claim that natural determinism is compatible with absolute freedom, is widely regarded as puzzling and incoherent. In this paper I argue that what Kant means by ‘freedom’ has been widely misunderstood. Kant uses the definition of freedom found in the republican tradition of political theory, according to which freedom is opposed to dependence, slavery, and related notions – not to determinism or to coercion. Discussing Kant’s accounts of (...) of the will and freedom of the agent in turn, I argue that this insight sheds new light on Kant’s transcendental compatibilism and suggests novel responses to age-old objections. (shrink)
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  16. Gallows Pole: Is Kant's Fact of Reason a Transcendental Argument?Michael Kryluk - 2017 - Review of Metaphysics 70 (4):695-725.
    This essay examines one of the most obscure and controversial tenets of Kant’s critical philosophy, his claim in the Critique of Practical Reason that the moral law is immediately and unquestionably valid as an a priori fact of reason (Factum der Vernunft). This argument curiously inverts Kant’s earlier stance in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in which he justifies the reality of the categorical imperative through a much more cautious and qualified authentication of transcendental freedom. Against (...)
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  17. Where have all the Monads Gone? Substance and Transcedental Freedom in Schleiermacher.Jacqueline Mariña - 2015 - Journal of Religion 95 (4):477-505.
    This article explores the later Schleiermacher’s metaphysics of substance and what it entails concerning the question of transcendental freedom. I show that in espousing a metaphysics of substance, Schleiermacher also abandoned an understanding of nature as a mere mechanism, a view implying what I call a “state-state view of causation” (“SSV” for short). Adoption of the view of the self as substance was motivated by the primacy of practical and religious concerns in Schleiermacher’s later work: in Christian Faith, (...)
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  18. Bolstering the Keystone: Kant on the Incomprehensibility of Freedom.Timothy Aylsworth - 2020 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102 (2):261-298.
    In this paper, I give an explanation and defense of Kant’s claim that we cannot comprehend how freedom is possible. I argue that this is a significant point that has been underappreciated in the secondary literature. My conclusion has a variety of implications both for Kant scholars and for those interested in Kantian ideas more generally. Most notably, if Kant is right that there are principled reasons why freedom is beyond our comprehension, then this would release his ethical (...)
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  19.  88
    Arkham's Sirens. Analyzing the Roles of the Body and the Transcendental Subject in Arkham's Villainesses and Antiheroines.Favaro Marco - 2023 - In Favaro Marco & Justin F. Martin (eds.), Batman’s Villains and Villainesses: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Arkham’s Souls. Lexington Books. pp. 229-244.
    Cartesian and Western religious and philosophical traditions distinguish the body from the mind, viewing the former as a prison or a burden. The mind (spirit, soul, rationality) is identified as good, while the body is devalued and associated with evil. Some philosophers restored the body's value: humans are not imprisoned spirits, but they are their bodies. Husserl, for example, claims that human beings are not an immaterial substance in a Körper, a physical body, but Leib, a living body that solves (...)
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  20. Are our moral responsibility practices justified? Wittgenstein, Strawson and justification in ‘Freedom and Resentment’.Benjamin De Mesel - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (3):603-614.
    D. Justin Coates argues that, in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, P. F. Strawson develops a modest transcendental argument for the legitimacy of our moral responsibility practices. I disagree with Coates’ claim that Strawson’s argument provides a justification, in Wittgenstein’s and/or Strawson’s sense of that term, of our responsibility practices. I argue that my interpretation of Strawson solves some difficulties with Coates’ argument, while retaining its advantages.
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  21. Phenomenology as Critique: Teleological–Historical Reflection and Husserl’s Transcendental Eidetics.Andreea Smaranda Aldea - 2016 - Husserl Studies 32 (1):21-46.
    Many have deemed ineluctable the tension between Husserl’s transcendental eidetics and his Crisis method of historical reflection. In this paper, I argue that this tension is an apparent one. I contend that dissolving this tension and showing not only the possibility, but also the necessity of the successful collaboration between these two apparently irreconcilable methods guarantees the very freedom of inquiry Husserl so emphatically stressed. To make this case, I draw from Husserl’s synthetic analyses of type and concept (...)
