From 1900 onwards, scientists and novelists have explored the contours of a future society based on the use of “anthropotechnologies” (techniques applicable to human beings for the purpose of performance enhancement ranging from training and education to genome-based biotechnologies). Gradually but steadily, the technologies involved migrated from (science) fiction into scholarly publications, and from “utopia” (or “dystopia”) into science. Building on seminal ideas borrowed from Nietzsche, Peter Sloterdijk has outlined the challenges inherent in this development. Since time immemorial, and (...) at least since the days of Plato’s Academy, human beings have been interested in possibilities for (physical or mental) performance enhancement. We are constantly trying to improve ourselves, both collectively and individually, for better or for worse. At present, however, new genomics-based technologies are opening up new avenues for self-amelioration. Developments in research facilities using animal models may to a certain extent be seen as expeditions into our own future. Are we able to address the bioethical and biopolitical issues awaiting us? After analyzing and assessing Sloterdijk’s views, attention will shift to a concrete domain of application, namely sport genomics. For various reasons, top athletes are likely to play the role of genomics pioneers by using personalized genomics information to adjust diet, life-style, training schedules and doping intake to the strengths and weaknesses of their personalized genome information. Thus, sport genomics may be regarded as a test bed where the contours of genomics-based self-management are tried out. (shrink)

While it is possible to understand utopias and dystopias as particular kinds of sociopolitical systems, in this text we argue that utopias and dystopias can also be understood as particular kinds of information systems in which data is received, stored, generated, processed, and transmitted by the minds of human beings that constitute the system’s ‘nodes’ and which are connected according to specific network topologies. We begin by formulating a model of cybernetic information-processing properties that characterize utopias and dystopias. It is (...) then shown that the growing use of neuroprosthetic technologies for human enhancement is expected to radically reshape the ways in which human minds access, manipulate, and share information with one another; for example, such technologies may give rise to posthuman ‘neuropolities’ in which human minds can interact with their environment using new sensorimotor capacities, dwell within shared virtual cyberworlds, and link with one another to form new kinds of social organizations, including hive minds that utilize communal memory and decision-making. Drawing on our model, we argue that the dynamics of such neuropolities will allow (or perhaps even impel) the creation of new kinds of utopias and dystopias that were previously impossible to realize. Finally, we suggest that it is important that humanity begin thoughtfully exploring the ethical, social, and political implications of realizing such technologically enabled societies by studying neuropolities in a place where they have already been ‘pre-engineered’ and provisionally exist: in works of audiovisual science fiction such as films, television series, and role-playing games. (shrink)

One of the most historically recent and damaging blows to the reputation of utopianism came from its association with the totalitarian regimes of Hitler’s Third Reich and Mussolini’s Fascist party in World War II and the prewar era. Being an apologist for utopianism, it seemed to some, was tantamount to being an apologist for Nazism and all of its concomitant horrors. The fantasy principle of utopia was viewed as irretrievably bound up with the irrationalism of modern dictatorship. While these (...) conclusions are somewhat understandable given the broad strokes that definitions of utopia are typically painted with, I will show in this paper that the link between the mythos of fascism and the constructs of utopianism results from an unfortunate conflation at the theoretical level. The irrationalism of any mass ethos and the rationalism of the thoughtful utopian planner are, indeed, completely at odds with each other. I arrive at this conclusion via an analysis of the concepts of myth and narrative, and the relationships these have with the concept of utopia. (shrink)

A critique of the prediction that technology will end humans' direct involvement in work. Contentions: a workless world is not without qualification desirable; it is not attainable by technology alone; the end sought does not in and by itself justify present job ending applications. Underlying these contentions: a claim that utopian visions with regard to work function as ideologies. Evidence for this claim derived from revisiting past non-industrial and industrial fantasies regarding a work-free utopia.

Although the question of religion did not feature prominently in Jürgen Habermas’s early political theory, his more recent work has continuously addressed the topic. This later interest in religion is grounded in what one commentator in a volume on The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, cited as the urgent need to integrate religious voices in the workings of public reason in order to avoid social disharmony and to thwart potential violence. However, the following paper argues that the hermeneutic (...) procedures Habermas develops for the public sphere cannot bear the weight that his later understanding of religion demands of them. Such an insight validates Paul Ricoeur’s earlier argument that Habermas’s “depth hermeneutics,” were themselves utopic in nature. It is from this vantage point that a return to Ricoeur's thought is justified, through which a more productive understanding of the public potential of religious discourse can be understood. (shrink)

The article analyzes the main aspects of the interpretation of philosophical thinking by the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowskі (1927–2009). He is more known as a brilliant disputant on the history of Marxism and the prospects for the further development of Marxist theory, but his thoughts on the nature and functions of philosophical thinking in the broadest sense are of no less importance, since they address the painful issue of the autonomy of thinking. The purpose of the article is to reconstruct (...) the principles that, according to the philosopher, would allow thinking to maintain its autonomy under the pressure of ideas and ideologies. Utopia and nihilism in the interpretation of L. Kolakowskі appear as temptations of the modern world. It is in the quest for defending from these “monsters” (L. Kolakowskі) that the philosopher comes to the conclusion that the basis of utopia and nihilism are certain ideas about the truth. Through the prism of this theoretical discovery, he reveals the importance of consensus, tolerance, compromise, and non-consistency (inconsistency) as epistemological tools of support or undermining of ideologies. The basic epistemological model the philosopher used has been reproduced by means of theoretical reconstruction. This is the attitude of the subject to the truth, which is realized in two ways: to either master the truth on the basis of certain beliefs or neglect the truth on the basis of other beliefs. With the help of this model, the philosopher comes to understanding that dogmatism and unification are not only utopian diseases but also nihilists. The reason for this is loyalty to one’s own truth, that is, thinking without gaps based on unchanging principles and aimed at reproducing certain institutional and social constants. Instead, inconsistency as a principle forms a completely different setting, the advantage of which is that it extends to itself and frees a thinker from the need to be or not to be consistent, but does not relieve the search of truth and meaning, without which human existence is impossible, according to L. Kolakowskі. The reconstruction was carried out on the basis of analysis of articles and essays of various years, combined with the development of concepts of utopia and nihilism as alternative projects of human existence, rooted in the epistemological directions of the subject. (shrink)

The attitude to the Bible is a seismograph for scrutinizing the attitude of Zionism, in general, and that of the settlers, in particular, to their ideological and political world view. To where in the Bible are the settlers returning? To the Land of Canaan, to the land of the Patriarchs, or perhaps to the Kingdom of David? And what is the meaning of this return? It is not only the land that is basic to this question, but the relationship of (...) the Land of Israel to the people of Israel. In this article, we will mainly address the radical theological facets of the settler movement, not the proponents of Greater Israel. Our article will focus on the replication of settler theology from the first stage of Gush Emunim and the act of settlement, which in the opinion of the settlers is in accord with the continuation and completion of the Zionist project, to a more metaphysical phase, in which the centrality of the act of settlement gives way to Hassidic or kabbalistic thinking. The models which we present, make possible a fresh look at the utopian thinking and radical theology that are nourished by the settler movement and reflect a new, non-homogeneous stage. (shrink)

Contemporary politics is often said to lack utopias. For prevailing understandings of the practical force of political theory, this looks like cause for celebration. As blueprints to apply to political practice, utopias invariably seem too strong or too weak. Through an immanent critique of political realism, I argue that utopian thought, and political theory generally, is better conceived as supplying an orientation to politics. Realists including Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss explain how utopian programs like universal human rights poorly orient (...) their adherents to politics, but the realists wrongly conclude that utopias and other ideal theories necessarily disorient us. As I show through an analysis of utopian claims made by Michel Foucault, Malcolm X, and John Rawls, utopias today can effectively disrupt entrenched forms of legitimation, foster new forms of political identity, and reveal new possibilities within existing institutions. Utopias are needed to understand the political choices we face today. (shrink)

World food production is facing exorbitant challenges like climate change, use of resources, population growth, and dietary changes. These, in turn, raise major ethical and political questions, such as how to uphold the right to adequate nutrition, or the right to enact a gastronomic culture and to preserve the conditions to do so. Proposals for utopic solutions vary from vertical farming and lab meat to diets filled with the most fanciful insects and seaweeds. Common to all proposals is a polarized (...) understanding of food and diets, famously captured by Warren Belasco in the contraposition between technological fixes and anthropological fixes. According to the first, technology will deliver clean, just, pleasurable, affordable food; future generations will not need to adjust much of their dietary cultures. According to the second, future generations should dramatically change their dietary habits (what they eat and how they eat it) to achieve a sustainable diet. The two fixes found remarkably distinct perspectives over dietary politics and the ethics of food production and consumption. In this paper we argue that such polarized thinking rests on a misrepresentation of the ontological status of food, which in turn affects the underlying ethical and political issues. Food is a socially constructed object that draws in specific ways on habits, norms, traditions, geographical, and climatic conditions. Although this thesis seems somewhat obvious, its consequences on the ethical and political perspectives on the future of food have not been derived properly. After introducing the issue at stake (¤1), we point out the polarities that characterize food utopias (¤2) and their ontological faults (¤3). We hence suggest that a socio-ontological analysis of food can better deliver the principles for a foundation of food utopias (¤4). (shrink)

In the first stage of his thinking Karl Marx founded his revolutionary politics on philosophical speculation, while in the second (mature) stage he relied on economics and the theory of exploitation based on his theory of surplus value. Marxism, however, developed in the opposite direction. After Marx's economic doctrine became vulnerable to powerful objections, Marxists tried to find a refuge in his early philosophical writings and in this way avoid refutation. Ultimately this attempt proved unsuccessful too.

Human obsolescence is imminent. We are living through an era in which our activity is becoming less and less relevant to our well-being and to the fate of our planet. This trend toward increased obsolescence is likely to continue in the future, and we must do our best to prepare ourselves and our societies for this reality. Far from being a cause for despair, this is in fact an opportunity for optimism. Harnessed in the right way, the technology that hastens (...) our obsolescence can open us up to new utopian possibilities and enable heightened forms of human flourishing. (shrink)

Populations in developed societies are rapidly aging: fertility rates are at all-time lows while life expectancy creeps ever higher. This is triggering a social crisis in which shrinking youth populations are required to pay for the care and retirements of an aging majority. Some people argue that by investing in the right kinds of lifespan extension technology – the kind that extends the healthy and productive phases of life – we can avoid this crisis (thereby securing a ‘longevity dividend’). This (...) chapter argues that this longevity dividend is unlikely to be paid if lifespan extension coincides with rampant technological unemployment. This does not mean that we should not pursue lifespan extension, but it does mean that the argument in its favor needs to rest on other grounds. After articulating these grounds, the chapter proceeds to consider the implications this has for our vision of the extended life, postwork utopia. It argues that this vision may need to be reconceived and suggests that one plausible reconception involves prioritizing the role of games in the well-lived life. (shrink)

It examines the concept of utopia through an analysis of a major work of Greek literature, Aris Alexandrou's "The Mission Box.".

Este artigo tem por objetivo analisar o significado do termo 'utopia'. Para isso, é fundamental tratar da obra de Morus – origem do termo. O estudo aborda a formação do termo e a atribuição de significado negativo de fantasia e impossibilidade, o qual é rechaçado como incompreensão do movimento completo que caracteriza a utopia. Tal impressão de ilusão repousaria sobre o focar-se apenas no exercício imaginativo eutópico. A utopia é compreendida aqui como processo dialético fundado na análise (...) de uma sociedade distópica e proposição de uma antítese eutópica, cuja síntese é a ação prática transformadora no processo histórico. (shrink)

Cualquier propuesta de alternativa a la democracia representativa, sea para mejorarla, sea para sustituirla por otro tipo de forma política, debería de tomar en cuenta dos tipos de restricciones para que la alternativa en cuestión tenga mayores probabilidades de éxito. Al primer grupo de restricciones los llamaremos factores limitantes de la conducta humana, mientras que al segundo grupo los llamaremos funciones impropias de esa forma política, es decir, las funciones que no debería tener. Tanto los factores limitantes de la conducta (...) humana como las funciones impropias de una forma política son restricciones sobre lo que realmente, es decir, no utópicamente, podríamos hacer para mejorar a la democracia y en general a la gobernabilidad de las sociedades. Esas restricciones, que a continuación señalaré, constituyen los argumentos que me llevan a plantear la siguiente tesis: la democracia representativa puede y debe ser mejorada al reducir su alcance económico, político y social, pero continúa siendo una mejor opción de gobierno que cualquier alternativa, incluyendo la demarquía. (shrink)

This article is a review of Erik Olin Wright’s 2010 book Envisioning Real Utopias. The review focuses on certain topics such as his understanding of ‘capitalism,’ his conception of worker cooperatives, and the general issues surrounding markets, the Left, and Marxism.

Abstract: In 1934 Gadamer delivered the lecture Plato und die Dichter. Its central topic was the relationship between poetry, philosophy and politics in Plato’s thought. Gadamer developed an original phenomenological investigation on Plato’s ethical-political philosophy and the role that art played in it, in which the dimension of language and the meaning of utopia are structural for his arguments. This article aims, in the first place, to elucidate some political dimensions of Plato und die Dichter. In order to do (...) this, I will carry out a critical review of Donatella Di Cesare’s and Dennis Schmidt’s contemporary readings of these aspects. In the conclusions, after briefly analysing in the third section the relationship between phrónēsis, aretḗ and andreía in the Platonic dialogues, I will try to demonstrate how these notions illuminate the question of the seduction of power (neglected by Schmidt in his reading of Gadamer’s Plato), as well as the inseparability of this problem with respect to the dialectical conception of utopia. It will be suggested that it is possible, from and beyond the Gadamerian reading of Plato, to rethink the idea of civil disobedience and the political value of the myth from standpoint of utopia. // Resumen: En 1934 Gadamer pronunció la conferencia Plato und die Dichter,cuyo tema central era la relación entre poesía, filosofía y política en el pensamiento platónico. Allí desarrolló una original investigación fenomenológica sobre la filosofía ético-política de Platón y el lugar que el arte ocupaba en ella, en la que la dimensión del lenguaje y el significado de la utopía son estructurales para sus argumentaciones. El presente artículo se propone, en primer lugar, elucidar algunos aspectos de la dimensión política de Plato und die Dichter. Para ello, se realizará una revisión crítica de las lecturas contemporáneas de estos aspectos por parte de Donatella Di Cesare y Dennis Schmidt. En las conclusiones, tras analizar brevemente en el tercer apartado la relación entre phrónēsis, aretḗ y andreía en los diálogos platónicos, intentaré demostrar cómo estas nociones alumbran la cuestión de la seducción del poder (descuidada por Schmidt en su lectura del Platón gadameriano), así como la inseparabilidad de este problema con respecto a la concepción dialéctica de la utopía. A partir de esto último se sugerirá que es posible, a partir y más allá de la lectura gadameriana de Platón, repensar la idea de “desobediencia civil” y el valor político del mito desde el punto de vista de la utopía. (shrink)

La negativa a imaginar la "otra" sociedad más allá del capitalismo no está ajena a la prohibición judía de nombrar o describir a Dios. Cualquiera que sea la fuente del tabú, de las principales figuras relacionadas con la Escuela de Frankfurt, solo Mar- cuse se ha atrevido en los últimos años a romperlo. Solo Marcuse ha tratado de decir lo indecible en un esfuerzo cada vez más urgente por reintroducir un molde utópico a la teoría socialista.

A utopia is an ideal society that does not exist, which the author conceives better than the society in which he lives. A predilection for it is a social dream driven by a narrowing of reality and a desire for a better way of life. All forms of philosophical, social, scientific, religious and literary utopia raise questions such as: Can the way we live be improved? What are the faults of the society or the world in which we (...) live? What is the best way to lead a better life? This article aims to address the concept of a utopia in an analytical way, and discusses the most prominent images of utopias such as Plato's Republic, Al-Farabi's Utopia, More's Utopia, Bacon's The New Atlantis, Skinner's Walden Two. It shows that utopia is the mirror of human hope. People see in it themselves and love what they love and hate from it what they hate. Their love drives them to seek perfection, and their hatred drives them to seek reform. المدينة الفاضلة أو اليوتوبيا هي مجتمع مثالي لا وجود له، يتصوره المؤلف على نحو أفضل من المجتمع الذي يعيش فيه. والميل إليها هو حلم اجتماعي يدفعه ضيق بالواقع ورغبة في طريقة أفضل للحياة. وتطرح كل صور اليوتوبيا الفلسفية، والاجتماعية، والعلمية، والدينية، والأدبية، أسئلة من قبيل: هل يمكن تحسين الطريقة التي نحيا بها؟ وما عيوب المجتمع أو العالم الذي نعيش فيه؟ وما الطريقة المثلى لحياة أفضل من التي نحياها؟ ويهدف هذا المقال إلى تناول مفهوم المدينة الفاضلة بطريقة تحليلية، ويناقش أبرز صور المدن الفاضلة مثل الجمهورية (أفلاطون)، والمدينة الفاضلة (الفارابي)، ويوتوبيا (توماس مور)، وأطلنطس الجديدة (فرنسيس بيكون)، ووالدين تو (سكنر). ويبن أن اليوتوبيا هي مرآة الأمل البشري. يرى فيها الناس أنفسهم فيحبون منها ما يحبون ويبغضون منها ما يبغضون. يدفعهم حبهم إلى التماس التمام، ويدفعهم بغضهم إلى التماس الاصلاح. (shrink)