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  22. Can Determinists Act Under the Idea of Freedom?Martin F. Fricke - 2023 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):49-64.
    Determinism which denies freedom of action is a common philosophical view. Is the action of such determinists incompatible with Kant’s claim that a rationally willed being “cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom” [G 4, 448]? In my paper, I examine Kant’s argument for this claim at the beginning of the Third Section of the Groundwork and argue that it amounts to the assertion that one cannot act while being aware of being guided by invalid principles. (...)
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  23. We Don't Need No Noumena? Freedom Through Rational Self-Cultivation in Kant.Louise R. Chapman - 2016 - Pli 1 (Special Volume: Self-Cultivation):55-69.
    In this paper I argue that we find in Kant a more plausible alternative to his transcendental conception of freedom. In the Metaphysics of Morals in particular, we find a naturalistic conception of freedom premised upon a theory of rational self-cultivation. The motivation for a naturalising reading of Kant is two-fold. On the one hand, a naturalistic conception of freedom avoids the charges levelled against Kant’s 'panicky metaphysics', which both forces us to accept an ontologically extravagant (...)
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  24. Cientificismo em esteróides: uma revisão da ‘Liberdade Evolui’ (Freedom Evolves) por Daniel Dennett (2003) (revisão revisada 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Delírios Utópicos Suicidas no Século XXI Filosofia, Natureza Humana e o Colapso da Civilization- Artigos e Comentários 2006-2019 5ª edição. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 95-111.
    ' ' As pessoas dizem repetidas vezes que a filosofia não progride realmente, que ainda estamos ocupados com os mesmos problemas filosóficos que os gregos. Mas as pessoas que dizem isso não entendem por que tem que ser assim. É porque a nossa língua permaneceu a mesma e continua a seduzir-nos a fazer as mesmas perguntas. Contanto que continue a ser um verbo ́para ser ́ que pareça como se ele funciona da mesma forma como ́para comer e beber ́, (...)
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  25.  94
    Kant on Cognition and Knowledge.Markus Kohl - forthcoming - In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Kant. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    I discuss the difference and the connections between Kant’s notions of cognition (Erkenntnis) and knowledge (Wissen). Unlike knowledge, cognition is a representational state which need not have the propositional structure of a judgments. Even cognitions that have such a structure need not coincide with knowledge, because they might rather have the doxastic status of opinion or faith, or they might be false (whereas knowledge is a certain recognition of truth). I argue that while Kant distinguishes between many different species of (...)
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  26. Schleiermacher on the Philosopher’s Stone: the Shaping of Schleiermacher’s Early Ethics by the Kantian Legacy.Jacqueline Mariña - 1999 - Journal of Religion 79 (2):193-215.
    This article explores the early Schleiermacher's attempts to deal with difficult philosophical problems arising from Kant's ethics, specifically Kant's notion of transcendental freedom. How do we connect a transcendentally free act with the nature of the subject? Insofar as the act is transcendentally free, it cannot be understood in terms of causes, and this means that it cannot be connected with the previous state of the individual before he or she engaged in the act. I work through Schleiermacher's (...)
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  27. Transformation and Personal Identity In Kant.Jacqueline Marina - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (4):479-497.
    In this paper I explore how Kant’s development of the idea of the disposition in the Religion copes with problems implied by Kant’s idea of transcendental freedom. Since transcendental freedom implies the power of absolutely beginning a state, and therefore of absolutely beginning a series of the consequences of that state, a transcendentally free act is divorced from the preceding state of an agent, and would thus seem to be divorced from the agent’s character as well. (...)
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  28. Ist die Lehrbarkeit der Tugend vereinbar mit Kant’s Theorie der Willensfreiheit?Markus Kohl - forthcoming - In Dörflinger Bernd, Hüning Dieter & Kruck Günter (eds.), Kant als Tugendethiker? Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie. Olms Verlag.
    In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant declares that virtue “can and must be taught.” This claim raises two problems. First, it is in tension with Kant’s emphasis on the absolute moral responsibility that each individual agent owes to her transcendental freedom. Second, it raises the question of how the empirical events that constitute moral education can have an impact on atemporal moral choices. Concerning the second issue, I argue that Kant has a coherent framework for representing how empirical (...)
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  29. Kants subjektivistische Begründung von Moral und Freiheit im Naturrecht Feyerabend.Markus Kohl - 2021 - In Haakonssen Knud, Grunert Frank & Diethelm Crystal (eds.), Natural Law 1625-1850. Brill. pp. 150-171.
    “Naturrecht Feyerabend” is a collection of student notes taken on a lecture that Kant gave around the time he was working on the Groundwork. I show that these notes portray Kant as proposing a defense of morality and freedom whose “subjectivism” is unparalleled by anything that we find in his major published works. Kant here traces both the normativity of the moral principle that we must treat humanity as an end in itself and the legitimacy of regarding ourselves as (...)
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  30. The Thesis Argument of Kant’s Third Antinomy.Corey W. Dyck - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 475-484.
    The Thesis of Kant’s Third Antinomy asserts that, because it is “necessary to assume another causality through freedom” in order to derive all the appearances of the world, “causality in accordance with the laws of nature is not the only one” (A444/B472). The argument Kant supplies in support of this, however, has been the subject of interpretative disagreement since at least Schopenhauer, with the most plausible reconstructions being dismissed as question-begging, resting on a conflation relating to the principle of (...)
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  31. Beauty as a Symbol of Morality.Zhengmi Zhouhuang - 2019 - In Das Selbst und die Welt - Denken, Handeln und Hoffen in der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie. pp. 113-134.
    Kant uses the concept of the symbol to show the complicated relationship between the autonomy of beauty and its systematic function as a transition from nature to freedom, which are the two most important topics in the third Critique. Beauty’s symbolism of morality lies in the analog between aesthetic reflection and moral disposition; concretely, it lies in the purity or disinterestedness and self-legislation as negative and positive freedom in both subjective states of mind. In this scenario, beauty’s symbolism (...)
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  32. Circumstantial and Constitutive Moral Luck in Kant's Moral Philosophy.Robert J. Hartman - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    The received view of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it precludes all moral luck. But I offer a plausible interpretation according to which Kant embraces moral luck in circumstance and constitution. I interpret the unconditioned nature of transcendental freedom as a person’s ability to do the right thing no matter how she is inclined by her circumstantial and constitutive luck. I argue that various passages about degrees of difficulty relating to circumstantial and constitutive luck provide a reason to (...)
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  33. The Philosopher's Stone.Jacqueline Mariña - 2008 - In Transformation of the Self in the thought of Schleiermacher. Oxford University Press.
    This is the first chapter of my book Transformation of the Self in the Thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher. It is a look as some of Schleiermacher's early attempts to critique Kant's ethics, in particular with respect to the idea of transcendental freedom and the problem of act attribution.
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  34. Five perspectives on holding wrongdoers responsible in Kant.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32 (1):100-125.
    The first part of this paper surveys five perspectives in Kant’s philosophy on the quantity of retribution to be inflicted on wrongdoers, ordered by two dimensions of difference – whether they are theoretical or practical perspectives, and the quantity of retribution they prescribe: (1) theoretical zero, the perspective of theoretical philosophy; (2) practical infinity, the perspective of God and conscience; (3) practical equality, the perspective of punishment in public law; (4) practical degrees, the perspective we adopt in private relations to (...)
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  35. The Scope of Responsibility in Kant's Theory of Free Will.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (1):45-71.
    In this paper, I discuss a problem for Kant's strategy of appealing to the agent qua noumenon to undermine the significance of determinism in his theory of free will. I then propose a solution. The problem is as follows: given determinism, how can some agent qua noumenon be 'the cause of the causality' of the appearances of that agent qua phenomenon without being the cause of the entire empirical causal series? This problem has been identified in the literature (Ralph Walker (...)
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  36. Kantian Remorse with and without Self-Retribution.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2022 - Kantian Review 27 (3):421-441.
    This is a semifinal draft of a forthcoming paper. Kant’s account of the pain of remorse involves a hybrid justification based on self-retribution, but constrained by forward-looking principles which say that we must channel remorse into improvement, and moderate its pain to avoid damaging our rational agency. Kant’s corpus also offers material for a revisionist but textually-grounded alternative account based on wrongdoers’ sympathy for the pain they cause. This account is based on the value of care, and has forward-looking constraints (...)