Estamos cansados das utopias. Estamos cansados das utopias literárias e dos devaneios sobre a Cidade ideal: as utopias em ação que foram os totalitarismos do século XX nos nausearam. Os horrores reais de uns nos impedem de sonhar com os outros. Nossas antigas utopias De Platão a Thomas More, de Étienne Cabet a Fourier, as utopias falavam da rejeição do presente e do real: “Existe o mal na comunidade dos homens”. Mas não lhe contrapunham o futuro nem o possível; elas (...) descreviam um impossível desejável: “Seria bom viver lá!”. Não eram programas políticos planejando meios de atingir um objetivo racional. Contentavam-se em querer o melhor. E mais valia o Bem nunca obtido a um Mal menor amanhã. As utopias eram revolucionárias, mas em palavras: “Os homens vivem assim, sempre viveram assim, deveriam viver de outra forma”. Todas as utopias comunistas do século XIX foram assim. Quando se tratava de arregaçar as mangas, havia um esforço para criar à distância, e durante um certo período, uma pequena comunidade real mais ou menos em conformidade com o sonho. Os utopistas eram revolucionários quando não eram realistas, e quando eram realistas não eram revolucionários. Nunca visaram a eliminar o Mal para sempre e derrubar as comunidades políticas existentes para instaurar o Bem. Por exemplo, Étienne Cabet, com seu comunismo cristão, imaginou a cidade ideal de Icária e tentou fundar uma colônia icariana em New Orleans, em 1847. Charles Fourier, com seu falanstério, estava em busca de uma harmonia universal que se formaria livremente por afeição de seus membros. O mais realista de todos, Saint-Simon, descreveu uma sociedade fraterna, cujos membros mais competentes (industriais, cientistas, artistas, intelectuais, engenheiros) tinham a tarefa de administrar a França da forma mais econômica possível, a fim de torná-la um país próspero, onde reinariam o interesse geral e o bem comum, a liberdade, a igualdade e a paz; a sociedade seria uma grande fábrica. Mas o sonho de uma associação entre industriais e operários baseada na fraternidade, na estima e na confiança desfez-se na realidade das grandes empresas capitalistas dos saint-simonianos, no Canal de Suez e nos caminhos de ferro franceses. No fundo, aconteceu o mesmo com os teóricos do "comunismo científico" no século XIX, Karl Marx e Friedrich Engels. Eles, é claro, eram autenticamente revolucionários e profundamente realistas, pois fundamentaram seu projeto político em uma análise do funcionamento econômico e histórico do capitalismo, mas a ideia comunista e a abolição da propriedade privada permaneceram em estado de esboço nas obras dos autores do Manifesto, um ideal abstrato e, por assim dizer, vazio, ou, em todo caso, tão utópico quanto nos teóricos franceses. Nos Manuscritos de 1844, a ideia comunista é pura especulação conceitual em torno da "apropriação real da essência humana pelo homem e para o homem" ou "a verdadeira solução da luta entre existência e essência, entre objetivação e afirmação de si mesmo, entre liberdade e necessidade". Em A ideologia alemã, é uma expressão puramente verbal para designar "o movimento real que abole a ordem estabelecida". Em Engels, é "o ensinamento das condições da libertação do proletariado" (Princípios do comunismo). E uma ideia até mais vaga e abstrata nos marxistas do que nos utopistas, pois é dissociada de qualquer tentativa de fundamentação conceitual e qualquer análise concreta dos meios de sua realização. E ainda como um sonho de Cidade ideal, em que "cada um recebe conforme suas necessidades", como circulava entre os utopistas franceses do comunismo no século XIX. Ao contrário de suas predecessoras, as utopias em ação dos totalitarismos do século XX situam-se no cruzamento de um ideal revolucionário ("partir ao meio a História do mundo", segundo Nietzsche em Ecce homo, depois retomado pelos maoístas) e um programa realista de transformação política radical. Enquanto as utopias de Platão a Engels evitavam os meios de se atingir o ideal para preservar sua perfeição, as utopias em ação fazem o inverso: retardam indefinidamente a realização do ideal para empregar da melhor forma os meios capazes de realizá-lo. Não é mais uma questão de sonhar com o Bem, mas de lutar indefinidamente contra o Mal. E, desde a República de Platão,5 o Mal na comunidade política tem duas faces: ou é Impuro ou Desigual. Portanto, a Cidade deve ser: ou uma comunidade de iguais, cuja unidade perfeita é garantida pelo fato de que tudo é comum entre eles; ou uma comunidade pura, cuja unidade perfeita é garantida pelo fato de que todos têm a mesma origem. Define-se ou pelo comum das posses (nada deve pertencer a ninguém, mas a todos) ou pela identidade dos seres (ninguém deve ser estrangeiro): o comum que temos (ou deveríamos ter) ou aquilo que somos (ou deveríamos ser). Naturalmente, nessa união de idealismo revolucionário e realismo programático, o Bem absoluto, o Puro, o Comum, é uma idealidade fora de alcance: o combate mortal contra o Mal torna-se a obsessão dos regimes de terror. O Puro deve começar excluindo. Mas nunca chega a excluir por completo, porque o já purificado nunca é suficientemente puro. A ponto de a ideia se transformar em um delírio infinito de rechaçar e depois expulsar, a fim de exterminar. Os judeus e os ciganos, que encarnavam o micróbio maléfico que ameaça a pureza da raça e do sangue ariano, tinham de ser caçados até nos mais ínfimos recantos do território sob domínio nazista e eliminados como pulgas. O Comum e o comunismo também estão fora de alcance. Começa-se expropriando. Mas ainda há a propriedade e o privado. E, portanto, nunca se chega a expropriar, despossuir, comunizar por completo. As lutas contra as classes (supostamente) proprietárias ou avessas à coletivização, os pequenos proprietários de terra, geram deportações em massa (deskulakização) ou organização sistemática de grandes fomes (Holodomor). Por isso, apesar da formidável esperança de emancipação que o ideal comunista representou durante quase um século para as classes ou povos explorados do mundo inteiro, ele se despedaçou no século XX contra o muro do "socialismo real". Nos antípodas do comunismo imaginado, ao qual se supunha que conduziria infalivelmente, o ideal comunista se transformou em uma máquina tirânica, burocrática e totalitária. A sociedade sem Estado sugerida por Engels na obra Anti- Dühring6 tornou-se seu contrário, uma ditadura do Estado contra a sociedade. O terrível fracasso dessa utopia em ação destruiu os sonhos de libertação coletiva — enquanto "a exploração do homem pelo homem" continua indo muito bem. Infelizmente, não se pode dizer o mesmo das utopias revolucionárias em nome do Puro. Enquanto o ideal comunista quase desapareceu dos programas políticos, a ideologia purista do sangue e da raça, a ilusão da origem comum (seja biológica ou religiosa) e, portanto, o ódio destruidor do estrangeiro continuam a alimentar as utopias coletivas e seus massacres em série: genocídio ruandês contra os tutsis, depuração étnica dos muçulmanos na ex-lugoslávia (em particular na Bósnia), limpeza étnica de cristãos, turcomanos xiitas e no autoproclamado "Estado islâmico" etc. O fim das utopias? Felizmente, parece que somos poupados de tudo isso em nossas "democracias ocidentais", após setenta anos de paz sob as asas da Europa, algumas décadas de relativa prosperidade econômica e tranquilidade política sob a frágil proteção de nossos sistemas representativos. Não acreditamos mais na salvação comum. Nem na salvação nem no comum. Há três razões para isso, todas as três interligadas: o fim do político, a desconfiança em relação ao Bem, o reino dos direitos individuais. As utopias políticas conduziram ao desastre. Não conseguem mais nos fazer sonhar com o futuro como faziam no passado, porque estamos absorvidos por nosso hoje e por nós mesmos. A política parece ter derrotado o político. A política são estratégias coletivas ou táticas individuais, é o império dos "eles" ou o reino dos "eus". O político é a afirmação da existência de um "nós" ("nós, o povo"), além das comunidades de famílias ou amigos, das comunidades regionais ou religiosas, além das identidades de gênero ou origem, e aquém da comunidade humana em geral. As peripécias usuais dos governos representativos sufocaram o sentimento de pertencimento coletivo e a aspiração a um destino comum, que ressurgem apenas quando uma emoção violenta abala o corpo social, quando existe uma ameaça extremista ou ocorre um atentado terrorista. Em situações normais, porém, os acasos da conquista ou do exercício do poder escondem o político, isto é, as condições de unidade da comunidade. Não acreditamos mais no Bem. Não sonhamos mais com uma Cidade bondosa, finalmente livre do Mal. Aspiramos simplesmente a uma sociedade — ou um mundo — menos má. Prova dessas aspirações são as manifestações que mobilizam a juventude dos países ocidentais ou sublevam os povos do planeta de vez em quando. Movimentos altermundialistas contra o capitalismo financeiro, Fórum Social Mundial (Porto Alegre), Occupy Wall Street, Indignados, Nuit Debout etc. Movimentos a favor da democracia nos países da Europa do Sul nos anos 1970, na América Latina e, em outros continentes, lutas de emancipação na praça da Paz Celestial (Pequim), na praça Tahrir (no Cairo), na praça Taksim (Istambul), de Sidi Bouzid (Tunísia), revolução dos guarda-chuvas (Hong Kong) etc. Apesar da diversidade de contextos e objetivos, em todas essas revoltas há uma constante que as distingue das utopias revolucionárias passadas: as pessoas se revoltam contra alguma coisa, elas não se mobilizam por alguma coisa. Sabemos o que elas rejeitam (injustiça, miséria, corrupção, humilhação, arbitrariedade, segregação e repressão), mas desconhecemos a que aspiram. Ou melhor, é como se tudo que desejassem fosse justamente um "menos" — menos injustiça, menos miséria, menos arbitrariedade, menos corrupção, menos segregação, menos repressão etc. —, ou o menos possível, mas nunca o impossível de um horizonte coletivo. Os que almejam em todo o mundo derrubar um poder tirânico ainda sonham com essa nossa "democracia" que não nos encanta mais, porque acreditamos que as liberdades fundamentais em que ela consiste são para sempre e ela se resume a votarmos esporadicamente em políticas que não nos satisfarão. Pois quando não há mais nada contra o que se revoltar, restam apenas motivos para reivindicar. Contudo, ninguém mais sonha com uma Cidade perfeita: nem os que protestam contra sua miséria e servidão nem os que lutam por condições de vida decentes e pela satisfação de seus interesses. Não há mais utopia política. Foi assim que se instalou entre nós o reino dos direitos individuais. Pois não desejamos mais um Estado ideal que nos una e nos faça um nós, um nós inédito, um nós que seja um nós mesmos: esperamos somente que esse Estado nos deixe em paz, cada um por si, e nos permita realizar as aspirações individuais a que acreditamos ter direito. O sonho de emancipação coletiva se estilhaçou em uma multiplicidade dispersa de desejos. Podemos indicar a data recente em que esse "nós" considerado poderoso demais começou a se encolher em "eus" triunfantes. Quando esses "eus" ainda usavam a máscara do antigo "nós" para se legitimar. No último terço do século XX, as reivindicações individualistas ainda tinham uma coloração revolucionária; as pessoas não sonhavam mais com a libertação de uma classe ou de um povo, mas ainda sonhavam com uma libertação política: a dos desejos individuais. O ideal proletário adquiriu um matiz libertário: foram os movimentos de "Maio de 68". O conceito de revolução recuava na história social e progredia nos costumes. Nesses movimentos dos países capitalistas ocidentais, as pessoas acreditavam, apoiavam, afirmavam em textos e discursos que tudo na vida de cada um era político por natureza, para além da própria política. O amor era político: elas acreditavam que as relações entre homens e mulheres, os sentimentos, a sexualidade eram determinados pela existência social — logo eram políticos. A arte também era política: a arte falsa era a arte reacionária, a música tonal, a pintura figurativa, o romance ou o cinema narrativos etc. A "verdadeira arte" era a das vanguardas, revolucionária na forma e messiânica no conteúdo. A moral, por sua vez, era política de um extremo a outro. Ou então era oca, ridícula. (Isso foi antes de tudo virar ética.) Este era o programa: libertação coletiva das aspirações individuais, "viver sem tempo morto e gozar sem obstáculos". Desde o início do século XXI, não existe mais utopia política. Nem sonhos de libertação social; ela se despedaçou contra o muro da realidade totalitária: de suas esperanças restam apenas algumas conquistas, cada vez mais frágeis, do Estado providência. Nem sonhos de realização libertária; eles se chocaram contra o fim das ilusões e o retorno do conservadorismo. Dos primeiros e dos segundos sobrou apenas o império dos direitos. A era do indivíduo não precisa mais se abrigar sob a ideologia da libertação: o vocabulário liberal dos direitos subjetivos é suficiente. De fato, os direitos individuais, na esteira e conforme o modelo muitas vezes infiel dos "direitos humanos", tornaram-se nosso único ideal, depois que perdemos a fé no Ideal. Pois a ideia de "direitos humanos" é a dupla negação de toda utopia política: porque se trata de "direitos" e porque se trata de "humanos". Cópia de: FRANCIS WOLFF. Três Utopias Contemporâneas. São Paulo: Unesp, 2018. (shrink)