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  37. Kant’s Derivation of the Formula of the Categorical Imperative: How to Get it Right.Jacqueline Mariña - 1998 - Kant Studien 89 (2):167-178.
    This paper explores the charge by Bruce Aune and Allen Wood that a gap exists in Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative. I show that properly understood, no such gap exists, and that the deduction of the Categorical Imperative is successful as it stands.
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  38. The Prolegomena and the Critiques of Pure Reason.Gary Hatfield - 2001 - In Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant Und Die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 185-208.
    This chapter considers Kant's relation to Hume as Kant himself understood it when he wrote the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena. It first seeks to refine the question of Kant's relation to Hume's skepticism, and it then considers the evidence for Kant's attitude toward Hume in three works: the A Critique, Prolegomena, and B Critique. It argues that in the A Critique Kant viewed skepticism positively, as a necessary reaction to dogmatism and a spur toward critique. In his (...)
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  39. Kant's Mature Theory of Punishment, and a First Critique Ideal Abolitionist Alternative.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2017 - In Altman Matthew (ed.), Palgrave Kant Handbook.
    This chapter has two goals. First, I will present an interpretation of Kant’s mature account of punishment, which includes a strong commitment to retributivism. Second, I will sketch a non-retributive, “ideal abolitionist” alternative, which appeals to a version of original position deliberation in which we choose the principles of punishment on the assumption that we are as likely to end up among the punished as we are to end up among those protected by the institution of punishment. This is radical (...)
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  40. Kategorische Rechtsprinzipien in Zeiten der Postmoderne. Interview mit Prof. Dr Otfried Höffe.Shaveko Nikolai - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (1):62-73.
    This interview explores the extent to which Kant’s philosophy, which postulates certain moral principles categorically, has influenced the contemporary theory of justice. Many academics believe such principles to be relative and emphasise that justice lies beyond the remit of science. Otfried Höffe is convinced that categorical legal principles remain a valid subject for an academic discussion. In his works, he often appeals to Kantian philosophy. In the interview, Prof. Dr. О. Höffe refers to such famous German Neo-Kantian philosophers of law (...)
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  41. Kann man nichtzeitliche Verursachung verstehen? : Kausalitätstheoretische Anmerkungen zu Kants Freiheitsantinomie.Geert Keil - 2012 - In Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann & Bernd Ludwig (eds.), Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten?: Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus. Hamburg: Meiner. pp. 223-257.
    Die von Kant vorgeschlagene Auflösung der Freiheitsantinomie gehört zu denjenigen Theoriestücken, die auch für den transzendentalen Idealismus aufgeschlossene Philosophen schwer zu verteidigen finden. Dies gilt insbesondere für die Lehre von der nichtzeitlichen Verursachung. Nach dieser Doktrin hebt die »Causalität der Vernunft im intelligibelen Charakter […] nicht zu einer gewissen Zeit an, um eine Wirkung hervorzubringen«. In diesem Beitrag wird nicht Kants Auflösung der Freiheitsantinomie im Mittelpunkt stehen, sondern die Frage, wie das Junktim zwischen Freiheitsrettung und transzendentalem Idealismus allererst motiviert ist. (...)
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  42. Die dritte Antinomie und die Unterscheidung von Dingen an sich und Erscheinungen bei Kant.Wolfgang Ertl - 2016 - Nihon Kant Kenkyu 18:66-82.
    The distinction of things in themselves and appearances is an integral part of Kant’s transcendental idealism, yet it has often been met with rather significant hostility. Moreover, what surely has not contributed to the popularity of this Kantian doctrine is that there are, or at least there appear to be, two distinct models, detectable in Kant’s texts, to account for this distinction. Most commonly, these two models are called the “two aspect view” on the one hand and the “two (...)
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  43. “The Transition from Sensibility to Reason In Regressu”: Indeterminism in Kant's Reflexionen.Lionel Stefan Shapiro - 2001 - Kant Studien 92 (1):3-12.
    According to Roman Ingarden, transcendental idealism prevented Kant from "even undertaking an attempt" at elucidating freedom "in terms of the causal structure of the world." I show that this claim requires qualification. In a remarkable series of Critical-period Reflexionen (5611-4, 5616-9), Kant sketches a defense of the possibility of freedom that differs radically from his published ones by incorporating an indeterministic account of the phenomena. Anticipating Łukasiewicz, he argues that universal causal determination is consistent with an open (...)
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  44. The struggle for recognition and the authority of the second person.Thomas Khurana - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):552-561.
    In this introductory paper, I discuss the second-personal approach to ethics and the theory of recognition as two accounts of the fundamental sociality of the human form of life. The first section delineates the deep affinities between the two approaches. They both put a reciprocal social constellation front and center from which they derive the fundamental norms of moral and social life and a social conception of freedom. The second section discusses three points of contrast between the two approaches: (...)
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  45. Kant's One-World Phenomenalism: How the Moral Features Appear.Andrew Chignell - 2022 - In Karl Schafer & Nicholas Stang (eds.), The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds: New Essays on Kant's Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 337-359.
    The goal of this paper is to sketch an account of Kant’s signature metaphysical doctrine (transcendental idealism) that (a) has no supporters – as far as I am aware – in the contemporary literature, and (b) draws its primary motivation (as interpretation) from considerations regarding our practical situation and needs as agents. -/- The consideration I focus on here is that people not only have mental and moral features, but they also appear to us – in our daily experience (...)
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  46. The Implied Standpoint of Kant's Religion: An Assessment of Kant's Reply to an Early Book Review of Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason.Stephen R. Palmquist & Steven Otterman - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (1):73-97.
    In the second edition Preface of Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason Kant responds to an anonymous review of the first edition. We present the first English translation of this obscure book review. Following our translation, we summarize the reviewer's main points and evaluate the adequacy of Kant's replies to five criticisms, including two replies that Kant provides in footnotes added in the second edition. A key issue is the reviewer's claim that Religion adopts an implied standpoint, described using (...)
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  47. Libertad, determinación e indeterminación en una perspectiva tomista.Juan José Sanguineti - 2013 - Anuario Filosófico 46 (2):387-403.
    The Thomistic account of freedom as election and freedom as love of the transcendental good, which in its perfect achievement is indefectible, introduces a new and unexpected approach in relation to contemporary debates concerning compatibilism and incompatibilism between freedom and determinism. This article develops both aspects of freedom and tries to bring new light to the problem of defining and evaluating the concepts of determination and indeterminacy.
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  48. New Humanism -An Analytical Review.Sangita Sahu - 2023 - Akshara Multidisciplinary Research Journal 9 (3):106-109.
    Abstract The article undertakes ina socio- economic-political order free from exploitation, dogma, superstitions and discrimination, wherein every individual occupies the center stage in collective life. He is critical of speculative lain the empirical realities. It is argued that since the empirical realities are explainable by laws of nature postulation of transcendental entities is redundant and unwarranted. He seeks to show the futility of Parliamentary democracy as it vests power with the elected minority whereas the real power should rest in (...)
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  49. Real Repugnance and Belief about Things-in-Themselves: A Problem and Kant's Three Solutions (including one about Symbols).Andrew Chignell - 2010 - In Benjamin J. Bruxvoort Lipscomb & James Krueger (eds.), Kant's Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality. de Gruyter. pp. 177-209.
    Kant says that it can be rational to accept propositions on the basis of non-epistemic or broadly practical considerations, even if those propositions include “transcendental ideas” of supersensible objects. He also worries, however, about how such ideas (of freedom, the soul, noumenal grounds, God, the kingdom of ends, and things-in-themselves generally) acquire genuine positive content in the absence of an appropriate connection to intuitional experience. How can we be sure that the ideas are not empty “thought-entities (Gedankendinge)”—that is, (...)
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  50. Noumenal Power, Reasons, and Justification: A Critique of Forst.Sameer Bajaj & Enzo Rossi - forthcoming - In Ester Herlin-Karnell & Matthias Klatt (eds.), Constitutionalism Justified. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In this essay we criticise Rainer Forst's attempt to draw a connection between power and justification, and thus ground his normative theory of a right to justification. Forst draws this connection primarily conceptually, though we will also consider whether a normative connection may be drawn within his framework. Forst's key insight is that if we understand power as operating by furnishing those subjected to it with reasons, then we create a space for the normative contestation of any exercise of power. (...)
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