This paper analyses Nozick's possible-worlds model of utopia. It identifies and examines three arguments in favour of the minimal state: (1) the minimal state is the real-world analogue of the possible-worlds model and can hence be considered to be inspiring; (2) the minimal state is the common ground of all possible utopian conceptions and can hence be universally endorsed; and (3) the minimal state is the best or at least a very good means for approximating or achieving utopia. (...) While constituting fascinating lines of inquiry, all arguments are found to be wanting and unable to yield the conclusions that Nozick intended to establish. Nonetheless, they establish interesting and important results, in particular the result that the minimal state is the maximal institutional structure that is in principle compatible with the complete satisfaction of the maximal non-arbitrary set of preferences that are in principle co-satisfiable, as well as the corollary that in utopia any state will exert at most the functions of a minimal state. (shrink)

Rawls’ realistic utopia has been subject to much criticism. The Realist claims Rawls’ realistic utopia to be too utopian. The Cosmopolitan, on the other hand, claims Rawls’ realistic utopia to be insufficiently utopian. In this essay, I argue that the criticism can be circumvented by means of clarifying an ambiguity in the concept of utopia. I argue that the Realist is not criticizing Rawls for being utopian, but unrealistic, impractical and idealistic (quixotic). The Cosmopolitan might be (...) right in criticizing Rawls for not being utopian enough. The orthodox understanding of utopia, adopted by the Cosmopolitan is, however, in itself quixotic. Drawing on Le Guin’s The Dispossessed, I propose a novel understanding of how utopia ought to be understood. Once the Rawlsian adopts this conception of utopia, it alleviates the objections raised by the Realist and the Cosmopolitan. (shrink)

Can we understand (German) idealism as emancipatory today, after the new realist critique? In this paper, I argue that we can do so by identifying a political theology of revolution and utopia at the theoretical heart of German Idealism. First, idealism implies a certain revolutionary event at its foundation. Kant’s Copernicanism is ingrained, methodologically and ontologically, into the idealist system itself. Secondly, this revolutionary origin remains a “non-place” for the idealist system, which thereby receives a utopian character. I define (...) the utopian as the ideal gap, produced by and from within the real, between the non-place of the real as origin and its reduplication as the non-place of knowledge’s closure, as well as the impulse, inherent in idealism, to attempt to close that gap and fully replace the old with the new. Based on this definition, I outline how the utopian functions in Kant, Fichte and Hegel. Furthermore, I suggest that idealism may be seen as a political-theological offshoot of realism, via the objective creation of a revolutionary condition. The origin of the ideal remains in the real, maintaining the utopian gap and the essentially critical character of idealism, both at the level of theory and as social critique. (shrink)

A critique of Habermas is theory of the three worlds as a foundation for criticism and social philosophy.

The Beginning and The End Of Utopia-Irfan Ajvazi -/- Utopians' mistake was not to think that the present is awful but to imagine that what exits must therefore describe reality.

The aim of this article is to explore Gadamer’s early reflections on Plato’s utopian thought and its potential topicality. In the following section, I will show how areté, understood as a hermeneutical and existential virtue, is dialectically related to ethics and politics in Gadamer’s phenomenological reception of Plato’s philosophy. I argue that, in Gadamer’s eyes, Socratic-Platonic self-understanding enables human beings to be aware of their political responsibilities, to recognize how they are existentially and mutually related to the other, and to (...) clarify dialectically their own existential possibilities in order to transcend their inherited world of values. In the third section, I aim to show how these are the grounds on which Gadamer’s initial thoughts on the utopian dimension of Platonic political philosophy developed, mainly through his further critical account of the works on the German “political Plato” published in Germany between 1927 and 1933, i.e., Kurt Singer’s Platon, der Gründer (1927), Julius Stenzel’s Platon. Der Erzieher (1928), and Kurt von Hildendrandt‘s Platon, Der Kampf des Geistes um die Macht (1933). Then, in the fourth section, I will express my own views on the relevance of reconsidering how the notions of areté, phrónesis, and andreía are already related in Plato’s dialogues, complementing the insights on Gadamer’s interpretation of areté in section two. My purpose is to go beyond Gadamer’s reading and provide us with a more solid ground to address his late reflections on political courage and its relations with his dialectical understanding of Platonic utopia as a myth. Therefore, I will explore the problem of civil disobedience, a topic that was actually not at the centre of Gadamer’s concerns, as a genuine mode of utopian political action which can enact a true deviation from the sophistic pólis and its understanding of power. Finally, in the conclusion, I will characterize Gadamer’s portrait of Platonic utopia as a dialectical myth which enables human beings to recognize when politics are being reduced to mere power abuse by the State and also suggest why Gadamer’s approach to utopias is still relevant today. (shrink)

The paper attempts to develop an immanent conception of natural law and natural rights of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.

This paper responds to an ingenious footnote from Robert Nozick’s book Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Using a table of four possible situations, Nozick defines what it is to be jealous, envious, begrudging, spiteful and competitive. I deny a claim that Nozick makes for his table, a claim needed for these definitions. I also point out that Nozick fails to capture what he has in mind by jealousy.

This paper introduces Richard Rorty’s notion of the liberal ironist and his vision of a liberal utopia and explores the implications of these for philosophical questions concerning morality, as well as morality in general. Rorty’s assertions of the contingency of language, society and self are explored. Under the contingency of language, the figure of the ironist is defined, and Rorty’s conception of vocabularies is discussed. Under the contingency of society, Rorty’s definition of liberalism, his opposition of literary culture to (...) materialist and metaphysical culture, and his notions concerning utopian politics are discussed. Under the contingency of self, Rorty’s critique of Kantian and his appropriations of Deweyan and Freudian conceptions of morality are presented. Other key factors discussed are Rorty’s theory of the separation of the private and public spheres of life and his ideas concerning cruelty and human solidarity. In this way, a critical analysis of Rorty’s proposed balance between private, ironic doubt and public, liberal social hope is presented and assessed in terms of its merit as a system of thought suited to the needs of post-metaphysical, liberal societies. (shrink)

Os direitos subjetivos são direitos e, em primeiro lugar, dos homens. Mas os "homens" também não conseguiriam coligar muito bem as energias. Acreditamos cada vez menos na humanidade. As reivindicações proliferam porque são irredutivelmente singulares. Essa é a diferença que vale e importa. Como diz Marcel Gauchet: em oposição ao ideal democrático original (de Rousseau, por exemplo), em que se exigia de: [...] cada cidadão que se apropriasse do ponto de vista do conjunto a partir de seu próprio ponto de (...) vista, na nova configuração que se desenha o que prevalece é a disjunção, e que cada um faça valer sua particularidade diante de uma instância do geral do qual não se pede em nenhum momento que ele abrace o ponto de vista. (GAUCHET, 1998). O homem nunca aparece no horizonte de nossas mobilizações, porque está sufocado nas novas formas de fazer o nós. É verdade que o homem, a humanidade, o humanismo nunca se deram bem com as utopias. Nem com as utopias literárias nem com as utopias em ação. As primeiras se apoiavam em certa concepção do ser humano: bom em si mesmo, mas vivendo em comunidades políticas que precisavam ser refundadas. As utopias em ação se apoiavam em uma visão geral da humanidade na história (raça contra raça, classe contra classe), mas a revolução que conduziria à libertação e à saída da história deveria ser realizada no interior de um país, de uma nação ou de um povo, mensageiro do destino de toda a humanidade. Foi assim com o nazismo. O ariano é o Prometeu da humanidade [...]; ele sempre mostrou ao homem o caminho que deveria percorrer para tornar-se o mestre dos outros seres vivos sobre a terra; se o fizessem desaparecer, uma escuridão profunda desceria sobre a terra, em alguns séculos a civilização humana acabaria e o mundo se tornaria um deserto (HITLER, 1939). E preciso acabar com o humanismo e o cosmopolitismo. E partir a história humana ao meio: ela sempre foi a história da luta da raça ariana contra seus inimigos, em particular contra a raça judia. E necessário recorrer a uma solução final: livrar a terra para sempre dos judeus para finalmente assegurar o triunfo da raça ariana: a Alemanha é a detentora desse papel predestinado. Foi assim com o "socialismo real". Mais uma vez era necessário partir a história humana ao meio. Ela sempre foi a história da luta de classes: não pode mais haver classes. Desde sempre houve propriedade privada. Ela deve ser abolida. Mas o fim definitivo das classes e da propriedade deve passar primeiro pela exacerbação da luta de classes no interior de um país: o proletariado e o campesinato são herdeiros desse papel histórico. Assim, na época em que o marxismo era considerado um horizonte intelectual intransponível, e a revolução proletária era vista como o horizonte intransponível desse horizonte, "o homem" do "humanismo" era desprezado porque supunha uma unidade de essência além das comunidades verdadeiras, definidas em si mesmas por um antagonismo fundamental: antagonismo interno das classes (exploradoras/exploradas), antagonismo externo dos povos (opressores/oprimidos) ou das culturas (dominantes/minoritárias) etc. Não se podia conceber uma causa comum à humanidade nem preparar ou defender uma revolução hipotética dos humanos. E, além do mais, contra quem e contra o quê? "Não vejo homem", dizia-se após Marx, "vejo apenas operários, burgueses, intelectuais." O homem não era a medida de todas as coisas, o verdadeiro padrão de medida era menor: por exemplo, os burgueses ou os proletários. A humanidade, ou melhor dizendo, a realidade da história definia-se em um nível inferior. As utopias revolucionárias parecem ter abandonado o horizonte ideológico de nossa Modernidade. Em todo caso, as utopias políticas. Mas pode ser que nossa época ainda tenha o poder de conceber novas utopias. Pois não nos livramos delas tão facilmente. Expulsas pela porta da história, elas retornam pela janela da imaginação. Expulsas de nosso ideal político, serão pós-políticas. Podemos vislumbrar essas novas utopias revolucionárias nos dois traços que definem o contemporâneo, através da ambiguidade da expressão "direitos humanos". Negativamente, delineiam-se de forma indireta a partir das dúvidas sobre o que somos. Positivamente, cumprem o que sabemos que somos: indivíduos. REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO GAUCHET, M. La religion dans la démocratie. Paris: Gallimard, 1998. Col. Folio Essas. HITLER, A. Mein Kampf. Mon combat. La Défense Française, 1939. (Édition intégrale) Cópia de: FRANCIS WOLFF. Três Utopias Contemporâneas. São Paulo: Unesp, 2018. (shrink)

-/- OS NOVOS CAMINHOS OPOSTOS DA UTOPIA: O HOMEM ENTRE DEUS E ANIMAL -/- THE NEW OPPOSITE WAYS OF UTOPIA: THE MAN BETWEEN GOD AND ANIMAL -/- Por: Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva -/- Na Antiguidade, em particular em Aristóteles, os homens eram definidos por duas grandes oposições. Acima deles, havia os deuses; abaixo deles, havia os animais. O que os homens tinham em comum com um opunha-os ao outro; e o que os distinguia de um ligava-os ao (...) outro. Os homens tinham em comum com os deuses o fato de serem racionais — o que os opunha aos animais, que não podem argumentar ou raciocinar. Mas os homens tinham em comum com os animais o fato de serem viventes mortais — o que os opunha aos deuses, que são viventes imortais. Havia, portanto, três tipos de viventes (zôa) ou, por assim dizer, três "faunas": os viventes imortais racionais, os viventes mortais irracionais e o homem, entre seus dois "Outros": nem irracional como os animais nem imortal como os deuses. Isso garantia a natureza humana. O homem está no centro do mundo, não no sentido de que é a espécie superior, mas no sentido de que sua natureza, por mais imperfeita que seja, está encerrada, e como que a meio caminho, entre duas outras naturezas perfeitas: o animal e o deus. Sabíamos o que tínhamos de fazer, pois sabíamos o que somos. Mas porque sabíamos que não somos nem animais nem deuses, sabíamos também o que não podíamos fazer. Querer subir ao céu dos deuses era pecar por húbris, pela "desmedida" daquele que quer ultrapassar seus limites naturais. Inversamente, tender a descer ao nível dos animais, abandonar sua faculdade racional, era cair na vergonhosa bestialidade. Hoje, porque não sabemos mais quem somos, nós, seres humanos, ora nos identificamos com os animais (liberais), ora com os deuses (libertarianos). Essas são as duas utopias de nossa Modernidade. Não utopias de quem imagina viver em outro lugar, mas utopias de quem imagina ser outro. Não podemos mais pensar o que somos: seres humanos. Perdemos as duas referências que nos definiam: nossos limites superior e inferior. Como os outros animais, somos fruto da evolução natural e o que nos diferencia deles não é nem uma diferença absoluta nem uma oposição de natureza. Hoje sabemos que existe consciência na maioria dos animais superiores; que há modos de comunicação em muitas espécies sociais e de inteligência nos primatas; e que há modos de transmissão de conhecimentos culturais em certas espécies de chimpanzés etc. Por outro lado, não acreditamos mais que o Céu seja habitado por deuses imortais. Para boa parte da Modernidade, o Céu é vazio: é o que chamamos de secularização do mundo; e para outra parte da Modernidade, para a qual Deus ainda é mestre absoluto, Ele é tão inconcebivelmente grande, tão elevado e tão distante de nós que não podemos mais nos definir em relação a Ele. Portanto, não há nenhuma distinção que nos separe dos animais, mas ao mesmo tempo há uma distância infinita que nos separa do além. Surgem então as duas grandes utopias que hoje se contrapõem no horizonte humano. De um lado, a utopia pós-humanista é herdeira do ideal libertário do gozo; ela sonha como um novo "eu", mais poderoso do que jamais foi, e triunfante sobre sua própria animalidade e mortalidade. De outro lado, a utopia animalista é herdeira das grandes esperanças de libertação coletiva do século XX; ela sonha com um novo "nós", uma nova comunidade além da política, a comunidade de todos os animais sensíveis. Sonhamos para o homem um futuro divino ou um destino animal. Haveria lugar para uma utopia humanista entre essas duas utopias anti-humanistas? Ainda é possível sonhar para a humanidade um destino à sua medida? É muito tarde para uma nova utopia política ou ainda não é hora para uma utopia humanista, para a revolução cosmopolítica? Seria possível deduzir a priori esses três ideais a partir de uma única certeza: nós nos tornamos indivíduos. Mas como seriam os programas revolucionários na era dos direitos subjetivos? Livrar-nos do Mal. Nós quem? Talvez você e eu. Ou os habitantes de uma nova Cidade pós-política. O primeiro tipo de programa seria o de uma utopia libertariana: o Mal seria tudo que obstrui e limita a ação, o pensamento e a vida individuais: a doença, a velhice, a morte, em resumo: a animalidade. O direito seria o privilégio de viver melhor, viver mais, viver sempre. Eu tenho esse direito! Quem seríamos nós? Seríamos apenas, e para sempre, eus. Nossa ética seria na primeira pessoa: ser eu plenamente. Pós-humanismo. Quanto ao segundo tipo de programa, das duas uma. Ou os habitantes da nova Cidade seriam de um gênero novo ou então a própria Cidade é que seria de um gênero novo. No primeiro caso, os indivíduos não seriam mais humanos, pois a Cidade seria estendida a todos os seres sensíveis. O Mal seria o sofrimento ou a dominação. A Cidade ideal, a Calípolis de Platão, seria uma Zoópolis. Todos os seres sensíveis seriam detentores dos mesmos direitos, isto é, de imunidades. Quem seríamos nós? Seríamos animais sensíveis aos animais sensíveis. Nossa ética seria na segunda pessoa: compaixão, culpa. Animalismo. No segundo caso, os indivíduos seriam humanos, pois a Cidade seria estendida a todos os homens. O Mal seria a guerra ou a condição de estrangeiro. A Cidade boa, a Calípolis de Platão, seria uma Cosmópolis. Todos os seres humanos seriam detentores dos mesmos direitos, isto é, de liberdades iguais. Quem seríamos nós? Seríamos a humanidade. Nossa ética seria na terceira pessoa: justiça. Cosmopolitismo. -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – Agropecuarista, Autodidata, Escritor, Estudante, Pesquisador e Professor. Acadêmico do curso de Zootecnia na Universidade Federal Rural de Pernambuco (UFRPE). WhatsApp: (82) 9.8143-8399. (shrink)

Se vivemos juntos apenas porque temos direitos e para termos mais direitos, então não temos nenhum motivo para imaginar uma salvação comum: a salvação não está no comum, mas no próprio. Por oposição ao Direito (em inglês, Law) que, impondo-se a todos de cima para baixo, normatiza objetivamente as relações entre cidadãos, há agora o império crescente dos direitos subjetivos (em inglês, rights) reivindicações particulares que tentam impor-se a todos de baixo para cima. Esses direitos costumam ser descritos como sendo (...) de dois tipos ou duas gerações. De um lado, há, ou houve em um primeiro momento depois da Revolução Francesa, o reconhecimento dos direitos-liberdades (direitos de fazer alguma coisa: ir e vir, associar-se, reunir-se, manifestar opiniões, praticar uma religião etc.); de outro lado, há, ou houve em um segundo momento depois da Segunda Guerra Mundial, os direitos sociais, os chamados direitos-créditos, os direitos ao beneficio de certa prestação da parte de um poder público (direitos a alguma coisa: educação, saúde, trabalho etc.). Eles se fundamentam em dois sentidos opostos da ideia de direitos. Os direitos-liberdades definem um território de igual independência de todos e cada um com relação às ingerências do poder público; os direitos-créditos definem um horizonte de expectativa de todos e cada um com relação às ações desse mesmo poder público. De um lado, impedem o Estado de agir em certas esferas de ação dos indivíduos; de outro, obrigam o Estado a agir em certas esferas a favor dos indivíduos. No entanto, do ponto de vista da perda do ideal de uma salvação comum, estes e aqueles vão no mesmo sentido. Tornamo-nos duplamente liberais. Liberais porque apreciamos viver em uma sociedade de liberdade igual, assegurando por direitos negativos a esfera de autonomia de cada um de nós. Liberais porque, gostando ou não, vivemos em uma sociedade de mercado e esperamos ações do Estado que corrijam os efeitos das desigualdades econômica e social gerados por esse sistema. Queremos um Estado que nos faça menos desiguais e ao mesmo tempo garanta nossa independência dele e dos outros. A demanda preocupada de menos injustiça substituiu mais uma vez a vontade do Bem. Em todos os lugares do mundo onde essas duas condições da autonomia individual (liberdades fundamentais e prestações sociais) não são satisfeitas, os povos aspiram a elas. Em muitos casos, a Cidade ideal desses povos é semelhante à nossa pobre Cidade real, que, no entanto, não nos satisfaz. Não tentamos mais nos realizar por e na comunidade política e não aspiramos mais a nos fundir nela. O que esperamos do Estado é que nos permita viver sem ele. É pelo fato de não acreditarmos mais no político que nossos sonhos tomam a forma lúcida e prosaica de demanda sem fim de novos direitos individuais. E pelo fato de não acreditarmos mais na Cidade justa, na Cidade e na Justiça, que multiplicamos os focos de reivindicação. Queremos não só mais direitos de (fazer) e mais direitos a (serviços), como queremos esses direitos a outros seres além de nós. Assim, há dois movimentos paralelos: de um lado, uma multiplicação de tipos de direitos (liberdades, mas sobretudo créditos); de outro, uma proliferação de detentores de direitos; em última instância, todo grupo de interesses real ou supostamente real é considerado um detentor de direitos. Em vez de ser outro nome para a igualdade de todos — o que eram originalmente —, os direitos se tornaram sinônimo de interesses particulares. Contra as desigualdades entre homens e mulheres, reivindicamos paradoxalmente os "direitos das mulheres"; contra os maus-tratos e a carência de educação, apelamos aos "direitos da criança"; contra as discriminações, defendemos os "direitos dos homossexuais"; contra a medicina invasiva, exigimos respeito aos "direitos dos doentes"; contra as falhas dos transportes públicos, reivindicamos o reconhecimento dos "direitos dos usuários" etc. O "direito ao trabalho" é invocado tanto pelo desempregado que exige do poder público que lhe dê emprego quanto pelo não grevista que exige acesso ao seu posto de trabalho, contrapondo-se aos piquetes. Exigimos do Estado que reconheça o direito dos fumantes de fumar e o dos não fumantes de não ser expostos à fumaça, o dos não crentes de blasfemar e o dos crentes de não ser ofendidos; queremos que o Estado conceda aos solteiros o direito aos filhos, e às crianças, o direito "a um papai e a uma mamãe". E, finalmente, onde antes se impunham deveres morais ou normas jurídicas, hoje surgem inesperados beneficiários putativos de novos direitos: as culturas autóctones, os animais, os robôs, a Natureza, a biosfera, a Terra- mãe etc. — de tal forma a palavra "direito" se tornou mobilizadora e coligadora de energias em torno de uma causa, graças à sua extraordinária ambiguidade (Vantagem? Habilitação? Permissão? Privilégio? Não ingerência? Poder? Reivindicação? Imunidade?). Tudo isso, no fundo, é prazeroso e marca a vitória (para nossa infelicidade, geograficamente parcial e socialmente frágil) da autonomia individual sobre a onipotência dos Estados, as sociedades fechadas, as culturas fusionais ou os integrismos religiosos. Mas incita muito pouco a utopia e, menos ainda, a revolução. Cópia de: FRANCIS WOLFF. Três Utopias Contemporâneas. São Paulo: Unesp, 2018. (shrink)

Mary Midgley's book Utopias, Dolphins and Computers will be needed to recharge our more philosophical approach to life as new problems present themselves to humanity at an accelerated rate. The most dangerous attitude to these challenges, Midgley argues, is an anti-intellectualism that fails to see that all approaches presuppose tacit or hidden assumptions, that is a philosophy. One part of our tacit philosophy that is now breaking up is the social contract, according to Mary Midgley in Utopias, Dolphins and Computers (...) It needs tempering with a vision of people in relationships bordering on the organic—ideas with their roots in ecology—rather than as fundamentally isolated atoms in contractual union. (shrink)

In the early twentieth century, Uchiyama Gudō, Seno’o Girō, Lin Qiuwu, and others advocated a Buddhism that was radical in two respects. Firstly, they adopted a more or less naturalist stance with respect to Buddhist doctrine and related matters, rejecting karma or other supernatural beliefs. And secondly, they held political and economic views that were radically anti-hegemonic, anti-capitalist, and revolutionary. Taking the idea of such a “radical Buddhism” seriously, A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism (...) asks whether it is possible to develop a philosophy that is simultaneously naturalist, anti-capitalist, Buddhist, and consistent. Rather than a study of radical Buddhism, then, this book is an attempt to radicalize it. The foundations of this “radicalized radical Buddhism” are provided by a realist interpretation of Yogācāra, elucidated and elaborated with some help from thinkers in the broader Tiantai/Tendai tradition and American philosophers Donald Davidson and W.V.O. Quine. A key implication of this foundation is that only this world and only this life are real, from which it follows that if Buddhism aims to alleviate suffering, it has to do so in this world and in this life. Twentieth-century radical Buddhists (as well as some engaged Buddhists) came to a similar conclusion, often expressed in their aim to realize “a Buddha land in this world.” Building on this foundation, but also on Mahāyāna moral philosophy, this book argues for an ethics and social philosophy based on a definition of evil as that what is or should be expected to cause death or suffering. On that ground, capitalism should be rejected indeed, but utopianism must be treated with caution as well, which raises questions about what it means – from a radicalized radical Buddhist perspective – to aim for a Buddha land in this world. (shrink)

: ‘Ecological civilization’ has been put forward as a utopia, as this notion has been defended by Ernst Bloch and Paul Ricoeur. It is a vision of the future that puts into question that which presently exists, revealing its contingency while offering an inspiring image of the future that can mobilize people to create this future. Ecological civilization is a vision based on ecological thinking, seeing all life as interdependent communities of communities. Humanity’s place in nature is redefined as (...) participating in communities, both human and non-human, including the global ecosystem. From this perspective, the end of life in both ethics and politics should be to augment life through augmenting the conditions for life, that is, through ‘ecopoiesis’ or ‘home-making’. What is involved in this has been clarified by work in biosemiotics and biohermeneutics where life is identified with semiosis, the production and interpretation of signs. Advancing biosemiotics and biohermeneutics, I will argue that living processes can be understood as proto-narratives organizing living processes to advance the conditions for life. They are inchoate in Ricoeur’s sense because they are not reflectively formulated as such but are being lived out. Developing our understanding of the world involves understanding these inter-related proto-narratives, including the proto-narrative that has operated in the creation of the biosphere and semiosphere, and recognizing the potential of human culture as part of this semiosphere to make explicit and re-emplot these proto-narratives. Most importantly, it is to make explicit and further develop the proto-narrative of the global ecosystem to augment the conditions for life. This will involve articulating a new grand narrative of not only humanity but of terrestrial life, orienting human communities at all levels to create and sustain a global ecological civilization. (shrink)

Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice has its major attempts to defend the institution of private property and to criticize the redistributive measures on the part of government. Nozick frowns at Rawls’ approach and the approach of welfare economics, which focused on evaluating only current time-slices of a distribution with no concern about the procedural aspects of justice. His notion of distributive justice has its anchorage on the account of what and how a given person is entitled to in virtue of (...) what he has acquired and earned. While Rawls, whose position seems incompatible with that of Nozick holds a notion of justice on the account of the equality of the claims of each person in respect of basic needs and of the means to meet such needs. Nozick’s theory is a reaction against Rawls’ notion of distributive justice which he terms patterned, and of which he feels if upheld would consistently interfere with individual’s rights. This paper therefore argues that contrary to what Robert Nozick seems to suggest we do not see his theory as all satisfying nor any alternative, rather we are convinced that the inherent merits of his theory would suitably complement other patterned theories of distributive justice. This paper employed the expository method as well as critical analysis and prescriptive methods. (shrink)

Reading or hearing about Theodor Adorno's ideas always results in quibbles. He strikes many as a naïve philosopher because of his reversal of concept and object; some see him as an anarchist because of his relentless critique of rationality; while to others he simply does not make sense, and especially a critique of society based on negative dialectics simply does not make sense to many! These points, however, are precisely some of the key elements of his thought; without a deeper (...) apprehension of these main themes, it would be impossible to arrive at a level-headed appraisal of his philosophy. (shrink)

The utopian character of modern scientific theories, with the human nature as a subject, is an inevitable consequence of the presence of an imperative component of transdisciplinary human dimensional scientific knowledge. Its social function is the adaptation of the descriptive component of the theory to the given socio-cultural type that simplifies the passage of the process of social verification of the theory. The genesis of bioethics can be seen as one of the basic premises for the actualization of the anthropic (...) principle of ontology, which thus acquires the axiological and epistemological sense. (shrink)

: The debate between proponents of ideal and non-ideal approaches to political philosophy has thus far been framed as a meta-level debate about normative theory. The argument of this essay will be that the ideal/non-ideal debate can be helpfully reframed as a ground-level debate within normative theory. Specifically, it can be understood as a debate within the applied normative field of professional ethics, with the profession being examined that of political philosophy itself. If the community of academic political theorists and (...) philosophers cannot help us navigate the problems we face in actual political life, they have not lived up to the moral demands of their vocation. A moderate form of what David Estlund decries as “utopophobia” is therefore an integral element of a proper professional ethic for political philosophers. The moderate utopophobe maintains that while devoting scarce time and resources to constructing utopias may sometimes be justifiable, it is never self-justifying. Utopianism is defensible only insofar as it can reasonably be expected to help inform or improve nonutopian political thinking. (shrink)

Selezione di temi Dall'utopia razionalista di Bacone e Cartesio allo Stato-macchina di Hobbes.

This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited to bring them up to date (2019). All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it (...) is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes. If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and psychology to actually give them some control over themselves), maybe civilization would have a chance. As things are however the leaders of society have no more grasp of things than their constituents and so collapse into anarchy is inevitable. -/- The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups, I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide some suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers. -/- It is critical to understand why we behave as we do and so the first section presents articles that try to describe (not explain as Wittgenstein insisted) behavior. I start with a brief review of the logical structure of rationality, which provides some heuristics for the description of language (mind, rationality, personality) and gives some suggestions as to how this relates to the evolution of social behavior. This centers around the two writers I have found the most important in this regard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual system (two systems of thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion. No neurophysiology, no metaphysics, no postmodernism, no theology. -/- It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious automated System 1 actions or reflexes. -/- The next section describes the digital delusions, which confuse the language games of System 2 with the automatisms of System one, and so cannot distinguish biological machines (i.e., people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., computers). The ‘reductionist’ claim is that one can ‘explain’ behavior at a ‘lower’ level, but what actually happens is that one does not explain human behavior but a ‘stand in’ for it. Hence the title of Searle’s classic review of Dennett’s book (“Consciousness Explained”)— “Consciousness Explained Away”. In most contexts ‘reduction’ of higher level emergent behavior to brain functions, biochemistry, or physics is incoherent. Even for ‘reduction’ of chemistry or physics, the path is blocked by chaos and uncertainty. Anything can be ‘represented’ by equations, but when they ‘represent’ higher order behavior, it is not clear (and cannot be made clear) what the ‘results’ mean. Reductionist metaphysics is a joke, but most scientists and philosophers lack the appropriate sense of humor. -/- The last section describes The One Big Happy Family Delusion, i.e., that we are selected for cooperation with everyone, and that the euphonious ideals of Democracy, Diversity and Equality will lead us into utopia, if we just manage things correctly (the possibility of politics). Again, the No Free Lunch Principle ought to warn us it cannot be true, and we see throughout history and all over the contemporary world, that without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation that embraces these delusions. In addition, the monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we cooperate in selling our descendant’s heritage for temporary comforts, greatly exacerbating the problems. The only major change in this edition is the addition in the last article of a short discussion of China, a threat to peace and freedom as great as overpopulation and climate change and one to which even most professional scholars and politicians are oblivious so I regarded it as sufficiently important to warrant a new edition. -/- I describe versions of this delusion (i.e., that we are basically ‘friendly’ if just given a chance) as it appears in some recent books on sociology/biology/economics. Even Sapolsky’s otherwise excellent “Behave”(2017) embraces leftist politics and group selection and gives space to a discussion of whether humans are innately violent. I end with an essay on the great tragedy playing out in America and the world, which can be seen as a direct result of our evolved psychology manifested as the inexorable machinations of System 1. Our psychology, eminently adaptive and eugenic on the plains of Africa from ca. 6 million years ago, when we split from chimpanzees, to ca. 50,000 years ago, when many of our ancestors left Africa (i.e., in the EEA or Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation), is now maladaptive and dysgenic and the source of our Suicidal Utopian Delusions. So, like all discussions of behavior (philosophy, psychology, sociology, biology, anthropology, politics, law, literature, history, economics, soccer strategies, business meetings, etc.), this book is about evolutionary strategies, selfish genes and inclusive fitness (kin selection, natural selection). -/- The great mystic Osho said that the separation of God and Heaven from Earth and Humankind was the most evil idea that ever entered the Human mind. In the 20th century an even more evil notion arose, or at least became popular with leftists—that humans are born with rights, rather than having to earn privileges. The idea of human rights is an evil fantasy created by leftists to draw attention away from the merciless destruction of the earth by unrestrained 3rd world motherhood. Thus, every day the population increases by 200,000, who must be provided with resources to grow and space to live, and who soon produce another 200,000 etc. And one almost never hears it noted that what they receive must be taken from those already alive, and their descendants. Their lives diminish those already here in both major obvious and countless subtle ways. Every new baby destroys the earth from the moment of conception. In a horrifically overcrowded world with vanishing resources, there cannot be human rights without destroying the earth and our descendant’s futures. It could not be more obvious, but it is rarely mentioned in a clear and direct way, and one will never see the streets full of protesters against motherhood. -/- The most basic facts, almost never mentioned, are that there are not enough resources in America or the world to lift a significant percentage of the poor out of poverty and keep them there. Even the attempt to do this is already bankrupting America and destroying the world. The earth’s capacity to produce food decreases daily, as does our genetic quality. And now, as always, by far the greatest enemy of the poor is other poor and not the rich. -/- America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, most of it for the last century, and now all of it, due to 3rd world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. The earth loses about 2% of its topsoil every year, so as it nears 2100, most of its food growing capacity will be gone. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America, this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. China will continue to overwhelm America and the world, as long as it maintains the dictatorship which limits selfishness. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests (which I suggest may be regarded as an unrecognized -- but the commonest and most serious-- psychological problem -- Inclusive Fitness Disorder). This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic system. Hence my concluding essay “Suicide by Democracy”. -/- Those wishing to read my other writings may see Talking Monkeys 2nd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Stucture of Human Behavior (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

In Anarchie, Staat, Utopia aus dem Jahre 1974 legte Robert Nozick eine libertäre Staatstheorie dar, die er auch als Utopie verstanden wissen will. Ist nun diese Selbst-Etikettierung berechtigt? Hierzu möchte ich sowohl Nozicks Auffassung von einer Utopie betrachten, als auch nach einem sinnvollen Utopie-Begriff suchen, dem ein als utopisch bezeichneter Text zu genügen hat. Dabei werde ich hauptsächlich den Blick auf Thomas Morus’ genre-prototypischen Text über die Insel Utopia richten. Neben der Frage, ob Nozicks Staatstheorie als Utopie bezeichnet (...) werden sollte, möchte ich zum Schluß versuchen, eine Antwort auf die Frage zu finden, warum sich Nozick eines Begriffs bedient, der im allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch durchaus nicht immer positiv verstanden wird. (shrink)

This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited them to bring them up to date (2017). All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, (...) it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes. If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and psychology to actually give them some control over themselves), maybe civilization would have a chance. As things are however the leaders of society have no more grasp of things than their constituents and so collapse into anarchy is inevitable. -/- It is critical to understand why we behave as we do and so the first section presents articles that try to describe (not explain as Wittgenstein insisted) behavior. Section one starts with a brief review of the logical structure of rationality which provides some heuristics for the description of language (mind) and gives some suggestions as to how this relates to the evolution of social behavior. This centers around the two writers I have found the most important in this regard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual system (two systems of thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion. -/- Since philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of perspicuity of language, they run throughout human discourse, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930’s. -/- "Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness." (BBB p18) -/- The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell On Earth. As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see. We live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is the source of the universal blindness described by Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides’ Standard Social Science Model. -/- The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly counterproductive for an animal to be thinking about or second guessing every action, and in any case there is no time for the slow, massively integrated System 2 to be involved in the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we must make. As W noted, our ‘thoughts’ (T1 or the ‘thoughts’ of System 1) must lead directly to actions. -/- It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious automated System 1 actions or reflexes. -/- Thus all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, (or that that they differ only in degree from drug and sex addicts in being motivated by stimulation of their frontal cortices by the delivery of dopamine via the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens) but it’s clearly true. While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth and their descendant’s future. Section one continues with other views of behavior which my reviews attempt to correct and put in context with minimal theory. -/- The next section describes the digital delusions which confuse the language games of System 2 with the automatisms of System one, and so cannot distinguish biological machines (i.e., people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., computers). The ‘reductionist’ claim is that one can ‘explain’ behavior at a ‘lower’ level, but what actually happens is that one does not explain human behavior but a ‘stand in’ for it. Hence the title of Searle’s classic review of Dennett’s book (“Consciousness Explained”)— “Consciousness Explained Away”. In most contexts ‘reduction’ of higher level emergent behavior to brain functions, biochemistry, or physics is incoherent. Even for chemistry or physics the path is blocked by chaos and uncertainty. Anything can be ‘represented’ by equations, but when they ‘represent’ higher order behavior, it is not clear what the ‘results’ mean. Reductionist metaphysics is a joke but most scientists and philosophers lack the appropriate sense of humor. -/- Another hi-tech delusion is that the we will be saved from the pure evil (selfishness) of System 1 by computers/AI/robotics/ nanotech/genetic engineering created by System 2. The No Free Lunch principal tells us there will be serious and possibly fatal consequences. The adventurous may regard this principle as a higher order emergent expression of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. -/- The last section describes The One Big Happy Family Delusion , i.e., that we are selected for cooperation with everyone and that the euphonious ideals of Democracy, Diversity and Equality will lead us into utopia. Again the No Free Lunch Principle ought to warn us it cannot be true, and we see throughout history and all over the contemporary world, that without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation that embraces it. In addition, the monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we sell our descendant’s heritage for temporary comforts greatly exacerbating the problems. -/- I describe versions of this delusion (i.e., that we are basically ‘friendly’ if just given a chance) as it appears in some recent books on sociology/biology/economics. I end with an essay on the great tragedy playing out in America and the world, which can be seen as a direct result of our evolved psychology manifested as the inexorable machinations of System 1. Our evolved psychology, eminently adaptive and eugenic on the plains of Africa ca. 50,000 years ago, when many of our ancestors left Africa, to ca. 6 million years ago, when we split from chimpanzees (i.e., in the EEA or Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation), but now maladaptive and dysgenic and the source of our Suicidal Utopian Delusions. So, like all discussions of behavior, this book is about evolutionary strategies, selfish genes and inclusive fitness. (shrink)

In his political treatise, Mabadi ara ahl al-madina al-fadhila, Abu Nasr Alfarabi, the medieval Muslim philosopher, proposes a theory of virtuous city which, according to prominent scholars, is modeled on Plato’s utopia of the Republic. No doubt that Alfarabi was well-versed in the philosophy of Plato and the basic framework of his theory of city is platonic. However, his theory of city is not an exact reproduction of the Republic’s theory and, despite glaring similarities, the two theories do differ (...) in many aspects. In both, Alfarabi’s Mabadi ara ahl al-madina al-fadhila and Plato’s Republic, the theory of virtuous city is accompanied by a theory of the soul. Since the theory of soul plays a foundational role in both theories of the virtuous city, the present article intends to provide an explanation for the differences between the two theories of the city in terms of the differences between the two theories of the soul. (shrink)